The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
TAMMY RICHARDS,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 24-7325 (ZNQ) (RLS)
v.
OPINION
MONMOUTH COUNTY VOCATIONAL
SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.,
Defendants.
QURAISHI, District Judge
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants
Monmouth County Vocational School District and Monmouth County Vocational School District
Board of Education (collectively, “Defendants”).1 (the “Motion”, ECF No. 8.) Defendants filed
a brief in support. (“Moving Br.”, ECF No. 8-1). Plaintiff Tammy Richards (“Plaintiff”) filed a
brief in opposition (“Opp’n Br.”, ECF No. 14) to which Defendants replied (“Reply Br.”, ECF No.
15).
The Court has carefully considered the parties’ submissions and decides the Motion
without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will DENY Defendants’ Motion.
1 The Complaint also names as an individual defendant Sharon Bryant, the Principal of Biotechnology High School.
It appears, however, that despite multiple attempts Plaintiff was unable to successfully serve her (see ECF No. 7), and
no answer or motion has been filed with this Court on her behalf.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This is an employment discrimination and retaliation case. Plaintiff is a former guidance
counselor at Biotechnology High School (“BHS”) in Freehold, NJ. (Compl. ¶17.) Plaintiff began
working at BHS during the 2019–2020 school year and received a “Highly Effective” performance
rating2. (Id. ¶17, 19–20.) Defendant Monmouth County Vocational School District (“the
District”) renewed Plaintiff’s employment contract for the 2020–2021 school year and named her
“2021 Education Specialist of the Year.” (Id. ¶22.) The District renewed Plaintiff’s contract for
the 2021–2022 school year. (Id. ¶24.)
In September 2021, Plaintiff began experiencing depression and insomnia following the
death of a close friend and, at the recommendation of a psychiatrist, subsequently informed BHS
principal, Sharon Bryant, of her need to take a medical leave of absence. (Id. ¶¶25, 27.) Plaintiff
alleges that she did not disclose her medical diagnosis to Bryant or the anticipated length of her
medical leave due to ongoing discussions with her psychiatrist. (Id. ¶29.) Plaintiff ultimately
requested leave pursuant to the Family Medical Leave Act until December 14, 2021, which the
District approved. (Id. ¶31.)
After participating in an intensive outpatient program, Plaintiff returned to work on
December 15, 2021. (Id. ¶ 32.) On January 13, 2022, Bryant conducted a formal observation of
Plaintiff and rated Plaintiff’s “Program Planning and Management,” “Program Delivery,”
“Communication and Collaboration,” and “Professionalism,” as “Partially Effective.”3 (Id. ¶38.)
Bryant specifically criticized Plaintiff for: 1) “failing to schedule the administration of New
2 A performance rating is based on a formal evaluation of six categories: professional knowledge, program planning
and management, program delivery, assessment, communication and collaboration, and professionalism. (Compl.
¶36.)
3 Plaintiff claims that Bryant also gave Plaintiff an “Effective Rating” for “Professional Knowledge” but failed to
provide a rating for “Assessment” because Bryant allegedly did not observe Plaintiff perform her duties on the date
indicated in the observation.
Jersey’s ‘Start Strong Assessment’ before ‘[she] went out on leave,’” 2) “failing to implement 504
Plans before she ‘left out on leave,’” 3) “failing to create Student Growth and Objectives (SGOs)
plans ‘in the fall,’” and (4) “failing to write letters of recommendation for seniors.” (Id. ¶39.) A
few weeks later, the District’s Director of Curriculum & Instruction Kelly Harmon conducted
another formal evaluation of Plaintiff and rated her “Effective” in each of the above-mentioned
categories. (Id. ¶ 48.)
On March 7, 2022, Plaintiff had to report for jury duty and was ultimately selected as a
juror for a seven-day trial but reported to work each day court was not in session. (Id. ¶51-53.)
On April 1, 2022, Director of School Counseling Joseph Senerchia (“Senerchia”) conducted a third
formal observation of Plaintiff and rated Plaintiff “Effective” in Professionalism and Assessment
and “Partially Effective” in Professional Knowledge, Program Planning and Management, and
Program Delivery. (Id. ¶54.) Senerchia criticized Plaintiff for: 1) “failing to conduct a training
session for [the District’s] administration of New Jersey’s NJGPA assessment”; 2) “failing to
review training materials for the NJGPA with staff”; and 3) “only being available on the first of
three days of NJGPA testing.” (Id. ¶55.)
On April 8, 2022, Bryant informed Plaintiff that, due to Plaintiff’s recent evaluations,
Bryant recommended to the Monmouth County Vocational School District Board of Education
(“Board”) that it not renew Plaintiff’s contract for the 2022–2023 school year. (Id. ¶60.) As a
non-tenured employee, Plaintiff requested a hearing before the Board to challenge the non-renewal
recommendation.4 At the hearing on June 28, 2022, Plaintiff presented testimony from two
parents, two students, and the District’s International Baccalaureate Coordinator in support of her
renewal. (Id. ¶65.) Plaintiff alleges that the hearing, including the Board’s deliberation, lasted a
4 N.J.S.A. 18:27-4.1b.
total of fifteen minutes. (Id. ¶66.) The Board ultimately decided to accept the recommendation5
of nonrenewal. (Id. ¶¶66, 69.)
On June 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed a three-count Complaint in this Court alleging:
(1) retaliation and interference with rights, in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 2615 (Count One) (id. ¶¶78–80); (2) disability discrimination, in violation of the New Jersey
Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a) (Count Two) (id. ¶¶ 81-83); and (3)
retaliation, in violation of NJLAD, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d) (Count Three) (id. ¶¶84–88). In sum,
Plaintiff asserts that the nonrenewal of her contract was motivated by disability discrimination and
was in retaliation for taking federally-protected medical leave. On August 7, 2024, Defendants
filed the instant Motion.
II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 based on the
Complaint’s claims under federal law and supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 as to
the Complaint’s claims based on state law.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A district court may grant a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When considering a motion
under 12(b)(6), the “defendant bears the burden of showing that no claim has been presented.”
Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor,
Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)). Moreover, the court must accept as true all the plaintiff’s
well-pleaded factual allegations and “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). The
5 The Complaint consistently refers to the District/Board’s communications prior to the Hearing as “recommending”
and “recommendations.” Defendants dispute this characterization, as will be further discussed, infra.
court, however, may ignore legal conclusions or factually unsupported accusations that merely
state the defendant unlawfully harmed me. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Finally, the court must determine whether “the
facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for
relief.’” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). A facially plausible claim
“allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. at 210 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663).
“To decide a motion to dismiss, courts generally consider only the allegations contained in
the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record.” Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Mayer v.
Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010). “However, an exception to the general rule is that a
‘document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint’ may be considered ‘without
converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.’” In re Burlington Coat Factory
Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997).
IV. DISCUSSION
Defendants move to dismiss on the basis that all three claims are time barred. (Moving Br.
at 9.) They contend that the FMLA and the NJLAD that govern all of the Complaint’s claims have
a two-year statute of limitations period. (Id.) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(1)). They argue that the
statute of limitations period began to run on April 13, 2022. There is no explicit basis for this date
in the Complaint. It is the date Plaintiff acknowledged receipt of a written notice from the
District’s Superintendent that Plaintiff’s contract was not going be renewed (“Nonrenewal
Notice.”) (Moving Br. at 10; Exhibit A, ECF No. 8-3.) Plaintiff does not object procedurally to
Defendants’ reliance on the Nonrenewal Notice on this Motion.
As a preliminary matter, the Court assesses whether consideration of the Nonrenewal
Notice is appropriate here despite its conspicuous absence from the Complaint. It is significant
that Plaintiff neither objects to the Court’s consideration of the Nonrenewal Notice nor denies
having received it. Moreover, in the relevant language expressed by the Third Circuit, the Court
first finds that the Complaint is “based” on the Nonrenewal Notice insofar as it is the statutorily-
required, written expression of the District’s nonrenewal position. See Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d
241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014). Second, artful pleading aside, the Court finds it is “not unfair” to hold
Plaintiff accountable for the contents of the Nonrenewal Notice, and Plaintiff should not “be able
to evade accountability” for the Nonrenewal Notice “simply by not attaching [it] to [her]
complaint.” See id. at 250. The Court therefore concludes that the Nonrenewal Notice is fairly
considered in this Rule 12(b)(6) context.
Plaintiff does, however, challenge the Nonrenewal Notice on another ground. She
contends it should be deemed insufficient to put her on notice and therefore she neither knew nor
should have known of her claim. First, she argues that “Defendant Bryant’s April 8, 2022,
communication regarding her recommendation not to non-renew Plaintiff’s employment contract
was neither final, nor dispositive.” (Opp’n Br. at 12) (emphasis in original). Second, Plaintiff
says, the relevant New Jersey statute expressly states that the purpose of the hearing is “to provide
the staff member the opportunity to convince the board of education members to offer
reemployment,” confirming, if indirectly, that the Nonrenewal Notice is not final. (Id.) (citing
N.J.S.A. 18A:27-4.1).
On reply, Defendants are silent as to Plaintiff’s characterization of her April 8, 2022
meeting with Defendant Bryant.6 Instead, Defendants argue that the subsequent Nonrenewal
6 The Court attributes Defendants’ silence to their appreciation that it is procedurally difficult to dispute Plaintiff’s
characterization of the April 8, 2022 meeting in the context of a motion to dismiss.
Notice was clear and unambiguous in expressing its finality. (Moving Br. at 11.) They argue that
the Plaintiff’s receipt of the Nonrenewal Notice is the time of the purportedly discriminatory act
that starts the clock for purposes of a statute of limitations. (Id. at 15.)
“Technically, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a defendant to plead an
affirmative defense, like a statute of limitations defense, in the answer, not in a motion to dismiss.”
Schmidt, 770 F.3d at 249 (citation omitted). The Third Circuit does, however, allow a defendant
to raise a statute of limitations defense argument in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion if “the time alleged in
the statement of a claim shows that the cause of action has not been brought within the statute of
limitations.” Id. (citation omitted). The time bar must be “apparent on the face of the complaint”
to afford the basis for a dismissal of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). Id.
The issue here is whether the basis for dismissal of the Complaint is indeed apparent on
the Complaint’s face. Because the Court has concluded that it is proper to consider the Notice of
Renewal on this motion, that Notice is also considered. The Nonrenewal Notice is such a major
feature of the parties’ dispute that it merits quoting in its entirety:
I regret to inform you that your employment contract with the
Monmouth County Vocational School District Board of Education
will not be renewed lor the 2022-2023 school year and that your
employment with the Board of Education will end effective June 30,
2022. This letter shall constitute notice of non-renewal in
accordance with the law.
Additionally, you have the right to request a statement of reasons as
to why your contract was not renewed; such a request must be made
in writing addressed to the undersigned no more than 15 days after
receipt of this letter notice. After receiving the statement of reasons
for non-renewal, you may request an informal appearance before the
Board of Education. This request must be submitted in writing
within ten (10) calendar days of receipt of my statement of reasons.
Enclosed is information concerning the continuation of health
benefits through COBRA. Your health benefits will terminate on
June 30, 2022 unless you qualify and participate in COBRA.
Thank you for your work on behalf of the students of the Monmouth
County Vocational School District Board of Education. If you have
any questions, please do not hesitate to contact this office. We wish
you much success in your future endeavors.
(Nonrenewal Notice.)
For obvious reasons, Plaintiff couches the Notice as a mere recommendation, but the Court
sees no indicia that it should be so construed. The entire first paragraph uses exclusively final
language and concludes with the clear assertion that “[t]his letter shall constitute notice of non-
renewal in accordance with the law.” The second paragraph provides what the Court would
describe as a description of Plaintiff’s right to appeal the decision, which does not militate against
the Notice’s finality. The third paragraph communicates the timing of the conclusion of Plaintiff’s
health benefits, which also distinctly implies finality. Even the last paragraph—thanking Plaintiff
for her work and wishing her well in the future—bespeaks the Notice’s finality. The Court
therefore has doubts as to the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s belief that the Nonrenewal Notice did
not provide her with notice of her claim. As set forth above, the inquiry is an objective one and
the Notice is clear.
Nonetheless, the Court is mindful of two important features of this stage of the proceedings:
1) all factual allegations in a complaint are to be resolved in a plaintiff’s favor and 2) a statute of
limitations defense must be clear on the face of a complaint. Here, Plaintiff’s briefing—and a
liberal reading of the Complaint—suggest that something in the communication between Plaintiff
and Defendant Bryant during the April 8, 2022 meeting may have led to Plaintiff (or, more aptly,
a reasonable person in Plaintiff’s position) to misinterpret the Nonrenewal Notice.7 Plaintiff
should be afforded an opportunity to expand on any additional information, to the extent it exists,
concerning her interpretation of the Notice. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the Complaint
but will do so without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to amend her complaint to further articulate the
factual bases as to why the Nonrenewal Notice should not be treated as the accrual date of her
claims.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ Motion. The Complaint
will be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and with leave to amend to remedy the deficiencies
identified herein. An appropriate Order will follow.
Date: March 17, 2025
s/ Zahid N. Quraishi
ZAHID N. QURAISHI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
7 The Nonrenewal Notice is clear enough on its face that the Court may dismiss the amended complaint with prejudice
on a subsequent motion in spite of what was said by Defendant Bryant at the April 8, 2022 meeting. To that end, the
Court instructs the parties to also clarify what distinction, if any, there is between Defendant Bryant’s own
“recommendation” and the Notice of Nonrenewal, which was signed by the Charles R. Ford, Jr., as Superintendent of
Monmouth County Vocational School District. To the extent Bryant’s recommendation was to the Board and/or
District and the Nonrenewal Notice was the Board/District’s final decision in light of that recommendation, it would
also militate in favor of the finality of the Nonrenewal Notice. The Court also instructs Plaintiff to take the opportunity
to amend her pleading to specify that her FMLA claim (Count One) is limited to a willful violation as she argues in
her briefing.