“[U]pdated medical and other evidence will be necessary on remand, and [therefore,] the 60–day time limit for proceedings before the ALJ is too short.”
How later courts described this case
- “[U]pdated medical and other evidence will be necessary on remand, and [therefore,] the 60–day time limit for proceedings before the ALJ is too short.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------------------------------X
CHRISTOPHER M. LOZITO,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
-against- 21-cv-05969 (JMW)
COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.
-------------------------------------------------------------X
WICKS, Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Christopher M. Lozito (“Plaintiff” or “Lozito”) previously sought review and
reversal of the final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner” or
“Defendant”), reached after a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), the result of
which denied his application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits (“DIB”)
benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (the “Act”) (hereafter, the “ALJ’s Decision”). In
response, Defendant moved to remand this case for further administrative proceedings because,
Defendant contended, the ALJ “failed to make the necessary factual findings in determining that
Plaintiff was not disabled.” (ECF No. 18-3.) The undersigned entered a Memorandum and Order
on February 12, 2025, reversing and remanding the ALJ’s Decision for further administrative
proceedings pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and directing the decision by the ALJ to be entered
within sixty (60) days of the entry of the Order, and, if that decision is a denial of benefits, that a
final decision of the Commissioner be rendered within sixty (60) days of Plaintiff's appeal from
the ALJ's decision. See Lozito v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 21-CV-05969 (JMW), 2025
WL 473978, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2025).
Now before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Alter the Judgment entered on February
12, 2025, requesting that the Order be amended to allow for one hundred twenty (120) days for
the ALJ to issue a new decision, and, if that decision is a denial of benefits, one hundred twenty
120 days from the date any request for review is submitted for the Commissioner to render a
final decision (ECF No. 21), which is opposed by Plaintiff. (See ECF No. 22.) For the reasons
stated herein, Defendant’s Motion to Alter Judgment (ECF No. 21) is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part.
DISCUSSION
Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a court, on motion, to alter or
amend a judgment. The decision to grant or deny a motion to amend a judgment is within the
discretion of the Court. See McCarthy v. Manson, 714 F.2d 234, 237 (2d Cir. 1983). The
standards for a motion under Rule 59(e) are similar to those for a motion for reconsideration. See
Brown v. J.F.H. Mak Trucking, No. 95-2118, 1999 WL 1057274, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1999).
“The standard for granting [a motion for reconsideration] is strict, and reconsideration will
generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the
court overlooked matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the
conclusion reached by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp. Inc.</i>, 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir.
1995); Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL Irrevocable Tr., 729 F.3d 99, 104 (2d
Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted) (“A motion for reconsideration should be granted only when the
[moving party] identifies an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new
evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.”).
Here, taking into consideration the Second Circuit precedent presented by the
Commissioner, as well as how the previously imposed time limits for further administrative
proceedings may impose a burden on the Agency (see generally, ECF No. 21), the Court alters
the previous judgment entered on February 12, 2025 as follows: the proceedings before an ALJ
must be completed within one hundred twenty (120) days of the issuance of this Order.
However, “the appellate time limit remains unmodified; if the ALJ's decision is a denial of
benefits, a final decision of the Commissioner must be rendered within sixty (60) days of
Plaintiff’s appeal from the ALJ’s decision.” Butts v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 101, 106 (2d Cir. 2005)
(“Butts”); see also Cudak v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-CV-1250 (JS), 2025 WL 341930, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2025) (“This case is remanded to the ALJ for all further proceedings. Such
proceedings shall be conducted within 120 days of this Order. If, upon remand, the ALJ denies
Plaintiff's claim, the Commissioner shall issue a final decision within 60 days of any appeal of
that denial.”).
The Court further notes that the primary purpose of the remand is for the ALJ “to make
necessary factual findings regarding Plaintiff’s limitations” and “further evaluat[e] the opinion
evidence regarding Plaintiff’s visual and manipulative limitations[,]” see Lozito, No. 21-CV-
05969 (JMW), 2025 WL 473978, at *18, – not necessarily to obtain “additional medical
evidence” as Defendant suggests. See ECF No. 21 at 5; see also Long v. Berryhill, No. 18-CV-
1146 (PKC), 2019 WL 1433077, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2019) (internal citations omitted)
(“[R]emand is appropriate where inadequacies in the ALJ's analysis frustrate meaningful review,
such as when the ALJ makes credibility determinations and draws inferences from the record,
yet fails to fully explain the basis for them[.]”); Warcholak v. Colvin, No. 1:16-cv-00129(MAT),
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20806, at *13 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2017) (remanding the matter where
“the ALJ and the Appeals Council misapplied the relevant legal standards, and failed to properly
develop the record by obtaining a function-by-function assessment from a medical expert”).
Indeed, the Court in fact did not remand for further development through another
administrative hearing and/or additional evidence, but instead remanded for further evaluation of
the opinion evidence regarding Plaintiff’s visual and manipulative limitations. The Second
Circuit found a sixty-day timeframe to be too abbreviated in Butts because the ALJ had been
ordered to marshal additional evidence and obtain the services of a vocational expert to provide
testimony about the jobs claimant could perform. See ECF No. 22 at 2; see also Butts, 416 F.3d
at 106 (“[U]pdated medical and other evidence will be necessary on remand, and [therefore,] the
60–day time limit for proceedings before the ALJ is too short.”).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Alter Judgment (ECF No.
21) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Judgment (ECF No. 20) and the
Memorandum and Order dated February 12, 2025, see Lozito, No. 21-CV-05969 (JMW), 2025
WL 473978, at *19, are hereby amended as follows: The decision by the ALJ is to be entered
within one hundred twenty (120) days of the entry of this Order on the docket and, if that
decision is a denial of benefits, a final decision of the Commissioner be rendered within sixty
(60) days of Plaintiff's appeal from the ALJ’s decision.
Dated: Central Islip, New York
March 16, 2025 S O O R D E R E D:
James M. Wicks
/S/
JAMES M. WICKS
United States Magistrate Judge