Arrington v. Miami Dade County Public School District

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

MIAMI DIVISION

Case Number: 15-24114-CIV-MARTINEZ-GOODMAN

MICHAEL D. ARRINGTON,

Plaintiff,

MIAMI DADE COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOL

DISTRICT, et al.,

Defendants.

eae

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

THIS MATTER was referred to the Honorable Jonathan Goodman, United States Chief

Magistrate Judge, for a Report and Recommendation on Plaintiff's Motion to File Under Seal

Affidavit and Exhibits Containing Medical Information in Support of Motion for Relief from

Judgment (“Support Motion”), (ECF No. 127), and Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Judgment,

(ECF No. 129). (ECF No. 131.)

Judge Goodman filed an Omnibus Report and Recommendations (“R&R”), recommending

that the Motion for Relief from Judgment, (ECF No. 129), be denied because Plaintiff failed to

establish his entitlement to the requested relief, and accordingly that the Support Motion, (ECF

No. 127), be denied as moot. (ECF No. 135.) Plaintiff's Objections to the R&R were due within

fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy of the R&R. (ECF No. 135.) Plaintiff filed his

Objections to the R&R on October 16, 2024. (ECF No. 136.) It is unclear from the record when

Plaintiff received a copy of the R&R, but he claims in his Objections he received it on October 4,

2024. Taking this as true, Plaintiff?s Objections were due on or before October 18, 2024. Therefore,

this Court proceeds as if Plaintiff's Objections were timely submitted.

Plaintiff is a former student at one of Defendant School Board’s adult education programs.

Upon Report and Recommendation on Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, Plaintiffs initial

Complaint was dismissed as a shotgun pleading and for failure to state a claim. (ECF Nos. 30, 36.)

Counts 1-4 and 6 were dismissed without prejudice, and Plaintiff was given time to amend these

counts. (ECF No. 36.) Counts 5 and 7-13 were dismissed without prejudice, as the Court declined

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction as to those claims, and Plaintiff was given an opportunity to

refile those counts in state court. (/d.) Counts 14-18 were dismissed with prejudice, as counts 14-

16 were brought against Defendants that were never served and counts 17-18 were barred under

the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. (ECF Nos. 30, 36.)

Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, and subsequently requested leave to file a Second

Amended Complaint. (ECF Nos. 37, 48.) Plaintiffs request was granted, and Plaintiff filed his

Second Amended Complaint. (ECF Nos. 59, 60.) Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint was

again dismissed as a shotgun pleading, as it was “replete with conclusory, vague and immaterial

facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action.” (ECF No. 73) (quoting Weiland

vy. Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1322). This Court instructed that Plaintiffs

failure to cure the deficiencies would lead to the dismissal of his complaint with prejudice. (ECF

No. 73.) This Court dismissed Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint without prejudice, allowing

“one final opportunity to cure the deficiencies,” warning again that “failure to cure the deficiencies

as outlined in this Order will lead to this Court dismissing Plaintiff's action with prejudice.” (/d.)

Plaintiff subsequently filed his Third Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 75.)

Upon Report and Recommendation on Defendants’ Combined Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint, (ECF No. 82), this Court dismissed Plaintiff's Third

Amended Complaint with prejudice because Plaintiff again failed to cure the deficiencies outlined

by the Court. (ECF No. 86.) Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend Judgment under

Rule 59(e), (ECF No. 87), which this Court denied, (ECF No. 94).

Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal of the Court’s Order Adopting Judge Goodman’s Report

and Recommendation as to his Third Amended Complaint and the Court’s Order Denying

Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Judgment. (ECF No. 95.) The United States Court of Appeals for the

Eleventh Circuit affirmed the orders on appeal, finding “the district court properly dismissed

Arrington’s complaint for failure to state a plausible claim to relief. Accepting Arrington’s

allegations as true, he has not stated an underlying constitutional or statutory violation. Nor has he

shown that any of the named defendants would be liable even if he could establish a constitutional

violation.” (ECF No. 99.)

Following the Eleventh Circuit’s affirmance, Plaintiff filed another Motion for Relief from

Judgment of the Court’s Order dismissing his Third Amended Complaint, (ECF No. 86). (ECF

No. 100.) This Court denied Plaintiffs Second Motion for Relief from Judgment, (ECF No. 100),

because “the issues raised in Plaintiff's Rule 60(b) Motion were expressly decided in the Eleventh

Circuit’s opinion. Thus, relitigation at the district court level—if even allowed as a jurisdictional

matter—is precluded.” (ECF No. 102.) The Court further explained that in filing the Second

Motion for Relief from Judgment, Plaintiff was essentially asking the district court to reconsider

the Eleventh Circuit’s decision. (/d.)

Plaintiff then filed a Notice of Appeal of the Court’s Order Denying Plaintiffs Second

Motion for Relief from Judgment, (ECF No. 102). (ECF No. 104.) The Eleventh Circuit affirmed

the order on appeal, explaining “the district court had no authority to grant his requested relief

under Rule 60(b) or otherwise. Accordingly, the district court properly denied Arrington’s Rule

60 motion.” (ECF No. 109.)

Plaintiff then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Eleventh Circuit’s Mandate, despite

both this Court and the Eleventh Circuit explaining that the district court is without jurisdiction to

review an Eleventh Circuit mandate. (ECF No. 110.) This Court denied the Motion, again

explaining that relitigation at the district court level was precluded both because the issues at hand

were expressly decided in the Eleventh Circuit’s opinions, and because this Court did not have

jurisdiction to reconsider same. (ECF No. 111.)

Plaintiff initiated a third appeal. (ECF No. 112.) The Eleventh Circuit again affirmed the

order on appeal, explaining “the district court properly concluded that law of the case barred

Arrington’s second Rule 60(b) motion.” (ECF No. 117.) Undeterred, Plaintiff again filed a Motion

for Reconsideration of the Eleventh Circuit’s mandate. (ECF Nos. 118, 119.) The Court again

denied the Motion, (ECF No. 120), and Plaintiff again appealed, (ECF No. 121.) The Eleventh

Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, as Plaintiff failed to adhere to the 30-day

statutory time limit. (ECF No. 126.)

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Relief, (ECF No. 129), and Support

Motion, (ECF No. 127), for relief from the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion dismissing his appeal for

lack of jurisdiction, (ECF No. 126), arguing that his failure to adhere to the 30-day deadline was

excusable neglect because he was incapacitated and under the impression that the Eleventh Circuit

would not take any action on his third motion for reconsideration, (ECF No. 129). Judge

Goodman’s R&R explains that Plaintiff's reliance on Vencor Hosps., Inc. v. Standard Life & Acc.

Ins. Co. for relief pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) is misplaced because that case holds that Fed.

R. App. P. 4(a)(6) is the “exclusive method for extending a party’s time to appeal for failure to

receive actual notice that a judgment or order has been entered.” (ECF No. 135) (quoting Vencor

Hosps., Inc. 279 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2002)). Therefore, Plaintiff cannot obtain relief to file

an appeal past the 30-day deadline under Rule 60(b) for any reason. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6) is the

exclusive means for extending the time to appeal.

In considering Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6), Judge Goodman explained that Plaintiff's Motion

for Relief fails to meet Rule 4(a)(6)’s requirements because Plaintiff admitted that he properly

received notice of the Court’s Order. (ECF No. 135.) Plaintiff states that he “live [sic] alone and

didn’t check his mailbox regularly during the month of November 2023, due to the elevator not

working properly, pain in his left knee and the anxiety he was having after the workers

compensation carrier denied him medical treatment,” seemingly arguing that regardless of when

the Order was sent or delivered to his mailbox, he did not “receive” it until he checked his mailbox

on November 30, 2023, and therefore his failure to timely file his Notice of Appeal was excusable

neglect. (ECF No. 130.) This is not supported by relevant legal authorities. See Jn Re Keitel, 852

Fed. App’x 463 (11th Cir. 2021) (affirming district court’s decision to deny pro se party’s Rule 60

motion where party failed to meet court deadlines even where party “did not have access to the

electronic filing system, and was unable to get to his P.O. Box [...]” and suffered from “serious

health issues” resulting in a hospitalization). Relief pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6) is available

where “the court finds that the moving party did not receive notice under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 77(d) of the entry of judgment or order sought to be appealed within 21 days after

entry[.]” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6)(A) Thus, Plaintiff fails to meet the first requirement of Rule

4(a)(6) because he did not demonstrate that he did not receive notice of the Order within 21 days

after entry. He has only demonstrated that he did not timely retrieve it from his mailbox.

Judge Goodman further found, and this Court agrees, that Plaintiff failed to “articulate the

basis” of how he is entitled to relief under Rule 4(a)(6). (ECF No. 135) Cf Leib v. Hillsborough

Cnty. Pub. Transp. Comm’n, 558 F.3d 1301, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Leib’s failure to articulate

the basis of his arbitrary and capricious due process claim is a sufficient ground for its dismissal.’’)

(citing Tyler v. Runyon, 70 F.3d 458, 465 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[I]f an appellant fails to make a

minimally complete and comprehensible argument for each of his claims, he loses regardless of

the merits of those claims as they might have appeared on a fuller presentation.”)). Instead,

Plaintiff's Motion for Relief merely states the requirements of Rule 4(a)(6) and includes no

argument or discussion related to how he actually meets each of the requirements. (ECF No. 129.)

This Court has conducted a de novo review of the record and the arguments contained

within Plaintiff's Objections, (ECF No. 136). Plaintiffs Objections merely restate prior arguments

that have already been addressed and copies portions of the R&R, claiming that it “errs,” without

stating the specific authorities supporting the objections. Plaintiff's Objections do not establish

any error in the R&R. This Court concludes that the findings within Judge Goodman’s R&R are

supported by the evidence and relevant authorities. Accordingly, after careful consideration, it is

hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:

1. United States Chief Magistrate Judge Jonathan Goodman’s Report and

Recommendations, (ECF No. 135), is AFFIRMED and ADOPTED.

2. Plaintiff's Objections, (ECF No. 136), ace OVERRULED.

a Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Judgment, (ECF No. 129), is DENIED.

4. Plaintiff's Motion to File Under Seal in Support of Motion for Relief from

Judgment, (ECF No. 127), is DENIED as MOOT.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this □□ day of March, 2025.

MN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies provided to:

Magistrate Judge Goodman

Michael D. Arrington, pro se

All Counsel of Record