Opinion

Johns v. Francis

Court
District Court, E.D. Louisiana
Filed
Mar 10, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.4%

“Courts use [the first- to-file rule] to maximize judicial economy and minimize embarrassing inconsistencies by prophylactically refusing to hear a case raising issues that might substantially duplicate those raised by a case pending in another court.”

How later courts described this case

  • “Courts use [the first- to-file rule] to maximize judicial economy and minimize embarrassing inconsistencies by prophylactically refusing to hear a case raising issues that might substantially duplicate those raised by a case pending in another court.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JEREMIAH JOHNS CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO: 24-1064

DONOVAN FRANCIS, et al. SECTION: “G”

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is Defendants’ Donovan Francis, Tony Hernandez, and The Johns Law

Firm, LLC’s (collectively “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim.1

Defendants contend this case should be dismissed because (1) under the first-to-file rule, this case

mirrors earlier-filed lawsuits; and (2) the Complaint fails to state a valid cause of action under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).2 In opposition, Plaintiff argues the first-to-file rule does

not apply to state court proceedings.3 For the reasons stated herein, Defendants have not carried

their burden of establishing that the first-to-file rule applies here. Accordingly, considering the

motion, the opposition, the record, and the applicable law, the Court denies the motion without

prejudice and grants Defendants leave to file an appropriate motion addressing the potential

applicability of any abstention doctrine, claim preclusion, and/or issue preclusion.4

1 Rec. Doc. 9.

2 Rec. Doc. 9-1 at 2.

3 Rec. Doc. 15.

4 While claim or issue preclusion have not been raised here, courts may raise claim preclusion or issue

preclusion sua sponte. R J Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 96 F.4th 863, 875 (5th Cir. 2024).

Additionally, “abstention may be raised by the court sua sponte.” See Murphy v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 168 F.3d 734, 737

I. Background

On or about August 16, 2017, Plaintiff Jeremiah Johns registered The Law Office of J.

Nathan Johns, LLC with the Louisiana Secretary of State.5 The entity’s name was subsequently

changed to The Johns Law Firm, LLC.6 Thereafter, Defendants Donovan Francis and Tony

Hernandez became managing partners at The Johns Law Firm, LLC.7 The Complaint provides that

on August 16, 2017, Plaintiff, Donovan Francis (“Francis”), and Tony Hernandez (“Hernandez”)

entered into an operating agreement.8 On December 13, 2017, The Johns Law Firm applied for a

loan stating that Plaintiff was 70% owner.9 The loan application was signed by Plaintiff and

Hernandez and authorized by Francis.10 The Complaint provides that operations between the three

members later broke down after Plaintiff learned that Hernandez was allegedly operating an

undisclosed out-of-state company.11 The Complaint alleges that Hernandez deposited fees he

generated into an undisclosed business bank account.12

On October 29, 2020, Francis and Hernandez registered a new law partnership and

Louisiana limited liability company called Brogan Francis Hernandez, LLC, comprised of Francis,

5 Rec. Doc. 1 at 2.

6 Id.

7 Id.

8 Id.

9 Id.

10 Id.

11 Id.

12 Id.

Hernandez, and Blair Brogan.13 The Complaint alleges that, on the following day, Francis and

Hernandez withdrew $108,000.00 from The Johns Law Firm’s bank account, removed Plaintiff as

a firm manager, and removed Plaintiff’s access to The Johns Law Firm’s communications

devices.14 Thereafter, the Complaint alleges that Francis and Hernandez threatened to file a bar

complaint against Plaintiff if he emailed clients, directed letters to clients untruthfully stating that

Plaintiff withheld settlement offers, hacked Plaintiff’s personal accounts and destroyed data, and

alleged they possessed nude photographs of Plaintiff’s wife.15

On or about November 30, 2020, Plaintiff withdrew from The Johns Law Firm.16 Plaintiff

demanded that Francis and Hernandez immediately cease using his name in connection with The

Johns Law Firm, and Plaintiff demanded a refund of his membership interest and capital

contributions.17 The Complaint alleges, to date, Defendants have refused to return any portion of

Plaintiff’s capital contributions or membership interest.18 The Complaint alleges that Defendants

continue to use Plaintiff’s name extensively on their law firm’s website despite Plaintiff’s demands

that Defendants cease using his name.19

After Plaintiff withdrew from The Johns Law Firm, several clients, including Angela

13 Id. at 3.

14 Id.

15 Id.

16 Id.

17 Id.

18 Id.

19 Id. at 3–4.

Pawlik, transferred representation to Plaintiff’s new law firm, Johns Law Firm, PLLC.20 Ms.

Pawlik had a life insurance dispute pending in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of

Texas.21 The Complaint states that Plaintiff represented Ms. Pawlik and resolved her case

approximately ten months after Plaintiff withdrew from The Johns Law Firm.22 Ms. Pawlik

received a settlement award in the amount of $850,000, and Defendants attempted to intervene to

assert an attorneys’ fee claim, which was denied as untimely.23 Thereafter, Defendants filed a

lawsuit against Ms. Pawlik in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

seeking to recover a 40% contingency fee from the proceeds of her settlement.24 Defendants

prevailed and obtained a judgment against Ms. Pawlik for $340,000 in contingency fees.25 The

judgment was appealed with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,26 and was

later affirmed.27

The Complaint states that The Johns Law Firm, LLC is no longer a business in good

standing in the State of Louisiana.28 Francis and Hernandez also ended their law partnership

20 Id. at 4.

21 Id.

22 Id.

23 Id.

24 Id. at 5.

25 Id.

26 Id.

27 Case No. 24-20147.

28 Id.

through Brogan Francis Hernandez, LLC.29

On or about October 30, 2020, Plaintiff states that he accessed the operating agreement

between Plaintiff, Francis, and Hernandez, which was signed by all parties on August 17, 2017.30

The Complaint states that the operating agreement contained an unsigned page stating that Plaintiff

had a 39.5% equity interest in The Johns Law Firm, even though another document stated Plaintiff

had a 70% interest in the firm.31 The Complaint alleges there were discrepancies in the operating

agreement such as the date the document was created, alleged alterations to the document, and

missing signatures throughout the document.32 Plaintiff disagrees with the equity allocations in the

saved operating agreement.33

Plaintiff alleges that Francis and Hernandez have refused to produce Plaintiff’s personal

effects, including the original copy of the operating agreement.34 According to the Operating

Agreement, Plaintiff, Hernandez, and Francis were required to make cash contributions of $5,000,

$5,000, and $1,000, respectively.35 Plaintiff contends that he satisfied his capital contribution

obligation, but Plaintiff alleges that Francis and Hernandez have not.36 Plaintiff states that he has

made additional capital contributions during the course of The Johns Law Firm’s operations,

29 Id.

30 Id.

31 Id. at 7.

32 Id.

33 Id.

34 Id.

35 Id. at 8.

36 Id.

implicating potential adjustments of Plaintiff’s equity stake.37 The Complaint alleges that prior to

Plaintiff’s withdrawal from The Johns Law Firm, Francis and Hernandez took income distributions

which exceeded Plaintiff’s distributions.38

On April 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court asserting the following causes

of action: (1) declaratory judgment regarding Plaintiff’s equity in The Johns Law Firm, and an

order dividing the $340,000 settlement proceeds to an account for Plaintiff’s income distributions,

Plaintiff’s capital account, and damages; (2) breach of contract; (3) bad faith breach of contract;

(4) unjust enrichment/quantum meruit; (5) equitable estoppel/detrimental reliance; (6) unfair trade

practice act; and (7) interpleader.39

II. Parties’ Arguments

A. Defendants’ Arguments in Support of the Motion

Defendants contend this case should be dismissed because (1) under the first-to-file rule,

this case mirrors earlier-filed lawsuits; and (2) the Complaint fails to state a valid cause of action

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).40 On November 1, 2020, Defendants state they

filed a Petition for Damages for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Injunctive Relief, Declaratory

Judgment, and Money Judgment against Plaintiff in the Civil District Court for the Parish of

Orleans.41 A temporary restraining order was granted enjoining Plaintiff from transferring

37 Id.

38 Id.

39 Id. at 12–14.

40 Rec. Doc. 9-1 at 2.

41 Id.

$60,000.00 of The Johns Law Firm’s funds or converting those funds for Plaintiff’s personal use,

blocking Defendants from accessing The Johns Law Firm, composing any documents that purports

to remove either Hernandez or Francis as managers of The Johns Law Firm, and removing any

moveable property from The Johns Law Firm’s offices.42

Defendants state that on December 7, 2020, Plaintiff filed reconventional demands alleging

that Defendants breached their fiduciary duties to The Johns Law Firm, that Defendants tortiously

interfered with Plaintiff’s business relationships, and Plaintiff requested to be paid his membership

interest pursuant to the terms of the operating agreement.43 Defendants state that on December 8,

2020, the day before the hearing on Defendants’ temporary restraining order, Plaintiff agreed to

turn over control of the domain and restored access to the LLC’s web hosting provider.44

Defendants contend that at Plaintiff’s request, the temporary restraining order hearing was

continued, and the injunction against Plaintiff was extended indefinitely.45

In September 2021, Defendants allege that Plaintiff violated the temporary restraining

order by usurping control of The Johns Law Firm’s website and redirecting all traffic to Plaintiff’s

new Texas firm.46 Thereafter, Defendants obtained a second temporary restraining order against

Plaintiff, enjoining him from redirecting traffic from The Johns Law Firm’s website, holding

himself out as a member of The Johns Law Firm, representing that The Johns Law Firm and

42 Id. at 2–3.

43 Id. at 3.

44 Id.

45 Id.

46 Id.

Plaintiff’s Texas firm are one in the same, depositing checks written to The Johns Law Firm,

engaging with potential clients, and destroying any communications made through The Johns Law

Firm website or email system.47

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a Petition for Damages and Request for Preliminary and

Permanent Injunction in the Civil District Court of Orleans Parish, which was denied by the

court.48 Defendants contend that the litigation in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans

exceeded $75,000, and Plaintiff did not seek to remove the matter to federal court.49

On September 10, 2021, The Johns Law Firm moved to intervene to assert a fee lien in the

lawsuit of former client, Ms. Pawlik, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas.50

Defendants state that Ms. Pawlik fired The Johns Law Firm and hired Plaintiff through his Texas

law firm, Johns Law Firm, PLLC.51 The court denied The Johns Law Firm’s motion to intervene.52

The Johns Law Firm later retained outside counsel who sued Ms. Pawlik directly.53 The court

ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of The Johns Law Firm and awarded it $340,000

in monetary damages plus interest.54 The Johns Law Firm also requested attorneys’ fees, which

47 Id.

48 Id. at 4.

49 Id.

50 Id. at 5.

51 Id.

52 Id.

53 Id.

54 Id.

remains pending.55

Ms. Pawlik appealed the judgment to the Fifth Circuit but did not post a bond.56 In

response, The Johns Law Firm filed a Motion for Turnover against Ms. Pawlik requesting that the

$340,000 be transferred to The Johns Law Firm’s trust account.57 Defendants contend that Plaintiff

has now filed the present action asking to interplead the same funds into this Court and deprive

the U.S. District for the Southern District of Texas of the ability to enforce the judgment it

rendered.58 Defendants state that the Motion for Turnover remains pending in the U.S. District for

the Southern District of Texas.59

On September 22, 2021, Plaintiff and his Texas firm, Johns Law Firm, PLLC, sued

Hernandez individually in state court in Harris County, Texas.60 Defendants state that Plaintiff

sought damages for violations of the Harmful Access by Computer Act, intentional infliction of

emotional distress, slander, defamation, libel, and defamation per se.61 Defendants contend the

court has dismissed Plaintiff’s claims, and Hernandez’s counterclaims for abuse of process and

damages remain pending.62

Defendants assert that the issues raised in this case are mirror images of the issues raised

55 Id.

56 Id.

57 Id.

58 Id.

59 Id.

60 Id.

61 Id. at 6.

62 Id.

in multiple previously filed matters.63 Defendants argue this matter should be dismissed under the

First-to-File rule.64 Defendants aver that the matters in the Civil District Court for the Parish of

Orleans and the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas were filed years before the

instant matter.65 Defendants state that the matter before the Civil District Court for the Parish of

Orleans is still pending.66 Defendants contend the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of

Texas maintains jurisdiction over this case following the judgment in favor of The Johns Law Firm

for the limited purposes of enforcing the judgment and attorneys’ fees.67 Defendants argue Plaintiff

filed this lawsuit in an attempt to avoid the ramifications of the litigation in the U.S. District Court

for the Southern District of Texas.68

Defendants argue the litigation before the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans

encompassed all disputes regarding the ownership, management, disbursements, funding, and

operation agreement.69 Defendants contend that Plaintiff attempts to relitigate the judgment issued

in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas that awarded Defendants $340,000

against Plaintiff’s client.70 Defendants state that the Complaint before this Court also references

63 Id.

64 Id.

65 Id. at 7.

66 Id.

67 Id.

68 Id.

69 Id.

70 Id.

the ongoing litigation in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans.71 Defendants assert that

Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory judgment, breach of contract, bad faith breach of contract,

quantum meruit, and unfair trade practices related to the operating agreement have already been

raised in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans.72 Defendants argue this case plainly

overlaps with these previously-filed cases.73 Alternatively, Defendants argue this case should be

dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because Plaintiff has failed to state claim

upon which relief can be granted.74

B. Plaintiff’s Arguments in Opposition to the Motion

Plaintiff opposes the motion. First, Plaintiff argues the first-to-file rule does not apply

because there is no overlapping federal litigation.75 Next, Plaintiff argues he does have capacity to

sue Defendants.76 Plaintiff explains that he personally formed a partnership with Hernandez and

Francis, and thus, he has the capacity to sue Defendants.77 Third, Plaintiff argues Hernandez and

Francis can be sued in their personal capacity because the Complaint includes claims to resolve

ownership interest and capital contribution disputes between the parties.78

71 Id. at 7–8.

72 Id. at 8.

73 Id.

74 Id. at 9. The Court does not reach these issues at this time.

75 Rec. Doc. 15 at 5.

76 Id. at 7.

77 Id.

78 Id. at 7–8.

III. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that an action may be dismissed for

“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”79 A motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim is “viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.”80 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’”81 “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.”82 A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff has pleaded facts that allow

the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.”83

On a motion to dismiss, asserted claims are liberally construed in favor of the claimant,

and all facts pleaded are taken as true.84 However, although required to accept all “well-pleaded

facts” as true, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions as true.85 “While legal conclusions

can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”86

Similarly, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

79 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

80 Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982).

81 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

82 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

83 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

84 Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993); see also

Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322–23 (2007).

85 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.

86 Id. at 679.

statements” will not suffice.87 The complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it

must offer more than mere labels, legal conclusions, or formulaic recitations of the elements of a

cause of action.88 That is, the complaint must offer more than an “unadorned, the-defendant-

unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”89 From the face of the complaint, there must be enough

factual matter to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence as to each

element of the asserted claims.90 If factual allegations are insufficient to raise a right to relief above

the speculative level, or if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that there is an “insuperable”

bar to relief, the claim must be dismissed.91

IV. Analysis

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed under the “first-to-file” rule based

on previously-filed litigation in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans and the U.S.

District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

As between federal courts, under the “prior pending action” rule, or “first-to-file” rule,

when two duplicative actions are filed in federal courts of concurrent jurisdiction, the court which

first-acquired possession of the subject or action, or first-acquired jurisdiction should try the

lawsuit, as a matter of federal judicial comity, since plaintiffs have no right to maintain two actions

87 Id. at 678.

88 Id.

89 Id.

90 Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 (5th Cir. 2009).

91 Carbe v. Lappin, 492 F.3d 325, 328 n.9 (5th Cir. 2007); Moore v. Metro. Hum. Serv. Dist., No. 09-6470,

2010 WL 1462224, at * 2 (E.D. La. Apr. 8, 2010) (Vance, J.) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007)).

on the same subject in the same court, against the same defendant at the same time.92

Under the first-to-file rule, when related cases are pending before two federal courts, the

court in which the case was last filed may refuse to hear it if the issues raised by the cases

substantially overlap.93 The rule rests on principles of comity and sound judicial administration.94

“The concern manifestly is to avoid the waste of duplication, to avoid rulings which may trench

upon the authority of sister courts, and to avoid piecemeal resolution of issues that call for a

uniform result.”95

1. U.S. Southern District of Texas Litigation

In 2022, The Johns Law Firm filed a Complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern

District of Texas against Angela Pawlik to recover pursuant to a contingency fee agreement.96 The

Johns Law Firm asserted causes of action for breach of contract and quantum meruit.97 On March

5, 2024, a judge in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas entered an Order

granting summary judgment in favor of The Johns Law Firm as to its breach of contract claim, and

rendered final judgment in favor of The Johns Law Firm, awarding it $340,000.00.98 That decision

92 1 Cyc. of Federal Proc., § 2:171 Nature and effect of priority by prior filing (2025).

93 See Save Power Ltd. v. Syntek Fin. Corp., 121 F.3d 947, 950 (5th Cir. 1997); West Gulf Maritime Ass'n v.

ILA Deep Sea Local 24, 751 F.2d 721, 728 (5th Cir. 1985).

94 See Save Power, 121 F.3d at 950; West Gulf, 751 F.2d at 728.

95 West Gulf, 751 F.2d at 729.

96 Rec. Doc. 9-4.

97 Id.

98 Rec. Doc. 9-8.

was later affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.99 Because the

Southern District of Texas litigation started prior to the instant matter and the issues are related,

Defendants argue the instant matter should be dismissed pursuant to the first-to-file rule.

Here, Plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment regarding Plaintiff’s equity in The Johns Law

Firm, and an order dividing the $340,000 settlement proceeds to an account for Plaintiff’s income

distributions, Plaintiff’s capital account, and damages.100 Plaintiff explains this amount represents

the judgment Defendants obtained against Ms. Pawlik.101 While critical issues in the present action

appear to overlap or duplicate the issues in the first-filed action in the Southern District of Texas,

there has been a final judgment issued in the Southern District of Texas litigation and that judgment

was affirmed on appeal. As stated above, under the “first-to-file” rule when related cases are

pending before two federal courts, the court in which the case was last filed may refuse to hear it

if the issues raised by the cases substantially overlap.102 Because a final judgment was entered in

the Southern District of Texas, it does not appear that the “first-to-file” rule is applicable here.103

It appears to the Court that Plaintiff is using this litigation to attach or claim proceeds

awarded to Defendants from another federal district court’s judgment. Plaintiff cites no authority

to justify seizing the judgment proceeds from one case and holding the funds hostage in another

99 Case No. 24-20147.

100 Rec. Doc. 1.

101 Id.

102 See Save Power, 121 F.3d at 950; West Gulf, 751 F.2d at 728 (5th Cir. 1985).

103 See Cadle Co. v. Whataburger of Alice, Inc., 174 F.3d 599, 604 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Courts use [the first-

to-file rule] to maximize judicial economy and minimize embarrassing inconsistencies by prophylactically refusing

to hear a case raising issues that might substantially duplicate those raised by a case pending in another court.”).

case under the factual circumstances here. Further, claim or issue preclusion may also bar

Plaintiff’s claims here. “The rule of res judicata encompasses two separate but linked preclusive

doctrines: (1) true res judicata or claim preclusion and (2) collateral estoppel or issue

preclusion.”104 “Claim preclusion, or res judicata, bars the litigation of claims that either have been

litigated or should have been raised in an earlier suit.”105 Collateral estoppel or “issue preclusion,”

recognizes that suits addressed to particular claims may present issues relevant to suits on other

claims.106 This “means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a

valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future

lawsuit.”107

The $340,000 judgment from the Southern District of Texas litigation has already been

awarded to Defendants. If Plaintiff believed he was owed a portion of that money based on some

other reason, it seems Plaintiff should have raised the issue with the Southern District of Texas in

the prior lawsuit. While claim or issue preclusion has not been raised here, courts may raise claim

preclusion or issue preclusion sua sponte.108 Therefore, the instant motion is denied without

prejudice, and Defendants are granted leave to file an appropriate motion addressing the potential

applicability of claim and/or issue preclusion.

104 Stevens v. St. Tammany Par. Gov't, 17 F.4th 563, 570 (5th Cir. 2021).

105 Id.

106 Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55 (1971).

107 Id.

108 R J Reynolds Tobacco Co., 96 F.4th at 875.

2. Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans Litigation

On November 1, 2020, Defendants state they filed a Petition for Damages for Breach of

Fiduciary Duty, Injunctive Relief, Declaratory Judgment, and Money Judgment against Plaintiff

in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans. The petition contained allegations regarding

alleged conversion of funds and property and ownership and management disputes regarding The

Johns Law Firm.109 Here, Plaintiff similarly seeks declaratory judgment regarding Plaintiff’s

equity in The Johns Law Firm and breach of contract damages related to the parties’ Operating

Agreement.110 Because the Orleans Parish Civil District Court litigation started prior to the instant

matter and the issues are related, Defendants argue the instant matter should be dismissed pursuant

to the first-to-file rule.

While the present action appears to be related to the issues in the first-filed action in Orleans

Parish Civil District Court litigation, the first-to-file rule applies to ongoing litigation in federal

courts. As stated above, under the first-to-file rule, when related cases are pending before two

federal courts, the court in which the case was last filed may refuse to hear it if the issues raised

by the cases substantially overlap.111 Because there is no ongoing federal litigation, the first-to-

file rule is not applicable here. As such, the Court rejects Defendants’ argument. However, it

appears a certain abstention doctrine may apply. “[A]bstention may be raised by the court sua

109 Rec. Doc. 9-5.

110 Rec. Doc. 1.

111 See Save Power, 121 F.3d at 950; West Gulf, 751 F.2d at 728.

sponte.”''? Therefore, the instant motion is denied without prejudice, and Defendants are granted

leave to file an appropriate motion addressing the potential applicability of any abstention doctrine.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that Defendants’ arguments regarding the

applicability of the first-to-file are not supported here. Further, it appears claim preclusion, issue

preclusion, and/or certain abstention doctrine could apply. Therefore, the Court denies the motion

without prejudice and grants Defendants leave to file an appropriate motion addressing the

potential applicability of any abstention doctrine, claim preclusion, and/or issue preclusion.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss!’ is DENIED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE. Defendants are granted leave to file an appropriate motion addressing the potential

applicability of any abstention doctrine, claim preclusion, and/or issue preclusion.

NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA this _10th day of March, 2025.

Deceit obuvelt 0S

NANNETTE J ETTE BROWN (out

CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

12 See Murphy, 168 F.3d at 737 n. 1.

3 Rec, Doc. 9.

18

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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