The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION
ANNI VILLARROEL,
Petitioner,
v. Case No: 5:24-cv-149-JSS-PRL
WARDEN OF FCI COLEMAN LOW,
Respondent.
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ORDER
Petitioner, a prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2241. (Dkt. 1.) He claims that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) wrongly
“took back” his time credits under the First Step Act (FSA). (Id. at 6.) Respondent
counters that Petitioner is ineligible to apply his FSA credits because he is subject to a
final order of removal. (Dkt. 10 at 1–2.) An evidentiary hearing is unnecessary
because Petitioner’s claim requires no further factual development. See Turner v.
Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003). For the reasons outlined below, the
court dismisses the petition for writ of habeas corpus (Dkt. 1).
Petitioner is serving a fifty-one-month sentence at Federal Correctional
Institution (FCI) Coleman Low for possessing with intent to distribute cocaine while
on board a vessel, in violation of 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a)(1), and for conspiring to possess
with intent to distribute cocaine while on board a vessel, in violation of 46 U.S.C.
§ 70506(b). See Dkts. 43, 82, in Case No. 1:21-cr-20449-DMM-3 (S.D. Fla.).
Petitioner asserts one ground for relief: that the BOP wrongfully revoked his
contends that he is not subject to a final order of removal, and he requests an order
instructing the BOP to reinstate his FSA credits. (Id. at 6–7.) He also asks for
monetary compensation for the period he was “unfairly detained.” (Id. at 7.)
Habeas corpus is the “exclusive remedy” for prisoners seeking “‘immediate or
speedier release’ from confinement.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 525 (2011)
(quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005)). A section 2241 petition furnishes
a basis to challenge the execution, as opposed to the validity, of a petitioner’s sentence.
See McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1092–93 (11th
Cir. 2017) (en banc) (“A prisoner sentenced by a federal court . . . may file a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the execution of his sentence, such as the
deprivation of good-time credits . . . .)”). Petitioner claims entitlement to FSA credits
that would result in a shortened sentence and his immediate release. (See Dkt. 1.)
Therefore, his claim is properly brought under section 2241.
Under the FSA, federal prisoners may earn and apply time credits to any
remaining time in custody or supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A), (C).
However, a prisoner who is “the subject to a final order of removal under any provision
of the immigration laws” is “ineligible to apply time credits.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3632(d)(4)(E)(i). In addition, BOP regulations provide that “[f]or any inmate eligible
to earn FSA [t]ime [c]redits” who is “[s]ubject to a final order of removal under
immigration laws” of the United States, the BOP “may not apply FSA [t]ime [c]redits
toward prerelease custody or early transfer to supervised release.” 28 C.F.R.
§ 523.44(a)(2).
Petitioner is subject to a final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). (See
Dkt. 10-1 at 2; Dkt. 10-2 at 2.) The final order of removal renders Petitioner ineligible
to apply FSA credits to his sentence. Although Petitioner states that he does not have
a final order of deportation, (Dkt. 1 at 6), the court credits the order of removal filed
by Respondent, (see Dkt. 10-1 at 2; Dkt. 10-2 at 2). Because Petitioner has not been
unfairly detained, he is not entitled to the requested monetary compensation in this
habeas action.
Accordingly:
1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (Dkt. 1) is DISMISSED.
2. The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate any pending motions and deadlines and
to close this case.
ORDERED in Orlando, Florida, on March 13, 2025.
( fa _ a whesok
JUVIE S. SNEED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies furnished to:
Unrepresented Parties
Counsel of Record
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