Laurion v. PHH Mortgage Corporation

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

HARTFORD DIVISION

In re: Chapter 7

Samuel Aaron Laurion and Case No. 24-20521 (JJT)

Heather Renee Laurion,

Debtors.

Samuel Aaron Laurion, Adv. P. No. 24-02019 (JJT)

Plaintiff, Re: ECF Nos. 6, 10, 14, 26, 32, 33, 34

v.

PHH Mortgage Corporation,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

GRANTING AMENDED MOTION TO DISMISS

Appearances

Samuel Aaron Laurion

Pro se Debtor–Plaintiff

Tara L. Trifon

Troutman Pepper Locke LLP

20 Church Street, 20th Floor

Hartford, CT 06103

Counsel for Defendant PHH Mortgage Corporation

Before the Court is the Amended Motion to Dismiss (Motion, ECF No. 14)

filed by defendant PHH Mortgage Corporation. In the Motion, PHH requests that

this Court dismiss the Adversary Proceeding complaint (Complaint, ECF No. 1)1

filed by the Debtor, Samuel Aaron Laurion.2 In the Complaint, the Debtor seeks

damages and injunctive relief for alleged violations of the discharge injunction by

PHH. For the following reasons, the Court agrees that the Debtor has failed to state

a claim for relief upon which relief can be granted and accordingly dismisses the

Adversary Proceeding. Because the Debtor’s allegations are frivolous, the Court will

also deny leave to amend.

1. Background

1.1 Procedural History

Underlying this dispute is a mortgage granted by the Debtor when he

borrowed money to purchase real property located at 8 White Oak Drive,

Colchester, Connecticut.3 On October 18, 2023, the Debtor quitclaimed 8 White Oak

Drive to the Laurion Family GodTrust (Trust),4 which was recorded the following

day in the Colchester land records.5

Prior to the underlying bankruptcy case, the Debtor, in both his individual

capacity and as trustee of the Trust, filed a complaint against PHH and related

parties in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (District

1 The Complaint was styled a Motion for Sanctions for Violation of the Discharge Injunction as to

PHH Mortgage Corporation. Given the relief sought by the Debtor, the Court has construed it as an

adversary complaint and this Adversary Proceeding was accordingly opened.

2 Because Heather Laurion is not a party to this Adversary Proceeding, all references to the Debtor

are to Samuel Laurion alone.

3 The Debtor has referred to this property as Rural Route 8 White Oak Drive, Colchester,

Connecticut Republic, [06415] Outside D.C. The two are the same thing.

4 The Debtor sometimes refers to this as the Laurion Familia GodTrust. The Debtor is the trustee of

the Trust.

5 The Court has previously taken judicial notice of the Colchester land records.

Court Action).6 In the District Court Action, the Debtor sought rescission of the note

and mortgage underlying his purchase of 8 White Oak Drive based upon the Truth

in Lending Act (TILA) and Regulation Z. The Debtor immediately sought a

preliminary injunction, which the District Court denied because the Debtor “ha[d]

not established a sufficient likelihood of success.” Particularly, the District Court

noted that the Debtor’s “mortgage is not eligible for rescission because . . . [the

Debtor] entered into a purchase money mortgage.” After nothing substantive

occurred while the Debtor’s bankruptcy case proceeded, the Debtor moved to

dismiss the District Court Action,7 which the District Court did without prejudice

on February 13, 2025.8

While the District Court Action was pending, the Debtor and Heather

Laurion filed for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on June 5, 2024.

After the Chapter 7 Trustee filed a Report of No Distribution on August 28, 2024

(MC ECF No. 27), an order discharging the Debtor and Heather Laurion entered on

September 18, 2024 (MC ECF No. 31). Two days later, the Debtor filed a Motion to

Avoid Lien against PHH (ECF No. 34). The Court denied (ECF No. 63) the Motion

to Avoid Lien (and two others against other creditors) on October 29, 2024. In doing

so, the Court noted that the mortgage PHH holds on the Debtor’s residence is a

6 See Complaint, Laurion v. PHH Mortgage Corp., Case No. 3:23-cv-01561-JAM, ECF No. 1 (D. Conn.

Nov. 29, 2023). The Court has previously taken judicial notice of the District Court Action.

7 Although the Chapter 7 Trustee has indicated his intent to abandon all property of the estate,

absent a Court order, such abandonment does not happen until the closing of the case. See 11 U.S.C.

§ 554(c) and (d). Accordingly, the causes of action in the District Court Action properly belong to the

Chapter 7 Trustee and the Debtor had no standing to move for its dismissal.

8 The Debtor indicated that, due to the overlapping nature of the District Court Action and this

Adversary Proceeding, he wished to proceed in this forum to avoid “unnecessary complexity,

inefficiency, or prejudice against one or both parties.”

consensual purchase money mortgage and that the Debtor had quitclaimed the

property into a trust, meaning an exemption could not be claimed in it.

After the Court denied the Motion to Avoid Lien in the underlying

bankruptcy case, the Debtor filed the instant Adversary Proceeding on November

11, 2024. PHH filed its first Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 6) on December 23, 2024.

After the Debtor filed a response (ECF No. 10) on January 8, 2025, the Court held a

hearing on January 30, 2025. At that hearing, PHH indicated that it would consent

to entry of final orders or judgment by this Court, prompting its filing of the instant

Motion on February 5, 2025. The Court allowed for supplemental briefing, with both

parties filing such briefs (ECF Nos. 26, 32). The Debtor then belatedly filed a

“Counterclaim” (ECF No. 33) on March 11, 2025, and a “Motion for Equitable Relief

in Exclusive Equity, Setoff of In Rem Claim under Trust Law, Recognition as

Subrogee under Right of Reversion, and Request for Sealed Proceedings” (ECF No.

34) on March 13, 2025.9

1.2 Allegations in Complaint

In the Complaint, the Debtor alleges that PHH has violated the discharge

injunction by: (1) having a practice of holding partial payments in suspense,

(2) providing a loan statement with an ambiguous disclaimer, and (3) responding to

a request for verification under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act without

noting the Debtor’s discharge. His Complaint and attached affidavit allege

9 Because he is the plaintiff, the Debtor does not assert counterclaims. The Court will construe that

filing as a motion to amend the Complaint. Likewise, the Debtor’s motion seeks affirmative relief

that the Court will also construe as a motion to amend the Complaint. The Court will address both

later in this Memorandum of Decision after addressing the claims made in the Complaint as filed.

emotional distress and financial hardship for his family, including adverse effects

on Heather Laurion’s health. In his prayer for relief, the Debtor requests immediate

cessation of collection activities, acknowledgement of a discharge violation and

apology, damages in the amount of $150,000, confirmation of discharge of the debt,

and a release of the mortgage lien.

Additional factual allegations pertinent to this decision will be addressed as

necessary below.

2. Jurisdiction

The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has

jurisdiction over these proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), and the Bankruptcy

Court derives its authority to hear and determine this matter on reference from the

District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) and (b)(1) and the General Order of

Reference of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dated

September 21, 1984. This Adversary Proceeding is a core proceeding under 28

U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(O). To the extent that the claims asserted in this Adversary

Proceeding are related to or Stern claims,10 the Court construes the Debtor’s silence

in the Complaint as implied consent to this Court exercising final adjudicatory

authority. See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665, 683–85 (2015);

Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7008(a) (“In an adversary proceeding before a bankruptcy court,

the complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party complaint shall contain a

statement that the pleader does or does not consent to entry of final orders or

10 See generally Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011).

judgment by the bankruptcy court.”). PHH has consented to entry of final orders or

judgment by this Court.

3. Discussion

Under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as applied by Rule

7012 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, a party to an Adversary

Proceeding may assert by motion, among other things, the defenses of failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

In this Court’s review of the Debtor’s Complaint, “[t]he pleadings and

allegations of a pro se plaintiff must be construed liberally for the purposes of

deciding motions pursuant to . . . 12(b)(6).” Zapotocky v. CIT Bank, N.A., 587 B.R.

589, 592–93 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (citing McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 96 (2d. Cir.

2007); Weixel v. Bd. of Educ., 287 F.3d 138, 145–46 (2d Cir. 2002)). “The

submissions of a pro se litigant should be interpreted to ‘raise the strongest

arguments that they suggest.’” Id. (quoting Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 248 (2d

Cir. 2006)). While so generously construing the Debtor’s allegations as urged by our

jurisprudence, the Court cannot ignore where the Debtor misconceives the law, the

authority of the Court, or his rights of access to justice.

The United States Supreme Court has laid out a two-step test to evaluate a

complaint’s sufficiency. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). First, except for

legal conclusions, all allegations contained in the complaint are accepted as true. Id.

Second, the complaint must state a plausible claim for relief to survive dismissal.

Id. at 679. The plaintiff makes a facially plausible claim when he “pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). “A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court

should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise

to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. “Determining whether a complaint states a

plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. (citation

omitted).11

Under 11 U.S.C. § 524(a): “A discharge in a case under this title— . . .

(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an

action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such

debt as a personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is

waived[.]” Section 524(a)(2) “extends to all forms of collection activity, including

letters, phone calls, threats of criminal proceedings or other adverse actions

intended to bring about repayment.” 4 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 524.02[2] (16th ed.

2025). “Like the automatic stay of section 362(a), the discharge injunction is the

11 Before addressing the merits of the claims as alleged, the Court must observe that the Debtor filed

this action alone because he was indisputably the sole signatory to the note and mortgage at issue in

this case. He has no standing to assert any claimed damages to his wife or other family members.

Given that the Debtor fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in any regard, this point

is largely academic, but the Court must acknowledge it nonetheless because it implicates subject

matter jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court only addresses the claims alleged as they pertain to the

Debtor directly.

equivalent of a court order. Therefore, a violation of the injunction may be

sanctioned as contempt of court.” Id. (footnote omitted).12

The Chapter 7 discharge relieves the Debtor of his in personam liability, but

As the Supreme Court held in Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 112 S.

Ct. 773, 116 L. Ed. 2d 903 (1992), Chapter 7 does not provide for

stripping of in rem liens. Liens are therefore said to “pass through” or

“survive” Chapter 7 bankruptcy. See Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501

U.S. 78, 83, 111 S. Ct. 2150, 115 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1991). The holder of the

lien will continue to have recourse for the underlying debt in the

collateral itself, despite the discharge of the debtor's personal liability,

which prevents the creditor from recovering against any other of the

debtor’s assets.

Curwen v. Whiton, 557 B.R. 39, 42 (D. Conn. 2016). “When a secured creditor

retains a lien on the debtor’s property after the discharge, courts have held that it is

not per se improper for the secured creditor to contact a debtor to send payment

coupons, determine whether payments will be made on the secured debt, or inform

the debtor of a possible foreclosure or repossession, as long as it is clear the creditor

is not attempting to collect the debt as a personal liability.” 4 Collier on Bankruptcy

¶ 524.02[2][b].

As noted above, the Complaint asserts that three particular acts by PHH

constitute a violation of the discharge injunction, namely: (1) PHH’s practice of

holding partial payments in suspense, (2) PHH’s having provided a loan statement

with an ambiguous disclaimer, and (3) PHH’s having responded to a request for

12 Civil contempt is imposed under 11 U.S.C. § 105 and requires a finding that there is no fair ground

of doubt regarding the wrongfulness of the violator’s conduct. Taggart v. Lorenzen, 587 U.S. 554,

560–61 (2019).

verification under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act without noting the

Debtor’s discharge. The Court addresses each in turn.

3.1 Suspense Payments

The first claim is easily dispensed with. The Debtor alleges that PHH has

violated the discharge injunction by having a practice of holding partial payments

in suspense, which he claims misleads him into believing he had an obligation to

pay. Nowhere, however, does the Debtor allege that PHH held his payments in

suspense, which is confirmed by the monthly statement that the Debtor attached to

his Complaint. In fact, that statement showed that no payments had been made in

2024.

Section 524(a)(2) enjoins creditors from “the commencement or continuation

of an action” (i.e., a lawsuit) or “act[s] to collect, recover or offset any . . . debt as a

personal liability[.]” The first is not applicable here. The second requires that the

creditor have acted. The mere policy of a suspense account, without its actual

application, is not an act. Cf. Jacks v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Jacks), 642 F.3d

1323, 1329 (11th Cir. 2011) (“The mere recordation of fees incurred by Wells Fargo

on its internal records, without any attempt to collect these fees from the debtor or

estate or to modify the mortgage, is not an ‘act’ in violation of § 362(a)(3).”).

Accordingly, there is no plausible discharge violation pleaded with regards to any

suspense account.

3.2. Loan Statement

The Debtor next complains that a loan statement dated October 17, 2024,

was ambiguous and thus caused “confusion and coercion.” The statement, which is

attached to the Complaint as Exhibit A, shows prominently near the top left:

Bankrupicy Message

Our records show that ether you are a debtor in bankruptcy or you discharged

porsonal Tablity for your mortgage loan In bankriptcy.

We are sending this statement to you forinigrmational and oemplianoe pepose|s only. iis net

an attampt to cect a debt against you.

Ifyou want to stop receiving statements, write to us.at! PHH Mortgage Services

PO Box 24736

West Palm Beach, FL 32416

The Debtor states in the Complaint that the first sentence “breaches clarity

requirements under 12 CFR 1026.41()(2)@).”

Section 1026.41(f)(2) of title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which is

part of Regulation Z provides:

Bankruptcy notices. The periodic statement must include the following:

i) A statement identifying the consumer’s status as a debtor in

bankruptcy or the discharged status of the mortgage loan; and

(ii) A statement that the periodic statement is for informational

purposes only.

The Debtor chiefly takes issue with the fact that the loan statement does not only

say that he has received a discharge, instead providing that PHH knows that he is

either a debtor in bankruptcy or has received a discharge of his personal liability.

But a plain language reading of § 1026.41(f)(2)G) does not support the notion that

PHH must identify which of the two is currently true.

18 The Debtor elaborated at the January 30, 2025 hearing that he finds the use of the word “or”

confusing.

10

Under § 1026.41(a)(2), PHH is required to send periodic billing statements for

mortgages. A mortgage servicer like PHH is exempt from this requirement if a

consumer receives a bankruptcy discharge and that consumer requests in writing

that PHH cease providing periodic statements. Id., § 1026.41(e)(5)(i). There is no

allegation that the Debtor made such a request here (or that he fell into some other

exception).

The bankruptcy disclaimer at issue here matches that provided by the

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in its sample modified mortgage statement.

See Form H-30(E). Because the CFPB promulgated Regulation Z and Form H-30(E),

it is simply not plausible that PHH’s use of the language provided on the sample

form somehow violates the regulation requiring a bankruptcy disclaimer. Moreover,

the Second Circuit has held that periodic statements required by the Truth in

Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1638(f), as implemented by 12 C.F.R. § 1026.41, “do not

reflect attempts to collect [a] debt” under the FDCPA. Hill v. DLJ Mortg. Cap., Inc.,

689 F. App’x 97, 98 (2d Cir. 2017) (unpublished opinion). The Court fails to see how

that logic does not likewise apply to claimed violations of the discharge injunction.

The Debtor’s conclusory allegations that he was somehow confused and

misled do not change the calculus. Objectively, the bankruptcy disclaimer on the

October 17, 2024 statement complies with Regulation Z and is not attempt to collect

a debt in violation of the discharge injunction. The Debtor’s alleged confusion with

the law or the disclaimer’s objectively plain language is of no legal significance.

Accordingly, the Debtor has failed to state a plausible claim for relief in this regard.

3.3 Debt Verification Request

The Debtor final claim is like the prior one. According to the Complaint, on

November 4, 2024, the Debtor requested that PHH provide verification and

itemization of the mortgage debt under the FDCPA. PHH’s response included a

Payoff Statement (attached to the Complaint as Exhibit B) that, among other

things, did not provide a bankruptcy disclaimer.

In the Motion, PHH stated that it indeed responded to the Debtor’s

November 4, 2024 request, but that the Debtor conveniently failed to include the

cover letter that came with it (ECF No. 6, Ex. F), in which PHH’s counsel stated: “It

is important to note that PHH acknowledges the bankruptcy discharge order and is

not seeking to collect on the debt outside its contractual right to foreclose the

Mortgage.”

This Court must limit its analysis under Rule 12(b)(6) to the four corners of

the Complaint. Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67, 71 (2d Cir.

1998). The four corners, however, may include “documents attached to the

complaint as exhibits or incorporated in the complaint by reference.” Newman &

Schwartz v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 102 F.3d 660, 662 (2d Cir. 1996).

Additionally, the Court can rely on “documents either in plaintiff[’s] possession or of

which plaintiff[] had knowledge and relied on in bringing suit.” Brass v. Am. Film

Techs., Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir. 1993).

The Complaint alleges that PHH’s “response included a Payoff Statement . . .

that did not clarify [the Debtor’s] discharged status[.]” (emphasis added). This

statement clearly indicates that the response was more than just the Payoff

Statement that he alleges violated the discharge injunction. Moreover, at the

January 30, 2025 hearing, he acknowledged that the Cover Letter attached as

Exhibit F to the original Motion to Dismiss was indeed part of the response sent to

him. The Debtor’s selection of a part of what was provided to him in response to his

inquiry does not limit this Court’s review of the Cover Letter because it was part of

the admittedly complete response provided to him and was thus both incorporated

into the Complaint by reference and known and relied upon by the Debtor in

bringing suit.14

Analyzing the communication holistically, the Debtor’s claim regarding

PHH’s response to his request to verify the debt suffers the same infirmities as his

claim regarding the billing statement. First, Regulation Z requires that mortgage

lenders provide payoff statements upon written request—with no exception related

to bankruptcy. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.36(c)(3). PHH complied with the Debtor’s request as

required by law, but made sure to note at the outset that it acknowledged the

bankruptcy discharge and was not seeking to collect outside its right to foreclose.

That the Debtor would make the request and then claim a discharge violation is

calculated gotcha-ism at its worst. Because PHH both complied with the law in

providing the requested information and complied with the law in appropriately

noting the Debtor’s discharge status, the Debtor has failed to allege a plausible

claim for relief.

14 The Court therefore holds that it need not convert the Motion to a motion for summary judgment.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).

4. Leave to Amend

Having decided that dismissal of all counts is warranted, the Court must

consider whether to allow the Debtor to amend his pleadings. The Court determines

that such would be futile and thus declines to do so.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), as applied by Rule 7015 of the

Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure:

(1) Amending as a Matter of Course. A party may amend its pleading

once as a matter of course no later than:

(A) 21 days after serving it, or

(B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is

required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or

21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or

(f), whichever is earlier.

(2) Other Amendments. In all other cases, a party may amend its

pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the

court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so

requires.

Subsection (1) does not apply because each of the specified 21-day periods has

passed. It is also apparent that PHH will not consent to amendment. That means

amendment is only possible with this Court’s leave, which the rule says it “should

freely give leave when justice so requires.” Id. Under this “liberal and permissive

standard, . . . the only grounds on which denial of leave to amend has been held

proper are upon a showing of undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, or futility.”

Sacerdote v. N.Y. Univ., 9 F.4th 95, 115 (2d Cir. 2021) (cleaned up), cert. denied, 142

S. Ct. 1112 (2022). Although the first three grounds would potentially require the

Court to hear and weigh evidence, the Court has more than enough information

from the record of prior proceedings to determine whether any amendment would be

futile.

“Futility is a determination, as a matter of law, that proposed amendments

would fail to cure prior deficiencies or to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Commc’ns, Inc.,

681 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 2012).

With regards to the three claims made in the Complaint, no amount of

amendment can transform them into plausible claims. The Debtor’s misleading

arguments simply misconstrue the law and misstate undisputed facts, and his self-

serving, conclusory allegations of confusion do not objectively make PHH’s

communications so.

The Debtor, however, has also filed two documents that the Court is

construing as motions for leave to amend the Complaint (ECF Nos. 33, 34). In the

first, the Debtor largely reiterates his allegations in the Complaint, but attempts to

add a claim for fraud in the mortgage’s inception and seeking equitable setoff as a

remedy. The Debtor states, without any particularity, that PHH “perpetuated a

fraud where no funds were advanced, yet payments were coerced, vitiating the

mortgage with no statute of limitations bar.” In the second of these filings, the

Debtor further seeks a setoff, arguing that “[t]he United States operates under a

private trust in exclusive equity, per [the Trading with the Enemy Act] and the

1933 gold seizure, with trust law governing all contracts as offers (UCC military

jurisdiction).”

The invocations of trust law and the gold standard in this context are

hallmarks of sovereign citizen ideology.15 See Wood v. United States, 161 Fed. Cl.

30, 34–35 (Fed. Cl. 2022). The Debtor’s invocation of them is pure fantasy. Allowing

the Debtor to belatedly amend his Complaint to include these fictions is textbook

futility.

Given the Debtor’s history here and in the District Court, it is apparent that

he will not make allegations that states a plausible claim for relief. Additionally, his

failure to plead fraud with particularity, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), cannot be fixed by

repleading because his allegations are based on fundamental misunderstandings of

the law. The Court thus finds that any attempt to amend the Complaint would be

futile and only fuel further dilatory, repetitive, and wasteful litigation.16 See

Whittingon v. Deines, No. 21CV1224 DMS (JLB), 2021 WL 5761462, at *2 (S.D. Cal.

Dec. 3, 2021) (“Courts across the country ‘have uniformly rejected arguments’ based

on the sovereign citizen ideology as frivolous, irrational, or unintelligible.”) (cleaned

up).

15 The Debtor’s frequent use of “affidavits of truth” and reference to himself as “Authorized

Representative” are likewise well-documented sovereign citizen tactics. See Smith v. Quicken Loans,

No. 3:21-CV-903-L, 2021 WL 8323671, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2021); Vongermeten v. U.S. Trustee,

No. 23-CV-0823-BHL, 2023 WL 4685858, at *1 (E.D. Wis. July 21, 2023). To be clear, the Debtor has

the same right to access this Court as anyone else; however, in doing so, he is subject to the law as it

actually is, not how he imagines it to be.

16 Although the Second Circuit has said that “[a] pro se complaint should not be dismissed without

the Court granting leave to amend at least once[,]” this is qualified by the requirement that “a liberal

reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Nielsen v. Rabin,

746 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). A determination that a complaint

is futile is also determination that a valid claim cannot be stated, which the Second Circuit seemed

to recognize by immediately following its statement with the qualification that “leave to amend a

complaint may be denied when amendment would be futile.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

5. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is GRANTED. A separate order will

enter dismissing this Adversary Proceeding.

SO ORDERED at Hartford, Connecticut this 18th day of March 2025.

James J. Tancredi

‘United Sales Ranknupicy fuckge

District of Connecticut

17