People v. Amos CA1/3

Filed 3/14/25 P. v. Amos CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

A169358

v.

FRED LYNN AMOS, (Contra Costa County

Super. Ct. No. 05-910595-8)

Defendant and Appellant.

In 1992, a jury convicted Fred Amos and his codefendant, Donald

Boston, of multiple offenses, including three special circumstance murders.

The judgment was affirmed by a different panel of this court. (People v. Amos

et al. (July 22, 1994, A058843) [nonpub. opn.] (Amos I).) In 2022, Amos filed

a petition to vacate his murder convictions and resentence him for his other

offenses, which the trial court summarily denied. (Pen. Code, § 1172.6;

statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise indicated.)

Amos contends the court erred in concluding that he is ineligible for

resentencing as a matter of law. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

The parties do not discuss the facts that led to the charges against

Amos and Boston. Moreover, we do not rely on the factual summary in

Amos I when assessing whether Amos has made a prima facie case for

resentencing relief. (See People v. Beaudreaux (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1227,

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1238.) However, we utilize Amos I to flesh out the procedural history of this

case and to provide some basic context.

In December 1989, several individuals gathered at a minimart in

Vallejo, ostensibly to conduct a drug deal. (Amos I, supra, A058843 at pp. 5–

9.) Days later, three people with connections to the incident were found dead.

(Id. at p. 11.) The following month, two individuals who worked at the

minimart were placed in a witness protection program. (Id. at pp. 14–15.)

Over a year later, Amos and Boston were charged with multiple offenses

pertaining to these incidents. (Amos I, at p. 21–22.)

Criminal Charges

In January 1992, the Contra Costa County District Attorney filed an

amended information charging Amos and Boston with committing multiple

offenses in December 1989, and Boston with committing additional offenses

in January 1990. For clarity, we discuss the charges as they apply to Amos.

Amos was charged with the first degree murders of three victims,

Castaneda, Blackmon, and Treas. (§ 187, counts 1–3.) As to all three

charges, the information alleged the special circumstance that Amos

committed multiple murders. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3).) The information also

alleged three special circumstances for committing the murders during the

commission of another qualifying felony. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17) [the felony-

murder special circumstances].) Specifically, the prosecution alleged that

Amos and Boston were committing robbery when Castenada and Treas were

murdered; they were committing burglary when Castenada and Blackmon

were murdered; and they were committing kidnapping when Castenada and

Treas were murdered.

In addition to the three murders, Amos was charged with the following

offenses: kidnapping for robbery (§ 209, subd. (b), counts 4–5); robbery

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(§§ 211–212.5, subd. (a), counts 6–7); burglary (§§ 459, former 460.1, &

former 460.2, counts 8–9); vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a),

count 10); conspiracy to commit robbery, burglary, and kidnapping (former

§ 182.1, count 11); and unlawful possession of a concealable firearm by a felon

(§ former 12021, count 12).

The People alleged that Amos personally used a firearm while

committing all charged offenses, except for the unlawful gun possession

charge. (§ 12022.5, subd. (a).)

Jury Instructions Regarding Murder Charges

At trial, the jury was instructed regarding two theories of first degree

murder: deliberate, premeditated killing with malice aforethought and

felony murder, with robbery and burglary designated as the predicate

offenses. The jury also received instruction regarding the liability of an aider

and abettor, which provided that an aider and abettor is guilty not just of the

“particular crime aided and abetted” (the target offense), but is also “liable for

the natural and probable consequences of the commission of such crime.”

This instruction made clear that a defendant could not be found guilty as an

aider and abettor of any crime unless the jury was “satisfied beyond a

reasonable doubt that such crime was committed . . . .”

As to the special circumstance allegations, the jury was instructed that

if they found Amos guilty of first degree murder, they needed to decide

whether the prosecution proved any one of the four special circumstances as

to each murder victim. To assist the jury in making these determinations,

the court used a modified version of CALJIC No. 8.80, which stated in part:

“The People have the burden of proving the truth of a special

circumstance. If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether a special

circumstance is true, you must find it to be not true.

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“If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

actually killed a human being, you need not find that the defendant intended

to kill in order to find the special circumstance to be true.

“If you find that a defendant was not the actual killer of a human

being, or if you are unable to decide whether the defendant was the actual

killer, you cannot find any special circumstance to be true as to that

defendant unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that such

defendant with the intent to kill aided, abetted, counseled, commanded,

induced, solicited, requested, or assisted any actor in the commission of the

murder in the first degree.

“In other words, to find any of the four alleged special circumstances to

be true, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

actually killed a human being or had the specific intent to aid and abet

another in killing even though some other person actually did the killing.”1

Jury Verdicts and Sentence

The jury found Amos guilty of all charges except for one kidnapping for

robbery charge, as to which he was convicted of the lesser offense of

kidnapping. As to each murder conviction, the jury found that Amos used a

handgun during the commission of the offense, and that all of the special

circumstance allegations were true. The jury also found true all other

firearm use allegations, except for one pertaining to one of the burglary

convictions.

As noted, the charges and special circumstances alleged against Amos

were also charged and alleged against his codefendant, Boston. The jury

found that Boston was guilty of the same offenses that Amos committed, and

1 The last sentence of this excerpt from the special-circumstance

instruction was an addition to the standard CALJIC instruction.

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made identical findings regarding the special circumstance and gun use

allegations for both defendants. (Amos I, supra, A058843 at p. 22.) The trial

court granted defendants’ motion to sever the penalty phase of trial, and the

jury returned verdicts of life without the possibility of parole for both Amos

and Boston. (Ibid.)

In August 1992, the trial court sentenced Amos to three consecutive life

terms in state prison without the possibility of parole for the three murder

convictions, each with consecutive four-year terms for the firearm use

enhancements. The court stayed sentences as to all other convictions

pursuant to section 654.

Both defendants filed appeals, which were decided in Amos I. The

Amos I court directed the trial court to modify the firearm use enhancements

relating to the murder convictions, by imposing a two-year enhancement for

the murder charged in count 1 and staying enhancements for the other two

murders. (Amos I, supra, A058843 at p. 69.) In all other respects, the

judgment was affirmed. (Ibid.)

RESENTENCING PROCEEDING

Senate Bill 1437

In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg.

Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), which amended provisions of the Penal Code

pertaining to the felony-murder rule (§ 189) and the natural and probable

consequences doctrine (§ 188). (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959

(Lewis).) Regarding the felony-murder rule, Senate Bill 1437 added section

189, subdivision (e) (section 189(e)), which states: “A participant in the

perpetration or attempted perpetration of [qualifying felonies] in which a

death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven:

[¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual

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killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded,

induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission

of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major participant in

the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as

described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.” As to the natural and probable

consequences doctrine, section 188, subdivision (a)(3) now provides: “Except

[for felony-murder liability] as stated in subdivision (e) of Section 189, in

order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice

aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or

her participation in a crime.”

Senate Bill 1437 also “created a special procedural mechanism for those

convicted under the former law to seek retroactive relief under the law as

amended,” by filing a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95, which

was later renumbered as section 1172.6. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th

698, 708 (Strong); see also Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959.) Pursuant to

section 1172.6, a person previously convicted of murder or attempted murder

may file a resentencing petition “when all of the following conditions apply”:

(1) the charging document filed against the petitioner permitted the

prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, or another theory of

imputed malice; (2) the petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted

murder or manslaughter following a trial or plea proceeding at which the

petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder; and

(3) the “petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted

murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1,

2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)

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Amos’s Resentencing Petition

On June 1, 2022, Amos filed a petition for resentencing, checking boxes

on the form to indicate that he satisfies the statutory conditions for

resentencing. The People opposed the petition, contending that the jury’s

special circumstance findings establish Amos is ineligible for relief as a

matter of law. After the court appointed counsel for Amos, he filed a reply

brief in support of his petition. Amos argued that he made a prima facie case

by alleging that the conditions for relief have been met because his record of

conviction does not foreclose the possibility that the jury relied on the natural

and probable consequences doctrine and/or a no longer valid felony murder

theory.

On September 29, 2023, the trial court denied Amos’s petition in a

detailed written order. The court found that the record of conviction

establishes that Amos’s murder convictions are based on a still valid theory of

murder liability, thus making him ineligible for resentencing as a matter of

law. In reaching this conclusion, the court found that the special

circumstance findings establish that the jury found Amos was either the

actual killer or that he acted with the intent to kill while aiding and abetting

the actual killer.

DISCUSSION

Amos contends the trial court erred in finding that Amos failed to make

a prima facie showing that he is eligible for resentencing.

The procedure for seeking resentencing relief “begins with the filing of

a petition containing a declaration that all requirements for eligibility are

met.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) Upon receipt of a facially valid

petition, “the court must evaluate the petition ‘to determine whether the

petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.’ ” (Ibid.) At that stage, the

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“court may look at the record of conviction, which will necessarily inform its

‘prima facie inquiry under section [1172.6], allowing the court to distinguish

petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.’ ” (People

v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251; see Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at

p. 971.) “If the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that the

defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition.”

(Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708, citing § 1172.6, subd. (c).) If, on the

other hand, “the defendant has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to

relief, ‘the court shall issue an order to show cause.’ ” (Strong, at p. 708.)

Denial of a resentencing petition at the prima facie stage is reviewed de novo.

(People v. Beaudreaux, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1238; Williams, at

p. 1251.)

The dispositive issue presented by this appeal pertains to the third

condition for resentencing, whether Amos “could not presently be convicted of

murder . . . because of changes to Sections 188 or 189 made effective January

1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) Amos contends that his record of conviction

does not conclusively negate the possibility that the jury convicted him of the

three murders by “imputing malice” pursuant to a no longer valid theory of

murder liability. We disagree.

Under current law, a murder committed “in the perpetration” of a

robbery or a burglary “is murder of the first degree.” (§ 189, subd. (a).)

Participation in the qualifying felony in which the death occurs is sufficient

to justify liability for first degree murder if the defendant (1) was the actual

killer, (2) was not the actual killer, but with intent to kill, aided and abetted

or assisted the killer in the commission of the murder, or (3) was a major

participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to

human life. (§ 189(e).) Here, the record of conviction does not conclusively

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show that Amos was the actual killer, but it does establish that he had the

intent to kill, and that, if he was not the actual killer, he aided and abetted

the actual killer in the commission of the first degree murders of Castaneda,

Blackmon and Treas. (§ 189(e)(2).) We reach this conclusion based primarily

on our consideration of the jury instructions and findings regarding the

felony-murder special circumstance allegations.

The jury was instructed that, in order to find any of the special-

circumstance murder allegations true, it had to find that Amos was either the

actual killer or that “with the intent to kill” he “aided, abetted, counseled,

commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted any actor in the

commission of the murder in the first degree.” This quoted language mirrors

language in section 190.2, subdivision (c) (section 190.2(c)), which currently

provides: “Every person, not the actual killer, who, with the intent to kill,

aids, abets, . . . or assists any actor in the commission of murder in the first

degree shall be punished by death or imprisonment in the state prison for life

without the possibility of parole if one or more of the special circumstances

enumerated in subdivision (a) has been found to be true under Section 190.4.”

The jury found that the four special circumstances alleged against

Amos were true as to each of the three murders that Amos was convicted of

committing. Thus, even if Amos was not the actual killer, the jury found that

he harbored the requisite intent to kill when he aided, abetted, or assisted “in

the commission of murder in the first degree.” These findings, considered

together with the charges, instructions and verdicts, establish that Amos was

convicted under a still valid theory of felony murder, as he was either the

actual killer or, at the very least, acted with the intent to kill when he

assisted in the commission of the first degree murders by aiding and abetting

the robbery and burglary offenses during which the killings occurred.

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Amos makes two substantive arguments on appeal. He argues first

that his murder convictions may no longer be valid because the jury could

have relied on the natural and probable consequences instruction to impute

malice when they decided the murder charges. Amos acknowledges that the

jury necessarily found that he intended to kill by finding all special

circumstance allegations were true, but he posits that “just because the jury

found intent to kill later does not necessarily mean it found the same thing

earlier.” This argument fails in light of People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433

(Curiel), which holds that a finding of intent to kill made pursuant to a

special-circumstance murder allegation is relevant and binding on the

petitioner in a resentencing proceeding. (Id. at pp. 453–460 [addressing a

gang-murder special circumstance].)

Amos mistakenly relies on People v. Pacheco (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 118.

In that case, as in Curiel, the jury’s true finding as to a gang-murder special

circumstance allegation did not necessarily preclude resentencing relief

because that finding established only that the defendant had the requisite

mental state. Neither gang-murder enhancement nor any other finding

established that the jury necessarily found that the defendant’s conduct

“directly aided and abetted” the murder. (Pacheco, at pp. 122, 127–128; see

Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 466, 471.) In contrast to Pacheco and Curiel,

this case involves felony-murder special circumstance findings. To return

those true findings, the jury necessarily found that Amos not only had the

requisite mental state, he either killed the victims himself or he aided,

abetted or assisted in the commission of the first degree murders.

Amos’s second argument is that the felony-murder special circumstance

findings do not necessarily establish that his conduct would constitute

murder under current law, after the enactment of section 189(e). According

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to this argument, the language in section 189(e)(2) requiring that a defendant

who was not the actual killer must have aided, abetted, or assisted the

“actual killer in the commission of murder” changed the law of felony-murder

by requiring that the defendant must have aided, abetted, or assisted the

killing itself, not just the target felony during which the murder occurred.

Amos contends the jury did not necessarily make that finding about him

because the special-circumstance findings establish only that he assisted

“any actor” in the commission of these murders.

This same argument was rejected in People v. Lopez (2023) 88

Cal.App.5th 566 (Lopez), which holds that Senate Bill 1437 did not change

the actus rea requirement for convicting an aider and abettor of first degree

felony murder; under the current and former law, it must be shown that the

defendant aided and abetted the qualifying felony. (Lopez, at pp. 577–578.)

As the Lopez court explained, Senate Bill 1437 did not eliminate or amend

provisions in section 189, subdivision (a), which establish that a murder

committed “in the perpetration of” a qualifying felony constitutes first degree

murder. (Lopez, at p. 577; see id. at p. 581 (dis. opn. of Raphael, J.).)

Instead, Senate Bill 1437 “ ‘narrowed the scope’ ” of the felony-murder rule by

adding section 189(e). (Lopez, at p. 574.) Under the old felony murder law,

before Senate Bill 1437 was enacted, “[t]he necessary mental state was

simply the intent to commit a qualifying felony” as “malice was imputed to

the participant based on their willingness to commit a felony our Legislature

deemed ‘ “inherently dangerous to human life.” ’ ” (Lopez, at p. 574, italics

omitted.) In the Lopez case, the jury found that the victim was murdered

while the defendant and his confederate were attempting to rob him, and

that finding plus an intent to kill finding made during a later phase of the

trial established that the defendant “ ‘aided, abetted, . . . or assisted the

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actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree’ within the

meaning of section 189, subdivision (e)(2).” (Id. at p. 577.) Similarly, in this

case, the felony-murder special circumstance findings show that the jury

found that Amos had the intent to kill when he and Boston were engaged in

the commission of a qualifying felony during which the victims were killed.

Relying on the dissenting opinion in Lopez, which in turn relied on

People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, Amos argues that the special

circumstance felony-murder findings made by the jury in 1992 do not satisfy

section 189(e)(2) which expressly requires that a defendant must have aided

and abetted the “actual killer,” and that this allegedly new requirement

limits aider and abettor liability for felony murder to cases in which the

defendant aided and abetted the homicidal act itself. We disagree, as we find

the analysis of the Lopez majority more persuasive. (See also People v.

Morris (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1016, 1026, review granted July 17, 2024,

S284751 [“actus reus required for those possessing an intent to kill is simply

aiding the underlying felony in which a qualifying death occurs”].)

As explained in Lopez, the purpose of Senate Bill 1437 “was to stop the

practice of imputing malice to defendants to justify convicting them of

murder. A defendant who participates in a qualifying felony while harboring

express malice does not fall into the class of offenders the new law was

enacted to protect. [Citation.] In other words, because express malice is an

element of [section 189(e)(2)] felony-murder liability, there is no reason to

interpret the actus reus requirement as anything different than what the

felony-murder actus reus requirement was before Senate Bill 1437—‘aiding

and abetting the underlying felony or attempted felony that results in the

murder.’ ” (Lopez, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 578, italics omitted, quoting

People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 615.) Thus, under felony-murder law,

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both currently and historically, “assisting a qualifying felony in which a

death occurs is the same as assisting the actual killer in committing first

degree murder, and vice versa.” (Lopez, at p. 578.) There is no new

requirement that the defendant must have also assisted in the killing act

itself.

The Lopez majority’s construction of section 189(e)(2) is consistent with

and reinforced by authority construing substantially similar language in

section 190.2(c), the special-circumstance murder statute addressing aiders

and abettors. As noted, section 190.2(c) provides for enhanced penalties

when a special circumstance has been found true as to a defendant convicted

of first degree murder who, though not the actual killer, “with the intent to

kill, aids, abets, . . . or assists any actor in the commission of murder.” Our

Supreme Court has construed this language to mean that the defendant must

have aided or abetted the predicate felony but need not have assisted in the

killing itself. (People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884, 900 [construing section

190.2, former subd. (b), now subd. (c)].) The fact that the Legislature elected

to use language that is substantively similar to section 190.2(c) when it

enacted section 189(e)(2) reinforces that the Legislature intended both

provisions to have the same meaning, i.e., that a defendant who aids, abets,

or assists in the commission of the predicate felony thereby also aids, abets,

or assists in “ ‘the commission of murder.’ ” (Lopez, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at

pp. 577–578, italics omitted.)

Moreover, construing section 189(e)(2) as changing the actus reus for

felony murder would defy common sense because it would make it “easier for

the prosecution to obtain a conviction for defendants who harbored the less

culpable mindset of reckless indifference to human life than for those who

acted with express malice.” (Lopez, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 579, italics

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omitted.) Under the reckless disregard to human life provision of section

189(e), the defendant need only have been a major participant in the felony to

be guilty of murder, and yet under Amos’s reading of the statute, a defendant

who acts with actual malice would not be guilty of murder unless the

prosecution proved that the defendant not only aided and abetted the

qualifying felony but also aided the “murderous act as well.” (Lopez, at

p. 579, italics omitted.) Such a construction is inconsistent with the

legislative purpose underlying Senate Bill 1437, which was to “stop the

practice of imputing malice,” not to “make felony-murder liability more

difficult to prove than direct aiding and abetting in cases where the

defendant acted with express malice.” (Lopez, at p. 579, italics omitted.)2

Amos makes two additional arguments, ostensibly to show that while a

felony-murder special circumstance finding may be dispositive in some cases,

it does not render him ineligible for resentencing. First, Amos concedes that

the distinction between “any actor” and “actual killer” may be immaterial

when the evidence shows that only two people perpetrated the felonies, in

which case it can be assumed that the defendant who aided the commission of

the felony thereby assisted the actual killer. Here, however, the conspiracy

charges alleged against Amos and Boston included allegations of acts

2 We note that Amos contends repeatedly that Strong, supra, 13

Cal.5th 698, supports his argument that special circumstance murder

findings do not necessarily make him ineligible for resentencing. Under

Strong, a felony-murder special circumstance enhancement that was based

on findings the defendant (1) was a major participant in the underlying

felony who (2) acted with reckless indifference to human life, does not

necessarily establish that defendant is ineligible for resentencing under

section 189(e)(3), if the findings were made before these requirements were

elucidated by the California Supreme Court. (Strong, at pp. 710–711, see

pp. 717–718, 719–720.) Strong does not assist Amos, who contends

erroneously that he may be eligible for resentencing under section 189(e)(2).

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committed by a third cohort, Jackson. Amos argues that these allegations

open the possibility that he was found to have aided and abetted somebody

who was not the actual killer, i.e., “ ‘a nonkilling accomplice or

coconspirator.’ ” (Quoting People v. Singer (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 23, 44.) We

reject Amos’s contention that this factual wrinkle alters the analysis in his

favor, as it rests on the same premise that section 189(e)(2) changed the law

to require the defendant to have aided in the act of killing itself.

As explained above, “assisting a qualifying felony in which a death

occurs is the same as assisting the actual killer in committing first degree

murder, and vice versa.” (Lopez, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 578.) This

principle does not depend on the number of people who commit the qualifying

felony, as all participants in the crime necessarily aid the others, the actual

killer included. Thus, if the defendant’s conduct constitutes aiding and

abetting a target felony, and a death occurs during commission of the felony,

that defendant has necessarily assisted the actual killer in committing first

degree murder, whether or not the defendant assisted in the specific act of

killing itself.

Amos’s other factual theory pertains to the trial court’s modification of

CALJIC No. 8.80, which was used to instruct the jury regarding the special

circumstance murder allegations. As previously noted, the court added a

sentence to the instruction that stated: “In other words, to find any of the

four alleged special circumstances to be true, you must be satisfied beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant actually killed a human being or had the

specific intent to aid and abet another in killing even though some other

person actually did the killing.” Reading the sentence in isolation, Amos

posits that it does not bar resentencing, because it shows only that the jury

found he harbored an intent to kill, which does not “ ‘itself conclusively

15

establish that a petitioner is ineligible for relief.’ ” (Quoting Curiel, supra, 15

Cal.5th at p. 461.) However, a jury instruction “ ‘cannot be judged on the

basis of one or two phrases plucked out of context.’ ” (People v. Quinonez

(2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 465.) Viewed as a whole, the CALJIC instruction

conveyed to the jury that a true finding as to any one of the felony-murder

special circumstance allegations required the jury to find both that Amos had

the intent to kill and that he was a direct aider and abettor.

Section 189(e)(2) changed the law of felony murder but continues to

impose liability on a defendant who is not the actual killer but who, with

intent to kill, aids, abets, or assists in the commission of a predicate felony

during which a death occurs. Such conduct necessarily aids all of the

principals, including the actual killer, in commission of the murder. Because

Amos’s record of conviction shows that the jury made findings sufficient to

convict him of first degree felony murder under this law, we reject his

contention that the trial court erred by denying his petition.

DISPOSITION

The order denying Amos’s petition for resentencing is affirmed.

TUCHER, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

PETROU, J.

RODRÍGUEZ, J.

People v. Amos (A169358)

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