HARRIS v. SCOTT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

THORON HARRIS, Civil Action No. 24-7524 (MCA)(JBC)

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM OPINION

BECKY SCOTT, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Thoron Harris has filed a Complaint seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and an

application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP application”). At this time, the Court grants

Plaintiff’s IFP application. Federal law requires the Court to screen Plaintiff’s Complaint for sua

sponte dismissal prior to service, and to dismiss any claim if that claim fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted and/or to dismiss any defendant who is immune from suit. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). To survive

screening, Plaintiff’s Complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quotations omitted). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of

the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of

‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly 550 U.S. at 557). Because Plaintiff is

proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. See Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d

333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011).

I. The Allegations in the Complaint

According to his Complaint, Plaintiff contracted COVID-19 at HCCC during an outbreak

at the jail in January 2024, and he has sued the Becky Scott, as the Warden of Hudson County

Correctional Facility, the Hudson County Correctional Center (HCCC), and/or the “Hudson

County Medical Department” in connection with that incident. Complaint at 11. Plaintiff alleges

that when inmates were quarantined due to the COVID-19 outbreak, medical staff at HCCC used

the same water jugs for administering daily medications to prisoners. Id. Moreover, after Plaintiff

developed symptoms consistent with COVID-19, staff did not immediately test him for COVID-

19. Id. When another inmate in Plaintiff’s unit tested positive, staff placed the infected inmate in

the back of the unit, and he was not immediately removed. Id.

After Plaintiff and several other inmates tested positive, Plaintiff was moved to a quarantine

unit with “little to no medical attention.” Id. Although medical staff provided Plaintiff with his

daily medications, his requests for “anything” else were denied, and medical staff told him that his

“body had to get rid of the virus.” Id. Plaintiff was locked in a room with another inmate who

was positive for COVID-19, and his room was not disinfected due to a lack of supplies. Id.

Plaintiff was returned to his unit after eight days, even though others inmates were still testing

positive. Id.

“Hudson County staff” allegedly suspected that the COVID-19 outbreak was caused by

inmates coming from other jails who were not tested or quarantined, but they failed to take

precautions to prevent the spread of the virus. Id. at 12. Plaintiff alleges that he was “traumatized”

by this ordeal and states that he is diabetic and knew he could possibly die. Id. Plaintiff asks for

damages in the amount of $650,000.00. Id.

II. Screening the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

The Court construes Plaintiff to assert violations of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983. The Court does not construe Plaintiff to raise any state law claims. To succeed on a claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by

a person acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federally

secured right. See, e.g., Moore v. Tartler, 986 F. 2d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1983); see also Natale v.

Camden Cnty. Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 580–81 (3d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).

In cases involving conditions of confinement, the Constitution treats pretrial detainees and

convicted and sentenced prisoners differently. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 164-65 (3d

Cir. 2005) (discussing differing standards of constitutional protection over incarcerated

individuals). In his Complaint, Plaintiff indicates that he was both a pretrial detainee and a

convicted prisoner at the time of the events at issue. Available information, however, suggests that

Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee and not a convicted prisoner at the time he allegedly contracted

COVID-19 in January 2024.1

The Court first construes Plaintiff to allege that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to

his health and safety and his need for medical care. As a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff’s right to

adequate medical care arises under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See

Natale, 318 F.3d at 581, but courts analyze such claims using the same deliberate indifference

standard that applies under the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 581-82; Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854

F.3d 209, 221-23 (3d Cir. 2017). The Eighth Amendment requires “humane conditions of

confinement,” including “adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.” Farmer v. Brennan,

1 The New Jersey Department of Corrections Inmate Locator indicates that plaintiff was sentenced

on September 16, 2024, available at https://www-

doc.state.nj.us/DOC_Inmate/details?x=1584039&n=0, last visited Feb. 27, 2025.

511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). In addition, prison officials “must take reasonable measures to

guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Id. (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984); see also Duran v. Merline, 923 F.Supp.2d 702, 719 (D.N.J.

2013) (explaining that the Constitution mandates that prison officials satisfy inmates’ “basic

human needs—e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety”) (citing Helling

v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993)). This duty extends to protecting inmates against harms

including “serious contagious diseases[.]” Helling, 509 U.S. at 34. Thus, “[a] prison official’s

deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth

Amendment.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828 (cleaned up).

The Court also construes Plaintiff to allege that his conditions of confinement amount to

punishment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 549 (1979); Hope v. Warden York County Prison,

972 F.3d 310, 326 (3d. Cir. 2020). “Unconstitutional punishment typically includes both objective

and subjective components.” Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 2007). “[T]he

objective component requires an inquiry into whether the deprivation was sufficiently serious and

the subjective component asks whether the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of

mind.” Id. (internal quotations and alterations omitted). In analyzing a claim of unconstitutional

punishment, courts consider the “totality of the circumstances of confinement, including any

genuine privations or hardship over an extended period of time.” Hope v. Warden York Cnty.

Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 326 (3d Cir. 2020). Additionally, “a ‘particular measure amounts to

punishment when there is a showing of express intent to punish on the part of detention facility

officials, when the restriction or condition is not rationally related to a legitimate non-punitive

government purpose, or when the restriction is excessive in light of that purpose.’” Bistrian v.

Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 373 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 68); Steele v. Cicchi, 855

F.3d 494, 504 (3d Cir. 2017).

Here, Plaintiff has sued the Warden Becky Scott for violating his constitutional rights. In

addition to satisfying the elements of each claim, “a plaintiff must demonstrate a defendant’s

‘personal involvement in the alleged wrongs.’” Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dept of Corr., 806

F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)).4

There are “two general ways in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable for unconstitutional

acts undertaken by subordinates.” Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir.

2014), reversed on other grounds by Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822 (2015). First, a supervisor

may be liable if he or she “‘with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and

maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.’”? □□□

(quoting A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004)

(alteration in original)). “Second, a supervisor may be personally liable under § 1983 if he or she

participated in violating the plaintiffs rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in

charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.” Id.

Although Plaintiff has sued Becky Scott as the Warden of HCCC, he does not provide any

facts showing that she personally participated or acquiesced in any violations of his constitutional

“{T]Jo hold a supervisor liable. . . for their deficient policies. . . the plaintiff must identify a specific

policy or practice that the supervisor failed to employ and show that: (1) the existing policy or

practice created an unreasonable risk of [a constitutional] injury; (2) the supervisor was aware that

the unreasonable risk was created; (3) the supervisor was indifferent to that risk; and (4) the injury

resulted from the policy or practice.” Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 133-34 (3d Cir.

2001) (citing Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989)). Deliberate indifference in

the supervisory context may be demonstrated by “(1) showing that a supervisor failed to adequately

respond to a pattern of past occurrences of injuries like the plaintiffs’, or (41) by showing that the

risk of constitutionally cognizable harm was ‘so great and so obvious that the risk and the failure

of supervisory officials to respond will alone’ support the finding that the two-part test is met.”

Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d 136-37 (citing Sample, 885 F.2d at 1099).

rights. Plaintiff also fails to plead any facts showing that his constitutional rights were violated as

a result of Scott’s policies, or her failures to train, supervise, or discipline her staff. The Complaint

contains no facts about Scott’s personal involvement regarding Plaintiff’s exposure to COVID-19,

his conditions of confinement at HCCC, or the denial of medical care for his symptoms. See

Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 223 (dismissing § 1983 claim where the plaintiff failed to establish the

defendant’s personal involvement in the acted alleged to violate the Constitution). The Court

therefore dismisses without prejudice the § 1983 claims as to Becky Scott.3

Plaintiff also appears to name HCCC or the HCCC Medical Department as a defendant. A

county jail is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983, although the county itself may be a proper

defendant. See Abner v. Somerset Cnty. Jail, No. 18-16911, 2019 WL 1904880, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr.

29, 2019) (citing Barrett v. Essex Cty. Corr. Facility, No. 15-595, 2015 WL 1808523, at *3 (D.N.J.

Apr. 16, 2015)) (additional citations omitted). The Court dismisses with prejudice the claims

against the HCCC and HCCC Medical Department, and liberally construes the Complaint to assert

§ 1983 claims against the County of Hudson.

The liability of a municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is governed by Monell v.

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Municipalities may not be found vicariously

liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Ed. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown,

520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). Instead, a plaintiff must plead the elements of a Monell claim, which

may proceed in two different ways. See, e.g., Estate of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789,

3 The Court does not construe Plaintiff to allege § 1983 claims against individual corrections or

medical staff at HCCC. Plaintiff mentions unnamed medical and corrections staff in his

Complaint, but he does not provide sufficient facts to enable him to identify these John Does in

discovery. If Plaintiff seeks to hold individual corrections or medical staff liable, he must plead

facts sufficient to identify them later and show that those individuals acted with deliberate

indifference to his health and safety or serious medical needs.

798–99 (3d Cir. 2019) (describing the two types of municipal liability). A plaintiff may allege that

an unconstitutional policy or custom of the municipality led to his or her injuries, id. at 798 (citing

Monell, 436 U.S. at 694), or that his injuries were caused by a failure or inadequacy by the

municipality that “reflects a deliberate or conscious choice,” see id. (internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2001)); see also Forrest

v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105 (3d Cir. 2019) (explaining that the second type of Monell claim involves

failures to train, supervise, or discipline).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that unnamed staff failed to protect him from COVID-19, held him

in unsanitary conditions during quarantine, and denied him medical care for his COVID-19

symptoms. Plaintiff, however, has not pleaded any facts to support a Monell claim against the

County of Hudson, or its medical provider, and the Court dismisses without prejudice this claim

for relief.

III. CONCLUSION

For all the reasons explained herein, the Court dismisses the Complaint for failure to state

a claim for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Complaint is dismissed with prejudice as

to the HCCC and the HCCC Medical Department and without prejudice as to Becky Scott and the

County of Hudson. The Court will permit Plaintiff to submit an Amended Complaint to the extent

he can provide facts to cure the deficiencies in his claims for relief. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v.

Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that in civil rights

cases, the Court must allow amendment, unless doing so would be inequitable or futile). Because

it is conceivable that Plaintiff can cure the deficiencies in the claims against Becky Scott and the

County of Hudson, Plaintiff may submit an Amended Complaint and a request to reopen this

matter within 45 days of the date of this Memorandum and Order.’ If Plaintiff does not submit an

Amended Complaint within 45 days, the dismissal of this action will automatically convert to a

dismissal with prejudice. An appropriate Order follows.

CY

March 10, 2025

Hon. Madeline Cox Arleo, District Judge

United States District Court

* Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint is filed, it supersedes the original and

renders it of no legal effect, unless the amended complaint specifically refers to or adopts the

earlier pleading. See West Run Student Housing Associates, LLC v. Huntington National Bank,

712 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir. 2013)(collecting cases). To avoid confusion, the safer practice is to

submit an amended complaint that is complete in itself. /d.