Robin M. McNabb v. Gregory H. Harrison

03/07/2025

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

September 5, 2024 Session

ROBIN M. MCNABB v. GREGORY H. HARRISON

Appeal by Permission from the Court of Appeals

Chancery Court for Loudon County

No. 12997 Tom McFarland, Chancellor

No. E2022-01577-SC-R11-CV

This appeal addresses constitutional residency requirements for Tennessee municipal court

judges. Article VI, Section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution requires inferior court judges

to be “elected by the qualified voters of the district or circuit to which they are to be

assigned [and] have been a resident . . . of the circuit or district one year” prior to election.

Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 4. The appellant, Robin McNabb, proceeding pro se, filed an

election contest against the appellee, Gregory Harrison, contending that he was

constitutionally ineligible to be elected as Lenoir City Municipal Judge. Ms. McNabb

asserted that “district” in Article VI, Section 4 refers to Lenoir City, and that Mr. Harrison

had not lived within city limits in the year preceding. The trial court found that “district”

as used in Article VI, Section 4 refers to the modern-day judicial district. Because Mr.

Harrison resided in the Ninth Judicial District, the trial court found him to be eligible to

serve as Lenoir City Municipal Judge. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, but

modified the trial court’s judgment, finding that Article VI, Section 4 required Mr. Harrison

to be a resident of Loudon County, rather than the Ninth Judicial District. McNabb v.

Harrison, No. E2022-01557-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 7019872, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct.

25, 2023), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Apr. 11, 2024). The Court of Appeals reasoned that

because the Lenoir City Municipal Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Loudon

County General Sessions Court, “district” as used in Article VI, Section 4 means Loudon

County. Id. We respectfully disagree. We hold that Article VI, Section 4 requires a

candidate running for a municipal judgeship to be a resident of the same municipality to

which they will be assigned. Therefore, Article VI, Section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution

required Mr. Harrison to reside in Lenoir City. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of

the Court of Appeals and remand to the Chancery Court for Loudon County.

Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Appeals

Reversed and Case Remanded to the Chancery Court for Loudon County

MARY L. WAGNER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which HOLLY KIRBY, C.J, and

JEFFREY S. BIVINS, SARAH K. CAMPBELL, and DWIGHT E. TARWATER, JJ., joined.

Robin M. McNabb, Knoxville, Tennessee, Pro Se.

T. Scott Jones, Jordan D. Davis, and Baylee M. Brown, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the

appellee, Gregory H. Harrison.

OPINION

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Robin M. McNabb was appointed as Municipal Court Judge for Lenoir City in 2016.

In 2022, the Lenoir City Municipal Court judgeship was subject to election by the Lenoir

City voters. Gregory H. Harrison, Ms. McNabb, and a third individual sought election.

Mr. Harrison won the election on August 4, 2022. The Loudon County Election

Commission certified the election results on August 18, 2022.

On August 23, 2022, Ms. McNabb filed a complaint in Loudon County Chancery

Court challenging the election results pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-17-

101. Ms. McNabb argued that Mr. Harrison was constitutionally ineligible to serve

because he had not resided within Lenoir City corporate limits for the year prior to the

election. Ms. McNabb prayed that the trial court declare Mr. Harrison ineligible to serve

as Lenoir City Municipal Judge; enter a temporary restraining order or injunction

prohibiting him from taking office pending her lawsuit; and declare the August 4, 2022

election void pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-17-113. The trial court

denied Ms. McNabb’s request for a temporary restraining order.1

On August 26, 2022, Mr. Harrison filed a motion to dismiss Ms. McNabb’s

complaint for failure to state a claim under Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 12.02(6).

On September 12, 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to dismiss. At

that time, the trial court denied Mr. Harrison’s motion to dismiss and, with agreement of

the parties, heard the case on the merits.

Neither Ms. McNabb nor anyone else challenged Mr. Harrison’s eligibility prior to

the election. The parties stipulated that Ms. McNabb lived within city limits and Mr.

Harrison did not. The parties agreed that the Lenoir City Municipal Judge must satisfy the

residency requirements of Tennessee Constitution Article VI, Section 4 because the judge

1

Ms. McNabb’s request for a temporary restraining order was heard on August 26, 2022, by

interchange by Judge Michael Pemberton due to the absence of the then-elected Chancellor. Chancellor

McFarland took office on September 1, 2022, and heard the remaining issues in this matter.

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is popularly elected and has concurrent general sessions jurisdiction. The parties disagreed

on what Article VI, Section 4 requires.

Ms. McNabb argued that the Tennessee Constitution requires an elected municipal

court judge to live within corporate limits of the municipality the judge serves. She asserted

that the term “district,” as used in Article VI, Section 4, cannot mean the modern-day

judicial district because such districts did not exist at the time the section was first written.

Ms. McNabb argued that in 1870, a “district” divided a county into smaller areas. Thus,

“district” means an area smaller than a county, and this definition must apply consistently

across all of Article VI, Section 4.

Mr. Harrison argued that Article VI, Section 4 does not require a municipal court

judge, exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a general sessions court, to reside in the

municipality in which the judge serves. Relying on a 2020 Tennessee Attorney General

Advisory Opinion, Mr. Harrison asserted that “[a] ‘district’ or a ‘circuit’ connotes the

geographic territory in which a court has jurisdiction . . . . Thus, a district is greater—in

terms of both geographic territory and pool of voters—than any municipality within that

district.” Tenn. Op. Atty. Gen., No. 20-16, 2020 WL 6112990, at *2 (Oct. 2, 2020). Per

Mr. Harrison, the applicable district is the Ninth Judicial District.

The trial court found that Mr. Harrison prevailed over the challenge asserted by Ms.

McNabb. In its order entered on November 2, 2022, the trial court found that “district” as

used in the Tennessee Constitution applied to the Ninth Judicial District. Therefore, the

trial court found that Mr. Harrison “complied with Article VI, Section 4” by being a

resident of the Ninth Judicial District.

On November 9, 2022, Ms. McNabb filed a Notice of Appeal. The Court of Appeals

held that when a municipal judge exercises concurrent jurisdiction with the county general

sessions court, the Article VI, Section 4 residency requirement is met as long as the judge

resides within the county. McNabb, 2023 WL 7019872, at *7–8. In making this holding,

the Court of Appeals found the terms “district” and “circuit” ambiguous. Id. at *3. The

Court of Appeals disagreed with Ms. McNabb’s assertion that “district,” as used in Article

VI, Section 4, referred to a subdivision of the county. Id. at *4. Instead, the Court of

Appeals held that Article VI, Section 4 required residency in “the district or circuit to which

they are assigned.” Id. at *6. Because the Lenoir City Municipal Judge exercised

concurrent jurisdiction with the Loudon County General Sessions Court, the Court of

Appeals reasoned that Loudon County is the “district” to which the Lenoir City Municipal

Judge was assigned. Id. at *7–8. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial

court’s decision, but modified the judgment to clarify that Mr. Harrison complied with the

residency requirements because he resided in Loudon County for at least one year, rather

than the Ninth Judicial District. Id. at *8.

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Ms. McNabb successfully sought permission to appeal to this Court pursuant to Rule

11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.

II. ANALYSIS

The issue before this Court is one of constitutional interpretation. Specifically, does

Article VI, Section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution require a municipal judge to reside in

the municipality she serves when the court exercises concurrent jurisdiction with the

county general sessions court? The parties agree that the interpretation of Article VI,

Section 4 is dispositive of this matter.

Standard of Review

This Court reviews questions of law de novo with no presumption of correctness

accorded to the rulings of the courts below. State v. Burns, 205 S.W.3d 412, 414 (Tenn.

2006). When interpreting the Tennessee Constitution, we aim to enforce “what the people

who voted for this constitutional [provision] would think that the language meant.” State

ex rel. Doyle v. Torrence, 310 S.W.2d 425, 427–28 (Tenn. 1958). This approach is more

commonly known today as determining the “original public meaning.”

The process of determining the original public meaning has often been inaccurately

described as using the text to determine the intent of the drafters. See Antonin Scalia &

Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 30 (2012). In fact, this

Court has used similarly imprecise language in its description of this method. See, e.g.,

Est. of Bell v. Shelby Cnty. Health Care Corp., 318 S.W.3d 823, 835 (Tenn. 2010) (“This

Court . . . must construe each provision in a way that gives the fullest possible effect to the

intent of the Tennesseans who adopted it.”); Hatcher v. Bell, 521 S.W.2d 799, 803 (Tenn.

1974) (“The fundamental purpose in construing a constitutional provision is to ascertain

and give effect to the intent and purpose of those who adopted it.”). For almost a century

though, we have made clear that we do not speculate on the subjective intentions or motives

of the drafters. See Peay v. Nolan, 7 S.W. 2d 815, 820 (Tenn. 1928). Instead, “the focus

must be on the objective meaning of the text itself—because that is the law that was adopted

by the public.” Barnett v. Jones, 338 So.3d 757, 767 (Ala. 2021) (Mitchell, J., concurring).

We clarify today that in construing constitutional provisions, this Court seeks to determine

the original public meaning.

Determining the original public meaning does not require an overly narrow

construction. See Scalia & Garner, supra, at 355–58 (discussing the false notion that

individual words should be strictly construed). Thus, determining the original public

meaning does not require a judicial straitjacket, “limit[ing] one to the hyperliteral meaning

of each word in the text.” Id. at 356. Instead, it requires courts to determine, using the

evidence available, “how a reasonable reader, fully competent in the language, would have

understood the text at the time it was issued.” Id. at 33.

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“Original public meaning is discerned through consideration of the [] text in light

of ‘well-established canons of [] construction.’”2 State v. Deberry, 651 S.W.3d 918, 924

(Tenn. 2022) (citing State v. Sherman, 266 S.W.3d 395, 401 (Tenn. 2008)); see also Kisor

v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558, 621–22 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[Judges

have employed] traditional tools of interpretation . . . for centuries to elucidate the law’s

original public meaning.”). Consequently, we begin by reading the plain language and

giving terms “their ordinary and inherent meaning.” State v. Phillips, 21 S.W.2d 4, 5

(Tenn. 1929). Not only do we consider contemporaneous dictionary definitions, but also

usages and historical practices at the time of the adoption of the text. See Peay, 7 S.W.2d

at 817; Richardson v. Young, 125 S.W. 664, 674 (Tenn. 1910); Grainger Cnty. v. State, 80

S.W. 750, 751 (Tenn. 1904).

In this process, we construe the Tennessee Constitution as a single, unified

document. See Patterson v. Washington Cnty., 188 S.W. 613, 614 (Tenn. 1916). No

provision will be given construction that would “impair or destroy any other part.” Vollmer

v. City of Memphis, 792 S.W.2d 446, 448 (Tenn. 1990) (citing State v. Memphis City Bank,

19 S.W. 1045 (Tenn. 1892)).

Finally, we construe a constitutional provision as it is written. See State ex rel.

Sonnenburg v. Gaia, 717 S.W.2d 883, 885 (Tenn. 1986) (citing Chattanooga-Hamilton

Co. Hosp. Authority v. Chattanooga, 580 S.W.2d 322, 327 (Tenn. 1979)). It is not this

Court’s role to create ambiguity. When a constitutional provision has a clear meaning, this

Court cannot apply another. See Shelby Cnty. v. Hale, 292 S.W.2d 745, 749 (Tenn. 1956)

(citing State v. Manson, 58 S.W. 319, 320 (Tenn. 1900)).

Residency Requirements for Municipal Judgeships

Article VI, Section 4 does not apply to all municipal judgeships. However, when a

municipal court judge is popularly elected, the judge must meet the requirements of Article

VI, Section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution. Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-18-202 (2021).

Additionally, when a municipal judge exercises concurrent jurisdiction with a general

sessions court, the municipal judge must meet the requirements of Article VI, Section 4.

See State ex rel. Newsom v. Biggers, 911 S.W.2d 715, 717 (Tenn. 1995).

Here, the Lenoir City Municipal Court Judge is popularly elected and exercises

concurrent jurisdiction with Loudon County General Sessions Court. Lenoir City, Tenn.

Code, tit. 3, ch. 1., §§ 3-102, 3-103 (2013). Thus, the parties agree, and the trial court

2

Often these canons of construction reference statutory construction. However, most are equally

applicable to construction of constitutional text or any other legal text. See Scalia & Garner, supra, at 51.

5

correctly determined, that the Lenoir City Municipal Judge must comply with Article VI,

Section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution.

Constitutional Residency Requirements

To begin our analysis, the Court starts with the constitutional language itself.

Article VI, Section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution provides:

The Judges of the Circuit and Chancery Courts, and of other inferior Courts,

shall be elected by the qualified voters of the district or circuit to which they

are to be assigned. Every Judge of such Courts shall be thirty years of age,

and shall before his election, have been a resident of the State for five years,

and of the circuit or district one year. His term of service shall be eight years.

Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 4.

This language first appeared in the Tennessee Constitution adopted in 1870. Tenn.

Const. of 1870, art. VI, § 4. The 1870 Constitution also included language that divided

counties into districts to elect justices of the peace and constables. Id. art. VI, § 15; see

also Grainger Cnty., 80 S.W. at 753 (“As previously stated, when the Constitution of 1870

was framed, the present political organization of the state was in existence; the state itself

was an organized body, was divided into counties, and these were subdivided into civil

districts.”).3 In 1978, the constitution was amended to eliminate county justices of the

peace and constables, but the residency provision at issue remained. See Tenn. Const. art.

VI, § 4; State ex rel. Maner v. Leech, 588 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Tenn. 1979). The Tennessee

Constitution does not define the terms “circuit” or “district.”

To determine the original public meaning, we first turn to dictionary definitions

published around the time the constitutional language was approved. See Deberry, 651

3

Section 15 of the 1870 Tennessee Constitution provided:

The different Counties of this State shall be laid off, as the General Assembly may direct,

into districts of convenient size, so that the whole number in each County shall not be more

than twenty-five, or four for every one hundred square miles. There shall be two Justices

of the Peace and one Constable elected in each district by the qualified voters therein,

except districts including County towns, which shall elect three Justices and two

Constables. The jurisdiction of said officers shall be coextensive with the County. Justices

of the Peace shall be elected for the term of six, and Constables for the term of two years.

Upon the removal of either of said officers from the district in which he was elected, his

office shall become vacant from the time of such removal. Justices of the Peace shall be

commissioned by the Governor. The Legislature shall have power to provide for the

appointment of an additional number of Justices of the Peace in incorporated towns.

Tenn. Const. of 1870, art. VI, § 15.

6

S.W.3d at 925 (“In the absence of [constitutional] definitions, we look to authoritative

dictionaries published around the time of [the] enactment.”) (citing State v. Edmondson,

231 S.W.3d 925, 928 & n.3 (Tenn. 2007)).

When Article VI, Section 4 was first ratified, “district” and “circuit” had separate

and distinct meanings. “District” referred to a political subdivision and “circuit” meant a

grouping of areas in which a judge traveled to hear cases. Webster’s Dictionary in 1828

defined “district” as:

Properly, a limited extent of country; a circuit within which power, right or

authority may be exercised; and to which it is restrained; a word applicable

to any portion of land or country, or to any part of a city or town, which is

defined by law or agreement. A governor, a prefect, or a judge may have his

district.

1 Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828). The 1828

Webster’s Dictionary defined “circuit” as:

In England, the journey of judges through several counties or boroughs, for

the purpose of holding courts. In the United States, the journey of judges

through certain states or counties for the same purpose. The counties or states

in which the same judge or judges hold courts and administer justice. It is

common to designate a certain number of counties to form a circuit, and to

assign one or more judges to each circuit. The courts in the circuits are called

circuit courts. In the government of the United States, a certain number of

states form a circuit.

Id.

In 1871, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary defined “district” as “[a] certain portion of the

country, separated from the rest for some special purposes.” 1 John Bouvier, Law

Dictionary 491 (14th ed. 1871). It defined “circuit” as “[a] division of the country,

appointed for a particular judge to visit for the trial of causes or for the administration of

justice.” Id. at 267.

These definitions held true throughout the 19th century. In 1891, Black’s Law

Dictionary defined “district” as “[o]ne of the portions into which an entire state or country

may be divided for judicial, political, or administrative purposes.” District, Black’s Law

Dictionary (1st ed. 1891). The same dictionary defined “circuit” as:

[a] division of the country, appointed for a particular judge to visit for the

trial of causes or for the administration of justice. Circuits, as the term is used

in England, may be otherwise defined to be the periodical progresses of the

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judges of the superior courts of common law, through the several counties of

England and Wales, for the purpose of administering civil and criminal

justice.

Circuit, Id. (citation omitted). Our review of these dictionaries shows that “district”

consistently referenced a smaller political subunit, while “circuit” referenced an area to

which a judge traveled to hold court, similar to our modern-day judicial districts.

These historical definitions are consistent with this Court’s previous interpretation

of the constitutional meaning of the term “district.” “As used in the Constitution, a

‘district’ is a political subdivision, usually a subdivision of a county, as determined by the

legislature.” Hooker v. Haslam, 437 S.W.3d 409, 434 (Tenn. 2014) (citing Tenn. Const.

art. VI, § 15 (“repealed in 1978, but previously providing that the legislature was to divide

Tennessee’s counties into “districts of convenient size” for the purpose of electing justices

of the peace and constables”); and Tenn. Const. art. VII, § 1 (“providing for the division

of counties into districts from which legislators are to be elected and providing for the

reapportionment of the districts from time to time”)); see also Maxey v. Powers, 101 S.W.

181, 185 (Tenn. 1907) (“Civil districts are but territorial subdivisions of counties.”).

Our earlier cases and cases from the 1800s in other jurisdictions also suggest that

“circuit” and “district” had distinct meanings. See, e.g., Strain v. Hefley, 30 S.W. 747,

747–48 (Tenn. 1895) (discussing whether a justice of the peace elected for one civil district

of his county and having a residence there at the time of the election could open another

office in another civil district of his county); State ex rel. Hasley v. Gaines, 70 Tenn. 316,

328–39 (1879) (discussing judicial positions in the event of redistricting); State ex rel. Vail

v. Draper, 50 Mo. 353, 356 (1872) (discussing the boundaries of a circuit and territory of

the court).

Further, modern-day judicial districts did not exist at the time of the 1870 Tennessee

Constitution. The State of Tennessee was divided into its current judicial districts in 1984.

See Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-2-506 (Supp. 2024). These districts are larger in size and most

encompass multiple counties. We must apply the meaning of “district” that was used at

the time of adoption, and the current judicial district was not yet in existence.

In interpreting constitutional provisions, this Court favors an interpretation that

“will render every word operative rather than one which would make some words idle and

meaningless.” Hale, 292 S.W.2d at 749. Courts should presume that every word the

drafters used has a specific meaning and purpose. Courts should avoid interpretations that

render words inconsistent, meaningless, superfluous, or redundant. Scalia & Garner,

supra, at 176. Accordingly, in applying Article VI, Section 4, the Court must presume that

the terms “district” and “circuit” have different meanings. For this reason, the Court

disagrees with any interpretation that conflates the two terms.

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Here, the trial court held that, absent a definition, the term “district” equated to a

judicial district. It therefore held that Mr. Harrison satisfied the residency requirement

because he resided in the Ninth Judicial District.

Similarly, the Tennessee Attorney General Opinion No. 20-16, heavily relied upon

by Mr. Harrison, describes “district” as used in the constitutional provision as “judicial

district.” Tenn. Op. Atty. Gen., No. 20-16, 2020 WL 6112990, at *2 (finding that “the

Constitution requires only that the judge of an inferior court be a resident of the relevant

judicial district”). As explained in the Attorney General Opinion:

“Circuit” refers to a judicial division in which hearings occur at several

locations. Black’s Law Dictionary 305 (11th ed. 2019). The concept of a

“circuit” derives historically from the time when a single judge rode “the

circuit” to hold court at various places within a designated territory consisting

of several counties. In Tennessee today, there is no longer any meaningful

difference between a judicial district and a judicial circuit; there is a circuit

court in each judicial district.

Id. at *2 n.7. Both the trial court and the Attorney General opinion seem to suggest that

the terms “circuit or district” have one meaning, and that both refer to the judicial district.

Such interpretations are flawed as they render the term “district” superfluous and redundant

when it appears in the same provision with the term “circuit.” Therefore, “district” cannot

be interpreted to mean the modern-day judicial district.

In interpreting legal texts, the Court also must consider the entire text, known as the

“whole text canon.” Scalia & Garner, supra, at 167. In the constitutional provision at

issue, the drafters used the terms “district” or “circuit” twice within the same provision.

The first sentence of Article VI, Section 4 provides who elects the relevant judges;

providing that they “shall be elected by the qualified voters of the district or circuit to

which they are to be assigned.” Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 4 (emphasis added). The second

sentence of Article VI, Section 4 sets forth the qualifications of those to be elected,

including that the judge “shall be thirty years of age, and shall before his election, have

been a resident of the State for five years and of the circuit or district one year.” Id.

(emphasis added). In considering this language, the Court must apply a consistent

definition to the term “district” and consider both sentences as a whole when deciding the

meaning. Scalia & Garner, supra, at 170. Therefore, the term “district” cannot have

inconsistent interpretations within the same text.

In determining the meaning of “district” as used in the second sentence, the Court

of Appeals was correct to apply the limiting phrase “to which they are to be assigned” from

the first sentence. The Court of Appeals also correctly found that “‘[t]he relevant district

or circuit for such a municipal court judge would be the district or circuit in which the

municipal court has jurisdiction’ and that ‘[a] “district” or a “circuit” connotes the

9

geographic territory in which a court has jurisdiction.’” McNabb, 2023 WL 7019872 at *7

(quoting Tenn. Op. Atty. Gen., No. 20-16, 2020 WL 6112990, at *2–3) (emphasis omitted).

The Court of Appeals, however, misconstrued the “district” to which the Lenoir

City Municipal Court is assigned, or, in other words, the geographic territory in which it

has jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals equated the ability of the Lenoir City Municipal

Court to exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the Loudon County General Sessions Court

with the Lenoir City Municipal Court being assigned to Loudon County. This application

fails to recognize the limits on the territorial jurisdiction of the Lenoir City Municipal

Court. In other words, it fails to recognize that the Lenoir City Municipal Court’s

jurisdiction is limited to the “district” to which it is assigned.

The Lenoir City Municipal Code provides the Lenoir City Municipal Judge

concurrent jurisdiction with the Loudon County General Sessions Court. Lenoir City,

Tenn. Code, tit. 3, ch. 1, § 3-102 (2013). However, the Lenoir City Municipal Court has

no authority to exercise concurrent jurisdiction outside of the municipal city limits. Lenoir

City’s Charter and Municipal Code specifically limit the city court’s concurrent jurisdiction

to those violations that occur within the corporate limits. Lenoir City, Tenn. Charter, art.

XIII, § 3; Lenoir City, Tenn. Code, tit. 3, ch. 1, § 3-102 (2013). This corresponds with our

prior cases, where this Court has described municipal concurrent jurisdiction as limited to

offenses that occur within the municipality’s boundaries. See, e.g., State ex rel. Town of S.

Carthage v. Barrett, 840 S.W.2d 895, 898 (Tenn. 1992). Accordingly, the “district” to

which the Lenoir City Municipal Judge is assigned—the geographic territory in which the

court has jurisdiction—is Lenoir City. Following the whole text canon, we must apply the

limiting language from the first sentence to the second sentence’s residency requirements.

Therefore, the “district” to which the judge is assigned is where the judge must also reside.

In this case, that “district” is Lenoir City.

Lastly, there is also a presumption of consistent use by the drafters. Scalia & Garner,

supra, 170. It is presumed that a word or phrase bears the same meaning throughout the

text. Id. Mr. Harrison’s proposed interpretation would result in inconsistent interpretations

of the term “district” between the two sentences within Article VI, Section 4. Mr. Harrison

conceded during oral argument that only Lenoir City voters were able to vote in the election

for the Lenoir City Municipal Judge.4 This is consistent with Tennessee Code Annotated

section 16-18-201 (2021), which provides that “[i]n the election for city judge, only

qualified voters of the city or town may vote.” Additionally, this is consistent with the

Lenoir City Charter and the Lenoir City ordinances that limit voting to only municipal

residents. Lenoir City, Tenn. Charter art. III, § 3; Lenoir City, Tenn. Code, tit. 3, ch. 1, §3-

103 (2013). Applying Mr. Harrison’s expansive view of “district” for the residency

requirement would result in two different definitions of the word “district” within Article

4

Later in his argument, counsel did suggest that based upon his interpretation of the term “district”

that arguably all of Loudon County should have voted on the Lenoir City Municipal Judge.

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VI, Section 4. “District” would be narrowly defined to mean “Lenoir City” when it comes

to defining the qualified voters, but broadly defined as “Loudon County” when it comes to

residency requirements for the judge. We decline to adopt an interpretation that would

require two different definitions of the term “district” within the same section.

While use of traditional tools of construction may require effort, the need for effort

does not create ambiguity. See Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 970

(11th Cir. 2016) (en banc). It is this Court’s duty to apply those tools and find the plain

meaning of the language at the time it was drafted. Applying those traditional tools of

construction, it is clear that the terms “district” and “circuit” have separate and distinct

meanings. Further, it is clear that “district” refers to the smaller political subunit to which

the judge is to be assigned. In this case, that subunit to which the judge is assigned is

Lenoir City. Therefore, we find that the plain language of Article VI, Section 4 of the

Tennessee Constitution requires the Lenoir City Municipal Judge to reside in Lenoir City

at the time of the election and for one year prior.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the term “district” in Article VI, Section 4

refers to the geographical area where the court has territorial jurisdiction, or in other words,

the area to which the judge is assigned. Therefore, we find that Article VI, Section 4 of

the Tennessee Constitution requires a municipal judge to be a resident of that municipality

for a period of one year prior to election. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals

and remand to Chancery Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The

costs of this appeal are taxed to the appellee, Gregory Harrison.

MARY L. WAGNER, JUSTICE

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