Clark v. George Junior Republic

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

QUINTIS CLARK, CIVIL ACTION

CHARLES SLADE, III,

ALEXANDER GRANGER,

JESSE MYERS,

DONTE WEBB,

STANLEY POSTELL, NO. 23-922

HOLDEN HASTINGS,

ISRAEL BERRIOS,

JOSEPH ALBINO,

KEYON LUCAS,

OMONTAY MONROE and

ESTES WALKER,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GEORGE JUNIOR REPUBLIC,

GEORGE JUNIOR REPUBLIC REALTY,

GEORGE JUNIOR REPUBLIC IN

PENNSYLVANIA,

GEORGE JUNIOR REPUBLIC IN

INDIANA, INC. and

JOHN/JANE DOES 1-100,

Defendants.

Hodge, J. March 18, 2025

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiffs Quintis Clark, Charles Slade III, Alexander Granger, Jesse Myers, Donte Webb,

Stanley Postell, Holden Hastings, Israel Berrios, Joseph Albino, Keyon Lucas, Omontay Monroe,

and Estes Walker (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring claims against George Junior Republic, George

Junior Republic Realty, George Junior Republic in Pennsylvania, George Junior Republic in

Indiana, Inc., and John/Jane Does 1-100 (collectively, “Defendants”) under Title IX of the

Education Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”) and Title 42 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“CRA”).

(See generally ECF No. 17.)1 Plaintiffs also allege Pennsylvania state law claims under the

Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”), and tort claims

for negligence, gross negligence, reckless and wanton conduct, negligent hiring, negligent

retention, negligent supervision, negligent misrepresentations and omissions, vicarious liability,

intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and breach of fiduciary duty. (See

generally ECF No. 17.)

Plaintiffs, all of whom were housed at George Junior Republic facilities, allege that they

were sexually assaulted by staff at George Junior Republic in Pennsylvania over two decades.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants “failed to adequately screen, hire, train, and supervise staff,” and

as a result, “children in George Junior Republic facilities have been reportedly sexually abused.”

(ECF No. 17 ¶ 6.) Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Class

Action Complaint (“Motion”). (See generally ECF No. 19.) The Court grants in part and denies in

part the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

George Junior Republic is a custodial facility for the placement of juvenile court-

adjudicated youths, aged 8-18, and other at-risk youths. (ECF No. 17 ¶ 67.) George Junior

Republic operates custodial detention facilities for juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent in

juvenile court proceedings, as well as youth at risk for delinquency or criminal conduct. (ECF No.

17 ¶ 3.) George Junior Republic “offers rehabilitation, education and support services for youth

through a trauma-informed approach.” (ECF No. 17 ¶ 4.) George Junior Republic also provides

certain services including “state-of-the-art living facilities, fully accredited academic and

vocational programs, leisure and recreation activities, and a broad continuum of medical care and

1 The Court adopts the pagination supplied by the CM/ECF docketing system.

mental health treatment.” (ECF No. 17 ¶ 5 (citing https://gjr.org/about-us/).) George Junior

Republic provides “room and board, clothing, behavior management[,] individual and group

counseling, academic and vocational programming, medical and dental services, as well as athletic

and recreational opportunities.” (ECF No. 17 ¶ 11 (citing https://gjr.org/).)

Plaintiffs are all individuals who resided at George Junior Republic in Pennsylvania as

juveniles, and each alleges they were sexually assaulted by staff at the facility. Plaintiffs allegedly

suffered abuse from as early as 1998 through 2019 and suggest that others may be suffering similar

abuse presently. (ECF No. 17 ¶ 49.) Plaintiffs make the following allegations against named staff

members: Supervisor Hurshburger sexually assaulted Plaintiff Clark (ECF No. 17 ¶¶ 85-91); Ms.

Betty, Mr. Steve, and Mr. Mario sexually assaulted Plaintiff Granger (ECF No. 17 ¶¶ 100-112);

Ms. D sexually assaulted Plaintiff Myers (ECF No. 17 ¶¶ 113-118); Ferguson and Adrian Coleman

sexually assaulted Plaintiff Webb (ECF No. 17 ¶¶ 119-128); Mr. Rex, Ms. Morgan, and Mr. Burt

sexually assaulted Plaintiff Postell (ECF No. 17 ¶¶ 129-137); Matt sexually assaulted Plaintiff

Hastings (ECF No. 17 ¶¶ 138-146); Mr. Eric, Mr. Larmone, and Ms. Erika sexually assaulted

Plaintiff Berrios (ECF No. 17 ¶¶ 147-155); Ms. Beverly sexually assaulted Plaintiff Albino (ECF

No. 17 ¶¶ 156-161); Mr. Preston sexually assaulted Plaintiff Lucas (ECF No. 17 ¶¶ 162-168); Mr.

Ernie and Ms. Jackie sexually assaulted Plaintiff Monroe (ECF No. 17 ¶¶ 169-175); and Mr. Scott

sexually assaulted Plaintiff Walker. (ECF No. 17 ¶¶ 176-184.)

Plaintiffs also allege claims against corporate defendants George Junior Republic, George

Junior Republic Realty, George Junior Republic in Pennsylvania, and George Junior Republic in

Indiana. Plaintiffs allege that the Corporate Defendants engaged in the systematic sexual and

physical abuse of children in its care. (ECF No. 17 ¶ 74.) Plaintiffs claim that Defendants

“trapp[ed] children with their abusers” by limiting contact with the outside world. (ECF No. 17 ¶

69.) Plaintiffs also claim that Defendants did not provide any “clear and safe” mechanism to report

abuse and those that did report abuse were disbelieved or retaliated against. (ECF No. 17 ¶ 70.)

Defendants are alleged to have been indifferent to the safety and well-being of its residents and

patients and failed to act to prevent sexual abuse, allowing a “pervasive culture of abuse” against

children and young adults. (ECF No. 17 ¶¶ 78, 79.) Through a failure to adopt adequate policies

and procedures, failure to train, negligent supervision and hiring, and acting in extreme disregard

for the youth in its care, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants perpetuated sexual abuse within its

facilities. (ECF No. 17 ¶¶ 65-84.)

Plaintiffs bring a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. The class, at present, is defined

as:

All persons who are currently and/or have previously attended, resided,

and/or were court ordered into placement, at any George Junior Republic, juvenile

facility, juvenile detention, juvenile placement, and/or holding facility, in any state,

Commonwealth, or jurisdiction, and while at any or in connection with any of the

Defendants’ facility(ies) were subjected to either physical, mental, and/or sexual

abuse by any of the named Defendants, and/or their staff members, volunteers,

agents, servants, employees, or the like while juveniles, and/or either had their

educational opportunities deprived, are having their educational opportunities

deprived, and/or are at threat to have their educational opportunities deprived (the

“Class”).

(ECF No. 17 ¶ 193.)

Plaintiffs are seeking injunctive, equitable, and declaratory relief along with monetary

damages including interest and attorneys’ fees. (ECF No. 17 ¶¶ 354-55.)

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed a Class Action Complaint on March 10, 2023, against all Defendants. (ECF

No. 1.) Plaintiffs filed an Amended Class Action Complaint on June 30, 2023. (ECF No. 17.)

Defendants filed this Motion to Dismiss on July 20, 2023. (ECF No. 19.) Plaintiffs responded in

opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on August 10, 2023. (ECF No. 22.) Additionally, Defendants

filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Certificate of Merit on December 18, 2023. (ECF No. 24.)

Plaintiffs responded in opposition to the Motion to Strike on December 29, 2023. (ECF No. 25.)

III. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is

plausible when the plaintiff pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

In deciding whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the

court is required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint as well as all reasonable

inferences that can be drawn from the complaint. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel,

Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). These allegations and inferences are to be construed in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. But, the court “need not credit a complaint’s bald

assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch.

Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Plaintiffs cannot prove facts they have not alleged.

Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

Thus, “a pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. Rather, a complaint must recite factual

allegations enough to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere

speculation. Id.

IV. DISCUSSION

i. Corporate Defendants

Plaintiffs have brought claims against George Junior Republic in Indiana and George

Junior Republic Realty. Defendants move to dismiss all claims against George Junior Republic in

Indiana and George Junior Republic Realty as they are not specifically alleged to have participated

in any of the conduct alleged in the Amended Complaint. Furthermore, all of the named Plaintiffs

were incarcerated at only George Junior Republic in Pennsylvania. The Court agrees that the

Amended Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations by Plaintiffs that specifically mentions

George Junior Republic in Indiana or George Junior Republic Realty. Because Plaintiffs have not

pled any specific allegations against George Junior Republic in Indiana nor George Junior

Republic Realty, all claims against those two entities will be dismissed without prejudice with

leave to amend should Plaintiffs wish to do so.

ii. Class Certification

Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the elements of Rule 23 no matter how

much discovery is conducted. (ECF No. 19-1, at 19.) Again, the class is currently defined as:

All persons who are currently and/or have previously attended, resided, and/or

were court ordered into placement, at any George Junior Republic, juvenile

facility, juvenile detention, juvenile placement, and/or holding facility, in any

state, Commonwealth, or jurisdiction, and while at any or in connection with

any of the Defendants’ facility(ies) were subjected to either physical, mental,

and/or sexual abuse by any of the named Defendants, and/or their staff

members, volunteers, agents, servants, employees, or the like while juveniles,

and/or either had their educational opportunities deprived, are having their

educational opportunities deprived, and/or are at threat to have their educational

opportunities deprived (the “Class”).

(ECF No. 17 ¶ 193.)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs the requirements for a class to be certified for

a class action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. There are four prongs that must be met for a class to be

successfully certified: (1) numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy of

representation. Id. Class Action certification is usually a decision to be made when a class moves

for class action certification. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ class allegations should be struck

because Plaintiffs will not “satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a) as to numerosity, commonality,

typicality and adequacy of representation.” (ECF No. 19 at 18 ¶ 2.) Plaintiffs argue in response

that striking class action allegations is premature as Plaintiffs have not filed a motion for class

action certification yet. (ECF No. 22, at 1.) The Court agrees with the Plaintiffs. The Defendants’

Motion to Strike the Plaintiffs’ class action allegations is premature.

“[D]istrict courts within the Third Circuit typically conclude that motions to

strike class action allegations filed before plaintiffs move for class certification are

premature.” Goode v. LexisNexis Risk & Info. Analytics Grp., Inc., 284 F.R.D. 238, 244 (E.D. Pa.

2012); see also Landsman & Funk PC v. Skinder-Strauss Assocs., 640 F.3d 72, 93 n.30 (3d Cir.

2011) (courts should grant pre-discovery motions to dismiss or strike class allegations in rare cases

only when the “complaint itself demonstrates that the requirements for maintaining a class action

cannot be met.”); Mullen v. Red Lobster Rest., LLC, 2020 WL 13653526, at *9 (W.D. Pa. 2020)

(“Courts routinely reject preemptive motions to strike class allegations except in the rare case.”).

“It is only when no amount of discovery or time will allow for plaintiffs to resolve deficiencies in

class definitions under Rule 23, that a motion to strike class allegations should be

granted.” Zarichny v. Complete Payment Recovery Servs., Inc., 80 F. Supp. 3d 610, 615 (E.D. Pa.

2015) (internal quotations omitted).

At this time, “Plaintiffs have not had the opportunity to conduct discovery.” (ECF No. 22,

at 2.) In Miller v. Glen Mills Schools, the court “denied [defendant’s motion to dismiss and strike

plaintiff’s class allegations] without prejudice to defendants’ right to challenge any future motion

for class certification.” 2019 WL 6877176, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2019). Since there was no

discovery, the court determined that the motion to strike was premature stating “the court [could

not] determine whether a class of boys who attended Glen Mills and who suffered physical abuse

is ascertainable as a Rule 23(b)(3) class.” Id., at *3. The Court finds the same here. Plaintiffs have

sufficiently pled allegations that may give rise to a class action claim under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 23(a). The Court declines to conduct any analysis of class certification at this time due

to the premature nature of the question. Moreover, Defendants have not shown that “no amount of

discovery or time will allow for plaintiffs to resolve deficiencies in class definitions under Rule

23." Zarichny, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 615.

The Court also notes that the alleged class is not controlling at this point and further

discovery may reveal a different class than what has been asserted by Plaintiffs. The Court has the

ability to modify and redefine the class, if necessary. See Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 265 F.R.D.

208, 234 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (“Pursuant to Rule 23(c), a court has the inherent power and discretion

to redefine and modify a class in a way which allows maintenance of an action as a class action.”)

(internal quotations omitted); Pelletier v. Endo Int'l PLC, 338 F.R.D. 446, 478 (E.D. Pa. 2021)

(“Courts possess the authority to limit or modify class definitions in order to provide the precision

needed for class certification”). The Court, having determined the class action certification is

premature, denies the Motion to Strike.

iii. Title IX Claim (Institutional Defendants)

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated Title IX by creating a hostile culture that

heightened the risk of sexual harassment (ECF No. 17 ¶ 213) and by being deliberately indifferent

to prior sexual harassment. (ECF No. 17 ¶ 236.) Title IX states that “[n]o person in the United

States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be

subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial

assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681. Under Title IX, "recipients of federal funding may be liable for

'subjecting' their students to discrimination.” Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629,

646-47 (1999).

Defendants move to dismiss this claim because “Defendants are not, and never have been,

a school.” (ECF No. 19-1, at 1.) Defendants claim George Junior Republic has never had the

required Pennsylvania state licensures of “Alternative Education for Disruptive Youth, Licensed

Private School, or Licensed Private Academic School.” (ECF No. 19-1, at 25.) Instead, Defendants

direct children at their facility to the Grove City School District for education. (Id.) Plaintiffs

respond that George Junior Republic advertises on its website that it has “accredited academic and

vocational educational programs.” (ECF No. 17 ¶ 8.)

Title IX’s application begins with a preliminary question “on whether the defendant-

entity’s questioned program or activity has educational characteristics.” Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med.

Ctr., 850 F.3d 545, 556 (3d Cir. 2017) (emphasis in original). The Third Circuit has enumerated

several different features that may be relevant in determining whether a defendant-entity’s

program or activity has educational characteristics:

(A) a program is incrementally structured through a particular course of study or

training, whether full- or part-time; (B) a program allows participants to earn a

degree or diploma, qualify for a certification or certification examination, or pursue

a specific occupation or trade beyond mere on-the-job training; (C) a program

provides instructors, examinations, an evaluation process or grades, or accepts

tuition; or (D) the entities offering, accrediting, or otherwise regulating a program

hold it out as educational in nature.

Id. “Whether a program or activity is sufficiently educational under Title IX is a mixed question

of law and fact. When the facts are uncontested, the judge decides the matter. Factual disputes

material to her legal conclusions are, however, left for the finder of fact.” Id.

Plaintiffs allege that “Defendant[s] receive[] federal financial assistance for its education

programs and is therefore subject to the provisions of Title IX.” (ECF No. 17 ¶ 220.) Per George

Junior Republic’s website, the Defendants have “accredited academic and vocational educational

programs.” (ECF No. 17 ¶ 5 (citing https://gjr.org/about-us/).) Thus, the information available at

this time suggests to the public and to this Court that Defendants provide some educational

programming and education or academic instruction. Hence, this more than suggests that the

Defendants meet the definition of educational entity or an entity that has educational

characteristics, which thereby requires the Defendants to comply with Title IX. If Defendants fail

to comply, Title IX creates exposure to liability.

Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that “George Junior Republic’s programs and facilities

consist of educational programs including day schools, special education programs, vocational

training, therapeutic boarding schools, and residential education programs.” (ECF No. 17, at 30.)

As Plaintiffs argue, George Junior Republic’s website states, “The residential programs include

state-of-the-art living facilities, fully accredited academic and vocational educational programs . .

.” About Us, George Junior Republic, https://gjr.org/about-us/. The Court, at this stage in the

proceedings, must take Plaintiffs’ alleged facts as true. Therefore, considering that Plaintiffs have

alleged that Defendants provide accredited academic and vocational training programs, the Court

concludes that there are sufficient factual allegations that the Defendant-entity provides a program

or activity that is educational in nature. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint contains “sufficient factual

material” necessary for the Court to plausibly believe Defendants are subject to Title IX. As result,

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Title IX claims is denied.

iv. Section 1983 Claims (Institutional Defendants)

Defendants’ claim that Plaintiffs have failed to plead a Section 1983 claim because

Plaintiffs do not specify “which corporate Defendant is alleged to have failed to provide a safe

custodial setting.” (ECF No. 19-1, at 27.) Defendants allege that Plaintiffs “have impermissibly

lumped Defendants together, failing to specify specific conduct of each individual Defendant.”

(ECF No. 19-1, at 27.) Plaintiffs allege that they did, in fact, plead personal involvement of the

specific Defendants along with the “specific details surrounding the factual background and

incidents of abuse.” (ECF No. 22, at 11.) The Court notes that Defendants George Junior Republic

Realty and George Junior Republic in Indiana are dismissed from this case. Therefore, the Court

will only analyze this argument as it pertains to George Junior Republic and George Junior

Republic in Pennsylvania. There are multiple specific claims within Plaintiffs’ Amended Class

Action Complaint that detail the actions of George Junior Republic and George Junior Republic

in Pennsylvania. Thus, the Court is not persuaded by Defendants’ argument.

The Defendants seem to argue that there is some sort of heightened pleading standard with

regards to claims under Section 1983. (ECF No. 19-1, at 25-26.) However, the Supreme Court and

Third Circuit have explicitly rejected the notion that any heightened pleading requirement applies

to Civil Rights Claims. See Loftus v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 843 F. Supp. 981, 984 (E.D. Pa. 1994)

(“The Supreme Court noted [in Leatherman] that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure impose a

particularity requirement only in two specific instances, fraud or mistake.”) (citing Leatherman v.

Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993)). With this in mind,

the Court turns to Defendants’ argument.

While the Court acknowledges that the Plaintiffs do initially group the Defendants into

“George Junior Republic”, the “School”, and “Defendants”, (ECF No. 17 ¶ 1), the Amended

Complaint is sufficiently specific to identify which Defendants are responsible for what conduct.

First, the individual Defendants are sufficiently identified in the complaint and are separated by

name (to the extent those names are available to Plaintiffs pre-discovery). (ECF No. 17 ¶¶ 85-184.)

Plaintiff bolds and underlines the specific individual Defendants who are responsible for specific

instances of alleged misconduct and which youth is alleged to have been abused by the individual

Defendant or Defendants. Second, the Amended Complaint makes clear that the facilities in

question are those in Pennsylvania. (ECF No. 17 ¶ 2.) While Plaintiffs, admittedly, could have

been clearer on the division of Defendants in the pleading, even a cursory review of the allegations

provides sufficient clarity at this point as to which Defendants were responsible for what conduct.

For example, Plaintiffs clearly state that “George Junior Republic is responsible for setting and

approving all national, organization-wide policies and protocols for George Junior Republic

programs and operations, including sex discrimination policies.” (ECF No. 17 ¶ 226.) The

Plaintiffs are clearly discussing George Junior Republic, a named Defendant.

Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ reference to George Junior Republic in Pennsylvania as “[t]he

School,” does not warrant dismissal of the Section 1983 claims. Plaintiffs claim “[t]he School

failed, with deliberate indifference, to provide a safe custodial setting for Plaintiffs and the Class,

by failing to properly train, supervise, and discipline the staff at the School, including all John

Does.” (ECF No. 17 ¶ 259.) The Complaint is clear that the “School” is referring to the George

Junior Republic in Pennsylvania. Because the Complaint is sufficiently clear, and there is no

heightened pleading requirement, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Section 1983 claims is

denied.

v. Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law

(UTPCPL)

Plaintiffs bring claims under the Pennsylvania UTPCPL. Plaintiffs claim that they

“purchased behavioral health treatment services from George Junior Republic.” (ECF No. 17, at

47.) In order to state a claim under the UTPCPL, a private individual must establish that they are

(1) a purchaser or lessee; (2) the transaction is dealing with goods or services; (3) the good or

service was primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; and (4) they suffered damages

arising from the purchase or lease of goods or services. Ranalli v. Etsy.com, LLC, 570 F. Supp. 3d

301, 305 (W.D. Pa. 2021) (citing Keller v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 733 A.2d 642, 646 (Pa. Super.

1999)). Defendants contend that Plaintiffs did not pay for the services, but rather the government

paid for Defendants’ services. (ECF No. 19-1, at 27 (citing ECF No. 17 ¶ 220).) In support of this

argument, Defendants point to the portion of the Amended Complaint stating that “Defendant

receives federal financial assistance for its education programs[.]” (ECF No. 17 ¶ 220.) It is

entirely possible that an entity both receives federal assistance and also requires payment by

individuals to avail themselves of certain services. The fact that an institution receives federal

financial assistance does not preclude that same institution from receiving payment for other

specific or additional available services. Taking the Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, that they

purchased behavioral health treatment services from Defendant, the Court finds that Plaintiffs

were “purchasers” for the purposes of UTPCPL.

Plaintiffs further satisfy the other prongs of a UTPCPL claim, that they purchased (2)

services, (3) for personal, family, or household purposes, and (4) suffered damages from that

purchase. Plaintiffs purchased behavioral treatment services from Defendants, for personal use,

and allege they suffered extensive damages as a result of that purchase. Due to the sensitive and

graphic nature of the damages, the Court will not repeat them in this analysis. However, there are

more than sufficient allegations stated in the Complaint, which the Court must take as true, to

satisfy a finding of damages.

vi. Negligence, Gross Negligence, Wanton and Reckless Conduct, Negligent

Hiring, Supervision, Misrepresentation, and Retention Claims

Defendants group these tort claims into one paragraph and make a singular argument as to

why the claims should be dismissed. (ECF No. 19-1, at 27-30.) Defendants state that Plaintiffs’

failure to identify specific employees by name means that Plaintiffs have not adequately pled the

grouped negligence causes of action. Defendants cite one case, Buttermore v. Loans, to support

their position. 2016 WL 308875 (W.D. Pa. 2016). Defendants use this case for the quote: “[a]s

with the negligent hiring claim, the initial defect in plaintiff’s negligent supervision claim is that

he identifies no specific employee or even class of employees, who are alleged to have engaged in

conduct giving rise to a particularized duty of supervision.” Id. However, even taking this

statement in a vacuum, this case is factually and legally distinct. Plaintiffs do identify which

specific employees engaged in what conduct. While Plaintiffs may not have been able to identify

each employee’s full legal name, they provide dates, first names when available, last names when

available, roles, and the specific conduct they engaged in. Defendants’ assertion that they “cannot

prepare an adequate defense without being able to identify the employees at issue” is not

convincing.

The information provided by Plaintiffs in their pleading is sufficient at this juncture to

survive the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on these claims. Defendants are the employers of the

employees alleged to engage in the misconduct at issue. Defendants are aware of the full legal

names of the Plaintiffs, the dates of their housing, and first and last names of the individuals alleged

to have engaged in misconduct. Defendants do not indicate that they attempted to look for and

were unable to locate the names of the alleged offending individuals. Rather, Defendants are

making an unconvincing attempt to have the Court ignore the pleading standard required at the

Motion to Dismiss stage, the legal requirements of the tort claims, and instead focus on Plaintiffs

inability to provide full legal names who, without discovery, are presumably within the sole

possession of Defendants.

vii. Vicarious Liability

Plaintiffs have asserted vicarious liability claims against George Junior Republic and

George Junior Republic in Pennsylvania for the actions of their employees. (ECF No. 17, at 49.)

While the general rule is that “sexual harassment by a supervisor [or employee] is not conduct

within the scope of employment[,] [s]cope of employment does not define the only basis for

employer liability under agency principles.” Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 757-

58 (1998). “In limited circumstances, agency principles impose liability on employers even where

employees commit torts outside the scope of employment.” Id. These principles are set out in

Section 219(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency:

(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting

outside the scope of their employment, unless:

(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or

(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or

(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or

(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and

there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the

tort by the existence of the agency relation.

Specifically, Section 219(2)(d) “concerns vicarious liability for intentional torts committed by an

employee when the employee uses apparent authority (the apparent authority standard), or when

the employee was aided in accomplishing the tort by existence of the agency relation.” Burlington

Indus., 524 U.S. at 759 (citation omitted). “When a party seeks to impose vicarious liability based

on an agent’s misuse of delegated authority, the Restatement’s aided in the agency relation rule,

rather than the apparent authority rule, appears to be the appropriate form of analysis.” Id. at 759-

60.

Plaintiffs do not allege that any of the employee-Defendants used apparent or false

authority; rather they allege that the employee-Defendants misused their delegated authority to

commit acts of sexual misconduct. As a result, the Court analyzes the vicarious liability of the

employer-Defendants through the aided in agency relation rule. The Third Circuit has interpreted

the Restatement Rule on vicarious liability to apply to employees committing acts against non-

employees. See Yucis v. Sears Outlet Stores, LLC, 813 F. App’x 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2020). “[F]or

an employee to be aided by his employment in committing a wrongful act, he must have taken

advantage of some special mechanism afforded to him by his employment. . . . Or the employment

must have provided the employee a position of special authority making the victim particularly

vulnerable to the wrongful act.” Id.

Defendants argue that to establish vicarious liability, a plaintiff must satisfy the standard

test for vicarious liability: that “the employee’s conduct (1) is of a kind and nature that he or she

is employed to perform; (2) occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits

designated by his employer; and (3) is driven by a desire to serve the employer.” (ECF No. 19-1,

at 30 (citing Costa v. Roxborough Mem’l Hosp., 708 A.2d 490, 493 (Pa.Super.Ct.1998)).) Both

the Supreme Court and Third Circuit have interpreted the Restatement (Second) of Agency

principles related to vicarious liability, in extraordinary circumstances, to apply to situations not

explicitly within the scope of employment. See Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 759; Yucis, 813 F.

App’x at 786 (holding that an employer can be liable for their employee if the employee took

advantage of some special mechanism afforded to him by his employment or the employment

provided the employee a position of special authority making the victim particularly vulnerable to

the wrongful act.) Based on current law, the Court concludes that there are two scenarios in which

an employer may be liable for the conduct of their employee even when the misconduct of the

employee is not driven by a desire to serve the employer. First, an employer may be liable for the

actions of their employee when the employee takes advantage of some special mechanism afforded

to them by their employment. See Yucis, 813 F. App’x at 786. Second, whenever the employer

provided the employee with a position of special authority, making the victim particularly

vulnerable to the wrongful act. Id. The Court finds both of these to be true in the present case.

First, Plaintiffs allege sufficient facts in their Amended Complaint to show that the

employees of Defendant George Junior Republic allegedly used (and abused) their positions of

authority over minor children within the exclusive care of Defendants. Specifically, they allege

that the employees were given special mechanisms by George Junior Republic and they abused

those mechanisms. Employee-defendants were given special access to children, who were placed

as delinquent youth to live at the facility without their parents. Employee-defendants were also

given the opportunity to schedule various types of appointments which would involve one-on-one

interaction with a juvenile. Those employees then allegedly misused those mechanisms, given to

them by George Junior Republic, to sexually abuse children within their care. Plaintiffs have valid

claims under the first exception recognized by the Third Circuit in Yucis. 813 F. App’x 780, 786

(3d Cir. 2020).

Second, Plaintiffs sufficiently plead that their employment provided employees with

special authority that made the victims vulnerable to the wrongful acts. Again, Plaintiffs allege

that the employees of Defendants had the opportunity to be in close proximity to the minor children

and allowed them to render care to them. Plaintiffs, juvenile children housed at George Junior

Republic, were extremely vulnerable to the authoritative figures present at the facility. These minor

children were under the care and supervision of George Junior Republic and employees of George

Junior Republic took advantage of their supervisory role and the trust and care relationship they

were expected to provide. For these reasons, the Court finds that there are sufficient allegations

pled in the Amended Complaint for the vicarious liability claim to survive.

viii. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

In order for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) to be sustained,

Plaintiffs must show that Defendants (1) engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct and (2)

intentionally or recklessly (3) caused severe emotional distress to another. Mantua Cnty. Planners

v. City of Phila., 2016 WL 3227643, at *10 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (citing Manley v. Fitzgerald, 997 A.2d

1235, 141 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010)). Liability for IIED arises “where the conduct has been so

outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency,

and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.” Strickland v. Univ.

of Scranton, 700 A.2d 979, 987 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (emphasis in original) (quoting Small v.

Juniata Coll., 682 A.2d 350, 355 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)). Defendants claim that Plaintiffs have

failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that Defendants’ conduct was outrageous or

extreme. (ECF No. 19-1, at 32.) Defendants also claim that the allegations are merely conclusory.

(Id.) The Court disagrees.

Plaintiffs have detailed, extensively, in a 357-paragraph Amended Complaint, the alleged

conduct that employees of George Junior Republic have engaged in. This conduct, as described,

is of such an outrageous nature, and extreme in degree, that the Court need not repeat it in detail

in this Opinion. (See generally ECF No. 17.) However, the Court finds that the Amended

Complaint sufficiently details extensive alleged sexual abuse of children under the care of George

Junior, which went on for decades. Taking the allegations in the Amended Complaint as true, the

fact that this behavior was arguably prevalent at George Junior for such a reportedly lengthy

amount of time, without any repercussion for the employees, is repulsive. The Court finds that the

reported conduct engaged in, as pled, was extreme, that George Junior was at least reckless in

allowing such behavior to persist for decades, and the Amended Complaint sufficiently details the

severe emotional distress that this has caused Plaintiffs. Thus, Plaintiff has adequately pled a claim

for IIED.

ix. Breach of Fiduciary Duty

In order to allege a breach of fiduciary duty, Plaintiffs must assert that a “fiduciary or

confidential relationship existed between themselves and [d]efendants.” Reese v. Pook & Pook,

LLC., 158 F. Supp. 3d 271, 298 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (internal citations omitted). After a plaintiff

adequately pleads that such a relationship exists, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendants

negligently or intentionally failed to act in good faith and solely for the benefit of plaintiffs in all

matters for which they are employed; (2) plaintiffs suffered injury; and (3) the defendant’s failure

to act solely for the plaintiff’s benefit was a real factor bringing about plaintiff’s injuries. Id.

“Although no precise formula has been devised to ascertain the existence of a confidential

relationship, it has been said that such a relationship exists whenever one occupies toward another

such a position of advisor or counselor as reasonably to inspire confidence that he will act in good

faith for the other's interest.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not alleged any counselor or advisor relationship

between the parties. Defendants also state that they have been unable to locate a case where a

juvenile detention center or correctional facility owed a fiduciary duty to detained persons.

Plaintiffs respond that a confidential relationship can be found where one party “has reposed a

special confidence in each other to the extent that the parties do not deal with each other on equal

terms” and “can result from ‘an overmastering dominance on one side, or weakness, dependence,

or justifiable trust, on the other.’” (ECF No. 22, at 18 (citing Harold v. McGann, 406 F. Supp. 2d

562, 571 (E.D. Pa. 2005).) Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that “[a]lthough no precise formula has

been devised to ascertain the existence of a confidential relationship, it has been said that such a

relationship exists whenever one occupies toward another such a position of advisor or counselor

as reasonably to inspire confidence that he will act in good faith for the other's interest.” (ECF No.

22, at 18 (citing Reese v. Pook & Pook LLC, 158 F. Supp. 3d 271, 298 (E.D. Pa. 2016)).)

While there is not test for determining whether a fiduciary duty exists, the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court has laid out the following contours:

A fiduciary duty is the highest duty implied by law. A fiduciary duty

requires a party to act with the utmost good faith in furthering and advancing the

other person's interests.... This highest duty will be imposed only where the

attendant conditions make it certain that a fiduciary relationship exists.

In some types of relationships, a fiduciary duty exists as a matter of law.

Principal and agent, trustee and cestui que trust, attorney and client, guardian and

ward, and partners are recognized examples.... Where no fiduciary duty exists as a

matter of law, Pennsylvania courts have nevertheless long recognized the existence

of confidential relationships in circumstances where equity compels that we do so.

Our courts have found fiduciary duties in circumstances where the relative position

of the parties is such that the one has the power and means to take advantage of, or

exercise undue influence over, the other. The circumstances in which confidential

relationships have been recognized are fact specific and cannot be reduced to a

particular set of facts or circumstances. We have explained that a confidential

relationship appears when the circumstances make it certain the parties do not deal

on equal terms, but, on the one side there is an overmastering influence, or, on the

other, weakness, dependence or trust, justifiably reposed.

Yenchi v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 161 A.3d 811, 819-21 (Pa. 2017). Plaintiffs argue that the Court

should hold that confidential relationships should include that of juvenile detention center

employees and students within their custody. However, that relationship is not fiduciary in nature.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not recognize the existence of a therapist-patient or even

doctor-patient relationship as evidence of a fiduciary relationship. The Court in Yenchi specifically

uses the word “deal” to contextualize the fiduciary relationship. Id. Breach of fiduciary duty claims

usually arise within the context of a business transaction, where a duty is created through a

financial relationship, the benefit of which is some sort of exchange or management of monies or

services related to business or personal affairs management. See, e.g., Puente v. Navy Fed. Credit

Union, 2025 WL 408677 (E.D. Pa. 2025); Gen. Refractories Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1999

WL 1134530 (E.D. Pa. 1999); Alpart v. Gen. Land Partners, Inc., 2008 WL 3852256 (E.D. Pa.

2008); Health Robotics, LLC v. Bennett, 2009 WL 5033966 (E.D. Pa. 2009).

The Court is unable to locate a case where a fiduciary or confidential relationship, for

breach of fiduciary duty purposes, existed between parties similar to those in the present case.

Plaintiffs cite two cases which discuss confidential or fiduciary relationships through power

imbalances, but they both have to do with financial relationships, as opposed to a medical,

educational, or punitive relationship like those in the present case. See Reese v. Pook & Pook LLC,

158 F. Supp. 3d 271, 298 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (discussing a breach of fiduciary duty claim within the

context of duties owed in an auction of toys); Harold v. McGann, 406 F. Supp. 2d 562, 571 (E.D.

Pa. 2005) (discussing a contract dispute).2 Considering the guidance of the Supreme Court, the

cases in this Circuit regarding fiduciary duty, and the lack of other cases indicating otherwise, the

Court finds that there is no fiduciary duty or confidential duty within the context of a Breach of

Fiduciary claim that exists in the present case. Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of fiduciary duty is,

therefore, dismissed.

2 In both the cases cited by Plaintiffs, the breach of fiduciary duty claims were dismissed. See Reese v. Pook

& Pook LLC, 158 F. Supp. 3d 271, 298 (E.D. Pa. 2016); Harold v. McGann, 406 F. Supp. 2d 562, 571 (E.D. Pa. 2005).

x. Injunctive Relief

Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief for the class to prevent future harms. Defendants claim that

because Plaintiffs are not current students at George Junior Republic and that the claims are based

on past injuries, that the claims for injunctive relief should be stricken. Plaintiffs argue that because

Defendants have engaged in actions that apply to the class in general, injunctive relief is

appropriate. (ECF No. 22, at 20 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2)).)

Plaintiffs may proceed with a class for injunctive and/or declaratory relief “if the party

opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that

final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a

whole.” Derrick v. Glen Mills Sch., 2019 WL 7019633, at *9-10 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (citing Fed. R.

Civ. P. 23(b)(2)).3 “To determine whether plaintiffs have standing to seek injunctive relief, we

consider whether they can ‘show that they are likely to suffer from injury from the defendant’s

conduct.’” Id. (citing Richardson v. Bledsoe, 829 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2016)). Because the class

at issue includes “[a]ll persons who are currently . . . at any George Junior Republic [facility],”

and taking all allegations as true, the Court concludes that there is risk of future injury, therefore,

the injunctive relief claims shall not be stricken. If at any point the class is amended to exclude

current students, Defendants reserve the right to re-assert their objection to injunctive relief.

xi. Writ of Mandamus

Plaintiffs seek a writ of mandamus against Defendants to report all child abuse presently

known or suspected by them, and to submit proof of compliance with such order to the Court

within ten (10) days of such order. (ECF No. 17, at 57.) A District Court may issue a writ of

3 The Court in Derrick granted Defendant Glen Mills Schools’ Motion to Dismiss class action allegations

under Rule 23(b)(2) (injunctive relief) but only on the grounds that Glen Mills Schools was closed at the time of Judge

Bartle’s decision and, therefore, the reopening of Glen Mills Schools was too speculative to justify allowing injunctive

relief claims to survive.

mandamus when it is “necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable

to the usages and principles of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a); In re Baldwin, 700 F. 3d 122, 126-27

(3d. Cir. 2012). A writ of mandamus is only available in “exceptional circumstances.” Baldwin,

700 F.3d at 126 (citing Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967)). Ordinarily, a writ is issued

only “to confine inferior courts to their lawful jurisdiction or to compel them to exercise authority

when they have a duty to do so.” Id. (citing De Masi v. Weiss, 669 F.2d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1982)).

Plaintiffs claim that aside from this Court issuing a writ of mandamus, “there is a lack of

alternative means to obtain this information and to obtain relief for children who were abused.”

(ECF No. 22, at 20.) The Court disagrees. At this point in time, the Court is reluctant to issue a

writ of mandamus, usually used to compel inferior courts or the government to do something, to

order a juvenile detention center to disclose documents; Hence, the Court will not do so in this

instance. The Court, at this time, believes that there are other alternative means to obtain this

information through normal discovery processes. Considering these two factors, the Court rejects

Plaintiffs’ request and will not issue a writ of mandamus.

V. CONCLUSION

The Court will grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to George Junior Republic in

Indiana and George Junior Republic Realty as to all claims. George Junior Republic in Indiana

and George Junior Republic Realty are dismissed from this case. The Court will grant Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss as to George Junior Republic and George Junior Republic in Pennsylvania as

to the breach of fiduciary duty claim (Count 13) and request for a writ of mandamus only. The

Court denies Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to all other claims (Counts 1-12, 14). An

appropriate order will follow.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Hon. Kelley B. Hodge

HODGE, KELLEY B., J.