Anderson v. Conley

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

DAVID M. ANDERSON, : Case No. 1:24-cv-700

:

Plaintiff, :

: District Judge Matthew W. McFarland

vs. :

Magistrate Judge Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

:

DAVID CONLEY, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

:

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION1

Plaintiff, a prisoner at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, has filed a pro se civil

rights complaint against Defendants David Conley and Officer Fore. (See Doc. 1-1, Complaint

at PageID 12). By separate Order Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

On December 13, 2024, the Court issued an Order providing Plaintiff with the

opportunity to file an Amended Complaint. (Doc. 2). As noted in the Order, Plaintiff’s

Complaint appears to be incomplete, including a blank “Statement of Claims” page. (See Doc.

1-1, Complaint at PageID 15). Noting that the Complaint otherwise failed to state with

particularity what any named Defendant did or failed to do in violation Plaintiff’s rights, the

Court provided Plaintiff with thirty days to file an Amended Complaint. The Order further

specified that should Plaintiff fail to file an Amended Complaint, the Court would proceed with

the initial screen of the Complaint as submitted. (See Doc. 2, at PageID 61). To date, more than

thirty days after the December 13, 2024 Order, Plaintiff has not responded to the Order.

1 Attached is a NOTICE to the parties regarding objections to the Report and Recommendation.

Accordingly, this matter is before the Court for a sua sponte review of the Complaint to

determine whether the Complaint, or any portion of it, should be dismissed because it is

frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary

relief from a Defendant who is immune from such relief. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of

1995 § 804, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); § 805, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

Screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint

A. Legal Standard

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to “lower

judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing

so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed

by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous,

malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324

(1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e)(2)2 as part of the statute, which

provides in pertinent part:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—

* * *

(B) the action or appeal—

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. See also § 1915A(b). Thus, § 1915(e) requires

sua sponte dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or

2 Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).

malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted.

To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the

basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also Hill

v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule

8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual demands

on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d

502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a]

pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked

assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of

considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the

defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the Court holds

pro se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Garrett

v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th Cir. April 1, 2010)

(quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has limits;

“‘courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.’” Frengler v. Gen. Motors,

482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir.

1989)).

B. Allegations in the Complaint

Without factual elaboration, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent

to his serious medical needs. (Doc. 1-1, Complaint at PageID 13). Aside from this conclusory

allegation, Plaintiff’s sole allegation against Defendant Conley is that he is employed by the Ohio

Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections (ODRC) as the Advanced Level Provider/Nurse

Practitioner. (Id.). As to Defendant Officer Fore, Plaintiff also alleges that he is employed by the

ODRC and that Fore “was working as housing unit booth officer, operating the electronic

crossover crash gates while on his cell phone.” (Id.). It appears that Plaintiff contends that Fore

negligently operated the gate resulting in the gate temporarily closing on his hand. (See id. at

PageID 13, 16).

As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. (Id. at PageID 14).

C. Analysis.

For the reasons set forth below, the Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety. See 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b).

As an initial matter, although Plaintiff names David Conley as a Defendant to this action,

he includes no factual allegations against this Defendant aside from asserting that Conley is

employed by the ODRC and his conclusory claim that Defendants were “negligently indifferent to

a serious medical need and or inadequate medical treatment.” (Doc. 1-1, Complaint at PageID 13

(quotation marks omitted)).3 Plaintiff’s “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual

enhancement” fail to meet the basic pleading standard under Twombly. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff has

pled insufficient factual content to state a claim for relief against Defendant Conley. See Twombly,

550 U.S. at 5.

Defendant Officer Fore should also be dismissed as a Defendant to this action. As noted,

above, Plaintiff seeks to hold Fore liable for negligently operating the crossover crash gates while

on the phone. (See Doc. 1-1, Complaint at PageID 13). Plaintiff does not allege that Fore

intentionally closed the door on his hand or denied him medical care following the incident, much

less that Fore was deliberately indifferent to his health or safety, as would be required to plausibly

state a claim for relief under the Eighth Amendment. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 528

(2002) (citing Hudson v. McMilliam, 503 U.S. 1 (1992) (holding that a prisoner alleging excessive

force—which concerns “purposeful or knowing conduct”—must demonstrate that the defendant

acted “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm”)). See also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825

(1994). To the contrary, the allegations in the attached grievances suggest that Fore was not aware

that the gate closed on Plaintiff’s hand until Sergeant Samons subsequently radioed for him to

open the gate and Plaintiff was sent to medical following the incident. (Id. at PageID 16).

To state a viable claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege that he was deprived of “a right

secured by the United States Constitution or a federal statute.” See Spadafore v. Gardner, 330

F.3d 849, 852 (6th Cir. 2003). Mere negligence is insufficient to state a claim of constitutional

3 Plaintiff does include thirty-two pages of grievances and/or correspondence regarding the incident as an attachment

to the Complaint, however Conley is not mentioned in the documents. (See Doc. 1-1, Complaint at PageID 16-47).

The documents instead include allegations regarding other individuals who are not named as Defendants to this action

in connection with his alleged denied medical care. (See id. at PageID 16, 18 (asserting allegations against Nurse

Durham and a female ALP)). The documents submitted by Plaintiff fail to specify what Defendant Conley did or

failed to do that he claims resulted in a violation of his rights.

dimension under § 1983. See, e.g., Warren v. Doe, 28 F. App’x 463, 464 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing

Ritchie v. Wickstrom, 938 F.2d 689, 692 (6th Cir. 1991), as support for holding that “the district

court properly dismissed [the plaintiff’s] case because his allegations involved mere negligence

that is not actionable under § 1983”). Cf. Quinn v. Esham, No. 1:13cv864, 2014 WL 4774604, at

*2 (S.D. Ohio July 23, 2014) (Bowman, M.J.) (Report & Recommendation) (pointing out that the

plaintiff’s original allegations of “negligent behavior” by prison staff “failed to state any claim

under § 1983 and therefore were subject to dismissal at the screening stage”), adopted, 2014 WL

4774621 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 24, 2014) (Weber, J.). Plaintiff’s allegations that Fore was negligent in

operating the gate while on the phone is insufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted under § 1983.

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and the

Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1).

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. The Complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1).

2. The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that for the foregoing

reasons an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation

would not be taken in good faith and therefore deny plaintiff leave to appeal

in forma pauperis. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir.

1997).

March 18, 2025 s/Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections

to this Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served

with a copy thereof. That period may be extended further by the Court on timely motion by either

side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the portion(s) of the R&R objected to,

and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. A party shall

respond to an opponent’s objections within FOURTEEN DAYS after being served with a copy

of those objections. Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit

rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947

(6th Cir. 1981).