bond hearing only warranted where a petitioner can show his detention has become so prolonged as to violate Due Process after consideration of the time in detention, conditions of detention, and related factors
How later courts described this case
- bond hearing only warranted where a petitioner can show his detention has become so prolonged as to violate Due Process after consideration of the time in detention, conditions of detention, and related factors
- detention becomes unreasonable between six months and a year
- detention under § 1226(c) will usually not become suspect until beyond the six-month time period discussed in Demore
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ISHAN WAHI,
Petitioner, Civil Action No. 24-10314 (MAS)
MEMORANDUM ORDER
YOLANDA PITTMAN, et al.,
Respondents.
SHIPP, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration (ECF Nos.
11, 14) of the denial of his habeas petition (ECF Nos. 5-6), filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e). The Government filed a response to the motion (ECF No. 14), to which Petitioner
replied (ECF Nos. 15-17).
The scope of a motion for reconsideration of a final judgment brought pursuant to Rule
59(e) is extremely limited. See Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 415 (3d Cir. 2011). A Rule 59(e)
motion may be employed “only to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly
discovered evidence.” Jd, ““Accordingly, a judgment may be altered or amended [only] if the
party seeking reconsideration shows at least one of the following grounds: (1) an intervening
change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when the
court [decided the motion], or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent
manifest injustice.’” Jd. (quoting Howard Hess Dental Labs., Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l Inc., 602 F.2d
237, 251 (3d Cir. 2010)). In this context, manifest injustice “generally ... means that the Court
overlooked some dispositive factual or legal matter that was presented to it,” or that a “direct,
obvious, and observable” error occurred. See Brown vy. Zickefoose, No. 11-3330, 2011 WL
5007829, at *2, n.3 (D.N.J. 2011).
In his motion for reconsideration, Petitioner essentially renews his claim that this Court
should grant him a bond hearing because he believes his mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c) is already unduly prolonged, and is likely to continue for a considerable period as there
is currently a backlog in the processing of certain forms of immigration relief. (See ECF Nos. 11,
14.) As this Court previously explained, Petitioner has only been in immigration custody since
September 27, 2024. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) At the time he filed the petition, Petitioner had been
detained for less than two months, and at the time this Court dismissed his habeas petition, he had
been detained in a private immigration facility for just over three months. Even now, Petitioner
has been detained for just over five months — a period of mandatory detention the Supreme Court
has previously expressly upheld as constitutionally firm. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510,
523 (2003); see also Dryden v. Green, 321 F. Supp. 3d 496, 502 (D.N.J. 2018) (detention under
§ 1226(c) will usually not become suspect until beyond the six-month time period discussed in
Demore).
Despite the arguments presented in Petitioner’s motion and supporting filings, Petitioner
has not shown that this Court committed a clear error of fact or law in ruling that he had not shown
that his mandatory detention had become so prolonged as to amount to an unconstitutional
application of § 1226(c). Petitioner’s current detention has not yet crested six months, has been
entirely in a non-jail private detention center', and Petitioner’s immigration proceedings appear to
' The Court does not discount that the private detention center is almost certainly not a comfortable
setting for Petitioner as Petitioner argues, but the relevant question in this matter is whether it is
truly akin to punitive detention — and Petitioner has not shown that it is so punitive as to accelerate
the time period necessary for his detention to become unduly prolonged.
be proceeding apace. In light of these facts, and the extremely short amount of time Petitioner had
been in detention at the time this Court dismissed his petition at screening, Petitioner cannot show
that this Court committed a clear error in finding his petition at best premature. See German Santos
v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 209 (3d Cir. 2020) (bond hearing only
warranted where a petitioner can show his detention has become so prolonged as to violate Due
Process after consideration of the time in detention, conditions of detention, and related factors).
Gayle v. Warden Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst., 12 F.4th 321, 333 Gd Cir. 2021); Chavez-Alvarez
v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 783 F. 3d 469, 478 (3d Cir. 2015) (detention becomes unreasonable
between six months and a year), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct.
830 (2018). Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is therefore denied. To the extent Petitioner
seeks to present new arguments or to assert that his detention has now become prolonged in light
of developments following the dismissal of his petition, the proper procedure would be to file a
new habeas petition.
IT IS THEREFORE on this IT Gay of March, 2028, ORDERED that:
1. The Clerk of the Court shall re-open this matter for the purposes of this Order only;
2. Petitioner’s Rule 59(e) reconsideration motion (ECF No. 11) is DENIED; and
3. The Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Order upon the parties electronically,
and shall CLOSE the file.
Md Hip
MICHAEL A. SPP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE