United States v. Yina Castaneda Benavidez

USCA11 Case: 24-13054 Document: 14-1 Date Filed: 03/13/2025 Page: 1 of 7

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-13054

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

YINA MARIA CASTANEDA BENAVIDEZ,

a.k.a. La Reina,

a.k.a. Ingeniera,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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2 Opinion of the Court 24-13054

D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cr-20575-RNS-5

____________________

Before JORDAN, LUCK, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Yina Maria Castaneda Benavidez, proceeding pro se, appeals

the district court’s denial of her motion to reduce her sentence,

pursuant to § 3582, based on Amendment 821 to the Sentencing

Guidelines. She asserts the court abused its discretion by not ana-

lyzing her motion under § 3582(c)(1)(A), not addressing that she

exhausted her administrative remedies, and not considering that

her health, family needs, and rehabilitation efforts warrant compas-

sionate release. After Castaneda Benavidez filed her brief on ap-

peal, the Government moved for summary affirmance. After re-

view, 1 we grant the Government’s motion for summary affir-

mance.

A district court may modify a defendant’s term of imprison-

ment if the defendant was sentenced based on a sentencing range

1 We review de novo the district court’s legal conclusions about the scope of its

authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). United States v. Lawson, 686 F.3d 1317,

1319 (11th Cir. 2012). If § 3582(c)(2) applies, we review the district court’s de-

cision to grant or deny a sentence reduction for abuse of discretion. United

States v. Caraballo-Martinez, 866 F.3d 1233, 1238 (11th Cir. 2017). Similarly, we

review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction under

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) and the district court’s denial of a prisoner’s

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Giron, 15

F.4th 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021).

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24-13054 Opinion of the Court 3

that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commis-

sion. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). “This authority is limited to those

guideline amendments listed in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c) that have the

effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline range.”

United States v. Williams, 557 F.3d 1254, 1256 (11th Cir. 2009) (quo-

tation marks omitted).

Amendment 821 added a new section, U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1

(2023), which provides for a two-level decrease in a defendant’s of-

fense level if the defendant satisfies ten criteria. U.S.S.G. App. C

Amendment 821, Pt.B; see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 (listing Amend-

ment 821). Among other things, in order to receive the two-level

decrease, the defendant must not have received an adjustment un-

der U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 for an aggravating role. U.S.S.G.

§ 4C1.1(a)(10).

Summary affirmance is warranted as to Castaneda Be-

navidez’s Amendment 821 argument because the Government’s

position is clearly correct as a matter of law. See Groendyke Transp.,

Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969) 2 (stating summary

disposition is appropriate where “the position of one of the parties

is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial

question as to the outcome of the case, or where . . . the appeal is

frivolous”). The district court did not err in determining Castaneda

Benavidez did not qualify for a sentencing reduction under

2 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),

this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Cir-

cuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981.

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4 Opinion of the Court 24-13054

Amendment 821 because she received a sentencing adjustment un-

der U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b), which plainly disqualifies her from the re-

duction. U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1(a)(10).

The Government’s remaining arguments as to why the dis-

trict court did not err in denying Castaneda Benavidez’s motion

under either § 3582(c)(1)(A) or (c)(2) are also clearly correct as a

matter of law.

The First Step Act of 2018 amended 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) to allow the court to reduce a defendant’s term of

imprisonment upon motion of the defendant, after the defendant

has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of

the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf,

or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the

warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier. See Pub. L.

115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 § 603; 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). A district

court may grant a sentence reduction if: (1) an extraordinary and

compelling reason exists; (2) a sentencing reduction would be con-

sistent with U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13; and (3) the § 3553(a) factors 3 weigh

3 The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense

conduct and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for

the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote re-

spect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need

for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence; (4) the need to protect

the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with educational or voca-

tional training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sen-

tencing Guidelines range; (8) the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing

Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwanted sentencing disparities; and

(10) the need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

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24-13054 Opinion of the Court 5

in favor of a sentence reduction. United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th

1234, 1237-38 (11th Cir. 2021).

The policy statements applicable to § 3582(c)(1)(A) are

found in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. Section 1B1.13

states a defendant’s sentence may be reduced, upon motion of the

defendant, where extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant

the reduction, the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any

other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3142(g), and the court considers the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Id. § 1B1.13(a). Section 1B1.13, as amended at the time of Cas-

taneda Benavidez’s sentence reduction motion, provides that an

extraordinary and compelling reason exists under any of the fol-

lowing circumstances or a combination thereof: the medical cir-

cumstances of the defendant, the age of the defendant, the family

circumstances of the defendant, or if the defendant was the victim

of abuse while serving a term of incarceration. Id. § 1B1.13(b)(1)-

(4). The section also contains a catch-all provision for “other rea-

sons,” which provides that a prisoner may be eligible for a sentence

reduction if he “presents any other circumstance or combination

of circumstances that, when considered by themselves or together

with any of the reasons described [above], are similar in gravity” to

the other examples listed. Id. § 1B1.13(b)(5).

As an initial matter, the court’s discussion of Castaneda Be-

navidez’s exhaustion of administrative remedies would not change

the availability of relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A) or (c)(2) as the court

independently found she was not entitled to relief under either

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6 Opinion of the Court 24-13054

subsection. As to Castaneda Benavidez’s argument the court mis-

construed her motion and should have analyzed her motion under

§ 3582(c)(1)(A), the court addressed her alleged extraordinary and

compelling reasons and the record reflects the court sufficiently an-

alyzed the § 3553(a) factors in denying her relief. The court ad-

dressed that she had not established extraordinary and compelling

reasons to justify compassionate release, acknowledging that, had

she intended to move for relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A), release was

not warranted as there was no significant change since her last mo-

tion for compassionate release. See Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237-38.

Having found that Castaneda Benavidez independently did

not qualify for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A) or (c)(2),

the court referenced its prior analyses in orders on Castaneda Be-

navidez’s earlier compassionate release motions and found the

only thing that had changed regarding the § 3553(a) factors was her

acceptance of responsibility. However, the court correctly rea-

soned that her assertion she had accepted responsibility from “day

one” was untrue as she objected to the PSI while maintaining her

innocence, and did not accept responsibility for the offense when

given the opportunity to do so at sentencing. In its prior analyses,

the court acknowledged that, though Castaneda Benavidez’s of-

fense was nonviolent, the offense was serious as she trafficked large

amounts of cocaine that ended up in the United States. The court

further noted that, serving less than a third of her sentence would

not promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for her

offense, or afford adequate deterrence. Similarly, Castaneda Be-

navidez had served less than one third of her sentence when the

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24-13054 Opinion of the Court 7

court denied her instant motion. The record shows the district

court relied on the nature of the offense, promoting respect for the

law, providing just punishment, and affording adequate deterrence

in determining that Castaneda Benavidez was not entitled to relief

under § 3582(c)(1)(A) or (c)(2). 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(A)-(B).

Castaneda Benavidez’s arguments the court should have

considered her “other reasons” justifying compassionate release

and that her medical conditions and care for her daughter similarly

justify compassionate release also fail as a matter of law. The court

found she did not establish extraordinary and compelling reasons

justifying release and that the § 3553(a) factors did not weigh in fa-

vor of a sentence reduction; thus, it need not consider whether a

reduction would be consistent with U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. See United

States v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1347-48 (11th Cir. 2021) (explaining

when the district court finds that one of the three prongs is not met,

it need not examine the other prongs).

Accordingly, because the Government’s position is clearly

correct as a matter of law, we GRANT the Government’s motion

for summary affirmance. Groendyke Transp., Inc., 406 F.2d at 1162.

AFFIRMED.