DeMarinis v. Anthem Insurance Companies, Inc.

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CHRIS DEMARINIS, individually

and as guardian of D.D., : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-CV-713

: (JUDGE MARIANI)

Plaintiff,

Vv.

ANTHEM INSURANCE COMPANIES, :

INC., d/b/a ANTHEM BLUE CROSS

AND BLUE SHIELD and ABC :

CORPORATIONS 1-10,

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

|. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff's Motion for an Award of Attorney’s Fees and Costs (Doc. 63) is pending

before the Court. Plaintiff moves for an award of attorney’s fees and taxable costs pursuant

to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1), the provision of the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974

(“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, et seg., which addresses the award of attorney’s fees and

costs. (/d. at 1.) Plaintiff claims entitlement to fees and costs based on the Court's partial

grant of summary judgment in his favor. (Doc. 63-1 at 1.) He alternatively seeks attorney's

fees on a contingency basis, the amount of which is “pending” and on an hourly basis

calculated to be $51,704.60. (/d. at 12.) Plaintiff also requests an award of taxable costs in

the amount of $2,056.52.63. (/d.) Defendant Anthem Insurance Companies, Inc. (“Anthem”

“Defendant’) responds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he qualifies for an award of

fees and costs under ERISA, an hourly calculation rather than contingency fee is

appropriate if he were entitled to fees, and any award should be reduced because Plaintiff

achieved only partial success and submitted improper entries for reimbursement. (Doc. 66

at 1.) Plaintiff did not file a reply brief and the time for doing so has passed. Therefore,

Plaintiff's Motion is ripe for disposition. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant

Plaintiffs Motion in part.

Il. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this action on April 30, 2020, claiming violations of ERISA, specifically

29 U.S.C. §§ 1109 and 1132(a)(1)(B). Plaintiff filed the action after Defendant denied

coverage for a substantial portion of the cost of his son’s treatment at the Kennedy Krieger

Institute (“KKI”) inpatient Neurobehavioral Unit (“NBU”). (Doc. 1.) At the time the Complaint

was filed, D.D., Plaintiffs minor son, was sixteen years old and had a diagnosis of “severe

intellectual disability, Autism Spectrum Disorder, Disruptive Behavior Disorder, Obsessive-

Compulsive Disorder, seizures, Macrocephaly, and Hypokinetic syndrome.” (/d. § 13.) With

Anthem’s approval, D.D. had been admitted to KK! on May 1, 2019, and on May 8, 2019,

Defendant denied continuation of coverage. (Id. J 34.) Defendant continued to deny

coverage through the appeals process. (/d. J] 35-42.) On July 9, 2019, KKI submitted a

request for independent external review. (/d. 43.) On September 3, 2019, the assigned

reviewer, Advanced Medical Reviews (“AMR’), issued a letter and Peer Reviewer Final

Report upholding Anthem’s decision that continued treatment at KKI was not medically

necessary from May 8, 2019, forward. (/d. ] 50.) Plaintiff requested that the Court require

Defendant to cover the cost of D.D.’s treatment at KKI’s NBU program from May 8, 2019, to

October 24, 2019, in the amount of $459,318 and reimburse Plaintiff for the reasonable

attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this action. (Doc. 1 at 11.)

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 33) was filed on March 24, 2021.

Plaintiff sought summary judgment based on the contention that Anthem ignored the

opinions of D.D.’s treating physicians and common sense when it determined that D.D.’s

treatment at KKI was not medically necessary as of May 8, 2019. (Doc. 38 at 2.) Plaintiff

asserted that

{clontrary to Anthem’s determination, . . . the medical necessity of D.D.’s

treatment at KKI did not end on May 8, 2019.

There is significant evidence in the record from D.D.’s behavioral and

medical providers that he continued to require inpatient treatment and

benefited from treatment at KKI following Anthem’s denial. Premature

discharge and interruption in treatment would have placed D.D. and others at

risk for injury, and likely would have resulted in re-hospitalization. Further,

there is no indication that the experts retained by Anthem and/or its medical

directors involved in the appeal process had any expertise in the treatment of

severe behavioral dysfunction (notably self-injurious behavior) in children and

adolescents with autism and/or intellectual disability. What is certain is that

Anthem’s experts did not examine D.D. or meet with his parents or medical

providers. Accordingly, Anthem’s denial of plaintiff's claim should be

overturned as it is not supported by substantial evidence, erroneous as a

matter of law, not made in good faith and in violation of ERISA.

(Doc. 38 at 2.)

Defendant asserted that summary judgement in its favor was warranted because it

properly determined that D.D.’s continued treatment was not medically necessary and

denied coverage on this basis. (See, e.g., Doc. 47 at 1.)

On April 10, 2024, the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion (Doc. 61) and Order

(Doc. 62) granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 33) in part and denying

Defendant’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 45). The Court concluded that

Plaintiff was entitled to payment of benefits for the period of May 8, 2019, through July 7,

2019, and for evaluation of benefits consistent with the Court's Memorandum Opinion for

the period of July 8, 2019, through October 24, 2019, and appropriate payment of benefits

for that period. (Doc. 61 at 95.)

Employing the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review,' the Court's decision

was based on (1) findings that numerous recognized procedural anomalies suggested that

Anthem’s decision was arbitrary and capricious; and (2) the lack of substantial evidence to

support Anthem’s decision that continued care for D.D. was not medically necessary further

supported a finding that its determination not to continue coverage was arbitrary and

capricious. (Doc. 61 at 39-81.) The anomalies identified included Anthem’s reversal of its

position, inconsistent treatment of facts, inadequate consideration of opinion evidence,

' If a plan does not grant discretion to the fiduciary, “then a court reviews an adverse benefit

determination de novo.” Noga v. Fulton Fin. Corp. Emp. Benefit Plan, 19 F.4th 264, 272 (3d Cir. 2021)

(citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989)). But if a plan does confer

discretionary authority on a fiduciary decision-maker, then a court reviews an adverse benefit determination

for an abuse of discretion under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard.” /d. (citing Firestone, 489 U.S. at

115; McCann v. Unum Provident, 907 F.3d 130, 147 (3d Cir. 2018)). The parties agreed that the arbitrary-

and-capricious standard applied in this case. (Doc. 61 at 37.)

analysis of all relevant diagnoses, and review independence. (/d. at 45-65.) The Court's

substantial evidence determination included findings that Anthem’s conclusions that

applicable discharge guidelines had been met were not supported by adequate evidence,

i.e., substantial evidence did not support Anthem’s conclusions regarding risk assessment,

absence of thoughts of serious harm, the management of medication effects, and the

satisfaction of treatment goals. (Id. at 71-80.) Based on the finding that Anthem’s decision

to terminate benefits was arbitrary and capricious, the Court concluded that the appropriate

remedy was an award of benefits (id. at 84) and that remand to the Plan Administrator was

required to determine the amount (id. at 92-94). Finally, the Court concluded that Plaintiff's

request for attorney's fees and costs would be denied without prejudice and subject to

consideration upon receipt and briefing of a motion for attorney's fees.

Ill. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff claims entitlement to fees and costs based on the Court’s partial grant of

summary judgment in his favor, alternatively seeking attorney's fees on a contingency basis,

the amount of which is “pending,” and on an hourly basis calculated to be $51,704.60. (Doc.

at 1, 12.) Defendant responds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he qualifies for

an award of fees and costs under ERISA, an hourly calculation rather than contingency fee

is appropriate if he were entitled to fees, and any award should be reduced because Plaintiff

achieved only partial success and submitted improper entries for reimbursement. (Doc. 66

at 1.)

A district court has the discretion to award reasonable attorney's fees and costs in an

ERISA action to a claimant who achieves “some degree of success on the merits” under 29

U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). Hardt v. Reliance Stand. Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 255 (2010)

(quoting Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 694 (1983)). Thus, whether a claimant

achieved “some degree of success on the merits” is the threshold question in considering a

request for attorney's fees in an ERISA action.

A claimant does not satisfy that requirement by achieving “trivial success on

the merits” or a “purely procedural victor[y],” but does satisfy it if the court can

fairly call the outcome of the litigation some success on the merits without

conducting a “lengthy inquir[y] into the question whether a particular party's

success was ‘substantial’ or occurred on a ‘central issue.”

Hardt, 560 U.S. at 255 (quoting Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 688 n.9).

Once the threshold question has been answered in the affirmative, several relevant

policy factors guide a court’s determination whether to make a discretionary award of fees.

Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1983), identified five such factors:

(1) the offending parties’ culpability or bad faith;

(2) the ability of the offending parties to satisfy an award of attorneys’ fees;

(3) the deterrent effect of an award of attorneys’ fees against the offending

parties;

(4) the benefit conferred on members of the pension plan as a whole; and

(5) the relative merits of the parties’ position.

719 F.2d at 673 (citing Hummell v. S.E. Rykoff & Co., 634 F.2d 446, 453 (9th Cir.1980), /ron

Workers Local 272 v. Bowen, 624 F.2d 1255, 1266 (5' Cir. 1980); Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d

453, 465 (10th Cir.1978)).

The Supreme Court has noted that, once a court determines that an award of fees is

warranted, the lodestar approach is appropriate to calculate the award:

The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee

is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a

reasonable hourly rate. This calculation provides an objective basis on which

to make an initial estimate of the value of a lawyer's services. The party

seeking an award of fees should submit evidence supporting the hours

worked and rates claimed. Where the documentation of hours is inadequate,

the district court may reduce the award accordingly.

461 U.S. at 433.

Here, Defendant does not argue that Plaintiff did not achieve some degree of

success on the merits of his claim. Rather, Defendant maintains that “the Ursic factors

demonstrate that Plaintiff is not entitled to attorney's fees or costs under ERISA,” (Doc. 66

at 4), and, if the Court allows an award, the Court should narrow the request for fees and

limit the award based on only partial success (id.).

A. Ursic Factors

1. Defendant’s Culpability or Bad Faith

Plaintiff asserts that “[t]he degree of Anthem’s culpability is high” (Doc. 63-1 at 5)

while Defendant maintains that it did not engage in culpable or bad faith conduct (Doc. 66 at

4). The Court concludes that this factor weighs in favor of an award of attorney's fees.

The first Ursic factor favors an award to the prevailing party not only in

cases involving “bad faith” but in other cases as well. As the district court

recognized, bad faith normally connotes an ulterior motive or sinister purpose.

Ford v. Temple Hosp., 790 F.2d 342, 347 (3d Cir.1986). A losing party may

be culpable, however, without having acted with an ulterior motive. In a civil

context, culpable conduct is commonly understood to mean conduct that is

“blameable; censurable; ... at fault; involving the breach of a legal duty or the

commission of a fault.... Such conduct normally involves something more than

simple negligence.... [On the other hand, it] implies that the act or conduct

spoken of is reprehensible or wrong, but not that it involves malice or a guilty

purpose.” Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990). Thus, in Vintilla v. United

States Steel Corp. Plan, 642 F.Supp. 295, 296-97 (W.D. Pa.1986), aff'd, 815

F.2d 697 (3d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 143, 98 L.Ed.2d

100 (1987), for example, the court concluded with respect to the first Ursic

factor: “While we cannot ascribe bad faith to plaintiffs’ efforts, we do find

certain elements of culpability attributable to plaintiffs.” Indeed, this court in

Groves v. Modified Retirement Plan, Inc., 803 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.1986), found

an award of counsel fees to be appropriate in an ERISA case without finding

that the defendants had acted with an ulterior or sinister purpose.

A party is not culpable merely because it has taken a position that did

not prevail in litigation.

McPherson v. Employees’ Pension Plan of Am. Re-Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 253, 256-57 (3d Cir.

1994),

The abundant evidentiary support for the Court's determination that Defendant's

decision to deny benefits from May 8, 2019, was arbitrary and capricious also provides

abundant support for finding that Defendant engaged in culpable conduct. Certainly,

Anthem’s conduct was “blameable; censurable.” McPherson, 33 F.3d at 257. The Court

found that Anthem was “at fault” in this ERISA action for its denial of benefits. /d. The Court

has no impediment to concluding that Anthem’s conduct was “reprehensible or wrong.” /d.

Anthem decided that D.D.’s treatment at KK! was not medically necessary as of May

8, 2019, but did not provide any valid support for that position. Rather, the Court found that

Anthem’s three denial letters indicate that the requests for continued care

were denied based on the assertions that D.D. went to the hospital because

he was at a high risk for harm, Anthem had information showing that D.D. had

improved, D.D. was not at risk or high risk for harming himself, and he could

be safely treated outside of a hospital. See supra. Anthem did not provide any

details or citation to medical records; no basis for the assessed improvement

is proffered nor is there support for the risk assessment. In other words,

Anthem provides no support for its conclusion that D.D. was no longer at risk

for harming himself. Most importantly, . . . the notes of both medical reviewers

contradict the conclusions stated [elsewhere] in their own notes and Anthem’s

letters.

(Doc. 61 at 52-53.)

Similarly, regarding Defendant’s final decision authored by Advanced Medical

Review, the Court identified contradictory findings and concluded that the reviewer's

decision that D.D.’s treatment at KKI was no longer medically necessary as of May 8, 2019,

was not supported by sufficient evidence. (Doc. 61 at 56-57.)

The Court further found that this was a case where Defendant was required to

articulate its thought process for crediting non-treating doctors’ opinions over those of

treating doctors because the non-treating doctors’ opinions did not constitute reliable

evidence.

Anthem relied solely on the paper reviews of its non-treating physicians, Dr.

Allen and Dr. Soliman, without articulating its thought process for doing so.

The record shows that the reviews provided by these doctors were cursory

and internally contradictory, see supra pp. 10-17, 50, 52-53, whereas [treating

physicians] Dr. Tierney and Dr. Schmidt provided detailed analysis of D.D.’s

problems, treatment, progress, and prognosis in support of their opinion that

D.D.’s ongoing care on the NBU was medically necessary in both their

Voluntary Second Level of Appeal letter dated May 31, 2019, (AR 222-26)

and their request for Independent External Review letter dated July 9, 2019,

(AR 397-404).

Notably, as discussed above, in contrast to the rationales for denial

stated in Anthem’s letters, outside of their conclusory comments, neither Dr.

Allen nor Dr. Soliman substantively assessed that D.D. had improved since

his admission to KKI. See supra pp. 50-53. In fact, Dr. Soliman’s review

specifically stated “Pt show no changes. He remains impulsive and

aggressive.” (AR 778 (emphasis added).) Given these findings, the Court

cannot conclude that the opinions provided by Dr. Allen and Dr. Soliman

constitute “reliable evidence” upon which Anthem could rely without the need

for explanation. See [Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822,

834 (2003)].

(Doc. 61 at 59-60.) Because Defendant did not credit reliable evidence in making its medical

necessity determination, Defendant should have articulated its thought process for crediting

non-treating doctors’ opinions over treating doctors’ opinions. (/d. at 60-61.) Defendant's

failure to do so is further culpable conduct.

Another illustration of Defendant's culpable conduct is Defendant's determination in

support of its denial of continued care that D.D. met all relevant MCG (Milliman Care

Guidelines) B-902-IP discharge criteria and the lack of substantial evidence supporting that

reliance. (See id. at 66-73.)

The foregoing examples of Defendant’s culpable conduct indicate that this factor

weighs in favor of an award of attorney's fees. Defendant's arguments to the contrary are

unavailing.

Defendant relies on a District of New Jersey case where the court

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found that the facts in that case did not indicate “culpability” since the plan

“attempted to align its decision making with the dictates of medical science

and legal precedent[,]” with the court concluding that “while Defendant's

position was ‘ultimately unpersuasive, it cannot be said that’ it ‘was entirely

devoid of merit.”

(Doc. 66 at 6 (quoting Molders v. New Jersey Education Association Pruprotect Plus Plan,

Civ. A. No. 05-1747 (AET), 2006 WL 8457913, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 13, 2006) (quoting Wal-

Mart Stores, Inc Assocs.’ Health and Welfare Plan v. Bond, Civ. A. No. 96-522, 1997 WL

255527, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 1997))).) Analogizing this case with Molders, Defendant

states that its

denials here were made in good faith, based upon “dictates of medical

science and legal precedent” and were not “wholly devoid of merit[.]” Molders,

2006 [WL 8457913, at *2]; Opinion at 17-18 (discussing medical director's

consideration of the relevant medical records and statements regarding his

clinical findings and rationale in support of Anthem’s denial). D.D. was a

medically complex patient, and in light of Anthem’s review of the medical

records and applicable clinical criteria, Anthem determined some but not all of

the dates of service were medically necessary under the terms of the

Plaintiff's health benefits plan. See Opinion at 9 (discussing D.D.’s numerous

unique symptoms on admission and admission goals). This complexity is

reflected in the Court's own in-depth analysis as it weighed (i) the relevant

MCG criteria applied by Anthem; (ii) the risk assessment prepared by

Anthem’s reviewer; (iii) the management of D.D.’s medications; and (iv)

whether D.D.’s treatment goals were met. Opinion at 71-81. This is precisely

the type of case where granting an award of fees and costs would not align

with precedent.

(Doc. 66 at 7.)

A review of the Court’s Memorandum Opinion readily discounts Defendant's

analogy. The Court did not suggest that Defendant's denials were made in “good faith,

based on dictates of medical science and legal precedent” (id.). To the contrary, as outlined

11

above, the Court found that Defendant’s decision was not based on reliable evidence, that

the notes and conclusions of reviewing physicians upon which Defendant relied for its early

decisions were contradictory and did not provide sufficient evidence to support the denials,

that the AMR reviewer's decision was not supported by substantial evidence, and that the

relevant MCG B-902-IP Discharge Guidelines were not properly considered. See supra. To

the extent Defendant points to the complexity of this case to support its claim that it acted in

good faith and in accordance with medical science and legal precedent (Doc. 66 at 7), in

each instance cited, Defendant failed to properly apply medical criteria and/or legal

precedent: 1) Anthem did not properly consider the relevant MCG B-902-IP Discharge

Guidelines (Doc. 61 at 66-81); 2) the risk assessment prepared by Anthem’s reviewer was

not supported by substantial evidence (id. at 74-77); 3) the management of D.D.’s

medications was not properly assessed (id. at 77-79); and 4) substantial evidence did not

support Defendant's conclusion that D.D.’s treatment goals were met (id. at 79-81).

2. Ability to Satisfy Fee Award

Plaintiff asserts that the second Ursic factor weighs in favor of an award of attorney's

fees given that “Anthem is well-situated to satisfy a reasonable award of attorney's fees

because it is a national insurance provider that operates throughout the United States.”

(Doc. 63-1 at 5.) Defendant responds that “Plaintiff has not cited any evidence to support his

claim that Anthem is financially able to satisfy an award of attorney's fees and costs. Plaintiff

simply ‘submits’ that Anthem is a ‘national insurer.’ Given the lack of evidence, this factor

12

should weigh against Plaintiff or, at most, constitute a neutral factor.” (Doc. 66 at 10 (citation

omitted).)

In Ellison v. Shenango Inc. Pension Bd., 956 F.2d 1268 (3d Cir. 1992), the Circuit

Courted noted that, “[slince Shenango does not dispute the sufficiency of the Plan's assets

to cover an award of fees in this case, the district court should have resolved the second

Ursic factor in favor of an award of fees to Ellison.” /d. at 1277 (citation omitted).

Here, Defendant does not contest Plailntiff's assertion or dispute its ability to pay, it

merely criticizes Plaintiff's lack of specific evidence to support his assertion that Defendant

is able to pay. (See Doc. 66 at 10.) Pursuant to the standard set out in Ellison, the Court

concludes that this factor weighs in favor of an award of fees.

3. The Deterrent Effect of an Award of Attorney’s Fees

Plaintiff maintains that “an award of attorney's fees to Plaintiff will have a valuable

deterrent effect. Such an award will deter insurance companies from denying claims

without proper review and justification.” (Doc. 63-1 at 6.) Plaintiff adds that “[i]n the absence

of attorney's fee liability, a non-prevailing insurer would have little to lose but the amount of

damages it would have paid without litigation.” (/d.) Defendant responds that “an award of

attorney's fees and costs in this case would not have a deterrent effect. For an award of

attorney's fees and costs to have any deterrent effect, the administrator must have been

knowingly engaged in conduct that was culpable such that an award would deter future

conduct.” (Doc. 66 at 8 (citation omitted).)

13

McPherson addressed the deterrence factor in the context of the District Court's

consideration of this factor only in terms of whether the defendant acted in bad faith and

stated “[w]e believe it will further the objectives of ERISA if fee awards are employed to

deter behavior that falls short of bad faith conduct.” 33 F.3d at 258. McPherson approvingly

quoted Kann v. Keystone Resources, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan, 575 F. Supp. 1084 (W.D. Pa.

1983): “in [a] case in which ‘culpability... has been shown,’ [a] fee award will make [the]

plan ‘less likely and not so quick to deny benefits to other participants’ and thus be ‘a

deterrent factor.” 33 F.3d at 258 (quoting Kann, 575 F. Supp. at 1096-97).)

This is a case where culpability has been shown. See supra. Therefore, the Court

concludes this factor weighs in favor of an award of attorney’s fees.

4. Benefit Conferred on Members of the Plan as a Whole

Plaintiff contends that the fourth Ursic factor weighs in his favor because

[this action and resulting Order and Opinion may benefit other plan

participants because Anthem is on notice that its review policies should

assure that future claims are given adequate and fair consideration at all

levels of appeal. . . . Anthem, and other insurers, may be encouraged to

properly consider and pay meritorious claims, as opposed to engaging in

litigation.

(Doc. 63-1 at 6.) Defendant responds that

Any theoretical benefit conferred on members of the Plaintiff's health benefit

plan because of this case is speculative at best because the Plaintiff did not

bring this action on behalf of other plan participants, and the Court’s ruling did

not resolve a significant issue under ERISA. As a result, this judgment is

unlikely to benefit others and Plaintiff fails to satisfy this factor.

(Doc. 66 at 9.)

14

The Court concludes that this factor is neutral. Plaintiff's argument concerning the

benefits conferred is essentially a deterrence argument and, therefore, was addressed in

the context of the third Ursic factor. See Patrick v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., Civ. A.

No. 19-2106-CFC, 2021 WL 6335082, at *2 (D. Del. Dec. 17, 2021) (fourth factor neutral

where the decision in the plaintiff's favor did not confer a positive immediate benefit on other

plan members and is same as deterrence); see also Haisley v. Sedgwick Claims

Management Services Inc., Civ. A. No. 08-1463, 2011 WL 4565494, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Sept.

29, 2011) (fourth factor neutral where only the plaintiff benefits directly from fee award and

plan members benefit only indirectly by deterring other arbitrary and capricious conduct by

defendants and, as such, was already considered in the third factor).

5. Relative Merits of the Parties’ Position

As to the fifth factor, Plaintiff avers that he “clearly had a more meritorious legal

position that that of Anthem” in this action. (Doc. 63-1 at 6-7.) Defendant does not argue

otherwise. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of an award of fees.

Having found that four of the five Ursic factors weigh in favor of an award of

attorney's fees, the Court finds that an award of fees is appropriate in this case. Thus, the

Court will now turn to the calculation of the fee award.

B. Fee Award Calculation

Plaintiff first argues for a contingent fee award of 25% of the total award. (See Doc.

63-1 at 11.) Based on the Court's remand to the Plan Administrator for a calculation and

15

payment of fees, Plaintiff asserts that “a calculation of the contingent fee amount is still

pending.” (Doc. 63-1 at 11-12.) Plaintiff has not provided an update regarding the contingent

fee amount since the filing of his April 30, 2024, brief in support of his motion for fees and

costs. Because Hensley identifies the lodestar method as the “starting point” for

ascertaining reasonable fees and because the Court has no substantive information

regarding the contingent fee amount in this case, the Court will consider an award of fees

under the lodestar method.

In response to Plaintiff's assertion that fees and costs are reasonable (Doc. 63-1 at

10-15), Defendant does not challenge the hourly rate charged but contends that the fees

requested should be reduced based on Plaintiff's limited success and, in many instances,

the hours were inappropriately charged or insufficiently supported (Doc. 66 at 1). Plaintiff did

not file a reply brief and, therefore, has not refuted Defendant's arguments for a reduction in

the fee award requested.

“Where an opposing party lodges a sufficiently specific objection to an aspect of a

fee award, the burden is on the party requesting the fees to justify the size of its award.”

Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 426 F.3d 694, 713 (3d Cir. 2005), as amended

(Nov. 10, 2005). However, the party objecting to the fee award requested

“cannot merely allege in general terms that the time spent was excessive. In

order to be sufficient, the briefs or answers challenging the fee request must

be clear in two respects. First, they must generally identify the type of work

being challenged, and second, they must specifically state the adverse party's

grounds for contending that the hours claimed in that area are unreasonable.

16

The briefs must be specific and clear enough that the fee applicants have a

fair chance to respond and defend their request.”

426 F.3d at 713 (quoting Bell v. United Princeton Properties, Inc., 884 F.2d 713, 720 (3d

Cir. 1989)).

1. Reduction Based on Degree of Success

Defendant maintains that because Plaintiff sought benefits for all of D.D.’s 169 days

of hospitalization at KKI and the Court did not rule on the propriety of Defendant’s denial of

benefits for 101 of those days, the award of fees and costs should be reduced

proportionately. (Doc. 66 at 14.) Defendant posits that

[o]nce a lodestar calculation has been reached, a court may then reduce that

amount to account for ‘limited success’ by a plaintiff, focusing on ‘the

significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours

reasonably expended on the litigation.”” McCutcheon v. America’s Servicing

Co., 560 F.3d 143, 151 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.

424, 435- 36, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983)); Murphy v. Smith, 583

U.S. 220, 241, 138 S. Ct. 784, 797 (2018)).

(Doc. 66 at 14-15.) Defendant calculates that Plaintiff would be entitled to 36% of the fees

and costs requested based on his award of benefits for 61 of the 169 days. (/d. at 15.)

In support of its argument that reduction is warranted based on “limited success” by

Plaintiff, Defendant does not cite any ERISA case. Because the award of fees in an ERISA

case is based a claimant’s achievement of “some degree of success on the merits,” Hardt.,

560 U.S. at 255 (2010) (internal quotation omitted), the Court declines to adopt Defendant's

17

position on the proportionate reduction of fees.? The Court’s conclusion above that Plaintiff

had achieved some success on the merits is based on both the definitive determination that

Plaintiff was entitled the payment of benefits for the period of May 8, 2019, through July 7,

2019, and for evaluation of benefits consistent with the Court’s April 10, 2024, Memorandum

Opinion for the period of July 8, 2019, through October 24, 2019, and appropriate payment

of benefits for that period. See supra p. 4 (citing Doc. 61 at 95; see also Doc. 61 at 93

(“evidence indicates that D.D. was entitled to coverage for some period beyond July 7,

2019”). Thus, Plaintiff did achieve “some degree of success on the merits” of his claim for

reimbursement for the entire period of D.D.’s hospitalization. Further, though not necessary

to the finding of “some degree of success on the merits,” the Court can readily conclude that

Plaintiff's success was “substantial” and occurred on a “central issue.” Hardt, 560 U.S. at

225. For the foregoing reasons, the Court will not reduce the requested lodestar amount of

$51,704.60 based on the degree of success achieved by Plaintiff.

2. Reduction in Hours

Defendant identifies four categories of time entries that should be deducted from any

award: 1) vague time entries (Doc. 66 at 15); 2) entries for “internal collaborations” (id. at

17); 3) “block-billed” entries (id. at 18); and 4) entries for “costs of local counsel, fees for

communicating with local counsel, and fees for researching local rules or related issues”

2 In Haisley v. Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc., Civ. A. No. 08-1463, 2011 WL

4565494, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2011), the District Court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to an

award of benefits for a certain period and remanded for a determination of whether the plaintiff was entitled

° an award for a later period. /d. The Court did not reduce the fee and cost award based on proportionate

18

(id.). Defendant does not discuss specific time entries in its brief but sets out the categorical

basis for each entry to which it objects in Exhibit B attached to its brief. (See Doc. 66-1 at

15-16.)

Before addressing Defendant's objections to numerous time entries based on the

listed categories, the Court notes that Defendant “generally identiffied] the type of work

being challenged| ] and . . . specifically [its] grounds for contending that the hours claimed in

that area are unreasonable.” Interfaith, 426 F.3d at 713. Defendant's objections to time

entries are “specific and clear enough” that Plaintiff had a “fair chance to respond and

defend [his] request.” /d. Although Plaintiff did not file a reply brief and, therefore, did not

counter Defendant's specific objections discussed below, the Court reviews the record to

ascertain the validity of Defendant's objections, i.e., whether, contrary to Defendant's

objections, Plaintiff provided adequate information in the description of the billing entry to

justify the fees challenged.

In Washington v. Philadelphia Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 89 F.3d 1031 (3d Cir.

1996), the Third Circuit recognized that “[iJt is an established proposition of law that ‘[w]here

the documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the award

accordingly.” 89 F.3d at 1037 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, (1983)).

Washington then addressed the question of what constitutes adequate documentation. /d.

[IIn Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir.1990)[,] [wle explained that

specificity should only be required to the extent necessary for the district court

‘to determine if the hours claimed are unreasonable for the work performed.”

Id. at 1190 (citing Pawlak v. Greenawalt, 713 F.2d 972, 978 (3d Cir.1983),

19

cert. denied sub nom. International Broth. of Teamsiérs, Chauffeurs,

Warehousemen and Helpers of America v. Pawlak, 464 U.S. 1042, 104 S.Ct.

707, 79 L.Ed.2d 172 (1984)). Specifically,

a fee petition should include “some fairly definite information as

to the hours devoted to various general activities, e.g., pretrial

discovery, settlement negotiations, and the hours spent by

various classes of attorneys, e.g., senior partners, junior

partners, associates.” However, “it is not necessary to know the

exact number of minutes spent nor the precise activity to which

each hour was devoted nor the specific attainments of each

attorney.”

Rode, 892 F.2d at 1190 (citing Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. of Philadelphia, 487

F.2d at 167).

Washington, 89 F.3d at 1037-38.

Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly, 195 F. App’x 93 (3d Cir. 2006), provides

additional guidance as to the specificity required in a fee petition.

[D]ocumentation requirements for time charged are not exacting: “a fee

petition should include some fairly definite information as to the hours devoted

to various general activities, e.g., pretrial discovery, settlement negotiations,

... [but] it is not necessary to know the exact number of minutes spent nor the

precise activity to which each hour was devoted nor the specific attainments

of each attorney.” [Washington, 89 F.3d] at 1037-38 (internal quotation marks

omitted). While it is advisable in certain circumstances to provide greater

specificity [in some instances], we believe . . . entries [such as] “Attn to brief,”

“Attn to reply,” efc. [].. are sufficiently clear to allow us to know the tasks to

which [the attorney] devoted his time, and we therefore conclude they are

documented properly. We note two exceptions below in our itemized list of

reductions of the requested fees.

Although .. . entries noting . . . “att[entio]n” to various matters are

mostly sufficient to satisfy our documentation requirements, . . . [an] entry for

“attn to papers” and a(n] entry for “attn to status” do not provide any indication

20

to what “papers” or “status” [the attorney] was attending. We believe these

entries are not sufficiently precise to “determine if the hours claimed are

unreasonable for the work performed,” Washington, 89 F.3d at 1037 (internal

quotation marks omitted). . . .

A similar problem arises with . . . entries . . . for “e-mails” and . . . for

“conference call[.]” [They] are not specific enough for us to know the subject

of [the] actions... .

[Other] entries too vague to allow us to determine the nature of the]

work [are] an . . . entry for “correspondence” and a(n] entry for “review

papers.”

Tenafly, 195 F. App’x at 100.

Defendant alleges that numerous time entries submitted by Plaintiff are not

sufficiently specific or are otherwise not compensable. (Doc. 66 at 20-24.) Supporting

documents submitted by Defendant identify ninety-two entries to which it objects and

calculate the value of the disputed time to be $14,849.00. (Def.’s Ex. B, Doc. 66-1 at 7, 15-

16.) All but one entry identifies vagueness as an objection; twenty-three entries identify

vaguenss as the only objection; sixty-eight entries idenify some combination of “vague,”

“block-billed,” “internal collaboration,” and “local counsel/unnecessary”; and one entry

identifies only “block-billed” as an objection. (/d. at 15-16.)

a. Vagueness Objections

The Court's review of the twenty-three entries to which Defendant objects only on

the basis of vagueness indicates all but three of the entries fall into categories prohibited in

Tenafly. (Id.) The December 18, 2019, entry for “Review of correspondence, Settlement

21

Denial HR” (.10 hours/$30.50) (Doc. 66-1 at 15) provides definite information as to the

activity in which the attorney was engaged. The April 20, 2021, entry for “Review of

Documents Order” (.10 hours/$33.00) (Doc. 66-1 at 16) is sufficient because it refers to the

review of an order which corresponds with Orders issued by the Court, i.e., the April 19,

2021, Order regarding the summary judgment briefing schedule (Doc. 40) and/or the April

20, 2021, Order granting Defendant’s motion to extend the page limitation in its summary

judgment supporting brief (Doc. 41). The May 18, 2021, entry for “Review pleadings” (2.5

hours/$1375.50) (Doc. 66-1 at 15) is “sufficiently clear to allow [the Court] to know the tasks

to which [the attorney] devoted his time,” Tenafly, 195 F. App’x at 100, particularly in that

the pleadings review took place during the briefing period for the cross-motions for summary

judgment.

The value of the disputed time for the remaining twenty entries to which Defendant

appropriately objects on vagueness grounds alone is $3,793.50.3 Therefore, Plaintiff's fee

request will be reduced by this amount.

b. Remaining Entries

With one exception, Defendant objects to the remaining entries on multiple grounds,

Some combination of “vague,” “internal collaboration,” “block-billed,” and “local

counsel/unnecessary” grounds. The Court will first address the fifty-nine entries to which

Defendant objects based in part on “internal collaboration,” fifty-five of which are objected to

3 This figure is calculated from the identified amount billed for each of the twenty entries in the

Table set out in Defendant's Exhibit 5. (Doc. 66-1 at 15-16.).

22

as “Vague; internal collaboration” and four which add other grounds to the “Vague; internal

collaboration” rationale. (See Doc. 66-1 at 15-16.) Thereafter, the Court will assess the

merits of Defendant's “local counsel/unnecessary” and “block-billed” objections.

i, Internal Collaboration Objections

Defendant argues that “Counsel’s dozens of entries for ‘internal collaboration’

between lawyers of the same firm should be deducted from any award.” (Doc. 66 at 17.)

Defendant further argues that “[t]hese entries are not specific enough because, despite their

inclusion of the perfunctory phrase ‘re strategy,’ there is no basis for the Court to determine

for what purposes or aspects of the case counsel was conferring or whether the time spent

was appropriate for those purposes.” (/d. (citing Tenafly, 195 F. App’x at 100-101).)

Defendant also cites several district court cases in support of its assertion that the entries

for internal collaboration should be deducted or reduced. (Doc. 66 at 17 & n.4 (citing Jama

Corp. v. Gupta, Civ. A. Nos. 3:99-CV-01624 and 3:99-CV-1574, 2008 WL 108671 (M.D. Pa.

Jan. 4, 2008); Bluebeard’s Casile, Inc. v. Hodge, Civ. A. No. 2002-154, 2009 WL 891896

(D.V.I. April 1, 2009); Haisley v. Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc., Civ. A. No.

08-1463, 2011 WL 4565494 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2011)).)

Focusing on the guidance set out in Tenafly, a review of the panel’s opinion indicates

that time spent on internal collaboration was not deducted. 195 F. App’x at 99 Raitier, the

defendants’ challenge to “the time (about 140 hours) spent collectively by the attorneys on

meetings and conference calls” was determined to be unfounded or unpersuasive, the

23

Circuit panel noting that the defendants did not explain why the consultation time was

unreasonable given the complexity of the case and the many parties involved. /d. District

courts have recognized that conferences between lawyers working together on a case are

expected to occur and are compensable. United Food and Commercial Workers v. Super

Fresh Food Markets, Inc., Civ. A. No. 04-1226(RMB), 2009 WL 2517064, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug.

14, 2009). In Haisley, the court cited United Food and, after conclusorily determining that

“time spent on internal communications was excessive,” the court reduced the hours by fifty

percent. 2011 WL 4565494, at *17.

Here, Defendant acknowledges the complexity of D.D.’s “medical issues and

circumstances surrounding Anthem’s benefits determinations.” (Doc. 66 at 2.) In his

Declaration, Plaintiff's attorney Alan C. Millstein (“ACM”) stated that he was assisted in this

matter by his associate, attorney Leily Schoenhaus (“LS”). (Doc. 63-2 at 2.) Defendant

objected to fifty-five entries related to the collaboration between Ms. Schoenhaus and Mr.

Millstein, identifying them as “Vague; internal collaboration.” (Doc. 66 at 22.)

The Court disagrees that the value of these entries should be deducted. Over a

period of approximately three and a half years the collaboration between Ms. Schoenhaus

and Mr. Millstein set forth in these entries amounted to less than $3,500.00 in fees in

compensation for approximately 7.2 hours of work. (Doc. 66-1 at 15-16.) Considered in light

of the guidance provided in Tenafly and United Food, the Court concludes that this time and

expenditure for collaboration is reasonable given the circumstances of this case. The Court

24

further concludes that the Court's recognition of internal collaboration as a valid basis for

compensation negates the vagueness objection accompanying the “internal collaboration”

objection. Thus, the value of fifty-five entries with the identified objection “Vague; internal

collaboration” will not be deducted from Plaintiff's requested fee award.

The remaining four entries to which Defendant objects in part based on “vague” and

“internal collaboration” objections are not objectionable based on “internal collaboration,” but

these entries identify additional grounds, i.e., “local counsel/unnecessary” and/or “block-

billed.” (See Doc. 66-1 at 15-16.) Whether the entries should be disallowed because of

involvement of local counsel or block billing raise different issues which will be addressed

below.

ii. Local Counsel Objections

In objecting to fees related to local counsel activities, Defendant asserts that “costs

of local counsel, fees for communicating with local counsel, and fees for researching local

rules or related issues—except for the initial filing fee—should be deducted or reduced.

Costs of local counsel and fees for communications with such counsel were unnecessary.”

(Doc. 66 at 18 (citing Interfaith, 426 F.3d at 710).) In support of this assertion Defendant

relies on Interfaith’s statement that “under normal circumstances, a party that hires counsel

from outside the forum of the litigation may not be compensated for . . . the costs of local

counsel.” (Doc. 66 at 19 (quoting Interfaith, 426 F.3d at 710).)

25

A review of Interfaith’s guidance regarding local counsel indicates that the Circuit

Court did not address communication with local counsel. Rather, under the heading “Travel

Time and Costs of Local Counsel,” /nterfaith addressed the defendant's challenge to the

District Court's decision to award the plaintiff fees for its costs of travel and travel time

related to local counsel, as well as fees for its local counsel. 426 F.3d at 710. In the context

of this issue, the Circuit Court made the statement quoted above which reads in full:

We agree that, under normal circumstances, a party that hires counsel from

outside the forum of the litigation may not be compensated for travel time,

travel costs, or the costs of local counsel. However, where forum counsel are

unwilling to represent the plaintiff, such costs are compensable. Therefore,

because we have affirmed the District Court's conclusion that forum counsel

were unwilling to represent ICO in this action, we affirm the District Court's

decision to award compensation for travel time, travel costs, and the costs of

local counsel.

Id.

Viewing Interfaith in the proper context, it does not stand for the proposition that

communication with local counsel is not compensable. This determination is bolstered by

the District of New Jersey's consideration of Interfaith in Pretlow v. Cumberland County Bd.

of Social Services, Civ. A. No. 04-2785 (FLW), 2005 WL 3500028 (D.N.J. Dec. 20, 2005),

where the District Court relied on Interfaith to deny travel costs and costs for filing fees,

transcripts and travel expenses related to local counsel but did not otherwise limit

reimbursement for work related to local counsel. 2005 WL 3500028, at *9 (citing /nterfaith,

426 F.3d at 710).

26

The Court concludes that Defendant's reliance on Interfaith is overly broad: the case

does not support Defendant’s proposition that “costs of local counsel, fees for

communicating with local counsel, and fees for researching local rules or related issues—

except for the initial filing fee—should be deducted or reduced. Costs of local counsel and

fees for communications with such counsel were unnecessary” (Doc. 66 at 18 (citing

Interfaith, 426 F.3d at 710)).

Defendant objects to the March 17, 2020, entry for LS “Internal Collaboration re

strategy with local counsel” and the April 16, 2020, entry for LS described as “Internal

collaboration re strategy emails with ACM and Local Counsel” on the following bases:

“Vague; internal collaboration; local counsel/unnecessary.” (Doc. 66-1 at 15-16.) Given that

these two entries are not related to travel or costs of local counsel, they are not barred by

Interfaith. As set out above, time related to “internal collaboration” is acceptable and entries

related to internal collaboration are not objectionable on vagueness grounds. Therefore,

Defendant has not shown that the March 17, 2020, and April 16, 2020, entries for LS should

be deleted based on “Vague; internal collaboration; local counsel/unnecessary” grounds

(see Doc. 66-1 at 15-16).

Defendant objects to seven entries as “Vague; local counsel/unnecessary,” all of

which are for phone calls, correspondence, and/or emails with local counsel. (See Doc. 66-1

at 15-16.) These entries do not identify a purpose for the calls, correspondence, and/or

emails. Therefore, they lack the specificity required by Tenafly and the value of the seven

27

entries will be deducted from Plaintiff's fee request. This conclusion results in the following

deductions: 1) November 18, 2019, entry for $30.50; 2) December 16, 2019, entry for

$91.50; 3) December 30, 2019, entry for $30.50; 4) a second December 30, 2019, entry for

$30.50; 5) January 15, 2020, entry for $30.50; 6) January 21, 2020, entry for $30.50; and 7)

February 25, 2020, entry for $65.00. (See Doc. 66-1 at 15.) This results in a deduction of

$309.00 from Plaintiffs requested fee award.

iii. Block-Billed Objections

Defendant posits that “block-billed entries should not be recoverable because it is

not possible to determine how much time was spent on each separate task and thereby

assess the fee’s reasonableness.” (Doc. 66 at 18 (citing Arlington Industries, Inc. v.

Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., Civ. A. No. 3:02-CV-0134, 2016 WL 3522964 (M.D. Pa. June 28,

2016); Estate of Schultz v. Potter, Civ. A. No. 05-1169, 2010 WL 883710 (Mar. 5, 2010)).)

Based on these cases, Defendant asserts that courts have “deducted or reduced block

billing that prevented the court from assessing the time billed to a particular task and

reasonableness . . . [and] disallow[ed] all block-billed time entries where some tasks in each

entry could have been delegated to non-professional assistants.” (Doc. 66 at 18.)

Defendant concludes that “[t]his Court should not allow fees for such block-billed entries,”

but does not specifically argue why the entries to which it objects on a “block-billed” basis

should be disallowed. (/d.)

“Block billing refers to the practice of grouping several tasks together into a single

time entry, without specifying the amount of time spent on each particular task.” Arlington,

2016 WL 3522964, at *8 (citing Simring v. Rutgers, 634 F. App’x 853, 859 (3d Cir. 2015)).

After noting that the court did “not reject block billing as a time-keeping method,” Arlington

explained that

[a]lthough block billing “makes it more difficult for courts to review hours

expended because we do not know how many hours a lawyer spent on a

discrete task,” engaging in the practice is not per se unreasonable. Simring,

634 Fed. Appx. at 859. Block billing “will be upheld as reasonable as long as

the listed activities reasonably correspond to the number of hours billed.” See

Schlier v. Rice, No. 3:04-cv-1863, 2009 WL 5182164, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 22,

2009) (“[B]lock billing is a common practice which itself saves time’), see also

Rode, 892 F.2d at 1190 (explaining that specificity should only be required to

the extent necessary for a court “to determine if the hours claimed are

unreasonable for the work performed”); United States v. NCH Corp., Nos. 98-

5268, 05-881, 2010 WL 3703756, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 10, 2010) (noting that

block billing will be upheld as long as “the listed activities reasonably

correspond to the number of hours billed”).

Arlington, 2016 WL 3522964, at *8.

To the extent Defendant’s position is that fees for block-billed entries in this case

should be categorically deducted (see Doc. 66 at 18), the foregoing overview of how courts

consider block-billed entries requires more individualized consideration.

Turning now to entries to which Defendant objects on multiple grounds including

block billing, the Court will first address Plaintiffs April 16, 2020, entry for ACM described as

“Internal collaboration re strategy. Emails with LS and local counsel” to which Defendant

objects on the following bases: “Vague; internal collaboration; block-billed; local

counsel/unnecessary.” (Doc. 66-1 at 15.) For reasons discussed above, the ‘internail

collaboration” and “local counsel/ unnecessary” objections are without merit. Thus, the

Court will assess whether the entry is objectionable based on block billing or vagueness.

29

Although time spent on generic emails is not compensable and would be disallowed for

vagueness, see supra, the April 16, 2020, entry for ACM billing $181.50 for .30 hours is

reasonable when viewed in conjunction with the April 16, 2020, LS entry. First, it is

reasonable to conclude that the internal collaboration and emails described in the two

entries were related: the period separating “strategy” and “Emails” in the ACM entry is

absent in the LS entry which reads “Internal collaboration re strategy emails with ACM and

Local Counsel.” (Doc. 66-1 at 15-16.) Assessing both entries to be for emails to local

counsel and co-counsel regarding strategy, the Court will not disallow the ACM entry based

on vagueness or block billing.

The October 28, 2020, entry for “Review Joint Case Management Report, Internal

Collaboration with LS” (.30 hours/$181.50) to which Defendant objects on “Vague; internal

collaboration; block-billed” grounds (Doc. 66-1 at 16) is not disallowed based on block billing

or any other basis. The entry is compensable because both activities described are

individually compensable and the total time spent for review of the Joint Case Management

Report and internal collaboration is reasonable. Further, the specific identification of

activities negates the vagueness objection.

Defendant's objections to three additional entries include a “block-billed” objection:

two March 20, 2020, entries for 3.5 hours/$1,872.50 each described as “Review documents

and Amended Complaint” which Defendant objects to as “Vague; block-billed”; and a May 1,

2020, entry for 3.5 hours/$1872.50 described as “Draft Complaint. Correspondence with

Court’ which Defendant objects to as “Block-billed.” (Doc. 66-1 at 15.) For the reasons

30

discussed above, the Court will not disallow entries solely on the basis that they are “block-

billed.” See supra. However, the Court must assess the reasonableness of the requested

compensation.

The “Review documents” portion of the two March 20, 2020, entries does not satisfy

Tenafly’s specificity requirement. The Court cannot determine the reasonableness of the

“Review ... Amended Complaint” aspect of the entries in that the initial complaint in this

case had not yet been filed and was not filed until April 30, 2020, ie., more than a month

after the entry regarding review of an “Amended Complaint.” Because the Court cannot

determine the reasonableness of the two March 20, 2020, entries, the value of these

entries--$1,872.50 each for a total of $3,745.00--will be deducted from Plaintiff's requested

fee award.

The May 1, 2020, entry for “Draft Complaint. Correspondence with Court’ is not

compensable because the Complaint was filed on April 30, 2020, i.e., the day before the

“Draft Complaint” entry, and “Correspondence with Court” does not satisfy Tenafly’s

specificity standard. See supra. Therefore, the $1,872.50 value of this entry will be deducted

from Plaintiffs requested fee award. Thus, the total deduction for the three entries to which

Defendant objects on a “block-billed” basis $5,617.50,

c. Fee Award Deductions

Defendant does not argue, and the Court does not find, that the requested hourly

rates are unreasonable (see PI.’s Ex. A, Doc. 63-2). As calculated above, $3.793.50 willl be

deducted based on twenty entries to which Defendant objects on vagueness grounds

31

discussed above Section III(B)(2)(a), see supra p. 22; $309.00 will be deducted based on

seven entries to which Defendant objects based on vagueness and local counsel grounds

discussed in Section III(B)(2)(b)(ii) above, see supra p. 28; and $5,617.50 will be deducted

based on three entries to which Defendant objects on block-billed or vague and block-billed

grounds discussed above in Section III(B)(2)(b)(iii), see supra pp. 31. This results in a

deduction of $9,900.00 from the $51,704.60 requested award. Therefore, the Court

concludes Plaintiff is entitled to a fee award of $41,804.60.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court will grant Plaintiffs Motion for an Award

of Attorney’s Fees and Costs (Doc. 63) in part. The Court will award Plaintiff $41,804.60 in

attorney’s fees. The Court will also award Plaintiff $2,056.52 in taxable costs.4 (See Doc.

63-1 at 15.) A separate Order will enter.

\ they

Robert D. Mariani-~

United States District Judge

4 Defendant does not make any specific argument as to the amount of the requested award for

costs. (See Doc. 66.)