The opinion
03/07/2025
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
Assigned on Briefs February 4, 2025
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. DAVARIOUS MONTRAL TAYLOR
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Tipton County
No. 10734 A. Blake Neill, Judge
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No. W2024-00560-CCA-R3-CD
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The defendant, Davarious Montral Taylor, was convicted by a Tipton County Circuit Court
jury of second-degree murder and sentenced to twenty-five years in the Tennessee
Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the
convicting evidence and the sentence imposed by the trial court. After review, we affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed
J. ROSS DYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JILL BARTEE AYERS and TOM
GREENHOLTZ, JJ., joined.
Claiborne H. Ferguson, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Davarious Montral Taylor.
Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Abigail H. Hornsby, Assistant Attorney
General; Mark Davidson, District Attorney General; and Jason R. Poyner, Stephanie
Draughon, and James Walter Freeland, Jr., Assistant District Attorneys General, for the
appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION
Facts and Procedural History
The defendant was indicted for first-degree murder and employing a firearm during
the commission of a dangerous felony1 as a result of his shooting the driver of a vehicle
1
Before trial, the State moved to amend the indictment to clarify that first-degree murder was “not an
applicable dangerous felony,” so the second count would “only apply if [the defendant was] found guilty
of a lesser included crime that is an applicable dangerous felony.” The record shows that the jury did not
outside the Broadmeadow Apartments in Covington on March 11, 2021. The State’s proof
at trial showed that the defendant approached a vehicle occupied by the victim, Andrew
Terry, knocked on the window, and then shot into the vehicle four times. The evidence
suggested that the motive for the defendant’s actions was that the defendant learned the
victim had assaulted a close friend earlier that evening.
Kaylnn Hendrix, the victim’s girlfriend and mother of his unborn child, saw the
victim several times throughout the day of March 11, 2021. Around 10:00 p.m., the victim
picked up Ms. Hendrix, and they drove to the Broadmeadow Apartments to return the cell
phone of the victim’s brother, Jamarius Terry to him. They parked in front of one of the
buildings, and Jamarius2 came to the car, got the phone, and headed back inside. The
victim started to back out from where he was parked, but a “black figure” ran up to the car
and started beating on the driver’s side window “with something” that “wasn’t with a
hand.”
Ms. Hendrix heard the “person beating on the window” saying something, but she
could not make out the words. Ms. Hendrix then heard the victim say, “something about
his gun going for his gun,” which the victim kept in the center console. As the victim was
reaching for his gun, the other individual began firing into the car. Ms. Hendrix heard four
gunshots, ducked, and felt the car roll forward. According to Ms. Hendrix, the victim
retrieved his gun but did not fire any shots because the other individual shot first. The
victim was shot three times.
After the shooting, the victim’s car crashed into several nearby cars. Ms. Hendrix,
who was sitting in the front passenger seat, was in a panic. She “squeeze[d]” herself out
of the passenger door and went around to the driver’s side “to turn the car off, because [the
victim] was still driving into the other cars.” The victim was “gasping for his breath” and
“had globs of blood coming out of his nose.” Ms. Hendrix yelled for help and called the
police. The victim was transported by ambulance to the hospital where he died of “a
gunshot wound to the head and chest.”
Martavis Bland and Trevon White were home cooking pizza that evening when they
decided to walk to a friend’s home at the Broadmeadow Apartments. While walking, they
encountered the defendant, and the three men walked to the Broadmeadow Apartments
together. According to Mr. Bland, the defendant told them that “Little D,” Sheldrion
Somerville, had “got jumped” and that the defendant was “going over there to try to talk”
consider the firearm charge after finding the defendant guilty of second-degree murder, and the judgment
indicates that the count was dismissed.
2
Because the victim and the victim’s brother have the same surname, we will refer to the victim’s brother
by first name only at times to avoid confusion. No disrespect is intended by this practice.
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to someone named Drew. Mr. White did not recall any specifics about their conversation
and did not think the defendant said who he was going to see or what he was going to do.
As the three men walked into the apartment complex, Mr. Bland and Mr. White fell
behind the defendant because they “weren’t all going to the same place.” The defendant
ran up to a car that was “pulling off” and began shooting. Mr. Bland immediately thought
that he wanted to “[g]et away from there,” explaining he had been expecting the defendant
to have a conversation at the car, not to begin shooting. Similarly, Mr. White immediately
ran from the area. Neither man had seen the defendant with a gun while they were walking.
Mr. Bland acknowledged that he told officers that night that the defendant approached the
car and said, “[Y]ou better not move this car or I’ll put a whistle call on,” and then started
shooting. Mr. Bland denied being able to remember the specifics of his conversation with
police but agreed that what he said in his statement was correct. Mr. White maintained that
he did not hear what the defendant said at the car because he “was a good distance” away.
However, when questioned about whether he told the police that he heard the defendant
tell the driver of the car not to pull off and then started shooting, Mr. White stated that he
did not remember doing so but did not disagree that he could have, or did tell them that.
Sergeant Sarah Maclin3 with the Covington Police Department began her shift
around 10:00 p.m. on March 11, 2021, and went to relieve another sergeant at a crime scene
on Zion Street. Sergeant Maclin arrived around 10:07 p.m. and stayed for approximately
15-20 minutes. The alleged victim, Sheldrion Somerville, had apparently been assaulted,
but “he was not trying to give us a statement on the assault” and “did not want to be a
victim.” Sometime after Sergeant Maclin arrived, the defendant “walked on the scene.”
Sergeant Maclin left the scene on Zion Street and was patrolling the area when she
received a shots fired call at the Broadmeadow Apartments. Because she was in the area,
Sergeant Maclin actually heard the shots and was en route to the location before the call
came through dispatch at 10:50 p.m. Sergeant Maclin entered the apartment complex via
the rear entrance. As she drove towards the front, Sergeant Maclin saw two individuals
walking calmly towards the back entrance. She shined her spotlight on the individuals and
recognized one as Martavis Bland. Observing no alarming behavior, Sergeant Maclin
continued driving in the direction of the front entrance, eventually encountering a dark-
colored “car that was wrecked and crashed into multiple other cars in the parking lot[.]”
People were “yelling and screaming,” so Sergeant Maclin parked her vehicle and assessed
the situation. Ms. Hendrix and Jamarius Terry were near the driver’s side of the wrecked
car, “screaming that he needs help.” Sergeant Maclin saw the victim in the driver’s seat of
the car, “leaned back,” with a bullet wound in his chest. Ms. Hendrix advised that the
victim was still breathing, but Sergeant Maclin “could not see any chest movement going
3
At the time of trial, Sergeant Maclin’s last name was Dillingham, and she had been promoted to lieutenant.
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up and down.” Sergeant Maclin also checked for a pulse but could not determine if the
victim had one. At that point, Sergeant Maclin’s backup arrived and began to secure and
process the scene. Medical personnel also arrived and took over assessment of the victim.
Sergeant Maclin found a gun on the driver’s side floorboard, near the victim’s feet,
so she removed it for safety purposes. The gun had thirteen bullets in the magazine and
none in the chamber. Remembering that the apartment complex had active cameras it
allowed police to access, Sergeant Maclin obtained the surveillance footage and rewound
it from when she arrived at the scene to see if it captured the shooting. The video showed
Mr. Bland, Mr. White, and the defendant entering the complex on foot. Sergeant Maclin
immediately noticed that the defendant, who she did not know at the time, was wearing
“noticeable” royal blue shoes with a reflective tongue. Sergeant Maclin had seen the
defendant wearing the same shoes earlier at the scene on Zion Street. Around two and a
half minutes after the three men entered the complex, the video showed the defendant
“running out of the exit[.]” Less than a minute later, Mr. Bland and Mr. White walked out
as Sergeant Maclin drove in.
Another camera angle, with the victim’s car in view, showed Jamarius Terry walk
out of a building, get into the victim’s car, and then exit the car and walk back towards the
building. The victim’s car started reversing to leave, and the defendant ran toward the car
and began shooting. The defendant was then seen running away. The victim wrecked his
car into several parked vehicles, and Ms. Hendrix got out of the passenger side and ran
around the car to help the victim. Jamarius Terry ran back out of the building to help, and
Sergeant Maclin arrived soon thereafter.
Detective Tony Doss with the Covington Police Department arrived at the scene at
the Broadmeadow Apartments between 11:00 p.m. and midnight. When he arrived, the
scene was “already contained . . . pretty well,” and the victim had been taken for medical
treatment. Officers collected a 9mm Smith & Wesson firearm, four 9mm spent shell
casings, ammunition, two small bags of marijuana, blood-stained clothes, and $98.12. The
victim’s wallet with ID and debit card, keys, and cell phone were also collected. The shell
casings were on the pavement in the parking lot, along with shattered glass from the
victim’s car window, and none of the casings matched the ammunition from the gun found
inside the victim’s car. Based on that evidence, Detective Doss determined that the
victim’s gun was never fired.
Detective Doss interviewed Mr. Bland and Mr. White that night and developed the
defendant as a suspect. Detective Doss explained that the term “whistle call” means “a
gun.” Detective Doss obtained warrants to search the defendant’s mother’s and
grandmother’s homes, as well as spoke to the defendant’s father in Arkansas. Based on
the evidence gathered, Detective Doss obtained an arrest warrant for the defendant but
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ultimately needed help from the U.S. Marshals to locate him. The defendant was taken
into custody about two months later on May 17, 2021.
During the investigation, Detective Doss obtained search warrants for the
defendant’s social media accounts and cell phone records. Specifically, Detective Doss
searched the defendant’s Snapchat account after finding a Snapchat conversation between
the victim and “a name listed as All Mighty Va-va,” who Detective Doss identified as the
defendant. At 11:13 p.m. on March 11, 2021, the defendant sent the victim a message that
said, “Hey, bruh, you know what come behind TS you just pulled, right?” Detective Doss
interpreted “TS” to mean “the shit.”
Testifying on his own behalf, the defendant admitted that he shot the victim but
claimed he acted in self-defense. The defendant explained that his friend Sheldrion
Somerville called or texted him saying that “a black car just pulled up on him and pistol
whipped him. Beat him up or something,” and the defendant went to Mr. Somerville’s
house “to check up on him.” Based on what he learned from Mr. Somerville, the defendant
“wanted to get in contact” with the victim and Jamarius Terry.
The defendant left Mr. Somerville’s house, went home to put on extra clothing and
get his gun, and then messaged the victim and Jamarius to ask where they were. The
defendant admitted that he usually carried a gun with him, which was typical in his social
circle, but had not taken it to Mr. Somerville’s house because he knew the police would be
there. When the defendant received no response to his messages to the victim and
Jamarius, the defendant went to the Broadmeadow Apartments to find Jamarius, who he
believed would then be able to get ahold of the victim. The defendant acknowledged that
he was “angry at the situation” but denied that he intended to murder or fight with the
victim. The defendant maintained that he only intended to talk to the victim and Jamarius.
When he got to the apartment complex, the defendant saw that the victim’s car was
about to leave, so he ran to the car and knocked on the window. The defendant denied
having his gun in his hand when he approached the car, explaining it was in the front pocket
of his sweatshirt albeit with a bullet in the chamber. According to the defendant, the victim
looked at him and “then he reached and came up,” at which point the defendant “ran back”
and started firing to defend himself. The defendant denied using the term “whistle call”
when trying to get the victim to stop the car or even knowing what the term meant. The
defendant claimed that he only shot “to get away from the scene” and did not intend to kill
the victim. The defendant did not know the victim had died until the next day.
After the shooting, the defendant threw his gun and phone into some nearby woods
because he was “scared” and “panicking.” The defendant also explained that although he
knew the police were looking for him, he did not turn himself in because he was scared.
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The defendant admitted that once he was brought in and questioned by the police, he did
not tell them that the victim had pulled a gun on him because he “d[id]n’t want them to try
to switch [his] words around without a lawyer” present.
Following the conclusion of the proof, the jury convicted the defendant of the lesser-
included offense of second-degree murder. The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing,
after which it imposed a sentence of twenty-five years served consecutively to the sentence
in an unrelated case. The defendant appealed.
Analysis
On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and
the trial court’s imposition of a twenty-five-year sentence.
I. Sufficiency
The defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction
because the State failed to establish the mens rea of the offense based on his claim that he
acted in self-defense. The State responds that there “is ample evidence” to support the
defendant’s conviction and that “the jury reasonably rejected [the defendant’s] self-defense
claim.” We agree with the State.
When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the relevant question of the
reviewing court is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see also Tenn.
R. App. P. 13(e) (“Findings of guilt in criminal actions whether by the trial court or jury
shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to support the findings by the trier of fact
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”); State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 190-92 (Tenn.
1992); State v. Anderson, 835 S.W.2d 600, 604 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). All questions
involving the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given the evidence, and
all factual issues are resolved by the trier of fact. See State v. Pappas, 754 S.W.2d 620,
623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). “A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the trial judge,
accredits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of
the theory of the State.” State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973). Our Supreme
Court has stated the rationale for this rule:
This well-settled rule rests on a sound foundation. The trial judge and the
jury see the witnesses face to face, hear their testimony and observe their
demeanor on the stand. Thus, the trial judge and jury are the primary
instrumentality of justice to determine the weight and credibility to be given
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to the testimony of witnesses. In the trial forum alone is there human
atmosphere and the totality of the evidence cannot be reproduced with a
written record in this Court.
Bolin v. State, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tenn. 1966) (citing Carroll v. State, 370 S.W.2d 523
(1963)). “A jury conviction removes the presumption of innocence with which a defendant
is initially cloaked and replaces it with one of guilt, so that on appeal a convicted defendant
has the burden of demonstrating that the evidence is insufficient.” State v. Tuggle, 639
S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982).
Guilt may be found beyond a reasonable doubt where there is direct evidence,
circumstantial evidence, or a combination of the two. State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776,
779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) (citing State v. Brown, 551 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tenn. 1977);
Farmer v. State, 343 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tenn. 1961)). The standard of review for
sufficiency of the evidence “is the same whether the conviction is based upon direct or
circumstantial evidence.” State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting
State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 2009)). Moreover, the jury determines the
weight to be given to circumstantial evidence and the inferences to be drawn from this
evidence, and the extent to which the circumstances are consistent with guilt and
inconsistent with innocence are questions primarily for the jury. See id. at 379.
Circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to support a conviction. State v.
Richmond, 7 S.W.3d 90, 91 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999). This Court, when considering the
sufficiency of the evidence, shall not reweigh the evidence or substitute its inferences for
those drawn by the trier of fact. Id. This Court will not exchange its “inferences for those
drawn by the trier of fact from circumstantial evidence.” State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d
776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990).
Second degree murder is the “knowing killing of another.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-
13-210(a)(1). A person acts knowingly “when the person is aware that the conduct is
reasonably certain to cause the result.” Id. § 39-11-302(b). Whether a defendant acted
“knowingly” is a question of fact for the jury. State v. Inlow, 52 S.W.3d 101, 104-105
(Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).
It is well-established “that whether an individual acted in self-defense is a factual
determination to be made by the jury as the sole trier of fact.” State v. Goode, 956 S.W.2d
521, 527 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (citing State v. Ivy, 868 S.W.2d 724, 727 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1993)). At the time of the offense, the applicable statute provided:
(2) Notwithstanding § 39-17-1322, a person who is not engaged in conduct
that would constitute a felony or Class A misdemeanor and is in a place
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where the person has a right to be has no duty to retreat before threatening or
using force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury, if:
(A) The person has a reasonable belief that there is an
imminent danger of death, serious bodily injury, or grave
sexual abuse;
(B) The danger creating the belief of imminent death or serious
bodily injury is real, or honestly believed to be real at the time;
and
(C) The belief of danger is founded upon reasonable grounds.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-611(b)(2). When self-defense is fairly raised by the proof, the
State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-
defense. State v. Benson, 600 S.W.3d 896, 903 (Tenn. 2020).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was
sufficient for a rational jury to find that the defendant knowingly killed the victim and reject
the defendant’s claim of self-defense. The security footage and testimony at trial showed
that the defendant ran up to the victim’s car as it was pulling away and shot into the driver’s
side of the car from only a few feet away. The defendant would certainly be aware that
doing so could kill the victim and, thus, acted “knowingly.” With regard to the defendant’s
claim of self-defense, the defendant relies on his own self-serving testimony that the victim
raised his gun first. The defendant’s testimony, however, was countered by Ms. Hendrix’s
testimony that the “figure” that approached the car banged on the driver’s side window
“with something” that “wasn’t with a hand.” Ms. Hendrix recalled that as the victim was
reaching for his gun, the other individual began firing into the car. Mr. Bland, who was in
the vicinity, told police that night that the defendant approached the victim’s car and said,
“[Y]ou better not move this car or I’ll put a whistle call on,” and then started shooting. It
was explained at trial that “whistle call” meant to use a gun. The defendant’s assertion that
the victim was “known to be violent and was drawing a firearm” does not entitle him to
relief as the defendant presented no evidence that the victim was “known to be violent”
and the victim’s “drawing a firearm” was disputed by other testimony. The jury heard the
conflicting evidence and, within its prerogative, rejected the defendant’s claim of self-
defense. Goode, 956 S.W.2d at 527. The evidence is sufficient to sustain the defendant’s
conviction for second degree murder.
II. Sentencing
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The defendant argues that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence by imposing
the maximum in the range without addressing any mitigating factors or assigning weight
to the enhancement factors. The State responds that the trial court properly exercised its
discretion in imposing a within-range sentence of twenty-five years. We agree with the
State.
In determining an appropriate sentence, a trial court must consider the following
factors: (1) the evidence, if any, received at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (2) the
presentence report; (3) the principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing
alternatives; (4) the nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct involved; (5)
evidence and information offered by the parties on mitigating and enhancement factors; (6)
any statistical information provided by the administrative office of the courts as to
sentencing practices for similar offenses in Tennessee; (7) any statement the defendant
makes on his own behalf as to sentencing; and (8) the result of the validated risk and needs
assessment conducted by the department and contained in the presentence report. Tenn.
Code Ann. §§ 40-35-113, -114, -210(b). In addition, the court must consider the
defendant’s potential for rehabilitation, and that “[t]he sentence imposed should be the least
severe measure necessary to achieve the purposes for which the sentence is imposed.” Id.
§ 40-35-103(4), (5).
Pursuant to the 2005 amendments, the Sentencing Act abandoned the statutory
presumptive minimum sentence and rendered enhancement factors advisory only. See
Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-114, -210(c). Although the application of the factors is
advisory, a court shall consider “[e]vidence and information offered by the parties on the
mitigating and enhancement factors set out in §§ 40-35-113 and 40-35-114.” Id. § 40-35-
210(b)(5). The trial court must also place on the record “what enhancement or mitigating
factors were considered, if any, as well as the reasons for the sentence, in order to ensure
fair and consistent sentencing.” Id. § 40-35-210(e).
When an accused challenges the length or manner of service of a sentence, this
Court reviews the trial court’s sentencing determination under an abuse of discretion
standard accompanied by a presumption of reasonableness. State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682,
707 (Tenn. 2012). If a trial court misapplies an enhancement or mitigating factor in passing
sentence, said error will not remove the presumption of reasonableness from its sentencing
determination. Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 709. This Court will uphold the trial court’s sentencing
decision “so long as it is within the appropriate range and the record demonstrates that the
sentence is otherwise in compliance with the purposes and principles listed by statute.” Id.
at 709-10. Moreover, under such circumstances, appellate courts may not disturb the
sentence even if we had preferred a different result. See State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335,
346 (Tenn. 2008). The party challenging the sentence imposed by the trial court has the
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burden of establishing that the sentence is erroneous. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401,
Sentencing Comm’n Cmts.; State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991).
The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing, at which the victim’s adoptive
mother testified concerning the impact of the victim’s death. The State entered the
defendant’s juvenile court records, under seal, as well as an affidavit of complaint from the
Tipton County General Sessions Court for a burglary case that was pending at the time of
the victim’s murder.
The State filed a notice of enhancement factors asserting that the defendant’s
sentence should be enhanced based on: (1) the defendant’s previous history of
unwillingness to comply with the conditions of a sentence involving release in the
community as supported by the defendant’s Tipton County Juvenile Court records,
Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-114(8); (2) the defendant’s use of a gun in the
commission of the offense, id. section 40-35-114(9); (3) the defendant’s commission of the
offense while released on bond in February 2020 Tipton County and April 2020 Obion
County cases, id. section 40-35-114(13); and (4) the defendant’s having been adjudicated
to have committed criminal acts as a juvenile that would be felonies if committed by an
adult as supported by the defendant’s juvenile court file, id. section 40-35-114(16).
The defendant filed a notice of mitigating factors asserting that the court should
apply in mitigation that, “although guilty of the crime, [the defendant] committed the
offense under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely that a sustained intent to violate
the law motivated the defendant’s criminal conduct.” See id. § 40-35-113(11). At the
sentencing hearing, the defendant argued that this incident “directly flows” from the earlier
alleged assault incident at Mr. Somerville’s home and the victim was “likewise[] armed
with a weapon.”
In determining the defendant’s sentence, the trial court recounted the evidence
received at trial and nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct involved, observing
that the “jury didn’t think there was any evidence . . . of self[-]defense and didn’t think
there was evidence of voluntary manslaughter. It seems that the main thing the jury found
was that maybe he didn’t premeditate it.” The court noted its consideration of the statistical
information provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts, the validated risk and
needs assessment, and that it would have taken into account any statement the defendant
wished to make on his own behalf. The court reviewed the presentence report, pointing
out the defendant’s two misdemeanor convictions since becoming an adult for failure to
appear and theft of property. The court also observed the principles of sentencing and
arguments as to sentencing alternatives, finding that confinement was necessary to protect
society by restraining a defendant with a long history of criminal conduct given the
defendant’s juvenile record and to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense.
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The court found that five enhancement factors applied: the defendant’s history of
criminal behavior, the defendant’s failure to comply with the conditions of a sentence
involving release in the community, the defendant’s use of a firearm during the commission
of the offense, the defendant’s commission of the present offense while released on bail,
and the defendant’s having been adjudicated to have committed delinquent acts as a
juvenile that would constitute felonies if committed by an adult. See Tenn. Code Ann. §
40-35-114(1), (8), (9), (13) and (16).
The court summarized the defendant’s juvenile record, noting that from 2016 to
2019 the defendant had seven burglary adjudications, seven theft adjudications, and five
unlawful possession of a handgun adjudications. Then, in 2020, the defendant stole a
firearm from a car and was released on bond, a condition of which prohibited him from
possessing a firearm. While out on bond, the defendant committed the present murder with
a firearm.
The court concluded:
Considering everything and considering all of the enhancement factors,
considering the fact that [the defendant] throughout his life really beginning
at the age of 14 or 15 has been in the court system, has been repeatedly told
not to have firearms and yet has repeatedly continued to not only carry
firearms but to steal firearms. And then in this case, the reason that the courts
have told him over and over and over again not to have firearms is so that
you don’t use a firearm. The reason the courts have told you over and over
and over again not to have a firearm so you don’t use a firearm is so
somebody doesn’t end up dead.
Regardless of whatever happened that night, [the victim] is never
coming home. And you’re responsible for that . . . . And the result of that,
and again, as to all of the enhancement factors, the Court is going to sentence
you to 25 years, which is the maximum sentence that I can give you.
Although the trial court did not explicitly state the weight given to each
enhancement factor or expressly discuss the mitigating factor raised in the defendant’s
notice, we reiterate that the statutory enhancement and mitigating factors are advisory only
and that “a trial court’s weighing of various mitigating and enhancement factors [is] left to
the trial court’s sound discretion.” Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335, 345 (Tenn. 2008); see also
Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 706. It is clear the trial court found the maximum sentence to be
appropriate in light of the vast number of applicable enhancement factors and the
defendant’s consistent disrespect for the law. Moreover, as to mitigation, while the
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defendant filed a notice of mitigating factors before sentencing, he did not provide any
specific argument about mitigation in his notice or at the hearing. The trial court was not
required to surmise the defendant’s argument. The burden of proving applicable mitigating
factors rests upon the defendant. State v. Moore, 1995 WL 548786, at *6 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Sept. 18, 1995) (citation omitted). Regardless, based on his brief, we understand the
defendant’s claim of mitigation to relate to his assertion that he acted in self-defense, and
the trial court specifically recounted the jury’s lack of persuasion by such theory and the
evidence supports the jury’s finding. The trial court’s ruling was consistent with the
applicable statutes, reflected the purposes and principles of sentencing, and was supported
by the proof presented. Accordingly, the trial court’s sentence is presumed reasonable, and
we conclude there was no abuse of discretion. The defendant is not entitled to relief.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
S/ J. ROSS DYER _
J. ROSS DYER, JUDGE
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