TEAGLE v. DOC DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION'S

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KYLEAF TEAGLE : CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff :

:

v. : NO. 24-CV-5544

:

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, :

et al. :

Defendants :

M E M O R A N D U M

NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO, J. MARCH 17, 2025

Plaintiff Kyleaf Teagle, proceeding pro se, an incarcerated individual currently housed at

SCI Phoenix, asserts claims against numerous prison officials based on his prolonged

administrative custody status, his psychiatric care, and the conditions of his confinement. As set

forth more fully below, the Court will dismiss Teagle’s Complaint for failure to state a claim

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A)(b)(1). However, the Court will permit Teagle to file an amended

complaint limited to those claims dismissed without prejudice.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS1

Teagle asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title II of the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), against sixty-two

(62) Defendants. (Compl. at 12-14.) Teagle names the following Defendants: (1) SCI Phoenix;

(2) Superintendent Joe Terra; (3) Members of the PRC; (4) J. Muick; (5) N. Wynder; (6) C.

1 Teagle used the form complaint available to unrepresented litigants to file his claims and

added numerous handwritten pages. (ECF No. 2.) The Court considers the entire submission to constitute

the Complaint, to which the Court adopts the sequential pagination assigned by the CM/ECF docketing

system. The factual allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Teagle’s Complaint. Where

the Court quotes from the Complaint, punctuation, spelling, and capitalization errors will be cleaned up.

Hensley; (7) S. Grady; (8) “Psychology Drummed”; (9) “Psychology Ruiz”; (10) Doctor Burritt;

(11) Doctor Glushakow; (12) CO Ski; (13) CO Pixel; (14) CO Hue; (15) CO Trotman; (16) CO

Car; (17) CO Simmions; (18) CO Clausen; (19) CO Parker; (20) CO Tidwell; (21) CO Barksdale;

(22) CO Rick; (23) CO Shorter; (24) CO M. Matus; (25) Lt. J. Nyce; (26) Lt. Pantoja; (27) CO

Holden; (28) Lt. Judge; (29) CO Benson; (30) G. Orlando; (31) CO Gordeen; (32) “Psychology

Stickney; (33) Lt. Patterson; (34) SCI Frackville; (35) Superintendent K. Brittain; (36) “Members

of PRC”; (37) S. Kephart; (38) P. Damiter; (39) R. Styka; (40) N. Wynder; (41) Lt. J. Provow;

(42) “UM R. Tomcavage”; (43) M. Gourley; (44) “Other DOC Employees Involved”; (45) CO

Warford; (46) CO Brennan; (47) CO Storm; (48) CO Walton; (49) Sgt. Walter; (50) CO Morris;

(51) CO Mall; (52) CO Whitney; (53) CO Na’dah; (54) Lt. Simpson; (55) “Psychology Ms.

Smith”; (56) Counselor Merinick; (57) Lt. Pinkey; (58) the Secretary’s Office of Inmate

Grievances and Appeals; (59) D. Varner; (60) “The Ones Who Approve and Send out emails for

RRL Placement”; (61) SCI Fayette; and (62) the Department of Corrections (“DOC”). (Id. at 12-

13.)

Teagle’s factual assertions encompass 54 handwritten pages and detail events occurring

over approximately four and a half years at three state prisons. His stream-of-consciousness style

of writing, which is at times repetitive and scattered, obscures the true nature of his claims. Teagle

frequently fails to link Defendants to his allegations or specify the timing of events. Despite the

confusing nature by which he presented his claims, the Court understands Teagle to allege

generally that his prolonged administrative custody status on a Restricted Release List (“RRL”),

and the conditions under which he is housed in a restricted housing unit (“RHU”), including being

forced to take medications he believes he does not need, violates his constitutional rights.2 (Compl.

2 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the “Third Circuit”) has

explained Pennsylvania’s RRL classification process as follows:

at 23.)

The allegations in the Complaint begin with Teagle’s custody at SCI Fayette sometime in

2020. (Id. at 17.) Teagle asserts that he was placed on the RRL and transferred to the RHU at the

request of members of his Program Review Committee (“PRC”). (Id.) During his time at SCI

Fayette, corrections officers allegedly lost Teagle’s legal mail and “trashed” his cell. (Id. at 15.)

Teagle states that he filed grievances at SCI Fayette but was transferred to SCI Frackville before

he “could complete” them. (Id. at 8.) Teagle does not identify any particular staff member at SCI

Fayette as a Defendant; rather, he names the prison and all “employers of PRC Members who

endorsed [him] for RRL placement.” At some point that is not disclosed in the Complaint, Teagle

was transferred to SCI Frackville. (Id. at 15.)

Teagle asserts that upon his arrival at SCI Frackville, he was confined in the RHU and

placed on the RRL. (Id. at 17.) He states that he received a written reprimand in July of 2021,

was placed in a psychiatric observation cell (“POC”), and commenced a hunger strike in August

of 2021. (Id. at 15, 17.) During his hunger strike, he was allegedly “sprayed in the mouth” with

an unidentified liquid and “almost died.” (Id.) During his time at SCI Frackville, Teagle submitted

grievances about Defendants Lt. Provow, CO Brennan, CO Storm, CO Walton, and CO Warford.

(Id. at 17, 18.) Teagle does not disclose the content of those grievances except to state that the

grievance against Storm and Walton allegedly involved them “trashing [his] cell.” (Id. at 17.)

The RRL is a list of inmates who may only be released from [administrative custody

“AC”] status upon prior approval of the Secretary. An inmate may be placed on

RRL when he/she poses a threat to the secure operation of the facility and where a

transfer to another facility or jurisdiction would not alleviate the security concern.

The Secretary must approve the designation of the inmate to the RRL.

Nifas v. Beard, 374 F. App’x 241, 243 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (internal quotations omitted).

Prison documents attached as exhibits to the Complaint reflect that Teagle was transferred

to SCI Phoenix on December 21, 2021. (Id. at 56.) The majority of the allegations in Teagle’s

Complaint pertain to incidents that transpired during his incarceration at SCI Phoenix. Teagle

alleges generally that at SCI Phoenix he was “forcefully taken to [a] POC and forcefully injected

with unknown drugs,” remained on the RRL even though he didn’t “meet the criteria,” and was

subject to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. (Id. at 5, 47.) Specifically, Teagle alleges

that in July or August of 2022, he was “forcefully” taken to a POC by Defendant Lt. Pantoja and

other officers “shown on camera.”3 (Id. at 16, 18.) Officer Matus and Officer Gordeen were

allegedly present when Teagle was injected with needles. (Id. at 19.) Teagle states that he was

again forcefully taken to a POC by Lt. Judge on April 3, 2024, based on false claims by Defendant

Drummed that Teagle was hearing voices and hallucinating. (Id. at 4, 21-22.) Teagle alleges that

Dr. Glushakow and Dr. Burritt refused to stop prescribing him medications he deemed

unnecessary. (Id. at 21.) According to Teagle, he informed Dr. Burritt that he did not want to take

his prescriptions, but on June 24, 2024, and September 9, 2024, Dr. Burritt renewed them. (Id. at

29.) Teagle attaches to his Complaint PRC review paperwork, which reveals that psychiatric

medication had been prescribed to him in June and September of 2024. (Id. at 68-71.) He alleges

that the doctors at SCI Phoenix were “involved in things” to make it look like he needed

3 Repeatedly through the Complaint, Teagle refers to events that “can be seen on camera.”

Currently, no camera footage is part of the record in this case. Teagle cannot satisfy his burden to state a

plausible claim where he fails to allege specific facts but instead directs the Court to look at camera footage

that is not available. Even if he had been able to include camera footage with his Complaint, merely

attaching an exhibit without describing the underlying events in narrative form in the body of the Complaint

is not sufficient to allege a plausible claim. See Berkery v. Credit Collection Servs., No. 21-3809, 2021 WL

4060454, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 7, 2021) (“While a court may consider exhibits attached to a complaint,

merely attaching exhibits is insufficient to meet the requirement that a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”); RD Legal Funding,

LLC v. Barry A. Cohen, P.A., No. 13-77, 2013 WL 1338309, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 1, 2013) (“Plaintiff cannot

meet its pleading requirements under Rule 8(a) by attaching numerous exhibits to its Complaint.”).

medications and fit the criteria for the RRL. (Id. at 21, 27-28.) Teagle alleges that many

Defendants urged him to take medications, including Defendant Hensley during PRC meetings

and Defendants Judge and Hue during their visits to Teagle’s cell. (Id. at 31-33.) He also states

that the medications caused him to shake. (Id. at 5.)

While the timeframes are not explicitly stated, Teagle spent periods of his time in

administrative custody at SCI Phoenix. In 2024, Teagle challenged his AC status, contending that

his prolonged placement violated his due process rights and expressed a desire to be placed in the

general population. (Id. at 54.) In a letter dated May 22, 2024, about Teagle’s PRC Hearing

Appeal, he was informed that his placement on the RRL was a consequence of his “poor

institutional behavior and actions” and that he must participate in recommended programming and

PRC reviews but will remain in AC status. (Id.)

Teagle also complains about certain conditions of his confinement at SCI Phoenix. He

alleges that officers entered his cell and confiscated his legal mail without his permission. (Id. at

7, 16, 20.) He also states that officers contaminated his food with drugs, K2, and other “stuff,”

which caused him to contract “transmitted diseases.”4 (Id. at 5, 16, 20, 28.) He asserts that

occasionally during meals or family visits, officers would turn the lights off in his cell. (Id. at 47.)

Teagle also alleges that he received foam trays for meals in the POC area because K2 was found

in his system, but he states that prison officials put the K2 in his medications and in his food as

retaliation for his misconducts. (Id. at 16, 25, 28.) According to the exhibits attached to the

Complaint, Teagle has received three misconducts at SCI Phoenix. (Id. at 68.) Based on these

4 Teagle does not allege the specific involvement of any SCI Phoenix staff member. He only

asserts that food contamination and legal mail confiscation generally occurred during the 6:00 to 2:00 and

2:00 to 10:00 shifts and states that the following Defendants worked during those shifts: CO Trotman, CO

Clausen, CO Car, CO Ski, C Pixel, CO Parker, CO Tidwell, CO Barksdale, CO Rick, CO Shorter, and CO

Mattus. (Id. at 20)

allegations, Teagle requests money damages, to be removed from the “mental health roster,” that

the officers at SCI Phoenix be ordered to wear body cameras, and that he be permitted to visit the

hospital to be “check[ed] for transmitted diseases.” (Id. at 23-24.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Although Teagle has paid the filing fee in full, (see ECF No. 4), the Court has the authority

to screen the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116

n.2 (3d Cir. 2000) (recognizing that the district courts have the authority to screen a prisoner

complaint pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1) even if the prisoner is not proceeding in forma pauperis).

Section 1915A requires that the court “review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as

soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress

from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. §

1915A(a). In doing so, the court must dismiss a complaint or any portion thereof that “is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” id. § 1915A(b)(1), or that

“seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief,” id. § 1915A(b)(2).

Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915A(b)(1) is governed by the same

standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See

Harris v. Wetzel, 822 F. App’x 128, 130 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam); see also Tourscher v.

McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the Court must determine whether

the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). ‘“At this

early stage of the litigation,’ ‘[the Court will] accept the facts alleged in [the pro se] complaint as

true,’ ‘draw[] all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff’s] favor,’ and ‘ask only whether [that]

complaint, liberally construed, . . . contains facts sufficient to state a plausible [] claim.’” Shorter

v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021) abrogation on other grounds recognized by

Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768,

774, 782 (7th Cir. 2015)). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

As Teagle is proceeding pro se, the Court construes the allegations in the Complaint

liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc.,

704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)). “This means we remain flexible, especially ‘when dealing

with imprisoned pro se litigants[.]’” Id. (quoting Mala, 704 F.3d at 245). The Court will “apply

the relevant legal principle even when the complaint has failed to name it.” Id. However, ‘“pro

se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.’” Id. In that

regard, a complaint may be dismissed for failing to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

8. Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 91 (3d Cir. 2019). Rule 8 requires a pleading to include

a “short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” as well as a statement

of the court’s jurisdiction and a demand for the relief sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). In determining

whether a pleading meets Rule 8’s “plain” statement requirement, the Court should “ask whether,

liberally construed, a pleading ‘identifies discrete defendants and the actions taken by [the named]

defendants’ in regard to the plaintiff’s claims.” Garrett, 938 F.3d at 93 (citation omitted).

“Naturally, a pleading that is so vague or ambiguous that a defendant cannot reasonably be

expected to respond to it will not satisfy Rule 8.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). The important

consideration for the Court is whether, “a pro se complaint’s language . . . presents cognizable

legal claims to which a defendant can respond on the merits.” Id. at 94.

III. DISCUSSION

Teagle asserts constitutional claims under Section 1983 as well as statutory claims under

the ADA and the RA.

A. Constitutional Claims under § 1983

As best as the Court can discern, Teagle asserts First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment

claims pursuant to § 1983, the vehicle by which federal constitutional claims may be brought

against state actors in federal court. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the

violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that

the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins,

487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

1. Official Capacity Claims and Claims against the DOC, SCI Phoenix,

SCI Fayette, SCI Frackville, and the Secretary’s Office of Inmate

Grievances and Appeals

Teagle seeks money damages for his claims and checked the box on the form Complaint

indicating that he presents claims against Defendants in their official capacities as well as their

individual capacities. (See Compl. at 2, 3.) Official capacity claims are indistinguishable from

claims against the entity that employs the officials. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-

66 (1985). Teagle also names as Defendants the DOC, SCI Phoenix, SCI Fayette, SCI Frackville,

and the Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals. The Eleventh Amendment bars

suits against a state and its agencies, including the DOC, that seek monetary damages. See

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1984); A.W. v. Jersey City

Public Schs., 341 F.3d 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2003). Thus, suits against state officials acting in their

official capacities are really suits against the employing government agency and, as such, are also

barred by the Eleventh Amendment. A.W., 341 F.3d at 238; see also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21,

25 (1991); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989). Moreover, the DOC,

including its correctional institutions, is not considered a “person” for purposes of § 1983. Lavia

v. Pennsylvania, Dep’t of Corr., 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that, “[b]ecause the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s Department of Corrections is a part of the executive department

of the Commonwealth, it shares in the Commonwealth’s Eleventh Amendment immunity” and is

also not considered a person for purposes of § 1983); see also Pettaway v. SCI Albion, 487 F.

App’x 766, 768 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (“[A]s a state agency and the prison it administers,

the Department of Corrections and SCI-Albion are not ‘persons’ and thus cannot be sued under 42

U.S.C. § 1983.”). Accordingly, all claims for money damages against the DOC, SCI Phoenix, SCI

Fayette, SCI Frackville, and the Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals, and all

official capacity claims seeking money damages will be dismissed with prejudice.

2. Lack of Personal Involvement

In a § 1983 action, the personal involvement of each defendant in the alleged constitutional

violation is a required element, and, therefore, a plaintiff must allege how each defendant was

involved in the events and occurrences giving rise to the claims. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845

F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 290 (3d

Cir. 2018) (“Each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her

own misconduct.”) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677) (emphasis in original); Dooley v. Wetzel, 957

F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Personal involvement requires particular ‘allegations of personal

direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.’” (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207)); Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 676 (explaining that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a

plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual

actions, has violated the Constitution”).

Teagle names numerous Defendants associated with the three State Correctional

Institutions but asserts no factual allegations in the body of his Complaint about how each of these

individuals was personally involved in the events he described.5 Teagle names other Defendants

because they generally worked the shift during which events would take place or because Teagle

“let them know what was going on.”6 Certain other Defendants were named simply because

Teagle submitted a grievance about them, without alleging what any of these Defendants did or

did not do that caused him to file the grievance.7 Teagle also appears to name groups of Defendants

without specifically providing names or stating how each member of the group was involved in

the events giving rise to his claims. For example, Teagle names as Defendants “Members of the

PRC” at SCI Phoenix and at SCI Frackville, “Other DOC employees involved” at SCI Frackville,

“[t]he Ones Who Approve and Send Out Emails for RRL Placement,” and “employers of PRC

Members who recommended [him] for RRL placement.” 8 (Id. at 12-13.) Any claims asserted

5 These Defendants are CO Simmions, CO Holden, CO Benson, CO Orlando,

Superintendent K Brittain, S. Kephart, P. Damiter, R. Styka, N. Wynder, Um. R. Tomcavage, M. Gourley,

Sgt. Walter, CO Morris, CO Mall, CO Whitney, CO NA’dah, Lt. Simpson, “Psychology Ms. Smith,”

Counselor Merinick, “Psychology Stickney,” and D. Varner.

6 Teagle alleges that Defendants CO Trotman, CO Clausen, CO Car, CO Ski, CO Pixel, CO

Parker, CO Tidwel, CO Barksdale, CO Rick, and CO Shorter worked the 6:00 to 2:00 shift or the 2:00 to

10:00 shift. (Compl. at 20.) He further alleges that he let other Defendants at SCI Phoenix “know what

was going on,” including J. Muick, N. Wynder, C. Hensley, S. Grady, and Lt. J. Nyce. (Id. at 21.)

7 For example, Teagle alleges that he submitted grievances about Lt. J. Provow, CO

Warford, CO Brennan, CO Storm, and CO Walton. (Compl. at 17.)

8 Many of the events Teagle describes as taking place at SCI Fayette and SCI Frackville

occurred prior to August 2021. The Court will not consider the timeliness of these claims at this time.

Generally, Teagle’s claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. See 42 Pa. Const. Ann. § 5524;

Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). However, pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”), prisoners seeking to challenge the conditions of their confinement, like Teagle is here, must

exhaust all available administrative remedies before bringing a lawsuit. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “The

[Pennsylvania Department of Corrections] has a grievance policy involving a three-step process that an

inmate must fully complete in order to properly exhaust his administrative remedies under the PLRA.”

Jackson v. Carter, 813 F. App’x 820, 823 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam). Briefly, an inmate must file an

initial written grievance, appeal to the facility manager, and file a final written appeal to the Secretary’s

Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeal. Id.; see also Robinson v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 831 F.3d

148, 151 (3d Cir. 2016) (describing DOC grievance process in more detail). “[T]he PLRA is a statutory

prohibition that tolls Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations while a prisoner exhausts administrative

remedies.” Pearson v. Sec’y Dep’t of Corr., 775 F.3d 598, 603 (3d Cir. 2015). It is not clear when Teagle

began to file grievances and if so, when they were resolved.

against these collectively named Defendants must also be dismissed. See Lawal v. McDonald, 546

F. App’x 107, 113 (3d Cir. 2014) (concluding that the plaintiff’s collective use of the word

“Defendants” failed to adequately plead which specific defendant engaged in the specific conduct

alleged by the plaintiff).

In addition, to the extent that Superintendent Terra and Superintendent Brittain are named

simply due to their high-ranking positions at SCI Phoenix and SCI Frackville, respectively, this is

not sufficient to state a plausible claim. Although Teagle names Terra and Brittain as Defendants,

the Complaint contains no specific allegations against them. Supervisors are not liable for alleged

constitutional violations committed by their subordinates simply because they employ them.

Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 227 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that liability under

§ 1983 cannot be predicated on a respondeat superior basis); Jutrowski, 904 F.3d at 290 (“Each

Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”)

(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677) (emphasis in original). Rather, “[s]uits against high-level

government officials must satisfy the general requirements for supervisory liability.”9 Wharton v.

Danberg, 854 F.3d 234, 243 (3d Cir. 2017). Moreover, to the extent that these Defendants are

named because they were involved in denying Teagle’s grievances, such claims are not viable

because participation in the grievance process does not, without more, establish involvement in

9 There are “two general ways in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable for

unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates.” Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d

Cir. 2014), reversed on other grounds by Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822 (2015). First, a supervisor may

be liable if he or she “‘with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy,

practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.” Id. (quoting A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v.

Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (alteration in original)). Second, a

supervisor may “be personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff’s rights,

directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the

subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.” Id. “Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and

acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate particularity.” Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. Teagle’s

Complaint does not include allegations that would plausibly support a supervisory liability claim against

either Brittain or Terra.

the underlying constitutional violation. See Curtis v. Wetzel, 763 F. App’x 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2019)

(per curiam) (“The District Court properly determined that Defendants . . . who participated only

in the denial of [the plaintiff]’s grievances – lacked the requisite personal involvement [in the

conduct at issue].”).

Based on the absence of allegations in the Complaint about how each of these Defendants

was personally involved in the alleged wrongs, Teagle fails to put the Defendants on notice of the

conduct with which they are charged so that they can reasonably respond. He therefore fails to

state plausible § 1983 claims against these Defendants.

3. Due Process Claims based on RRL Placement

The Court understands Teagle to assert Fourteenth Amendment due process claims based

on his administrative confinement status on the RRL and his continued placement in an RHU

despite his belief that he “does not fit the criteria.” (Compl. at 4.) It is well-settled that prisoners

have no inherent constitutional right to any particular security classification or to any particular

housing assignment. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221-22 (2005) (“We have held that

the Constitution itself does not give rise to a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to more adverse

conditions of confinement.”). Rather, in the prison context, “[d]ue process protection for a state

created liberty interest is . . . limited to those situations where deprivation of that interest ‘imposes

atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison

life.’” Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 706 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.

472, 484 (1995)). “[C]onfinement in administrative or punitive segregation will rarely be

sufficient, without more, to establish the kind of ‘atypical’ deprivation of prison life necessary to

implicate a liberty interest.” Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486). In deciding whether conditions are atypical and significant for purposes

of establishing a liberty interest, a court must consider “(1) the duration of the challenged

conditions; and (2) whether the conditions overall imposed a significant hardship in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life.” Williams v. Sec’y Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 848 F.3d 549,

560 (3d Cir. 2017).

Teagle alleges that he was designated to the RRL at SCI Fayette and that the designation

carried over when he was transferred to SCI Frackville and later to SCI Phoenix. It is not clear

from the Complaint whether Teagle has been in administrative custody during all events described

in his Complaint or whether there were breaks in his status. Nor is it clear the reason why he was

designated for placement on the RRL. While placement in administrative confinement, including

designation to the RRL, does not by itself trigger a liberty interest, “an unduly lengthy period in

administrative confinement may amount to an atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Hill v. Fisher, No. 10-459, 2010 WL 6004059,

at *5 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 846201 (M.D. Pa.

Mar. 8, 2011); see Huertas v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 533 F. App’x 64, 67 n.6 (3d Cir. 2013)

(per curiam) (“To the extent that Huertas’ due process claim is based on his placement on the

RRL, a list of inmates who may only be released from administrative custody upon prior approval

of the Secretary of Corrections, we agree with the District Court that this does not implicate a

constitutionally protected due process right.”).

Assuming that the circumstances of Teagle’s incarceration implicate a liberty interest, the

allegations do not support a plausible inference that Teagle was denied proper due process

protections. The Third Circuit has held that “an ‘informal, nonadversary review’ at which the

prisoner has the opportunity to state his views satisfies the requirements of due process.” Shoats

v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that a prisoner who was placed in administrative

confinement for eight years was afforded due process because he was afforded periodic PRC

meetings where he had an opportunity to voice concerns and be advised of the prison’s reasons for

denying his release); Huertas, 533 F. App’x at 67 (concluding that inmate in administrative

confinement on the RRL for over seven years did not have procedural due process rights violated

where his status was reviewed every 90 days in accordance with DOC policy). Teagle alleges in

his Complaint that he met at various times with members of the PRC. He also attaches PRC reports

to his Complaint, which reveal that concerns he raised during those meetings were addressed by

members of his PRC team and that changes to his program were made based on his concerns.

Courts in this Circuit have generally found that so long as prison officials follow the

periodic review procedures mandated by DC-ADM 802, this satisfies the requirements of due

process.10 See Shoats, 213 F.3d at 145-46; see also Bowen v. Ryan, 248 F. App’x 302, 304-05 (3d

Cir. 2007) (“Bowen was afforded an initial opportunity to be heard upon confinement, and periodic

review of his status. Like the District Court, we reject [his] conclusory allegations that the periodic

reviews by the PRC were rote or meaningless.”); Delker v. McCullough, 103 F. App’x 694, 695

(3d Cir. 2004) (“We agree with the District Court that the appellees gave Delker meaningful

periodic reviews, and thus procedural due process, and were entitled to summary judgment.”). It

is not clear based on the Complaint whether Teagle has received reviews of his administrative

confinement status every 90 days, as required by DC ADM 802. See DC-ADM 802(2)(D)(5); see

also Watson v. Wetzel, No. 23-3246, 2024 WL 5096209, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2024) (noting

that “Defendants complied with [DC-ADM 802] by giving Watson notice of his initial RRL

approval, reviewing his RRL status every 90 days, and assessing Watson’s RRL status annually.”).

10 DC ADM 802 is the “Administrative Custody Procedures Policy” for the Pennsylvania

Department of Corrections. See https://www.pa.gov/content/dam/copapwp-

pagov/en/cor/documents/about-us/doc-policies/802-administrative-custody-procedures.pdf (last viewed

Mar. 5, 2025.)

In addition, Teagle has not alleged any specific deficiencies in the PRC review framework

set out by DC-ADM 802, or that he was otherwise denied due process. Although Teagle disagrees

with the PRC’s determination that he remains on the RRL, this alone does not support a due process

claim. See Huertas, 533 F. App’x 64, 67 (“Huertas may disagree with prison officials’ evaluation

that ongoing administrative custody is justified by continuing security concerns, but he must show

that the periodic reviews he receives are constitutionally inadequate, and he has not done so.”).

Accordingly, Teagle has failed to state a plausible due process claim based on his prolonged RRL

placement.

4. Forced Medication Claims

Teagle also asserts constitutional claims based on allegations that, at SCI Phoenix, he was

forcefully injected with medications and that doctors continued to prescribe him medications that

he refused. “[C]onvicted prisoners[] . . . retain a limited right to refuse treatment,” although this

right must also be balanced against valid state interests. White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 113 (3d

Cir. 1990); see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) (holding that prisoners

possess “a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic

drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” that must be balanced against

the state’s legitimate interests). However, “a prison may compel a prisoner to accept treatment

when prison officials, in the exercise of professional judgment, deem it necessary to carry out valid

medical or penological objectives.” White, 897 F.2d at 113 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Aruanno v.

Glazman, 316 F. App’x 194, 195 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he decision of a medical professional to force

medicate a prisoner is presumed valid, ‘unless it is shown to be such a substantial departure from

accepted professional judgment, practice or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible

actually did not base the decision on such judgment.’” (quoting White, 897 F.2d at 113)). The

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has also construed forced medication claims brought by

prisoners under the Eighth Amendment. See Aruanno, 316 F. App’x at 195 (analyzing forced

medication claim under Eighth Amendment and Due Process Clause).

Teagle alleges that while in the POC at SCI Phoenix, unidentified officers “bust[ed] in [his]

cell and injected [him] with needles . . . more than once forcefully.” (Compl. at 16.) Elsewhere

in his Complaint he alleges that in July or August of 2022, he was “forcefully” taken to a POC by

Lt. Pantoja and other officers and was “injected with a needle forcefully” by someone he does not

identify (Id. at 18.) CO Matus and CO Gordeen were allegedly present when Teagle was injected,

but their role in the incident is not otherwise alleged. (Id. at 19.) The Court understands Teagle

to assert excessive force and due process claims based on these allegations. As pled, however,

Teagle fails to state a plausible claim. Other than his conclusory assertion that Lt. Pantoja took

him a POC forcefully, Teagle does not provide sufficient details concerning the circumstances that

led to the alleged forceful injections, including how force was used, the reason for the injections,

and whether he was harmed in any way.11 Teagle also fails to allege specifically how any other

named Defendant was involved. Without details concerning these incidents, Teagle fails to put

Defendants on notice of the conduct with which they are charged.

Teagle also alleges that certain medical staff at SCI Phoenix, including Dr. Drummed, Dr.

Burritt, and Dr. Glushakow, prescribed medication to him that he believed he did not need, and

that despite his requests, they refused to stop prescribing it. Teagle does not elaborate on what

medication he refused or the reason the medication was prescribed to him in the first place. He

also does not allege whether he was forced to take the medication. See Carter v. Munoz, No. 18-

994, 2020 WL 838265, at *2 (D. Del. Feb. 20, 2020) (dismissing forced medication claim because,

11 According to Teagle’s Individual Recovery Plan, which he attaches to his Complaint, he

was prescribed by pills and shots while housed at SCI Phoenix. (See Compl. at 66.)

inter alia, “it is not clear if Plaintiff is actually forced to take medication or if he takes it but does

not want to”). Teagle’s claims for forced medication, whether asserted under the Eighth or the

Fourteenth Amendment, are undeveloped as pled and must be dismissed without prejudice to

Teagle being provided an opportunity to amend his claims.

5. Excessive Force Claims

The Court understands Teagle to assert Eighth Amendment excessive force claims based

on allegations that in August 2021, he was “sprayed” by officers at SCI Frackville, including Lt.

Pinkey, while he was on a hunger strike. The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from

unnecessarily and wantonly inflicting pain in a manner that offends contemporary standards of

decency. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). “Force that is used ‘maliciously and

sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm’ violates the Eighth Amendment.” Young v.

Martin, 801 F.3d 172, 180 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)).

When screening an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim under § 1915, the Court asks whether

the prisoner has alleged plausibly that the force was applied “maliciously and sadistically to cause

harm” rather than “in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.” Jackson v. Bueno, No.

20-0687, 2020 WL 2847925, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 2, 2020) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7). The

factors used to determine whether the force applied was excessive include: (1) the need for the

application of force; (2) the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used;

(3) the extent of injury inflicted; (4) the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as

reasonably perceived by responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to them; and (5) any

efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d

Cir. 2000) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321).

Teagle alleges that he was sprayed in the mouth with an unknown liquid sometime in

August of 2021 while on a hunger strike, and that after he was sprayed, officers placed him in a

wheelchair and put a “spit mask” on his face. (Compl. at 15.) Teagle does not provide any details

about the circumstances leading up to him getting sprayed, who was involved, and whether he was

harmed. Nor does Teagle allege sufficient facts about how Lt. Pinkey was specifically involved.

The claim must be dismissed because Teagle fails to provide any factual context to allow the Court

to consider whether the spraying was intended to harm or excessive. See Gibson v. Flemming, 837

F. App’x 860, 862 (3d Cir. 2020) (“The use of chemical agents to subdue recalcitrant prisoners is

not cruel and unusual when reasonably necessary.” (quoting Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1270

(7th Cir. 1984))); see also Passmore v. Ianello, 528 F. App’x 144, 147 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam)

(explaining that the use of chemical agents is not a per se constitutional violation).

6. Eighth Amendment Conditions of Confinement Claims

Teagle also asserts claims based on allegations that prison officials entered and exited his

cell without his permission, tampered with the lights during family visits or meals, and tainted his

food. The Court understands these challenges to raise Eighth Amendment claims in connection

with the conditions of his confinement while in DOC custody. To establish an Eighth Amendment

violation based on the conditions of confinement, a prisoner must establish that prison officials’

acts or omissions denied him “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 256 (3d

Cir. 2010) (stating that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment

requires that prison officials provide “humane conditions of confinement.”). Such necessities

include food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety. Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty.

Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 418 (3d Cir. 2000). A prisoner must also establish that the defendants

acted with deliberate indifference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994).

Teagle repeatedly alleges throughout his Complaint that while he was housed at all three

DOC facilities, prison officials entered his cell without permission, sometimes to conduct searches

and other times to “trash” his cell. (Am. Compl. at 7, 15, 16, 17, 41.) He also alleges that officers

would “play with” the lights by turning them on and off, either during family visitation or during

meals. (Id. at 39, 47.) Teagle fails to state plausible claims based on these conditions.12 First,

Teagle’s complaint that officials entered his cell with his permission fails to allege a plausible

claim because “prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy and . . . the Fourth

Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches does not apply in prison cells.” Palmer, 468

U.S. at 530. Second, Teagle fails to provide sufficient details about the incidents, including when

they occurred and who was involved. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207 (“A defendant in a civil rights

action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs.”). Third, Teagle has not alleged

how he was harmed by these incidents. See Fortune v. Hamberger, 379 F. App’x 116, 122 (3d

Cir. 2010) (concluding that denial of showers for fifteen days did not violate the Eighth

Amendment when the inmate did not “suffer[ ] any harm as a result of the denial of additional

showers”); Lindsey v. Shaffer, 411 F. App’x 466, 468 (3d Cir. 2011) (concluding that whether the

12 To the extent Teagle bases his claims on allegations that officers confiscated items from

his cell or otherwise destroyed his personal property, the claim must also be dismissed. A prisoner in

Pennsylvania cannot state a constitutional claim based on the loss of his property because he has adequate

postdeprivation remedies available to him. See Spencer v. Bush, 543 F. App’x 209, 213 (3d Cir. 2013)

(“‘[A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation

of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful

postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.’” (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)));

Shakur v. Coelho, 421 F. App’x 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (explaining that the Pennsylvania

Tort Claims Act provides an adequate remedy for a willful deprivation of property); see also Tillman, 221

F.3d at 422 (holding that the prison grievance system provides adequate postdeprivation remedy to satisfy

due process).

plaintiff suffered harm was critical to the determination of whether unsanitary conditions were

unconstitutional).

Teagle also repeatedly alleges that while he was housed at SCI Phoenix, prison officials

put “stuff” in his food, which “intoxicated him” and caused him to suspect that he may have

contracted a “transmitted disease.” (Compl. at 5, 8, 25, 34, 37.) The Eighth Amendment protection

requires that prisoners be served “nutritionally adequate food that is prepared and served under

conditions which do not present an immediate danger” to their health and well-being. Duran v.

Merline, 923 F. Supp. 2d 702, 720 (D.N.J. 2013) (citing Robles v. Coughlin, 725 F.2d 12, 15 (2d

Cir. 1983) (quoting Ramons v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 571 (10th Cir. 1980)); Mora v. Camden Cnty.,

No. 09-4183, 2010 WL 2560680, at *8 (D.N.J. June 21, 2010)). It has been held that “prison

officials may violate the Eighth Amendment by serving unsanitary, spoiled or contaminated food

if the prisoner also alleges that he or she suffered a distinct and palpable injury.” See DeJesus v.

Carey, No. 15-2504, 2016 WL 6134540, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 2016) (citing Robles, 725 F.2d

at 15); Escobar v. Mora, 496 F. App’x 806 (10th Cir. 2012) (inmate stated a claim when he alleged

that he lost thirty pounds and suffered psychological and mental injury because an officer spit in

food). However, food tampering has also been found not to state a claim where no physical injury

has been alleged. See Rieco v. Moran, 633 F. App’x 76, 78 (3d Cir. 2015) (inmate did not state an

Eighth Amendment food tampering claim where no injury was alleged).

Teagle’s allegations about contaminated food are not sufficient to support a plausible

claim. Although Teagle alleges generally that he was served food with “stuff” in it and that he

believes he developed stomach injuries as a result of the contaminated food, he does not provide

any details about who provided him the tainted food, when it was provided, and when he made

sick calls after ingesting the food. Instead, Teagle alleges that food was generally “intoxicated”

during two work shifts and that 11 correctional officers were assigned to work those shifts. This

is too vague and attenuated to support a plausible inference that any specific Defendant acted with

deliberate indifference to Teagle’s health or safety. Although Teagle alleges some details about

one incident involving CO Clausen providing him tainted food on September 19, 2024 (see Compl.

at 20, 74), he does not allege how he was harmed by the incident. See Rieco, 633 F. App’x at 78

(noting that prisoners must claim they suffered “a distinct and palpable injury” to state an Eighth

Amendment claim in connection with contaminated food (quoting Robles, 725 F.2d at 15)).

Accordingly, any claim Teagle asserts in connection with alleged unconstitutional conditions of

his confinement will be dismissed.

7. Missing Legal Mail Claims

Teagle also appears to assert First Amendment claims related to prison officials’ alleged

interference with his legal mail. Prisoners have protected First Amendment interests in both

sending and receiving mail. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989); see also Turner v.

Safley, 482 U.S. 78, (1987). However, “these rights must be exercised with due regard for the

‘inordinately difficult undertaking’ that is modern prison administration.” Thornburgh, 490 U.S.

at 407 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 85). To state a plausible interference with legal mail claim, a

plaintiff must allege that the interference was done according to a “pattern and practice.” Jones v.

Brown, 461 F.3d 353, 359 (3d Cir. 2006) (“A state pattern and practice . . . of opening legal mail

outside the presence of the addressee inmate . . . impinges upon the inmate’s right to freedom of

speech.”). “[A] single instance is usually not enough.” Gibson v. Erickson, 830 F. App’x 372,

373 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam). Prisoners need not allege or prove any “actual injury” beyond

direct injury to their First Amendment right to use the mails. Taylor v. Oney, 196 F. App’x 126,

128 (3d Cir. 2006). Nonetheless, courts have found that mere isolated incidents of interference

without evidence of an improper motive, are insufficient to establish a First Amendment violation.

See, e.g., Nixon v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 501 F. App’x 176, 178 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam)

(“[T]he District Court correctly determined that Nixon’s claim alleging a single, isolated

interference with his personal mail was insufficient to constitute a First Amendment violation.”).

Teagle generally alleges that during his stay at SCI Fayette and SCI Phoenix, officers “lost”

his legal mail. Teagle’s Complaint fails to set forth specific factual averments describing how any

named Defendant was personally involved in the interference. Teagle also makes no allegation

that the interference was part of a pattern and practice. Moreover, although Teagle names each

Defendant that allegedly worked during the shifts when he believes his legal mail went missing,

the mere fact that they may have worked at that time is too attenuated a connection to assert a

plausible claim against any of them. Without any actual specificity, the Court must conclude that

Teagle has failed to state a plausible claim of interference with legal mail under the First

Amendment. See Taylor, 196 F. App’x at 128 (stating that the inmate must allege the “personal

involvement on the part of the Defendants in the alleged pattern and practice of opening his mail”).

Accordingly, Teagle’s First Amendment interference with legal mail claim will be dismissed.

B. ADA and RA Claims

Teagle asserts claims under Title II of the ADA and the RA. The Court will consider these

claims together because “the substantive standards for determining liability are the same.” Furgess

v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 933 F.3d 285, 288 (3d Cir. 2019). “To state a claim under either the ADA

or the RA, [a plaintiff] must allege that he is a qualified individual with a disability, who was

precluded from participating in a program, service, or activity, or otherwise was subject to

discrimination, by reason of his disability.” Id. at 288-89 (footnote omitted). A plaintiff “must

also show intentional discrimination under a deliberate indifference standard [if] he seeks

compensatory damages.” Id. at 289. This standard may be satisfied with allegations that the

defendant failed to act despite knowledge that a federally protected right was substantially likely

to be violated. Id. at 292.

A “disability” is defined as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one

or more major life activities of such individual . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). “[M]ajor life

activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing,

hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning,

reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” Id. at § 12102(2)(A). “Both

[Title II of] the ADA and the RA require public entities, including state prisons, to provide, in all

of their programs, services, and activities, a reasonable accommodation to individuals with

disabilities.” Furgess, 933 F.3d at 287; see also Penn. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206,

210-12 (1998) (noting the phrase “services, programs, or activities” in Title II of the ADA includes

recreational, medical, educational, and vocational prison programs). But neither Title II of the

ADA nor the RA provides for individual liability. See Kokinda v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 779 F. App’x

938, 942 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“Kokinda’s claims for individual damages liability under

Title II of the ADA fail for the simple reason that there is no such liability.”); Bowens v. Wetzel,

674 F. App’x 133, 136 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“[T]he District Court could have properly

followed the holdings of those circuits which have concluded that there is no individual damages

liability under Title II of the ADA, which provides an additional basis to affirm the dismissal of

this claim.”); A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Sch., 486 F.3d 791, 804 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that “suits

may be brought pursuant to [the RA] against recipients of federal financial assistance, but not

against individuals”). Accordingly, the Court understands Teagle’s ADA and RA claims to be

asserted only against the DOC. To the extent that he asserts ADA or Section 504 claims against

any of the individually named Defendants, those claims will be dismissed.

The nature of Teagle’s ADA and RA claims are not clear from his Complaint. He alleges

no factual allegations to support a reasonable inference that he suffered from a disability or that he

was precluded from participating in a program, service, or activity because of that disability.13

These failures are fatal to his claims. See, e.g., Berk v. New Jersey Dep’t of Hum. Servs., No. 23-

1853, 2024 WL 3639442, at *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 2, 2024) (granting motion to dismiss where the

plaintiff failed to allege “any specificity as to the nature or time-period of [his] alleged disability”).

Nor does Teagle assert any facts to support a reasonable inference that any Defendant intentionally

discriminated against him on the basis of a disability. See Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170, 181

(3d Cir. 2018). To the extent that Teagle bases his ADA or RA claims on any alleged denial or

inadequacy of medical treatment, “decisions about a prisoner’s medical treatment generally do not

give rise to a claim under the ADA.” Nunez v. Prime Care Health, Inc., No. 19-0859, 2019 WL

1400466, at *1 n.3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2019) (citing cases); see also Fitzgerald v. Corr. Corp. of

Am., 403 F.3d 1134, 1144 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[P]urely medical decisions . . . do not ordinarily fall

within the scope of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.”). Accordingly, Teagle has failed to assert

plausible ADA and RA claims.

13 Although exhibits attached to the Complaint suggest that prison officials believed Teagle

suffered from psychological conditions, Teagle does not discuss the conditions in his Complaint and

appears to dispute the characterization and diagnosis, claiming repeatedly that he did not need medications.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth, the Court will dismiss Teagle’s Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(A)(b)(1). The following claims will be dismissed with prejudice: all § 1983 official

capacity claims; all § 1983 individual capacity claims asserted against the DOC, SCI Phoenix, SCI

Fayette, SCI Frackville, and the Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals; and the

ADA and RA claims asserted against all Defendants with the exception of the DOC. The balance

of the claims is dismissed without prejudice. Teagle may file an Amended Complaint in the event

he can allege facts to address the defects noted by the Court as to his claims dismissed without

prejudice. The Court will also deny without prejudice as premature Teagle’s request for the

appointment of counsel (Compl. at 8).14

An appropriate Order follows.

NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO, J.

14 Teagle’s request for the appointment of counsel is premature at this stage of the litigation

because his case has not yet passed the screening stage under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. See Tabron v. Grace, 6

F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993) (before exercising discretion to appoint counsel “the district court must

consider as a threshold matter the merits of the plaintiff’s claim”). The Court will therefore deny Teagle’s

request without prejudice. Teagle may renew his request after such time as his amended complaint, if he

files one, has been screened for merit. If Teagle chooses to file a renewed motion, he should do so in

accordance with the factors set forth by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Tabron.