The opinion
[Cite as Save Ohio Parks v. Oil & Gas Land Mgt. Comm., 2025-Ohio-847.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Save Ohio Parks et al., :
Appellants-Appellants, : No. 24AP-206
(C.P.C. No. 23CV-8540)
v. :
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
Oil & Gas Land Management :
Commission,
:
Appellee-Appellee.
:
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on March 13, 2025
On brief: Earthjustice, Megan M. Hunter, James Yskamp,
Claire Taigman, Chris Tavenor, and Nathan Johnson, for
appellants Save Ohio Parks, Backcountry Hunters & Anglers,
Buckeye Environmental Council, and Ohio Environmental
Council. Argued: Megan M. Hunter.
On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, Thomas J. Puckett,
and Daniel Martin, for appellee. Argued: Daniel Martin.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
BEATTY BLUNT, J.
{¶ 1} Appellants, Save Ohio Parks, Backcountry Hunters & Anglers, Buckeye
Environmental Council, and Ohio Environmental Council (“appellants”) appeal from a
decision of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting the motion to dismiss
filed by appellee, Oil & Gas Land Management Commission (the “Commission”) pursuant
to Civ.R. 12(B)(1). For the following reasons, we affirm.
No. 24AP-206 2
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} Appellants filed an appeal in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
on November 30, 2023, seeking to challenge certain decisions of the Commission made
pursuant to R.C. 155.33, to approve nine nominations of land owned or controlled by a state
agency for the purpose of subjecting those lands to bidding for leasing to explore, develop
and/or produce oil and natural gas resources. (See generally Cert. Rec., Index #12, Notice
of Appeal.) Appellants claimed they should have been provided with an administrative
appeal pursuant to R.C. Ch. 119 but were not. Id.
{¶ 3} On December 29, 2023, the Commission filed a motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1), asserting that R.C. Ch. 119 does not provide for
a right to appeal the decisions made by the Commission approving the nominations of land.
{¶ 4} On February 23, 2023, the trial court issued its decision and entry granting
the motion to dismiss filed by the [Commission] on December 29, 2023 and dismissing
appellants’ appeal. (Feb. 23, 2023 Decision & Entry.)
{¶ 5} This timely appeal to this court followed and is now before us.
II. Assignments of Error
{¶ 6} Appellants assert the following assignments of error for our review:
[1.] The Trial Court erred when it found that the Oil and Gas
Land Management Commission’s approval of Nomination
Nos. 23-DNR-0001, 23-DNR-0002, 23-DNR-0003, 23-DNR-
0004, 23-DNR-0005, 23-DNR-0006, and 23-DNR-0007 was
not subject to appeal under R.C. 119.12 because these approvals
were adjudicatory orders of a state agency performing a
licensing function, providing subject matter jurisdiction to the
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas to adjudicate the
appeal pursuant to R.C. 119.12.
[2.] The Trial Court erred when it found the Appellants lacked
standing because the Commission’s decision to approve the
leasing of Salt Fork State Park and two state wildlife areas
No. 24AP-206 3
without offering a hearing and without considering the
mandatory decisional statutory factors has procedurally
harmed Appellants and their members, and the Commission’s
leasing approvals threaten Appellants’ members with concrete
and particularized harms from the imminent oil and gas
development of these state lands.
[3.] In the alternative, the Trial Court erred when it proceeded
to decide the issue of whether Appellants had standing after the
Trial Court had already determined it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over this matter.
III. Law and Analysis
A. Standard of Review
{¶ 7} When reviewing a judgment on a Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction, a de novo standard of review is employed. Pankey v. Ohio
Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2014-Ohio-2907, ¶ 7 (10th Dist.); Foreman v. Dept. of Rehab. &
Corr., 2014-Ohio-2793, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.), citing Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 2004-Ohio-
4362, ¶ 5.
{¶ 8} Civ.R. 12(B)(1) requires dismissal where the trial court lacks jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the litigation. “Subject-matter jurisdiction involves ‘ “a court’s power
to hear and decide a case on the merits and does not relate to the rights of the parties.” ’ ”
Moore v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2019-Ohio-767, ¶ 4 (10th Dist.), quoting Robinson
v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2011-Ohio-713, ¶ 5 (10th Dist.), quoting Vedder v.
Warrensville Hts., 2002-Ohio-5567, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.).
{¶ 9} A court presented with a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction must determine whether the complaint states any cause of action cognizable by
the forum. State ex rel. Bush v. Spurlock, 42 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1989); PNC Bank, Natl.
Assn. v. Botts, 2012-Ohio-5383, ¶ 21 (10th Dist.). Subject-matter jurisdiction is “a
condition precedent to the court’s ability to hear the case. If a court acts without
No. 24AP-206 4
jurisdiction, then any proclamation by that court is void.” Pratts v. Hurley, 2004-Ohio-
1980, ¶ 11; State ex rel. Ohio Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 2006-Ohio-5202, ¶ 8. In
deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the trial court may
consider evidence outside of the complaint. Brown v. Ohio Tax Commr., 2012-Ohio-5768,
¶ 14 (10th Dist.), citing Cerrone v. Univ. of Toledo, 2012-Ohio-953, ¶ 5 (10th Dist.), citing
Southgate Dev. Corp. v. Columbia Gas Transm. Corp., 48 Ohio St.2d 211, (1976),
paragraph one of the syllabus.
B. First Assignment of Error
{¶ 10} In their first assignment of error, appellants contend that the trial court erred
when it found that the Oil & Gas Land Management Commission’s approval of the seven
nominations delineated above was not subject to appeal under R.C. 119.12 because these
approvals were adjudicatory orders of a state agency performing a licensing function,
bringing the matter within the ambit of R.C. 119 for purposes of subject-matter jurisdiction.
This contention has no merit.
{¶ 11} In the administrative appeals context, “[c]ourts of common pleas only have
‘such powers of review of proceedings of administrative officers and agencies as may be
provided by law.’ ” Clifton Care Ctr. v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2013-Ohio-2742,
¶ 9 (10th Dist.), quoting Ohio Const., article IV, § 4. See also Midwest Fireworks Mfg. Co.,
Inc. v. Deerfield Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 91 Ohio St.3d 174, 177 (2001) (“The right to
appeal an administrative decision is neither inherent nor inalienable; to the contrary, it
must be conferred by statute.”). Thus, jurisdiction over an administrative appeal is
improper “unless granted by R.C. 119.12 or other specific statutory authority.” Abt v. Ohio
Expositions Comm., 110 Ohio App.3d 696, 699 (10th Dist. 1996). To determine whether
R.C. 119.12 or other statutory authority does or does not grant the common pleas court
No. 24AP-206 5
jurisdiction over an appeal, the reviewing court must look to the language of the statutes
involved to determine legislative intent. Ikemefuna Nkanginieme v. Ohio Dept. of
Medicaid, 2015-Ohio-656, ¶ 16 (10th Dist.).
{¶ 12} Generally, “R.C. 119.12 only allows appeals of orders issued pursuant to an
adjudication.” Estep v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2013-Ohio-82, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.);
accord, Columbus S. Power Co. v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 860, *6
(10th Dist. Mar. 1, 1994), citing Brown v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 83 Ohio App.3d 879 (10th
Dist. 1992). R.C. 119.12(A) states: “Any party adversely affected by any order of an agency
issued pursuant to an adjudication may appeal from the order of the agency to the court of
common pleas of the county designated in division (B) of this section.” Further, R.C.
119.12(B) “permits a party adversely affected by an agency order ‘issued pursuant to [any
other] adjudication’ to appeal to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.” Cozad v.
Ohio Elections Comm., 2023-Ohio-839, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.), quoting R.C. 119.12(B). R.C.
119.01(D) defines “[a]djudication” to mean “the determination by the highest or ultimate
authority of an agency of the rights, duties, privileges, benefits, or legal relationships of a
specified person, but does not include the issuance of a license in response to an application
with respect to which no question is raised, nor other acts of a ministerial nature.” An
adjudication is an act which “is quasi-judicial in nature, involving notice, hearing, the
opportunity to introduce testimony through witnesses, and a finding or decision made in
accordance with statutory authority.” Columbus S. Power Co., citing Brown at 882.
{¶ 13} In Brown, this court was faced with the question of whether the owners of a
motel had the right to rely upon R.C. 119.12 to challenge an order issued pursuant to R.C.
5515.02 by the Director of the Ohio Department of Transportation (“ODOT”) which
required the owners to remove certain obstructions—including a swimming pool, parking
No. 24AP-206 6
lot, landscaping, flag pole, motel sign and light pole—from a right-of-way owned by ODOT.
In analyzing the specific question before us at the time, we stated:
An agency action does not qualify for an appeal pursuant to
[R.C. 119.12] unless: (1) the agency is specifically named in
R.C. 119.01(A); (2) the agency action involves licensing
functions of the agency; or (3) some other statute specifically
makes the agency or agency action subject to R.C. 119.12.
Brown at 881, citing Plumbers & Steamfitters Commt. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm., 66
Ohio St.2d 192 (1981); Asphalt Specialist, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 53 Ohio App.3d
45 (1988); Augustine v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 3 Ohio App.3d 398, 399 (1oth Dist.
1981); Fair v. School Emp. Retirement Sys., 44 Ohio App.2d 115, 117 (10th Dist. 1975);
State ex rel. Citizens for Van Meter v. Ohio Elections Comm., 78 Ohio App.3d 289, 293-
294 (10th Dist. 1992).
{¶ 14} The appellants in Brown argued that because R.C. 5515.02 references the
licensing authority granted to the Director of ODOT by R.C. 5515.01, all orders of removal
of obstructions made pursuant to R.C. 5515.02 are subject to R.C. 119.12 appeals. In
rejecting this argument, we observed that while “R.C. 119.12 allows a party affected by any
order of an agency, issued pursuant to an adjudication ‘ * * * denying the issuance or
renewal of a license or registration of a licensee, or revoking or suspending a license,’ to
appeal the order of the agency to the common pleas court[,]” in the Brown case, “no
license was ever applied for nor is there evidence of any license revocation or suspension.”
Brown at 882, quoting R.C. 119.12. We concluded that “[w]hile the agency’s action of
denying a license would be subject to an R.C. 119.12 appeal, this does not subject all agency
actions to R.C. Chapter 119.” Id.
{¶ 15} Subsequent to our decision in Brown, we had another opportunity to
analyze whether an appeal pursuant to R.C. 119.12 was available based upon the
No. 24AP-206 7
ostensible “licensing functions” of an agency. In Springfield Fireworks, Inc. v. Ohio Dept.
of Commerce, 2003-Ohio-694, (10th Dist.) the plaintiff was a fireworks manufacturer
which sought a variance under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3743.59 from defendant Ohio
Division of State Fire Marshal (“SFM”) so the manufacturer could transfer its wholesaler
fireworks license from one county to another. Relying on R.C. 119.12, the manufacturer
appealed SFM’s denial of the request, arguing that the denial of the request to transfer its
wholesaler license was part of SFM’s “licensing functions” and thus subject to an
administrative appeal pursuant to Brown. See generally Springfield Fireworks, Inc. The
trial court disagreed with this argument and granted SFM’s motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction. See id.
{¶ 16} In affirming the trial court’s judgment, we rejected appellant’s argument
that SFM’s action involved a “licensing function.” Specifically, we stated as follows:
The “licensing function” factor is derived from the language in
the first paragraph of R.C. 119.12[1] that permits an affected
party to appeal an agency order, issued pursuant to an
“adjudication denying * * * the issuance or renewal of a
license or registration of a licensee, or revoking or
suspending a license[.]” R.C. 119.01(B) defines the term
“license” as including “any license * * * issued by any agency.”
In turn, R.C. 119.01(A) defines “agency,” in pertinent part, as
including “the licensing functions of any administrative or
executive officer, department, division, bureau, board, or
commission of the government of the state having the
authority or responsibility of issuing, suspending, revoking,
or canceling licenses.”
(Emphasis added.) Springfield Fireworks, Inc. at ¶ 21. We then found that “SFM’s action
regarding the request for a transfer of Springfield’s wholesaler fireworks license did not
1 R.C. 119.12 has been amended since our decisions in Brown and Springfield Fireworks, Inc. and the language
set forth in our decision is now found in R.C. 119.12(B)(1). The reasoning behind our decision, however,
remains intact.
No. 24AP-206 8
involve the ‘issuing, suspending, revoking, or canceling’ of a license,” and therefore “SFM’s
action did not involve a licensing function and accordingly was not an ‘agency’ decision
under R.C. Chapter 119.” Id. at ¶ 24, citing Brown at 882.
{¶ 17} We further determined that because SFM’s denial of the transfer request was
not an “agency” decision,
it necessarily was not a decision “issued pursuant to an
adjudication,” as additionally required by both: (1) the
“licensing function” provision of the first paragraph of R.C.
119.12; and (2) the statute’s second paragraph, which
expressly provides an appeal to the Franklin County Court of
Common Pleas for “any order of an agency issued pursuant to
any other adjudication,” regardless whether a licensing
function is involved. R.C. 119.01(D) defines an “adjudication”
as a “determination by the highest or ultimate authority of an
agency.” In the absence of an “adjudication” as defined in R.C.
119.01(D), the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas,
together with other common pleas courts, lacks jurisdiction
under R.C. 119.12 to review SFM’s decisions.
Id. at ¶ 25, citing Brown; In the Matter of CBM Homes for the Devel. Disabled, Inc., 1993
Ohio App. LEXIS 2015 (10th Dist. Apr. 6, 1993). We thus concluded that the manufacturer
could not rely on R.C. 119.12 alone as the basis for appealing SFM’s denial of its request
to transfer its wholesaler license. Id.
{¶ 18} In sum then, based on the foregoing authorities, absent “an order of an
agency issued pursuant to an adjudication denying . . . the issuance or renewal of a license
or registration of a licensee, revoking or suspending a license . . .”, an agency action is not
subject to an appeal pursuant to R.C. 119.12 under the ostensible “licensing functions” of
the agency.
{¶ 19} Here, just as in Brown, “no license was ever applied for nor is there evidence
of any license revocation or suspension.” (Emphasis added.) Brown at 882, quoting R.C.
119.12. Likewise, as in Springfield Fireworks, Inc., in this case the Commission’s action
No. 24AP-206 9
regarding the approval of the seven nominations did not involve the “ ‘issuing, suspending,
revoking, or canceling’ of a license,” and therefore appellee’s action did not involve a
licensing function and was not an ‘agency’ decision under R.C. Ch. 119. See Springfield
Fireworks, Inc. at ¶ 24, citing Brown, at 882. Furthermore, as this court found in
Springfield Fireworks, Inc., because the Commission’s action was not an ‘agency’ decision
under R.C. Ch. 119, “it necessarily was not a decision ‘issued pursuant to an adjudication’ ”
as further required by R.C. 119.12.
{¶ 20} In short, in this case there simply was no “order of an agency issued
pursuant to an adjudication denying . . . the issuance or renewal of a license or registration
of a licensee, revoking or suspending a license . . . .” Thus, the action of appellee in
approving the seven nominations under the authority of R.C. 155.33 is not subject to an
appeal pursuant to R.C. 119.12 under the ostensible “licensing functions” of the agency.
Because appellee’s action is not subject to an appeal under R.C. 119.12, the trial court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction over appellants’ challenge to the Commission’s approval of the
nominations. Accordingly, the Commission’s motion to dismiss was properly granted.
{¶ 21} Therefore, based on the foregoing, we find the trial court did not err in
dismissing appellant’s action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly,
appellants’ first assignment of error is overruled.
C. Second Assignment of Error
{¶ 22} In their second assignment of error, appellants assert that the trial court
erred when it found the appellants lacked standing because the Commission’s decision to
approve the leasing of Salt Fork State Park and two state wildlife areas without offering a
hearing has procedurally harmed appellants and their members, and the Commission’s
leasing approvals threaten appellants’ members with concrete and particularized harms
No. 24AP-206 10
arising from the oil and gas exploration on these lands. This assignment of error is without
merit.
{¶ 23} The Supreme Court of Ohio has “recognized that standing is a ‘jurisdictional
requirement’ and [has] stated: ‘It is an elementary concept of law that a party lacks standing
to invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he has, in an individual or representative
capacity, some real interest in the subject matter of the action.’ ” (Emphasis in original.)
Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 2012-Ohio-5017, ¶ 22, quoting State ex rel.
Dallman v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 35 Ohio St.2d 176, 179 (1973). “Because
standing to sue is required to invoke the jurisdiction of the common pleas court, ‘standing
is to be determined as of the commencement of suit.’ ” Id. at ¶ 24, quoting Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 570-571, fn. 5 (1992).
{¶ 24} It is well-established that before an Ohio court may consider the merits of a
legal claim, “ ‘the person or entity seeking relief must establish standing to sue.’ ” Ohioans
for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. Columbus, 2020-Ohio-6724, ¶ 12, quoting Ohio Pyro, Inc. v.
Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 2007-Ohio-5024, ¶ 27. “At a minimum, common-law standing
requires the litigant to demonstrate that he or she has suffered (1) an injury (2) that is fairly
traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and (3) is likely to be redressed by
the requested relief.” Id., citing Moore v. Middletown, 2012-Ohio-3897, ¶ 22. Standing
does not turn on the merits of the plaintiff’s claims but rather on whether the plaintiff has
alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy that he is entitled to have a
court hear his case. Id., citing ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio, 2014-Ohio-2382, ¶ 7.
{¶ 25} Whether a litigant has established standing is a question of law which we
review de novo. Ohioans for Concealed Carry at ¶ 12; Wilkins v. Harrisburg, 2015-Ohio-
No. 24AP-206 11
5472, ¶ 7 (10th Dist.), citing LULAC v. Kasich, 2012-Ohio-947, ¶ 23 (10th Dist.), citing Ohio
Concrete Constr. Assn. v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 2009-Ohio-2400, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.).
{¶ 26} Here, appellants have alleged that they have suffered a direct injury or
specific harm due to the Commission’s action of nominating seven parcels of land owned
by the state for the purpose of negotiating leases for oil and gas exploration, development
and production, and therefore they have standing to assert their grievances. More
specifically, they have essentially alleged that if such exploration, development and
production ensue on the nominated lands, they will no longer be able to enjoy these lands
and further, that the lands may be negatively impacted by such exploration, development
and production. Thus, at best, appellants speculate that they may be harmed in the future.
We find this is far too tenuous of a connection to the actions of the Commission of which
appellants complain to be able to assert standing. As we have previously explained,
[i]njury that is borne by the population in general and does not
affect plaintiff in particular is typically insufficient to confer
standing upon the plaintiff to bring suit against a defendant.
Tiemann v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 127 Ohio App.3d 312, 325, 712
N.E.2d 1258 (10th Dist.1998), citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 82 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1984). The proposed
plaintiff’s injury cannot be merely speculative. A bare
allegation that plaintiff fears that some injury will or may occur
is insufficient to confer standing. Id., citing Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
Wurdlow v. Turvy, 2012-Ohio-4378, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.).
{¶ 27} Furthermore, it is well-settled that “a general interest as a citizen does not
convert an individual right into a right which would permit any citizen who suffers no
distinct harm to sue a government agency.” Yost v. Jones, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 5123, *8
(3rd Dist. Nov. 15, 2001), citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-578. “The emotional impact from,
loss of faith in, or personal distaste for a particular situation, law, or governmental
No. 24AP-206 12
proceeding, without more, does not satisfy the legal concept of ‘adversely affected’ or
‘aggrieved’ for purposes of standing.” Id. See also, State ex rel. Food & Water Watch v.
State, 2018-Ohio-555, ¶ 20 (alleging that one believes she is breathing polluted air, may be
exposed to radioactive contamination in the event of a waste spill, and/or expressing
concern for one’s health due to an oil-and-gas-drilling-waste-treatment facility insufficient
to establish standing).
{¶ 28} In sum, the trial court was correct in finding that even if appellants’ challenge
to the Commission’s action was amenable to an appeal pursuant to R.C. 119.12—which we
have already determined it is not—these particular appellants lacked standing to bring such
a challenge. Therefore, the trial court did not err in finding that appellant’s lacked standing
in this matter. Accordingly, appellants’ second assignment of error is overruled.
D. Third Assignment of Error
{¶ 29} In their third assignment of error, appellants assert that the trial court erred
when it proceeded to decide the issue of whether appellants had standing after it had
already determined it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter. We disagree.
{¶ 30} Appellants do not dispute that standing and subject-matter jurisdiction are
distinct issues, either of which might be a reason the trial court lacked jurisdiction, whether
that be subject-matter jurisdiction or general jurisdiction, over appellants’ challenge to the
Commission’s action in approving the nine nominations of land in this case. Indeed, they
fail to cite any authority directly supporting their argument that the trial court erred by
speaking on the standing issue after it had already found it lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over their claim. As the two issues are distinct, we do not agree that the trial
court erred in speaking on the standing issue as an alternative basis for granting the
Commission’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
No. 24AP-206 13
{¶ 31} Furthermore, even if the trial court erred in opining on the alternative issue
regarding standing, we find such error was harmless. This is so because in any event, the
motion to dismiss was properly granted for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the
appellants’ challenge was not permissible as an appeal under R.C. 119.12. In other words,
under either basis for dismissal, the appellants’ appeal to the trial court would have been
properly dismissed.
{¶ 32} Accordingly, we overrule appellants’ third assignment of error.
IV. Disposition
{¶ 33} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule appellants’ three assignments of error,
and we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
MENTEL and BOGGS, JJ., concur.