Nealis v. PGA Tour, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

PATRICK NEALIS,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 3:23-cv-623-TJC-MCR

v.

PGA TOUR, INC.,

Defendant.

ORDER

This COVID-era case is before the Court on Defendant PGA Tour, Inc.’s

Motion for Summary Judgment. Doc. 63. Plaintiff Patrick Nealis filed his

response and PGA has replied. Docs. 65, 70. Nealis is suing PGA, his former

employer, alleging his termination for violating PGA’s COVID testing

requirements was improper. Doc. 40. Nealis has four remaining claims against

PGA: Counts I and IV allege religious discrimination in violation of Title VII

and the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”) respectively and Counts II and V

allege retaliation in violation of Title VII and the FCRA.1 See Doc. 44.

1 “FCRA claims are analyzed under the same framework as claims

brought under Title VII . . . .” King v. HCA, 825 F. App’x 733, 736 n.2 (11th Cir.

2020). Counts III and VI were dismissed. See Doc. 44. The religious

discrimination counts cover both disparate treatment and failure to

accommodate theories. Doc. 63 at 4.

I. FACTS

Nealis started his employment with PGA in 2007. Doc. 64-17 at 9.2 In

March 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, PGA required employees to work

from home. Doc. 66-15 ¶26. More than a year later, in May 2021, PGA

encouraged employees to return to the office on a voluntary basis, with partially

vaccinated or unvaccinated employees required to mask or social distance. Doc.

66-15 ¶7; Doc. 64-17 at 402. PGA stated proof of vaccination was not required

(“we trust our employees to abide by the honor system”) and “[m]anagers and

coworkers should not ask one another about their vaccination status as a matter

of privacy.” Doc. 64-17 at 402. On July 16, 2021, PGA communicated with

employees that it was preparing for a full office return in September, and

unvaccinated employees would need to comply with various safety protocols

(including masking).3 Doc. 64-17 at 403–04. The same email notified employees

that “[f]ailure to comply is a violation of [PGA] policy and subject to disciplinary

action, including termination.”4 Id.

2 References are to the ECF document number, which may differ from

exhibit numbers referenced by the parties. See Docs. 64, 66.

3 The return to office was delayed several times but occurred November

1, 2021. See Doc. 66-15 ¶20.

4 Similar language about consequences for failure to comply was part of

a broad email communication on August 31, 2021, and the November 2021 PGA

policy. Doc. 64-17 at 406, 411.

On August 6, 2021, PGA informed employees about “required” steps to

provide their vaccination status, including reporting vaccination information by

August 13, 2021. Doc. 64-17 at 405. PGA also told employees “[i]f you have not

yet fully vaccinated, you will need to fill out a survey . . . stating when you

intend to get the vaccine or that you do not plan to get the vaccine.” Id. On

August 31, 2021, PGA told employees who choose to not be vaccinated for

medical or religious reasons they “must complete a COVID-19 Vaccination

Request for Exemption” form by September 15, 2021. Doc. 64-17 at 407. In the

same email, PGA stated “any employee not fully vaccinated will be required to

comply with new safety protocols, regardless of whether a medical or religious

exemption has been granted.” Id.5

About a month after the deadline, on October 19, 2021, Nealis submitted

a religious exemption request indicating his religious beliefs prevented him

from taking the vaccine.6 Doc. 66-15 ¶35. Within a week, on or before October

5 More than once, PGA uses mandatory language in its communication,

such as saying people who have a medical or religious reason to not be

vaccinated “must” complete an exemption request and “require[ing]”

compliance with safety protocols for unvaccinated employees. Even so, the

record does not indicate PGA required vaccination to stay employed, although

Nealis testified he interpreted PGA’s communication as a vaccine mandate and

was generally concerned about the “mandatory nature” of the vaccine. Doc. 64-

1 ¶8; Doc. 64-17 at 41–43, 71–74.

6 The religious objection was because Nealis thought the vaccine could be

the “mark” mentioned in Revelation, subjecting those who accepted the mark to

spiritual torment. See Doc. 64-17 at 41–46, 147–48, 415. Nealis’s exemption

request was a few days after PGA sent an email that stated: “[w]e respect your]

26, 2021, PGA approved the exemption request. Doc. 64-17 at 421. Even with

an approved exemption, Nealis and other unvaccinated employees were

required to comply with safety protocols. Doc. 64-17 at 413, 418. The safety

protocols had three components: (1) masking at work, (2) weekly testing, and

(3) weekly reporting of test results. E.g., Doc. 64-17 at 102, 410. As PGA and

Nealis communicated about Nealis’s concerns, PGA extended the deadline for

Nealis to comply (and report to work) at least three times. Doc. 64-17 at 201–

02.

Nealis had religious and other objections to the safety protocols.7 Even

though the safety protocols were required for all unvaccinated employees and

had been previously communicated, Nealis emailed PGA and characterized the

safety protocols as “punitive accommodations” amounting to religious

discrimination. Doc. 64-17 at 420.

decision to abstain from the COVID-19 vaccination. . . .” and went on to describe

mandatory safety protocols that would apply for the return to office. Doc. 64-17

at 409. Nealis requested the exemption to avoid “obtaining the vaccine and

being subjected to the safety protocols.” Doc. 66-15 ¶ 34; Doc. 64-17 at 83. The

only outcome, however, was that Nealis was not required to pay an additional

insurance premium for unvaccinated employees. Id.

7 There is evidence Nealis acted in ways contrary to his stated beliefs

(such as by getting other vaccines, masking, prior use of nasal tests and

reporting those COVID test results); however, Nealis testified as to why he

considered those circumstances different. Doc. 64-17 at 38, 45, 47–48, 61, 107–

08, 115–16. For summary judgment, the Court assumes the sincerity of Nealis’s

religious beliefs.

Nealis thought the masking requirement identified unvaccinated

employees in a discriminatory manner.8 See Doc. 64-17 at 108, 167–69, 290.

PGA offered Nealis a different (more remote) workstation, to limit when he

would be required to mask. Doc. 64-17 at 174–75, 438–39. Nealis declined this

option citing the need to interact with his team and noting the opportunity to

interact was one reason for the location of his current workstation. Doc. 64-17

at 177–78, 437–38. Nealis ultimately agreed to masking as required. Doc. 64-

17 at 216–17.

Nealis objected to nasal testing based on its intrusive nature. See Doc. 64-

17 at 420. Nealis considered the testing to be burdensome and was concerned

about the impact of supply chain issues with required weekly testing.9 See Doc.

64-17 at 159, 180–81. PGA offered saliva testing as an alternative, and Nealis

ultimately agreed to the saliva testing. Doc. 64-17 at 114, 157, 420.

PGA and Nealis did not reach an agreement about reporting test results.

Doc. 64-17 at 200-01, 217. The initial requirement was to report test results

8 Nealis testified his objections to safety protocols also were tied to his

religious beliefs, but admitted he did not tell PGA he had a religious objection

to the masking requirement. See Doc. 64-17 at 113–14, 132–35. Because Nealis

ultimately agreed to the masking requirement and was offered an acceptable

testing alternative, the discussion about the masking and testing protocols and

Nealis’s objections to those protocols is limited. See Doc. 64-17 at 114, 216–17.

9 To address this and other concerns, PGA offered to fully pay for testing

and have test materials delivered to Nealis’s home. Doc. 64-17 at 186, 208.

through an app. See Doc. 64-17 at 181, 189, 410, 439. Nealis expressed concerns

about confidentiality, requested to report his results to a designated individual,

and requested the results not be recorded or shared in any manner.10 Doc. 64-

17 at 181–83, 189–91, 427–40. PGA offered an internal email

(covid@pgatourhq.com) for Nealis to use to report results. Doc. 64-17 at 188.

Nealis continued to object, stating (by email):

[D]isclosing my personal medical information is a significant

concern to me. I am willing to disclose in confidentiality the results

of my test to a trusted point of contact; however . . . I do not want

my personal medical information stored, communicated or

distributed.11

Doc. 64-17 at 436. PGA reassured Nealis test results would not be shared with

others in the company and the information would be stored separately from

personnel files. Id. at 432. Nealis’s communication consistently expressed

concern over privacy or confidentiality related to reporting testing results. See

Doc. 64-17 at 161, 164, 181–83, 194, 200–01, 217.

10 Nealis characterized changes to requirements involving reporting and

sharing vaccination status information as “abandonment” of the prior honor

system, and a “contradiction to the commitment to confidentiality of personal

privacy [PGA] has previously promised . . . .” Doc. 66-15 ¶25; Doc. 65 at 4.

11 In another part of the same email chain, Nealis stated: “I do not feel

comfortable posting my personal medical information on an app interface which

is distributed to third parties outside of my control, including the recording and

reporting of my medical information without my consent . . . .” Doc. 64-17 at

438. At his deposition, Nealis expressed concern that storing the results would

allow someone like an “IT administrator” to have access to his medical records

without a justifiable reason. Doc. 64-17 at 188.

After they had been communicating about the protocols for almost two

weeks, Nealis told PGA the concern about reporting test results (the only safety

protocol not resolved) was related to his religious beliefs. Doc. 64-17 at 432

(stating in an email the “communicated objection to the recording of my

personal and medical information is directly related to my original ([PGA]

approved) religious exemption” request). In light of Nealis’s prior focus on

privacy, and because Nealis did not offer more explanation about why the

reporting requirement conflicted with his religious beliefs, PGA did not consider

this a “bona fide religious objection to the recording of his test results.” Doc. 64-

1 ¶18; Doc. 63 at 12. In addition, PGA deemed the request to report to an

individual without being able to record or share the results to be unreasonable

and inconsistent with the need to “conduct contact tracing, track quarantine

periods, and comply with potential imminent federal OSHA requirements.” Doc.

64-1 ¶¶16–17; see Doc. 63 at 7 n.3. Nealis then again requested to work full-

time from home. Doc. 64-17 at 51, 215, 427–28. PGA denied this request. Id.12

Doc. 64-17 at 51, 215, 427–28.

Nealis’s last position with PGA was as a Senior Manager Business

Intelligence for the Data and Technology Science Team. Doc. 66-15 ¶5. The

12 PGA did offer for Nealis to work two days a week from home but

compliance with safety protocols was still required. Doc. 64-17 at 427.

team was led by Mike Vitti, and Nealis’s supervisor was Jennifer Vermeulen.

Id. Nealis did not have any responsibility to manage or supervise others. Id.

Nealis identified three coworkers treated more favorably because they

were allowed to work from home: Maria Kellerman, Amberlee Buckley, and

Josh Oskwarek.13 Doc. 64-17 at 243–45. Kellerman worked on a different team.

Doc. 64-2 ¶9. Kellerman’s request to work from home for religious reasons was

denied, but a few days later she was allowed to work from home for medical

reasons. Doc. 64-17 at 248–50. Nealis does not know Kellerman’s medical

circumstances. See Doc. 64-17 at 250–51. Buckley, who worked on a different

team, was allowed to work from home for medical reasons. Doc. 64-17 at 254–

55; Doc. 64-2 ¶10. Oskwarek, who worked on the same team, was allowed to

work from home because of a severely immunocompromised family member.14

Doc. 64-17 at 245–47; Doc. 64-2 ¶11. No alleged comparator held the same

position as Nealis or had the same supervisor. Doc. 64-2 ¶¶9–11. PGA

determined on-site collaboration was not required for Kellerman, Buckley, or

13 Nealis argued there was a fourth individual, whose name and

circumstances were unknown. Doc. 64-17 at 243–45, 257–58. Kellerman and

Buckley were unvaccinated and Oskwarek was vaccinated. See Doc. 64-2 ¶¶9–

11.

14 Per PGA, Oskwarek worked on a different team. Doc. 64-2 ¶11. For

summary judgment purposes, the Court accepts Nealis’s characterization.

Oskwarek, but Nealis’s position did require on-site collaboration. Doc. 64-2

¶¶9–11; Doc. 64-3 ¶9.

Nealis argued the required safety protocols for unvaccinated employees

discriminated against employees who were unvaccinated, for any reason, and

gave preferable treatment to vaccinated employees.15 Doc. 64-17 at 29, 82, 88,

102, 239, 243. Doc. 64-17 at 420. Nealis told PGA he was concerned about the

“undue burden these currently stated additional protocols place on me as an

unvaccinated individual.” Doc. 64-17 at 420. Nealis thought PGA “was giving

preference to the ‘fears’ of vaccinated employees regarding getting COVID-19

over the ‘fears’ of religious employees regarding violating their religious beliefs.”

Doc. 66-15 ¶55.

Nealis did not comply with the required reporting of test results and was

terminated from employment on November 12, 2021. Doc. 64-17 at 216.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a “court shall grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

15 As support, Nealis cites (1) PGA’s positive comments about employees

who had been vaccinated, and (2) Vitti’s concern for a family member in the

hospital without access to support “because of unvaccinated individuals.” Doc

66-15 ¶¶16-18; Doc. 64-17 at 228–30. Vitti’s family member passed away.

Further, the Court will construe evidence in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party. See Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098

(11th Cir. 2014).

B. Religious Discrimination (Counts I and IV)

1. Alleged Disparate Treatment

A disparate treatment claim based on circumstantial evidence is analyzed

under the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework or Nealis may

establish a convincing mosaic of evidence to support discrimination. 16

McCreight v. AuburnBank, 117 F.4th 1322, 1334 (11th Cir. 2024) (noting “the

McDonnell Douglas framework and the ‘convincing mosaic standard’ are two

ways to approach the same question: whether the plaintiff has put forward

enough evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that illegal discrimination

occurred.”). Under McDonnell Douglas, Nealis can establish a prima facie case

of religious discrimination by showing: (1) he is a member of a protected class;

(2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he suffered an adverse employment

action; and (4) he was replaced by a person outside the protected class or was

treated less favorably than a similarly-situated individual outside his protected

class.” Maynard v. Bd. of Regents, 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). “If the plaintiff

16 Both parties cite standards for circumstantial evidence claims.

makes out a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to

articulate a legitimate reason for the adverse action. If the defendant does so,

the plaintiff must then show that the defendant’s proffered reason for the

adverse action is pretextual.” Hurlbert v. St. Mary’s Health Care Sys., Inc., 439

F.3d 1286, 1297 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal citation omitted).

To establish pretext, the plaintiff must show “the proffered reason was

not the true reason for the employment decision . . . either directly by

persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the

employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is

unworthy of credence.” Jackson v. Ala. State Tenure Comm’n, 405 F.3d 1276,

1289 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.

248, 256 (1981)). The evidence for pretext “must reveal such weaknesses,

implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies or contradictions in the

employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its actions that a reasonable

factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch.

Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 771 (11th Cir. 2005) (cleaned up).

Using the McDonnell Douglas framework, the only dispute is about the

fourth prong: whether Nealis identified a proper comparator. The Eleventh

Circuit requires a comparator be “similarly situated in all material respects.”

Lewis v. City of Union City, Ga., 934 F.3d 1169, 1178 (11th Cir. 2019). Nealis

identified three comparators. Two, Kellerman and Buckley, worked on different

teams, with different supervisors, and in different positions. Doc. 64-2 ¶¶9, 10.

Oskwarek worked on the same team, but under a different supervisor, and in a

different role. Doc. 64-2 ¶11. For the three alleged comparators, PGA granted a

work from home request for medical reasons and after determining on-site

collaboration was not necessary for their roles. Id. ¶¶9–11.

In contrast, PGA determined on-site collaboration was necessary for

Nealis’s position. Nealis does not directly dispute this, but he does argue that

he was able to work effectively as a remote employee. Doc. 64-17 at 428. Nealis’s

ability to work effectively while the employee workforce was generally remote

for safety reasons during the pandemic, does not refute PGA’s determination

that on-site collaboration for his role was critical as employees were able to

return to the office. See Doc. 63 at 33 n.22; Reno v. Holifield, 115 F.3d 1555,

1565 (11th Cir. 1997) (collecting cases noting the inquiry into pretext focuses on

employer belief, not the employee’s self-assessment) (abrogated on other

grounds by Lewis v. City of Union City, Ga., 918 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir.

2019)). Indeed, Nealis’s own testimony and action supports PGA’s conclusion

that on-site collaboration was critical to his role. Nealis himself refused the offer

of a more remote workstation, citing the importance of interacting with

colleagues and that his current workstation was chosen because it fostered such

interaction.

Nealis cannot establish a prima facie case because he lacks a proper

comparator. Having similarly situated comparators helps courts “avoid ‘second-

guessing employers’ reasonable decisions and confusing apples with oranges.’”

See Humphrey v. Napolitano, 517 F. App’x 705, 709 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting

Burke-Fowler v. Orange Cnty, Fla., 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006)).17

Nealis essentially argues his request to work from home for religious

reasons was treated differently than comparable requests to work from home

for medical reasons. In support, he cites the fact that Kellerman’s request to

work remotely was denied for a religious reason, but it was granted few days

later for a medical reason. While the reason for the change with Kellerman’s

request is not clear, it is undisputed that on-site collaboration was critical to

Nealis’s role and PGA determined it was not critical for Kellerman’s role or the

other alleged comparators.18

Nor has Nealis presented a “convincing mosaic” of evidence of being

treated differently based on his religious views. Nealis repeatedly testified he

17 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent,

however, they may be cited when the Court finds them persuasive on a

particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060-61 (11th Cir.

2022).

18 There is no evidence as to why Kellerman’s religious request to work

from home was denied but then granted for a medical reason, and the Court

will not speculate as to whether there was a legally sufficient distinction. Each

alleged comparator was permitted to work from home for a medical reason after

PGA determined on-site collaboration was not required. These circumstances

distinguish them from Nealis’s situation.

thought all unvaccinated employees (regardless of why they were unvaccinated)

were treated differently because they had to comply with PGA’s safety protocols,

while vaccinated employees were treated better because they were not subject

to the safety protocols. Vaccination status alone, however, is not a protected

characteristic. Accordingly, Nealis has not established a prima facie case of

disparate treatment based on religion.

Even if Nealis had established a prima facie case, his claims of religious

discrimination fail because he cannot show the reason for his termination was

pretextual. In multiple communications, PGA told employees that failure to

comply with safety protocols could result in termination. This is what happened

to Nealis—he was terminated because he did not comply with safety protocols.19

2. Alleged Failure to Accommodate

For a failure to accommodate claim based on “circumstantial evidence,

‘[a] Title VII plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of religious

discrimination by ‘present[ing] evidence sufficient to prove that (1) he had a

bona fide religious belief that conflicted with an employment requirement; (2)

he informed his employer of his belief; and (3) he was discharged for failing to

comply with the conflicting employment requirement.’ ” Jean-Pierre v. Naples

Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 817 F. App’x 822, 826 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Morrissette-

19 Apart from the alleged comparators, discussed supra, there is no

evidence about others who failed to comply with safety protocols.

Brown v. Mobile Infirmary Med. Ctr., 506 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir.

2007) (citations omitted). “If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, ‘the

burden shifts to the defendant to ‘demonstrate[ ] that he is unable to reasonably

accommodate [] an employee’s . . . religious observance or practice without

undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.’” Id. (quoting 42

U.S.C. § 2000e(j)).

Nealis initially objected to all the safety protocols, but he and PGA

reached agreement about masking and use of a saliva-based test, leaving only

a dispute about reporting of test results.20 PGA offered Nealis an alternative

20 Although the parties did not focus on them, there are cases discussing

employment disputes about COVID vaccine mandates or safety protocols. E.g.,

Schmidt v. Disney Parks, Experiences, and Products, Inc., et al., 721 F. Supp.

3d 1314 (M.D. Fla. 2024). Even so, the Court did not find cases similar enough

to be persuasive. Three recent appellate decisions reversed dismissal, generally

concluding the employee expressed a religious objection sufficient to defeat the

motion to dismiss. See Passarella v. Aspirus, Inc., 108 F.4th 1005 (7th Cir. 2024)

(reversing dismissal because employees sought accommodation from vaccine

mandate due to plausible religious beliefs); Ringhoffer v. Mayo Clinic,

Ambulance, 102 F.4th 894 (8th Cir. 2024) (reversing dismissal because

employees plausibly pled their religious beliefs conflicted with testing

requirement); Prida v. Option Care Enters., Inc., No. 23-3936, 2025 WL 460206

(6th Cir. Feb. 11, 2025) (reversing dismissal because employee consistently

communicated refusal to take weekly COVID tests was based on religious

beliefs). Besides being factually distinguishable, these cases address the

standard for dismissal for failure to state a claim which is materially different

than the summary judgment inquiry on a full record. Other cases the Court

identified involved religious objections to a vaccine mandate, religious

objections to another safety protocol, or non-religious objections to an employer

requirement, whereas the dispute between Nealis and PGA was ultimately

limited to a religious objection to the reporting of test results. See also Oberst

v. Cnty. of Lane, No. 6:23-CV-01556, 2025 WL 318712 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2025)

reporting mechanism (an internal email instead of external app) and some

assurances about confidentiality. The alternative did not meet Nealis’s

condition of reporting to an individual without his test results being recorded,

stored, or shared in any way.21 PGA extended the deadline for Nealis to report

test results three times. PGA informed Nealis he would be terminated if he did

not report test results by noon on November 12, 2021, and that is what

happened.

Nealis filed his request for religious exemption on October 19, 2021, and

it was approved one week later. However, the approval only meant Nealis did

not have to pay an additional insurance premium applicable to unvaccinated

employees. Even with an approved religious exemption, Nealis was still

required to comply with safety protocols to which he objected. Starting at least

by October 27, 2021, Nealis and PGA had multiple communications about his

(granting summary judgment for employer and finding that employer provided

accommodations for employee’s religious objections to vaccine requirement, but

employee only expressed “secular” objections to masking and testing

requirements).

21 PGA argues Nealis’s accommodation claim fails because Nealis is not

entitled to his preferred accommodation. Doc. 63 at 23 (citing Patterson v.

Walgreen Co., 727 F. App’x 581, 585 (11th Cir. 2018)). The Patterson court also

noted the Supreme Court had determined “a reasonable accommodation is one

that eliminates the conflict between employment requirements and religious

practices.” Id. at 586 (quoting Ansonia Bd. of Educ., v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60,

70 (1986)). Although PGA offered Nealis alternatives, none of them fully

addressed Nealis’s concern that having test results recorded and possibly

shared might leave him “marked.”

objections to the safety protocols and alternatives. Related to reporting the test

results, Nealis’s communication focused on privacy and confidentiality concerns

– not a conflict with his religious beliefs. Nealis repeatedly stated his concerns

about having test results recorded or shared in any manner, often expressing

that if the results were recorded, they could be shared in ways he did not

approve.

Then, on November 8, 2021, Nealis mentioned his privacy concerns were

“directly related” to his religious exemption request (and in turn, related to his

interpretation of Biblical prophecy). Other than saying the privacy concern was

related to his religious exemption (and referring to his notes about that broader

discussion), Nealis did not offer details as to how reporting the test results to

an internal email with limited sharing would conflict with his religious beliefs.

The overall context of the communication raises doubts whether Nealis had a

bona fide religious objection to reporting test results, but for summary

judgment, the Court will presume he did.

Because PGA’s offered accommodation of reporting to an internal email

did not resolve Nealis’s stated religious conflict, Nealis has established a prima

facie case and PGA must show the requested accommodation was an undue

hardship to rebut the prima facie case. Nealis suggested two alternatives. One

was to report his test results to an individual but not allow any recording or

sharing of the results. In late 2021, many workplaces, including PGA, were

trying to navigate the evolving circumstances related to the COVID-19

pandemic, including minimizing or managing exposure concerns for employees

and complying with developing and changing government requirements. The

request to test and report results weekly was common and exposure sometimes

resulted in contact tracing. OSHA guidance for its Emergency Temporary

Standard told employers that recording test results would be required.22 Given

this, it would have been an undue hardship as a matter of law (not to mention

as a matter of common sense) to allow the weekly reporting but prohibit PGA

from any recording or sharing of test results—under any circumstances. The

second option was to work remotely. The work from home option would have

been an undue hardship for Nealis’s position because it is undisputed that it

required on-site collaboration.

Accordingly, PGA is entitled to summary judgment on Nealis’s religious

discrimination claims, both disparate treatment and failure to accommodate.

22 The Court takes judicial notice that OSHA’s November 2021 FAQ,

Question 6.F. for the Emergency Temporary Standard required covered

employers to record test results of unvaccinated employees. COVID-19

Vaccination and Testing ETS - Frequently Asked Questions | Occupational

Safety and Health Administration (last visited February 28, 2025). The OSHA

ETS guidance was published November 5, 2021. The Fifth Circuit quickly

entered a stay of the OSHA rule, and the stay was lifted by the Sixth Circuit

after cases were consolidated. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. OSHA, 595 U.S.

109 (2022). The rule was stayed by the Supreme Court on January 13, 2022,

and later withdrawn. Id.; see Doc. 63 at 7 n.3.

C. Retaliation (Counts II and V)

Nealis also claims his termination was retaliatory. A plaintiff may

establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing: (1) he engaged in

statutorily protected activity, (2) he was adversely affected by an employment

decision, and (3) there was a causal connection between the statutorily

protected conduct and the adverse employment action. Drago v. Jenne, 453 F.3d

1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 2006). There is no dispute Nealis engaged in protected

activity by requesting a religious exemption and no dispute his termination was

an adverse employment action. Nealis also raised concerns of religious

discrimination to PGA by email.

The dispute is whether there is a causal connection between his protected

activity and termination. One way to establish a causal connection is based on

temporal proximity–when the adverse action occurs shortly after the protected

activity, it supports a conclusion the two are causally connected. Grant v.

Miami-Dade Cnty. Water & Sewer Dep’t, 636 F. App’x 462, 468–69 (11th Cir.

2015) (citing Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th Cir. 2004)). Here,

Nealis’s termination was less than a month after his request for a religious

accommodation and only a few weeks after he mentioned discrimination.

But in this case, the evidence of connection based on temporal proximity

is rebutted because the consequences of not following safety protocols were

announced before Nealis engaged in protected activity. As early as July 16,

2021, at least three months before Nealis submitted his request for religious

exemption, PGA told employees they could be terminated for not following

safety protocols. Nealis was terminated for not posting his test results by the

extended deadline.

Courts have held an adverse action before protected activity is not

causally connected as a matter of law. Debe v. State Farm Auto. Mut. Ins. Co.,

860 F. App’x 637, 641 (11th Cir. 2021) (“[I]f the alleged retaliatory conduct

occurred before the employee engaged in protected activity, the two events

cannot be causally connected.”). The same logic applies here because although

the adverse action occurred after the protected activity, the consequence of

termination was contemplated and communicated well before the protected

activity. See Gonzalez v. City of New York, No. 22-cv-3577, 2024 WL 1332546

at *14 (W.D.N.Y. March 28, 2024) (collecting cases which hold enforcement of a

previously communicated policy is not retaliation). Months before Nealis

engaged in protected activity, PGA decided (and communicated) that

unvaccinated employees who did not follow required safety protocols could be

terminated. Doc. 66-15 ¶24. The decision to terminate Nealis was because he

did not comply with the requirement to report his testing results. PGA’s

insistence that employees comply with safety protocols was the same before and

after Nealis’s protected activity, and therefore his termination was not causally

connected to his protected activity or religious objection. See Edgerton v. City

of Plantation, 682 Fed. App’x 748, 750—51 (11th Cir. 2017) (noting activities that

occurred both before and after protected activity, lack a causal connection to the

protected activity).

PGA is entitled to summary judgment on Nealis’s retaliation claims.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED:

1. Defendant PGA Tour, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc.

63, is GRANTED.

2. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of PGA Tour, Inc.,

and against Patrick Nealis and close the file.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida, the 13th day of March,

2025.

Ke Cmothy, ff. Corrigan

TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN

STACI Senior United States District Judge

ddw

Copies:

Counsel of record

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