The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 7 2025
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RENE A. RUIZ, individually, and as a No. 24-1215
proposed class representative, D.C. No.
5:20-cv-02283-JGB-KK
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM*
RYAN POLAR, Deputy,
Defendant - Appellee,
and
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO, CITY
OF VICTORVILLE, DOES, 1 through 20,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Jesus G. Bernal, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 5, 2025**
Pasadena, California
Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and SANCHEZ and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Judges.
Rene A. Ruiz (“Ruiz”) brought claims against San Bernardino County
Sheriff’s Department Deputy Ryan Polar (“Polar”), alleging that he was arrested
without probable cause, arrested in retaliation for his protected speech, and subject
to excessive force. “We review de novo a grant of summary judgment to
determine whether ‘a rational trier of fact might resolve the issue in favor of the
nonmoving party.’” S.R. Nehad v. Browder, 929 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2019)
(quoting Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 470 (9th Cir. 2007)). In
doing so, “we view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party
and draw all inferences in that party’s favor.” Id. “We also review de novo a
district court’s grant of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.” Id.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
1. A genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether Polar had
probable cause to arrest Ruiz for a violation of California Penal Code § 415(2).
Section 415(2) prohibits loud noises “where there is a clear and present danger of
imminent violence,” or “where the purported communication is used as a guise to
disrupt lawful endeavors.” Vanegas v. City of Pasadena, 46 F.4th 1159, 1164 (9th
Cir. 2022). After Ruiz was not permitted to cross a blockade to his home, Ruiz
followed Polar’s instructions by leaving the intersection and parking in his
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neighbor’s driveway. As he returned home, it is in dispute whether Ruiz was
headed toward Rudy Magana, a city employee, or walking home when he
displayed his middle finger and whether he shouted a curse at Polar or Magana.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Ruiz, a genuine dispute of
material fact exists as to whether Ruiz’s conduct presented a “clear and present
danger of imminent violence” or disrupted Magana’s “lawful endeavors.” Id.
The district court also erred in finding that probable cause existed to arrest
Ruiz for violating California Penal Code § 148(a)(1), which punishes those “who
willfully resist[], delay[], or obstruct[] any public officer . . . in the discharge or
attempt to discharge any duty of his or her office or employment.” Polar ordered
Ruiz to turn around three times before Ruiz complied with the instruction, all of
which occurred within the span of approximately twenty seconds. California
courts have held that while it “is true that [defendant] complied slowly with [the
police officer’s] orders, . . . it surely cannot be supposed that Penal Code section
148 criminalizes a person’s failure to respond with alacrity to police orders.” In re
Chase C., 243 Cal. App. 4th 107, 117 (2015) (first and second alterations in
original) (quoting People v. Quiroga, 16 Cal. App. 4th 961, 966 (1993)).1 Ruiz’s
1
The district court did not err in concluding that Polar lacked probable cause to
arrest Ruiz solely for his refusal to provide identification. Ruiz offered his I.D. to
Polar after being asked to turn around the second time. And as noted, the failure to
comply immediately with an officer’s requests does not constitute a violation of
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failure to comply immediately with Polar’s instructions does not constitute
probable cause to arrest him under California law.
Because there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to the existence of
probable cause to arrest under section 415(2), and probable cause to arrest under
section 148(a)(1) is lacking as a matter of law, we reverse the grant of summary
judgment to Polar on the Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure claim and the First
Amendment retaliation claim under Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 404 (2019),
and remand for further proceedings.2
2. When resolving questions of qualified immunity in a § 1983 action,
we engage in a two-prong inquiry. First, we “must decide whether the facts that a
plaintiff has alleged . . . or shown . . . make out a violation of a constitutional
right.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (internal citations omitted).
Second, we must determine whether the right at issue was “clearly established” at
the time of the violation. Id.
section 148(a)(1). Nor did the district court err in finding a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether probable cause supported arresting Ruiz for attempting
to fight in public. See Cal. Penal Code §§ 69(a), 415(1). When viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to Ruiz, a jury could credit Ruiz’s testimony
against Polar’s and Magana’s and find that Ruiz did not challenge Polar to a fight.
2
The district court did not address Polar’s separate claim that he had probable
cause to arrest Ruiz for a violation of City of Victorville Municipal Code
§ 14.04.040(l). On remand, the district court may consider this claim in the first
instance.
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In determining whether a police officer’s use of force against a person is
objectively unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment, we must give
“careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Graham
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). The reasonableness of an officer’s use of
force turns on factors such as the severity of the crime, whether the suspect posed
an immediate threat to the officer or others, and whether the suspect was actively
resisting arrest. Id. Where the objective reasonableness of an officer’s conduct
turns on disputed issues of material fact, that is “a question of fact best resolved by
a jury.” Wilkins v. City of Oakland, 350 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 2003).
Under the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis, we agree with the
district court and conclude that Ruiz has shown a violation of his Fourth
Amendment right. As noted above, there are genuine disputes of material fact as
to whether probable cause supported arresting Ruiz for any crime, and the offense
for which he was arrested was, in any event, a minor one. Under the record
presented, Ruiz did not pose an immediate threat to Polar or Magana, he did not
commit a severe crime or try to evade arrest, and Polar could have used less
intrusive alternatives to arrest Ruiz. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Ruiz, a jury could reasonably conclude that Ruiz was merely agitated
over the fact that he was not able to pass through the traffic barriers to get home
quickly and expressed his frustration to Polar in a nonthreatening manner. Thus, a
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reasonable factfinder could conclude that Polar’s use of force was objectively
unreasonable under the circumstances.
Under the second prong, the district court concluded in error that the
constitutional violation here was not clearly established. In response to a minor
offense, Polar placed his knee on Ruiz’s lower back while Ruiz was on the ground,
pulled Ruiz’s left arm behind his back to handcuff him, and lifted Ruiz up by his
arms. Polar held his right knee on Ruiz’s lower back for fifteen to thirty seconds.
While being handcuffed, Ruiz told Polar that he was “injured,” had “a torn rotator
cuff” on his “left shoulder,” and had “back problems.” Supreme Court and Ninth
Circuit precedent clearly established at the time of the incident that force like the
kind demonstrated here is unconstitutional when applied to a plaintiff who poses
little to no immediate threat and is suspected of committing a minor offense. See,
e.g., Los Angeles Cnty. v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 614 (2007); Young v. Cnty. of Los
Angeles, 655 F.3d 1156, 1168 (9th Cir. 2011); Meredith v. Erath, 342 F.3d 1057,
1061 (9th Cir. 2003); LaLonde v. Cnty. of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 952, 959 (9th
Cir. 2000). These cases would put a reasonable officer on notice that the force
alleged could violate Ruiz’s Fourth Amendment right. Therefore, the district court
erred in granting qualified immunity to Polar.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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