Daniels v. Lazusky

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JERRY JERON DANIELS, :

Plaintiff : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:23-1540

v. : (JUDGE MANNION)

BETH LAZUSKY, et al., :

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

Currently before the Court are Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Doc.

18) pro se Plaintiff Jerry Jeron Daniels (“Daniels”)’s amended complaint in

which he asserts claims for violations of the federal Criminal Code, the

Pennsylvania Constitution, and the United States Constitution (through 42

U.S.C. §1983), Daniels’s motions to amend his amended complaint, (Doc.

20, 21) and Daniels’s motion for the Court to take judicial notice. (Doc. 25).

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deem Daniels’s motions

withdrawn for his failure to file supporting briefs in accordance with the Local

Rules, grant the parts of Defendants’ motion to dismiss pertaining to

Daniels’s claims for violations of the Criminal Code and the Pennsylvania

Constitution and dismiss those claims with prejudice, deny as moot the parts

of the motion to dismiss relating to Daniels’s Section 1983 claims, dismiss

without prejudice Daniels’s Section 1983 pursuant to the Court’s screening

authority under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B), and decline to grant Daniels leave

to file an amended complaint.

I. BACKGROUND

Daniels, a convicted state prisoner, commenced this action by filing a

complaint against Defendants Beth Lazusky (“Lazusky”), Thomas Sokaloski

(“Sokaloski”), Jennifer Newberry (“Newberry”), and Peter Damiter

(“Damiter”), which the Clerk of Court docketed on September 15, 2023. (Doc.

1.) He also filed a motion to appoint counsel (Doc. 2), which this Court denied

as premature on October 5, 2023 (Doc. 5).

Unfortunately, Daniels neither remitted the filing fee nor sought leave

to proceed in forma pauperis when he filed his complaint. As such, an

Administrative Order issued requiring Daniels to either remit the fee or apply

for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, or risk dismissal of this action. (Doc.

4.) Daniels timely complied with the Administrative Order by filing an

application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Application”) and a

certified prisoner trust fund account statement, both of which the Clerk of

Court docketed on October 13, 2023. (Docs. 6, 7.)

Having reviewed Daniels’s complaint and observing that it did not

contain any factual allegations to support his legal claims, the Court entered

an Order on November 1, 2023, which, inter alia, required Daniels to file an

amended complaint within thirty (30) days. (Doc. 10.) Daniels timely

complied with this Order by filing an amended complaint on November 30,

2023. (Doc. 12.)

In his amended complaint, Daniels once again named Lazusky,

Sokaloski, Damiter, and Newberry as Defendants. (Id. at 1–2.) However, he

also added Kathy Brittain (“Brittain”), the Superintendent of Pennsylvania

State Correctional Institution Frackville (“SCI Frackville”) as a Defendant.

(Id.) He also indicated that Lazusky, Sokaloski, and Damiter also worked at

SCI Frackville and alleged that Lazusky is a grievance coordinator, Sokaloski

is the “DSFM” (Deputy Superintendent for Facilities Management), and

Damiter is the “CCPM” (Corrections Classification Program Manager).1 (Id.)

Regarding his legal claims, Daniels alleges that Defendants violated

two criminal statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, his Fourth Amendment right

to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, his Eighth Amendment

right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, his Fourteenth

Amendment rights to due process and equal protection, and his rights under

Article I, Sections 8 and 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. (Id. at 4.) Daniels

also appears to assert that Defendants violated the Thirteenth Amendment’s

1 Daniels lacks knowledge of Newberry’s role at SCI Frackville. See

(Doc. 12 at 2 (using question marks to fill out portions of form complaint

requiring him to identify Newberry’s current job title)).

slavery prohibition. (Id. at 5.) He purports to bring all these claims under 42

U.S.C. §1983. (Id. at 1.) Also, while very difficult to understand due to how

Daniels drafted the amended complaint, it appears that these claims are

based on (1) his contention that Defendants “defaulted” on a grievance he

submitted insofar as Newberry untimely responded to a grievance he

submitted and (2) his belief that he is wrongfully incarcerated insofar as “no

criminal charges were ever Filed [sic] to have [him] . . . in prison.” (Id. at 4.)

He also asserts that Defendants are “[t]rying to protect [the] Pennsylvania

Parol [sic] Board.” (Id. at 5.) For these claims, Daniels seeks monetary relief.

(Id. at 5.)

A day after the amended complaint was docketed, the Court entered

an Order which, inter alia, granted the IFP Application and directed the Clerk

of Court to send waiver of service forms to Defendants. (Doc. 13.)

Defendants waived service (Doc. 16), and then filed a motion to dismiss the

amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on

February 2, 2024. (Doc. 18.) Two (2) weeks later, Defendants filed a brief in

support of their motion to dismiss. (Doc. 19.) Daniels has not filed a brief in

response to the motion to dismiss.

Instead, Daniels responded to the motion to dismiss by filing duplicate

motions seeking permission to file a second amended complaint, which the

Court docketed on March 12, 2024. (Docs. 20, 21.) In these motions, Daniels

seeks to amend his complaint to include three pages of his criminal history

records which would allegedly show that defense counsel committed fraud

upon the Court when submitting Defendants’ supporting brief. (Docs. 20 at

1; 21 at 1.) Daniels also requests that the Court take judicial notice of various

state-court dockets, dockets for other civil cases he has filed in this District

(such as Nos. 23-cv-1214, 23-cv-1409, 23-cv-1539, and 23-cv-1540), and a

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections “Move Sheet.”

(Doc. 20 at 1–2; 21 at 1–2.) He then goes on to state the following about his

proposed amendment:

Plaintiff will show that he was and still is being kidnapped by

defendants when no criminal charges were ever field [sic] in 2006

or 2021 by any officer of this Commonwealth. records [sic] will

never lie [sic] people will though. Just look [sic] the Deputy

Attorney’s General all are trying to cover up the fact that plaintiff

has been denied due process of law and was never duly

convicted according to law. These types of injustices have been

occurring through this commonwealth [sic]. do [sic] not believe

me just take a look at any Common Pleas Docket Sheet from any

count of this commonwealth [sic] it will say “awaiting filing of

information” [sic] “awaiting Formal Arraignment” [sic] “Held for

Court (Lower Court) [sic] Defendant Was Present, Proceed to

Court [sic] Defendant Was Not Present. This is were [sic] thr [sic]

fraud starts or should plaintiff say at the illegal arrest without an

arrest warrant ever being issued moreless [sic] returned served.

Plaintiff [sic] CHRI PROVES everything plaintiff’s [sic] has stated

from the start [sic] its [sic] a lot of fraud going on in this

Commonwealth and Plaintiff not being from Pennsylvania knew

that you MUST see a judge within 48 hours of arrest. here [sic]

its [sic] the opposite go to jail [sic] bill a case [sic] then illegally

charge plaintiff. Not on my watch [sic] and the deputy Attorney

General’s [sic] have the AUDACITY to file untrue documents.

They need [sic] reported to the Pennsylvania Bar Association

immediately. Plus to have all cases looked at that all Deputy AG’s

have tried in Federal court. Its [sic] no way that they have an

“OATH OF OFFICE” Oh while on that subject why isn’t the

Governor and Attorney General “OATH OF OFFICE” in the Office

of the Secretary Of [sic] Commonwealth. [sic]

(Doc. 20 at 2; 21 at 2.)

On March 18, 2024, Daniels filed copies of Initial review responses to

grievances he filed at SCI Frackville. (Doc. 22.) On May 8, 2024, Daniels

filed a “Motion to Take Judicial Notice of Title 61 Pa. C.S. §6117. Official

Seal.” (Doc. 25.) Defendants’ motion to dismiss and Daniels’s motions are

ripe for disposition.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motions to Dismiss Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6)

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This standard “does not require detailed

factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-

unlawfully-harmed me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, a complaint that contains only

“labels and conclusions,” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action” is insufficient. Id.

A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint “for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive

a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678. Facial plausibility is achieved “when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Plausibility does not

require probability but “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has

acted unlawfully.” Id. Facts “merely consistent with” liability do not satisfy this

standard. Id.

While the Court at this stage accepts the complaint’s factual allegations

as true, the Court does not do so to a plaintiff’s legal conclusions. See id.

(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). In addition, “[d]etermining whether

a complaint states a plausible claim for relief” is “a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common

sense.” Id. at 679.

The federal pleading standard just described requires that district

courts conduct the following analysis when addressing a motion to dismiss

a complaint:

First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be

separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint’s

well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal

conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine

whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show

that the plaintiff has a plausible claim for relief. In other words, a

complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to

relief. A complaint has to show such an entitlement with its facts.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal

citations and quotations omitted).

Pro se filings such as Daniels’s amended complaint must be construed

“liberally.” Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021). That means that

the Court should “remain flexible,” and “apply the relevant legal principle

even when the complaint has failed to name it.” Id. It does not mean,

however, that pro se litigants may “flout procedural rules—they must abide

by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” Id. Thus, “pro se litigants

still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala

v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).

B. The Court’s Continued Screening Obligation of Complaints

Under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)

Because the Court previously granted Daniels leave to proceed in

forma pauperis (Doc. 13), the Court has a continuing obligation to examine

whether his amended complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted, or asserts a claim against a defendant

immune from monetary relief. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii) (providing

that “[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have

been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court

determines that-- . . . (B) the action or appeal—(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary

relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief” (emphasis

added)). A complaint is frivolous under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) if it “lacks an

arguable basis either in law or fact,” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325

(1989), and is legally baseless if it is “based on an indisputably meritless

legal theory.” Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1085 (3d Cir. 1995).

A complaint is malicious if, after “engag[ing] in a subjective inquiry into the

litigant’s motivations at the time of the filing of the lawsuit,” the Court

determines that “the action is an attempt to vex, injure or harass the

defendant.” Id. at 1086. “[A] district court may dismiss a complaint as

malicious if it is plainly abusive of the judicial process or merely repeats

pending or previously litigated claims.” Brodzki v. CBS Sports, No. 11-cv-

841, 2012 WL 125281, at *1 (D. Del. Jan. 13, 2012). Finally, when

considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim under Section

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state

a claim is identical to the legal standard described above when ruling on

motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See

Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Rule

12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state claim under section

1915(e)(2)(B)).

C. Section 1983

Section 1983 is the statutory vehicle by which private citizens may

seek redress for violations of federal constitutional rights committed by state

officials. See 42 U.S.C. §1983. This statute states in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution of laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress . . . .

Id. “Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights,” but is merely a means

through which “to vindicate violations of federal law committed by state

actors.” Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa.

2004) (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284–85 (2002)). “To

state a claim under §1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right

secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show

that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of

state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Daniels’s Motions to Amend His Amended Complaint and

Motion to Take Judicial Notice

As stated above, Daniels filed duplicate motions to amend his

complaint (Docs. 20, 21) as well as a motion for the Court to take judicial

notice (Doc. 25). The Court will deem these motions withdrawn due to

Daniels’s failure to file briefs in support of the motions. See M.D. Pa. L.R. 7.5

(“Within fourteen (14) days after the filing of any motion, the party filing the

motion shall file a brief in support of the motion. ... If a supporting brief is not

filed within the time provided in this rule the motion shall be deemed to be

withdrawn.”).

B. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint

Defendants move to dismiss Daniels’s claims for violations of 18

U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 because they do not provide for a private right of

action, his Section 1983 claims for their lack of personal involvement in any

constitutional violation, and his Section 1983 claims and claims for violations

of the Pennsylvania Constitution for the failure to state a plausible claim for

relief. (Doc. 19 at 3, 4–14.) For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Daniels’s claims for violations of the Criminal

Code and the Pennsylvania Constitution. As for Daniels’s Section 1983

claims, the Court will not address the merits of Defendants’ persuasive

arguments for dismissal of these claims because those claims are precluded

by the favorable termination rule set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.

477 (1994). Therefore, the Court will dismiss Daniels’s Section 1983 claims

under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) instead of pursuant to the grounds set forth

in the motion to dismiss.

1. Claims for Violations of 18 U.S.C. §§241 and 242

Defendants move to dismiss Daniels’s claims for purported violations

of 18 U.S.C. §§241 and 242. (Id. at 4–5.) The Court will grant this part of

Defendants’ motion.

18 U.S.C. §§241 and 242 are federal criminal statutes which, along

with 18 U.S.C. §245, establish criminal liability for certain deprivations of civil

rights and conspiring to deprive civil rights. Daniels may not assert claim for

violations of Sections 241 and 242 in this civil case because there is no

private right of action under federal criminal statutes. See Davis v. Warden

Lewisburg USP, 594 F. App’x 60, 61 n.3 (3d Cir. 2015) (unpublished)

(explaining that plaintiff’s claim for alleged violation of his civil rights under

18 U.S.C. §242 was “meritless because §242 is a criminal statute, through

which no private cause of action is created”); Molina v. City of Lancaster, 159

F. Supp. 2d 813, 818 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (“[T]he Court deems the Plaintiff’s claim

for relief pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§241-242 unmeritorious because those

statutes do not create a civil cause of action enforceable by the Plaintiff.”

(citation omitted)); see also Stern v. Halligan, 158 F.3d 729, 731 n.1 (3d Cir.

1998) (pointing out that the district court correctly “granted summary

judgment on the 18 U.S.C. § 241 claim because there is no private cause of

action under the criminal statute” (citing Newcomb v. Ingle, 827 F.2d 675,

677 n.1 (10th Cir. 1987))). Accordingly, the court will dismiss Daniels’s claims

for purported violations of 18 U.S.C. §§241 and 242.

2. Claims for Violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution

As indicated above, Daniels seeks monetary damages from

Defendants for their alleged violations of his rights under Article I, Sections

8 and 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. (Doc. 12 at 5.) Defendants move

to dismiss these claims because there is no private right of action for

damages under the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Court agrees.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly determined that

there is no private right of actions for damages for violations of the

Pennsylvania Constitution. See Moss v. Pennsylvania, 838 F. App’x 702,

708 (3d Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (“Moreover, to the extent that Moss alleged

violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution, he failed to state a claim, as

Pennsylvania does not recognize a private right of action for damages in a

lawsuit alleging a violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution.” (citing Jones v.

City of Philadelphia, 890 A.2d 1188, 1208 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006))); Miles v.

Zech, 788 F. App’x 164, 167 (3d Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (“To the extent that

Miles intended to allege violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution, he failed

to state a claim, as Pennsylvania does not have a statutory equivalent to

§1983 and does not recognize a private right of action for damages

stemming from alleged violation of the state constitution.” (citing Gary v.

Braddock Cemetery, 517 F.3d 195, 207 n.4 (3d Cir. 2008))); Pocono

Mountain Charter Sch. v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 442 F. App’x 681, 687

(3d Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (“No Pennsylvania statute establishes, and no

Pennsylvania court has recognized, a private cause of action for damages

under the Pennsylvania Constitution.”). Accordingly, the Court will grant

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Daniels’s claims for purported violations of the

Pennsylvania Constitution and dismiss those claims.

C. Screening of Daniels’s Section 1983 Claims Under 28 U.S.C.

§1915(e)(2)(B)

Daniels asserts Section 1983 claims for violations of his rights under

the Fourth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 12 at 5.)

The entirety of Daniels’s factual allegations in support of these claims are (1)

he filed a grievance to which he should have received a response by June

29, 2023, (2) Newberry did not respond to his grievance until July 7, 2023,

and (3) no criminal charges were filed against him on August 27, 2021. (Id.

at 4–5.) As Defendants argue in their motion to dismiss, these allegations in

whole or in part, fail to plead a plausible Section 1983 claim against any

Defendant for a constitutional violation. (Doc. 19 at 5–14.) However, there is

a fundamental flaw with Daniels’s Section 1983 claims that goes beyond his

failure to allege Defendants’ personal involvement or plead facts to satisfy

any element of a violation under the Fourth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and

Fourteenth Amendments. This fundamental flaw is that Daniels’s Section

1983 claims all relate to his belief that he is unlawfully imprisoned because

no criminal charges were ever filed against him on August 27, 2021, and he

cannot maintain such claims because he does not, and cannot, allege that

whichever state proceedings led to his incarceration have been invalidated.

In this regard,

to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose

unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a

§1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence

has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive

order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make

such determination, or called into question by a federal

court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994) (emphasis added)

(footnote and citation omitted); see also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74,

81–82 (2005) (“[A] state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior

invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no

matter the target of the prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to conviction or

internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily

demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” (emphasis

omitted)). “Thus, when a [plaintiff] seeks damages in a §1983 suit, the district

court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would

necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the

complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the

conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.

Here, Daniels seeks monetary damages under Section 1983 for

alleged constitutional violations, and any judgment in his favor in this case

would require a determination that either his conviction, sentence, or parole

revocation is invalid because his Section 1983 claims are based on the

premise that he is unlawfully incarcerated insofar as “no charges were ever

filed on 8-27-2021.” (Doc. 12 at 5.); see also Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d

173, 177 (3d Cir. 2006) (concluding that Heck extends to parole matters).

Even his allegations about Newberry not timely responding to his grievance,

which Daniels believes constitutes Defendants’ default as to that grievance,

pertain to his belief that he is unlawfully incarcerated. See (id. at 5 (“All

defendants put me in serious risk of harm when no charges were ever filed

on 8-27-2021 like stated in the defaulted grievance that was not answer [sic]

in a timely fashion.”)). By (incorrectly) asserting that Defendants are in

default, i.e., they admitted to his allegations in the grievance by failing to

timely respond to it, Daniels is contending that Defendants have admitted

that he is unlawfully incarcerated. See (id.).

Overall, Daniels’s attempt to obtain damages for his allegedly unlawful

incarceration, where he has not alleged that the state proceedings resulting

in his incarceration were invalidated in some fashion, is barred by Heck.

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Daniels’s Section 1983 claims against

Defendants under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

D. Leave to Amend

Having determined that Daniels’s claims against Defendants in his

amended complaint are subject to dismissal, the Court must decide whether

to grant him leave to file a second amended complaint. Although district

courts should generally give leave to amend, they may dismiss an amended

complaint with prejudice where leave to amend would be inequitable or futile.

See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247,

252 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[I]n civil rights cases district courts must offer

amendment—irrespective of whether it is requested—when dismissing a

case for failure to state a claim unless doing so would be inequitable or

futile.”); Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002)

(“When a plaintiff does not seek leave to amend a deficient complaint after a

defendant moves to dismiss it, the court must inform the plaintiff that [they

have] leave to amend within a set period of time, unless amendment would

be inequitable or futile.”). “In determining whether [amendment] would be

futile, the district court applies the same standard of legal sufficiency as [it]

applies under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec.

Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997).

Here, the Court finds that it would be futile for Daniels to file a second

amended complaint. Daniels cannot plead any factual allegations that would

permit him to proceed on his claims seeking money damages for violations

of the Criminal Code or the Pennsylvania Constitution. Thus, the Court will

dismiss those claims with prejudice.

As for his Section 1983 claims, Daniels cannot get past the Heck bar

by plausibly alleging in a second amended complaint that those state

proceedings have been invalidated because (1) the state courts have

rejected his challenges to those proceedings, see, e.g., Daniels v. Pa. Parole

Bd., No. 490 C.D. 2023, 2024 WL 2846437 (Pa. Commw. Ct. June 5, 2024)

(affirming Parole Board’s decision to, inter alia, “recommit him to a state

correctional institution as a convicted parole violator . . . to serve six months’

backtime”), appeal denied, No. 298 MAL 2024, 2025 WL 443022 (Pa. Feb.

10, 2025); Commonwealth v. Daniels, No. 1495 MDA 2022, 2023 WL

6209602 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sept. 25, 2023) (affirming dismissal of Daniels’s

petition for relief under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act),

reargument denied (Dec. 6, 2023), appeal denied, 322 A.3d 1284 (Table)

(Pa. 2024); and (2) he is currently challenging his incarceration in a habeas

petition under 28 U.S.C. §2254 that is also assigned to the undersigned, see

Daniels v. Brittain, No. 24-cv-01409 (M.D. Pa.), ECF No. 1. Therefore,

although the Court must dismiss Daniels’s Section 1983 claims barred by

Heck without prejudice, see Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 379 (3d Cir.

2016) (explaining that district court must dismiss without prejudice claims

barred by Heck), the Court will not grant him leave to replead those claims

in a second amended complaint.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the Court will deem withdrawn Daniels’s

duplicate motions to amend his complaint and his motion for the Court to

take judicial notice due to his failure to file briefs in support of those motions.

The Court will also grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss to the extent they

seek dismissal of Daniels’s claims under the Criminal Code and the

Pennsylvania Constitution, and the Court will dismiss those claims with

prejudice. The Court will deny as moot Defendants’ motion to dismiss

Daniels’s Section 1983 claims, but will also dismiss those claims without

prejudice because they are barred by Heck. Daniels will not receive leave of

Court to file a second amended complaint. An appropriate Order follows.

s/ Malachy E. Mannion

MALACHY E. MANNION

United States District Judge

DATE: March 12, 2025

23-1540-01