holding that officers must favor the public safety over statutory compliance
How later courts described this case
- holding that officers must favor the public safety over statutory compliance
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Case: 24-20015 Document: 83-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/11/2025
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
____________ Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 24-20015 March 11, 2025
____________
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Chelsie Cierra Rubin,
Personally and as the Personal Representative of
the Estate of Pamela Shantay Turner;
Cameron Daishaun January,
Personally and as the Personal Representative of
the Estate of Pamela Shantay Turner,
Plaintiffs—Appellants,
versus
Juan Pedro De La Cruz; City of Baytown, Texas,
Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:21-CV-1148
______________________________
Before Smith, Stewart, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
Jerry E. Smith, Circuit Judge:*
Baytown Police Officer Juan De La Cruz attempted to arrest Pamela
Turner on three warrants when Turner took De La Cruz’s taser during a
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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No. 24-20015
ground struggle and tased him in the testicles. In shock and fearing for his
life, De La Cruz jolted back, unholstered his firearm, and fired at Turner,
who died at the scene. Turner’s daughter and son, Chelsie Rubin and Cam-
eron January, sued De La Cruz under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of
Turner’s Fourth Amendment rights. They also sued the City of Baytown,
alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 504”) and myriad state
laws. The district court dismissed all claims on summary judgment. We
affirm.
I.
De La Cruz resided at the Brixton Apartments and served as a cour-
tesy law enforcement officer for the apartments. Turner also resided there
and was known to have some “mental health issues” that caused her to be
“aggressive,” but no one involved in this case knew of any specific conditions
or her medical history.
While De La Cruz was leaving the apartment complex to respond to
an unrelated dispatch call, he saw Turner screaming in the middle of the
apartment parking lot. Seeing that she was causing a disturbance in the neigh-
borhood, he searched her name in the police database and discovered that she
had three active Class B misdemeanor warrants. De La Cruz did not execute
the warrants at that time but instead left the complex to respond to the
dispatch call.
The dispatch call took about ten minutes and upon his return, De La
Cruz spotted Turner walking alongside the border of the property. He drove
toward her, got out of his car, and tried to arrest her on the warrants, but she
2
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No. 24-20015
ignored him and walked away.1
To stop her, De La Cruz grabbed Turner’s arm, but she wrestled out
of his grip and again tried to walk away. De La Cruz, in response, drew his
X26P taser in probe-deployment mode and fired it at Turner.2 Turner fell
backward onto the sidewalk, having been tased, but did not appear to be fully
incapacitated.
De La Cruz then walked over to her and bent down to handcuff her.
Turner, however, fought back, leading to a ground struggle that wrapped De
La Cruz in the active taser wires. With limited options, De La Cruz at-
tempted to use his taser in “drive-stun mode,” hoping that the shock would
incapacitate her enough to handcuff her. But in their struggle, Turner took
hold of the taser and tased him in the testicles.
In shock, De La Cruz jolted back, unholstered his gun, and fired at
Turner. At that time, Turner faced De La Cruz with the taser in hand and
was attempting to get up while De La Cruz was wrapped in the live taser
wires. Turner died at the scene.
Plaintiffs sued De La Cruz under § 1983 for excessive force in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment. They also sued the City of Baytown under
the ADA and Section 504 and for several claims under state law. De La Cruz
moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity (“QI”). The city
also moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judg-
ment for De La Cruz and the city on all federal claims and dismissed the
_____________________
1
The remaining facts are captured on De La Cruz’s body cam footage and a Face-
book video from an unnamed bystander.
2
According to the X26P instruction manual, once the taser is used in probe-
deployment mode, it can no longer be fired from a distance. Instead, the taser from then
on can be used only in “drive-stun mode,” meaning that, to be used, the taser must be
pressed against the person. The stray wires may still emit temporary electric shocks.
3
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No. 24-20015
remaining state-law claims against the city for want of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs
appeal.3
II.
We review summary judgments de novo. Ontiveros v. City of Rosenberg,
564 F.3d 379, 382 (5th Cir. 2009). Summary judgment is proper when “the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and
he is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A
fact is ‘material’ if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the gov-
erning law.’”4
When a defendant’s motion for summary judgment is based on a
good-faith assertion of QI, the burden of proof shifts “to the plaintiff to show
that the defense is not available.”5
“We review summary judgment evidence in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. But when video footage captures the incident at
issue, we rely on the facts depicted in the footage.” McVae v. Perez, 120 F.4th
487, 491 (5th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted).6
_____________________
3
Plaintiffs do not appeal the dismissal of their state law claims.
4
Aguirre v. City of San Antonio, 995 F.3d 395, 406 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
5
Ratliff v. Aransas Cnty., 948 F.3d 281, 287 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Orr v. Cope-
land, 844 F.3d 484, 490 (5th Cir. 2016)).
6
Plaintiffs dispute the weight that the district court gave the video evidence. Plain-
tiffs aver that we do not have clear video evidence to corroborate De La Cruz’s testimony,
and thus the district court improperly relied on it. But the plaintiffs are wrong. The video
plainly corroborates De La Cruz’s testimony and depicts Turner’s arms extending toward
De La Cruz’s groin area at the time that he alleges he was tased in the testicles. The video
also refutes plaintiffs’ alternative explanation. Accordingly, the district court properly
relied on De La Cruz’s corroborated testimony.
4
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No. 24-20015
III.
The district court granted summary judgment for De La Cruz, finding
that De La Cruz’s use of deadly force was reasonable and that it did not vio-
late clearly established law. We agree that De La Cruz did not violate any
clearly established law and is thus entitled to QI.
QI is an affirmative defense that exists to protect officers from liability
for civil damages where the officer’s “conduct does not violate clearly estab-
lished statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should
have known.” Aguirre, 995 F.3d at 406 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “A two-prong inquiry determines whether qualified
immunity applies. The first prong asks whether the facts show that the
official’s conduct violated a statutory or constitutional right. The second
prong asks whether that right was “clearly established” at the time of the
violation.” McVae, 120 F.4th at 492 (cleaned up). We may “decid[e] which
of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed []
in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Calla-
han, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). Because plaintiffs failed to identify any clearly
established law that De La Cruz violated, we do not address whether his use
of force was reasonable.
The clearly-established-law requirement ensures that officers have
“fair warning that their conduct violated the Constitution.” Hope v. Pelzer,
536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). “For a right to be clearly established, ‘existing
precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond
debate.’” Shepherd v. City of Shreveport, 920 F.3d 278, 285 (5th Cir. 2019)
(quoting White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017)). We are instructed not to
define clearly established rights “at a high level of generality.” Mullenix v.
Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.
731, 742 (2011)). “The dispositive question is ‘whether the violative nature
of particular conduct is clearly established.’” Id. (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S.
5
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No. 24-20015
at 742). “Such specificity is especially important in the Fourth Amendment
context[.]” Id.
Plaintiffs posit that De La Cruz is not entitled to QI because it is clearly
established that “[a] police officer may not seize an unarmed, nondangerous
suspect by shooting him dead.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).
Plaintiffs’ reliance on Garner—and only Garner—is misguided.7 “At
most, Garner prohibits using deadly force against an unarmed burglary sus-
pect fleeing on foot who poses no immediate threat.” Harmon v. City of
Arlington, 16 F.4th 1159, 1167 (5th Cir. 2021). That is a far cry from the
particular circumstances of this case.
Here, unlike in Garner, the officer used deadly force only after he had
been tased, and the taser wires were attached to him, and Turner, who had
been actively resisting arrest, was attempting to rise from the ground with the
officer’s taser in hand. In other words, Turner was not an “unarmed [] sus-
pect fleeing on foot and who pose[d] no immediate threat” to De La Cruz.
Accordingly, even if De La Cruz’s use of force is excessive, he is still entitled
to QI.
IV.
The district court granted summary judgment for the city on the ADA
and Section 504 claims, finding that because “De La Cruz was executing a
routine, on-the-street response to an incident when he attempted to arrest
Turner pursuant to warrants” and because the scene had not yet been
_____________________
7
Plaintiffs also aver that this is an “obvious” case under Garner, obviating the need
to identify any other caselaw. Though rare, “obvious” excessive force cases do exist. See
Cole v. Carson, 935 F.3d 444, 453–54 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc). This, however, is not one
of them.
6
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No. 24-20015
secured, the ADA and Section 504 do not apply. We agree. 8
Neither statute applies to “an officer’s on-the-street response to . . .
incidents, whether or not those calls involve subjects with mental disabilities,
prior to the officer’s securing the scene and ensuring that there is not a threat
to human life.” Allen v. Hays, 65 F.4th 736, 752 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting
Hainze, 207 F.3d at 801). Because effecting an arrest pursuant to a warrant
is merely “executing a routine, on-the-street response to an incident,” and
because De La Cruz was not able to secure the scene, neither the ADA nor
Section 504 applies.
Allen is illustrative of that conclusion: Two officers pulled over a
“veteran known to the Houston Police Department (“HPD”) for his docu-
mented history of PTSD” as part of a “routine traffic stop.” 65 F.4th at 741.
The stop quickly became non-routine, however, when a miscommunication
between Allen and the officers led to the officers’ suspecting Allen was dan-
gerous and fatally shooting him. Id. at 742. We held that the ADA and Sec-
tion 504 did not apply because “[t]o require the officers to factor in whether
their actions are going to comply with the ADA, in the presence of exigent
circumstances and prior to securing the safety of themselves, other officers,
and any nearby civilians, would pose an unnecessary risk to innocents.”
Hainze, 207 F.3d at 801. And “[w]hile the purpose of the ADA is to prevent
the discrimination of disabled individuals, we do not think Congress intended
that the fulfillment of that objective be attained at the expense of the safety
of the general public.” Id.
Accordingly, whether the ADA or Section 504 applies when a routine
arrest turns hostile because of exigent circumstances depends on whether the
_____________________
8
We analyze claims under the ADA and Section 504 together. See Hainze v.
Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
7
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No. 24-20015
scene is secure. To hold otherwise, as plaintiffs would have, disregards com-
mon sense and our precedents. See id. (holding that officers must favor the
public safety over statutory compliance); Allen, 65 F.4th at 752 (same).
Because De La Cruz faced hostile resistance from Turner when he
attempted to arrest her, the scene was entirely unsecure. And because of her
ongoing resistance, he never had a chance to secure it. Accordingly, the ADA
and Section 504 do not apply. The district court properly dismissed plain-
tiffs’ ADA and Section 504 claims.
Even if they did apply, dismissal would be proper. To establish a prima
facie case under either statute a plaintiff must show
(1) that he is a qualified individual. . . ; (2) that he is being ex-
cluded from participation in, or being denied benefits of, ser-
vices, programs, or activities for which the public entity is re-
sponsible, or is otherwise being discriminated against by the
public entity; and (3) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or
discrimination is by reason of his disability.[9]
The plaintiff must also demonstrate intentional discrimination to recover
damages. Id.
In this context, mere knowledge of a disability is not enough; the offi-
cer must have understood the “limitations [the plaintiff] experienced . . . as
a result of that disability.” Taylor v. Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 164
(5th Cir. 1996). “The burden falls on the plaintiff to specifically identify the
disability and resulting limitations, and to request an accommodation in dir-
ect and specific terms.” Windham v. Harris Cnty., 875 F.3d 229, 237 (5th Cir.
2017) (cleaned up). “When a plaintiff fails to request an accommodation in
this manner, he can prevail only by showing that ‘the disability, resulting lim-
_____________________
9
J.W. v. Paley, 81 F.4th 440, 449 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Melton v. Dallas Area
Rapid Transit, 391 F.3d 669, 671–72 (5th Cir. 2004)).
8
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No. 24-20015
itation, and necessary reasonable accommodation’ were ‘open, obvious, and
apparent’ to the entity's relevant agents.”10
De La Cruz knew only that Turner had “mental health issues” that
caused her to be “aggressive.” Turner never articulated a disability, ex-
pressed any resulting limitation, or requested an accommodation to De La
Cruz. And now, plaintiffs do not even attempt specifically to identify what
Turner’s disability is or explain how it is a qualifying disability under the
ADA and Section 504. Plaintiffs also fail to explain, given the various defici-
encies in their claims, how Turner’s disability, associated limitation, or
accommodation is “open, obvious, and apparent.” In other words, plaintiffs
have not established any element of their claims, let alone raised a material
factual dispute as to any of them.11
The summary judgment is AFFIRMED.
_____________________
10
Sligh v. City of Conroe, 87 F.4th 290, 304 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Windham,
875 F.3d at 237).
11
It does not matter that plaintiffs may have presented some question as to whether
there was “intentional discrimination,” namely whether De La Cruz worked with the
apartment complex constructively to evict Turner. Even accepting that as true, plaintiffs
have failed to demonstrate any support for the remaining elements.
9