Rayford, Jr. v. Erie Shores Council Headquarters, Inc., Boy Scouts of America

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

KIBWE RAYFORD, JR., CASE NO. 3:25 CV 348

Plaintiff,

v. JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP II

ERIE SHORES COUNCIL

HEADQUARTERS, INC.,

BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA,

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

Defendant. ORDER

INTRODUCTION

This Complaint is one of many in a long line of employment discrimination cases with

which pro se Plaintiff Kibwe Rayford, Jr. has flooded the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas

and, in turn, this Federal Court upon removal by the Defendants. See Rayford, Jr. v. Amazon.com

Services, LLC, No. 3:24-cv-02195-JGC (N.D. Ohio) (removed Dec. 17, 2024); Rayford, Jr. v. Kyle

Media, Inc., No. 3:25-cv-00269-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 12, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v.

Checkers Drive-In Restaurants, Inc., No. 3:25-cv-00294-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 14,

2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Panda Restaurant Group, Inc., No. 3:25-cv-00326-JJH (N.D. Ohio)

(removed Feb. 18, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Sigma Technologies, Ltd., No. 3:25-cv-00329-JJH (N.D.

Ohio) (removed Feb. 18, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Advocates for Basic Legal Equality, Inc., No. 3:25-

cv-00332-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 18, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. CCFI Companies, LLC, No.

3:25-cv-00338-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 19, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Krispy Kreme Doughnut

Corporation, No. 3:25-cv-00345-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 20, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v.

Whiteford Kenworth, No. 3:25-cv-00347-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 20, 2025); Rayford, Jr.

Jr. v. Lucas County Workforce Development, No. 3:25-cv-00350-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb.

21, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Board of Lucas County Commissioners, No. 3:25-cv-00351-JRK (N.D.

Ohio) (removed Feb. 21, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Hospital Service Associates, Inc., No. 3:25-cv-

00362-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 24, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Hirzel Canning Company, 3:25-

cv-00365-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 24, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Impact Employment

Solutions, 3:25-cv-00366-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 24, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Concord

Care Center of Toledo, No. 3:25-cv-00372-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 25, 2025); Rayford,

Jr. v. Northwest Ohio Realtors, No. 3:25-cv-00380-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 26, 2025);

Rayford, Jr. v. Community Health Services, No. 3:25-cv-00381-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb.

26, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Libbey Glass LLC, No. 3:25-cv-00382-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb.

26, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Fresh Products, LLC, 3:25-cv-00432-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (removed Mar.

4, 2025).

BACKGROUND

In each of the removed actions, Plaintiff utilizes the same self-styled form Complaint,

changing only the name of the Defendant and the position for which he applied. In all other

respects, the form is the same in each case. The form Complaints contain no facts specific to their

respective case and simply list causes of action as Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”) 42 U.S.C. § 42112, and Title XV the Equal Employment Opportunity

Act (“EEOA”) 47 U.S.C. §554. The form states only that he applied for a position and contains

spaces for him to write in the job for which he applied, the date he applied, and the date on which

the application was denied. The form then states that although he “surpass [sic]or meets the

qualifications, … [he] was not selected for Interview or considered for hiring practices.” (Doc. 1-

1, at 4). The form Complaint states:

The discriminatory conduct of which Plaintiff complain [sic] in this action includes:

º Unequal terms and conditions of employment

º Retaliation

Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff based on:

º Race

º Color

º Gender

º National Origin

º Disability

º Education

Id. The form Complaint seeks $ 15,000.00 in damages. Id. at 5.

On the form Complaint in the instant case, Plaintiff named the Erie Shores Council

Headquarters, Inc. Boy Scouts of America as a Defendant and indicated he applied for the

development director position on October 7, 2024. Id. at 4. Those are the only factual allegations

in the Complaint specific to this case. The rest of the form reads as stated above.

On February 26, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5). First, it notes the

extreme number of cases (48) that Plaintiff filed in the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas in

late January 2025, of which only 20 have been removed to this federal court to date. Thirty of

those cases were filed on the same day, January 17, 2025, and eighteen of them were filed five

days later on January 23, 2025. Defendant suggests that all of these cases utilized Plaintiff’s form

Complaint and all of them, including this Complaint, are based solely on legal conclusions

unsupported by factual allegations. It asserts that Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed because

Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies against them as required by 42 U.S.C. 2000e

et seq. In addition, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to meet the minimum pleading

requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. It contends Plaintiff’s Complaint is devoid of

nearly any factual allegations and alleges in conclusory fashion that he was not selected to

interview for a position based on several characteristics, some of which (e.g., education) are not

not allege the elements sufficient to state a claim for relief.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When deciding a Motion to Dismiss under Federal Civil Rule 12(b)(6), the function of the

Court is to test the legal sufficiency of the Complaint. See Mayer v. Mulod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th

Cir. 1993). The Supreme Court in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) and

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-678 (2009) clarified the law regarding what the Plaintiff must

plead in order to survive a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).

When determining whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted,

the Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all factual

allegations as true, and determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The plaintiff's obligation to provide

the grounds for relief “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555. Although a complaint need not contain

detailed factual allegations, its “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above

the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true.” Id. The

Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan

v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).

The Court in Iqbal further explains the “plausibility” requirement, stating that “a claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678. Furthermore, “the plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks

for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully.” Id. This determination is a

“context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and

common sense.” Id.

Plaintiff’s prolific filing of frivolous form Complaints is patently vexatious. He currently

has over twenty cases pending in this Court, and all but one of them were removed to this federal

court in February 2025. Moreover, Defendant suggests that Plaintiff filed nearly fifty cases in the

Lucas County Court of Common Pleas in late January 2025. Each of those cases uses the same

form Complaint, and each day the Court receives additional removals of those cases. Plaintiff has

not put forth a sincere effort to draft a pleading that contains facts specific to each case or an

explanation of why he believes he is entitled to relief from any specific Defendant under the

various statutes identified. The Complaints do not appear to seek real relief from the Defendants.

At best, this conduct could be construed as a misguided attempt to supplement his income through

frivolous litigation, hoping one of these cases will produce a settlement or a judgment in his favor.

Viewed less generously, it could be construed as harassment of the Defendants and courts. Neither

is a proper use of this Court’s time and resources.

The Court is aware that, at this stage, Plaintiff is not required to plead his discrimination

claims with heightened specificity. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 513-14 (2002).

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held that a Plaintiff must still provide “enough facts to state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 677-78 (“[A] complaint [will not] suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further

factual enhancement.’”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). The Sixth Circuit clarified the scope

of Twombly and Iqbal, noting that “even though a Complaint need not contain detailed factual

allegations, its ‘[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative

level on the assumption that all the allegations in the Complaint are true.’” New Albany Tractor v.

Lousiville Tractor, 650 F.3d 1046, 1051 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)

(alteration in original).

to this case, and the Court is left to guess his race, color, gender, national origin, and disability;

what the actual qualifications for the position were; whether Plaintiff truly met all of those

qualifications; and what facts, if any, support his assertion that a decision was made not to hire

him and that such decision was based on prohibited criteria.1 The form Complaint merely states

that he applied for a job and ultimately was not offered employment. Simply applying for a job,

even if fully qualified, does not guarantee employment, and failure to offer an employment

interview, alone is not a violation of federal law. Plaintiff’s bare bones form Complaint, devoid of

factual allegations and composed entirely of legal conclusions, is not sufficient to meet even the

minimum basic pleading requirements in federal court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (a complaint must

provide “a short and plain statement of the claim” made by “simple, concise, and direct”

allegations); see also Morgan v. Church’s Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding

legal conclusions alone are not sufficient to present a valid claim, and court is not required to

accept “unwarranted factual inferences”). Plaintiff’s repeated filings of the same form Complaint

lacking any factual basis is frivolous. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted.

Plaintiff also filed a Motion [for]Judgment (Doc. 4). Furthermore, after being permanently

enjoined from filing new actions without leave of court, see Rayford v. Kyle Media, Inc., 3:25-cv-

00269 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 2025) (Doc. 7), Plaintiff filed a Motion Pursuant to Court Order

Seeking Leave to File a Proposed Notice of Prima Facie (Doc. 6). The two Motions are also self-

styled forms that do not contain any facts specific to this or any other case. They are composed

entirely of excerpts from statutes and case citations. He adds:

The Plaintiff is overqualified for the position, should have been interviewed and

extended a job offer. The fact of the Plaintiff being denied an interview and a job

offer is discrimination. ADA set clear standards regarding being qualified and not

1. Indeed, the form Complaint has a line for the date on which Plaintiff was denied employment;

it is left blank. (Doc. 1-1 at 5).

(Doc. 6-1, at 6). He simply reworded the form Complaint without adding the crucial information

needed to state a claim against any particular Defendant. These Motions are also frivolous and are

denied.

Furthermore, undeterred by the Court’s warning against filing frivolous and harassing bulk

litigation, Plaintiff continued to engage in vexatious behavior by filing one or both of these form

Motions in at least twelve cases in this Court. See Rayford, Jr. v. Kyle Media, Inc, No. 3:25-cv-

00269-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (Doc. 6); Rayford, Jr. v. Checkers Drive-In Restaurants, Inc., No. 3:25-

cv-00294-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (Doc. 7); Rayford, Jr. v. Panda Restaurant Group, Inc., No. 3:25-cv-

00326-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (Doc. 10); Rayford, Jr. v. CCFI Companies, LLC, No. 3:25-cv-00338-JJH

(N.D. Ohio) (Docs. 4, 7); Rayford, Jr. v. Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corporation, No. 3:25-cv-

00345-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (Doc. 4); Rayford, Jr. v. Whiteford Kenworth, No. 3:25-cv-00347-JJH

(N.D. Ohio) (Docs. 6, 8); Rayford, Jr. v. Boy Scouts of America, No. 3:25-cv-00348-JJH (N.D.

Ohio) (Docs. 4, 6); Rayford, Jr. v. Hospital Service Associates, Inc., No. 3:25-cv-00362-JJH (N.D.

Ohio) (Doc. 5); Rayford, Jr. v. Hirzel Canning Company, 3:25-cv-00365-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (Doc.

6); Rayford, Jr. v. Impact Employment Solutions, 3:25-cv-00366-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (Doc. 6);

Rayford, Jr. v. Concord Care Center of Toledo, No. 3:25-cv-00372-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (Doc. 3);

Rayford, Jr. v. Libbey Glass LLC, No. 3:25-cv-00382-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (Doc. 4). This Court notes

that Judge James G. Carr enjoined Plaintiff from filing additional Motions in his case due to his

excessive filings. See Rayford, Jr. v. Amazon.com Services, LLC, No. 3:24-cv-02195 (N.D. Ohio).

In light of Plaintiff’s behavior in this and other cases in this federal court and in state court, Plaintiff

is enjoined from filing any new Motions or documents in this case.

viability, the Court concludes they are patently vexatious and frivolous and fail to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, good cause appearing, it is

ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5) be, and the same hereby is,

GRANTED and this action is dismissed; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is enjoined from filing any new motions or

documents in this case; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment (Docs. 4) and Motion for

Leave to File Motion for Judgment (Doc. 6) are DENIED; and the Court

FURTHER CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this

decision could not be taken in good faith.

s/ James R. Knepp II

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: March 10, 2025