Johnson Jr. v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 24-20756-CV-WILLIAMS

LORENZO JOHNSON JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

/

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Magistrate Judge Lisette Reid’s Report and

Recommendation on the Parties’ Motions for Summary Judgment (DE 20) (“Report”). In

the Report, Judge Reid recommends that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (DE

15) be denied, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (DE 18)1 be granted, and the

Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision that Plaintiff is not disabled be affirmed.

(DE 20 at 1, 14–15.) Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendant’s Cross Motion (DE 19).

The Report concludes the ALJ “applied the proper legal standard” and “her

findings were supported by substantial evidence.” (Id. at 14.) Specifically, the Report

finds that the ALJ’s analysis of Horace Ellis’ (“Ellis”) medical opinion sufficiently

considered Ellis’ clinical notes, Plaintiff’s statements regarding symptom improvement,

and the other evidence in the record. (Id.) Plaintiff filed an Objection to the Report and

Recommendations (DE 21) (“Objection”). Therefore, the Court conducted a de novo

review of the Report.

1 Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment doubled as its response to Plaintiff’s Motion

for Summary Judgment. (DE 18 at 1.)

Plaintiff contends the ALJ’s finding regarding the “mental aspect of th[e] [residual

functional capacity] was not supported by substantial evidence[] due to the ALJ’s failure

to properly explain [her] consideration of” the supportability and consistency factors with

regard to Ellis’ medical opinion (DE 15 at 7–8). If Plaintiff is correct, the ALJ’s failure to

“provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal

analysis has been conducted mandates reversal.” Keeton v. Dept. of Health and Hum.

Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting the “substantial evidence” standard

for factual findings in a disability decision, but also explaining that “conclusions of law

are not presumed valid” and sufficient reasoning must be provided to allow for

meaningful judicial review); see also Sneed v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:13-cv-1453-

Orl-TBS, 2015 WL 1268257, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2015) (“The [c]ourt will reverse a

final decision if the ALJ . . . fails to provide sufficient reasoning for the [c]ourt to determine

whether the ALJ properly applied the law.”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court

agrees with Plaintiff.2

Ellis had been Plaintiff’s therapist for several years during the period for which

Plaintiff claims his mental health impairments rendered him disabled. (DE 12 at 34) (ALJ

decision). In addition to providing his clinical notes, Ellis completed a treating source

statement in October 2020 to aid in the review of Plaintiff’s claim. (Id. at 34–35.) In that

statement, Ellis opined that Plaintiff “is likely to be off task greater than 15% during an

8-hour workday, in addition to standard breaks,” due to “several thought/mood

symptoms,” including hallucinations and depression caused by Plaintiff’s diagnosed

2 The Parties’ briefing on summary judgment and the Report comprehensively summarize

the background of the case and the record. See (DE 15 at 1–6; DE 18 at 2–-7; DE 20 at

1–2, 4–8.)

schizoaffective and generalized anxiety disorders.3 (DE 12-1 at 96–97.) Ellis further

opined that Plaintiff’s abilities to relate to co-workers, deal with the public, interact with

supervisors, deal with work stresses, function independently, maintain concentration,

understand, remember, and carry out complex job instructions, respond appropriately to

usual work situation[s] and to changes in routine work setting[s], behave in an

emotionally stable manner, relate predictably in social situations, and demonstrate

reliability were “poor to none”. (Id. at 98–99.) Ellis found Plaintiff had a “fair” ability to

understand, remember and carry out simple job instructions, follow work rules, and use

judgment, and a “good” ability to maintain personal appearance. (Id.)

In her decision, the ALJ included a partial summary of Ellis’ treatment notes and

the above opinions, before concluding the following:

The undersigned finds the portion of [Ellis’] opinion regarding the

claimant’s ability to work a full time job to be unpersuasive as this in [sic] an

issue reserved for the Commissioner and unsupported by the record. The

undersigned finds the portion of this opinion noting “fair” abilities in using

judgment, following work rules . . . to be generically persuasive as this

assessment is consistent with therapy notions of the claimant’s ability to

follow direction easily and moodiness. The undersigned otherwise finds

the remaining opinions, including his findings of “poor to none”

abilities to be unpersuasive as it is unsupported by the record as a

whole and the claimant’s reports of some symptom improvement over

the course of psychiatric treatment.

(DE 12 at 35) (emphasis added).

3 Dr. Guy Vinh, a mental health practitioner at North Dade Health Center who treated

Plaintiff for two years, similarly opined in April 2022 that Plaintiff would “miss work three

times a month and be off task for more than fifteen percent of an eight hour workday.”

(DE 12 at 34.) Similar to with Ellis’ opinion, the ALJ found this opinion unpersuasive

because “treatment records do not support and are inconsistent with this opinion.” (Id.)

Vocational expert James Miller testified at hearing before the ALJ that “off-task behavior

at that level would preclude competitive employment.” (Id. at 73.) Therefore, the ALJ’s

decision to disregard these opinions likely impacted her conclusion that Plaintiff is capable

of performing past relevant work and making a transition to other available work, and,

therefore, is not disabled. (Id. at 37–38.)

When evaluating the persuasiveness of medical opinions in a disability

determination, the ALJ must consider several factors, but must only “explain how [they]

considered the supportability and consistency factors,” as they are “the most important

factors.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(1)–(2); see also Robinson v. Kijakazi, No. 21-21603-

CIV-SINGHAL/MCALILEY, 2022 WL 18155656, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2022) (“Other

than articulating his consideration of the supportability and consistency factors, the

Commissioner is not required to discuss or explain how he considered any other factor

in determining persuasiveness.”). Supportability is the extent to which the opinion is

supported by “objective medical evidence and supporting explanations” within the

opinion. § 404.1520c(c)(1). Consistency is the degree to which the opinion conforms

with other medical and nonmedical sources in the claim. § 404.1520c(c)(2).4

There is no requirement that the ALJ use the “magic” terms supportability or

consistency. Brioso v. Kijakazi, No. 22-cv-21991-JEM/Becerra, 2023 WL 5595912, at *8

(S.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 2023) (report and recommendation). However, conclusory

statements are “insufficient to allow the [c]ourt to determine that the ALJ’s decision is

supported by substantial evidence.” Pierson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:19-cv-01515-

RBD-DCI, 2020 WL 1957597, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2020) (The ALJ’s conclusory

statements that “there is no support on record” for the opinion and “[c]laimant’s daily

activities are also inconsistent with [the] opinion” precluded meaningful review of the

ALJ’s conclusion and required remand). Similarly, “[t]he ALJ cannot merely summarize

4 The Report initially identifies these regulations as governing the ALJ’s assessment of

Ellis’ opinion. (DE 20 at 11, 13.) However, when reviewing the ALJ’s analysis, the Report

cites different rules more generally applicable to the evaluation of evidence in a disability

claim, for the proposition that “[t]he ALJ is not required to articulate how he considered

each opinion or finding.” (DE 20 at 14) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b)(1),

416.920(b)(1)).

the evidence, as a whole, and then conclude that medical opinions are not consistent

with the evidence as a whole. Rather the ALJ must build a logical analytical bridge

explaining what particular evidence undermined the medical opinions and why.” Gary-

Lowe v. O’Malley, No. 22-cv-22379-JB, 2024 WL 1178658, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Feb 12, 2024)

(alterations and internal quotations omitted) (quoting Brown v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.

6:20-cv-840-GJK, 2021 WL 2917562, at *4 (M.D. Fla. July 12, 2021)).

The ALJ did not adequately articulate her supportability or consistency analyses

of Ellis’ assessments that Plaintiff would be off task more than 15% of a workday and

has “poor or no abilities” in certain listed areas. The ALJ’s conclusory statement that

these opinions were “unsupported by the record as a whole and claimant’s reports of

some symptom improvement” do not allow the Court to meaningfully review the

conclusions.

Other courts have made the same determination in similar cases. For instance,

in Bowen v. Kijakazi, the ALJ found a doctor’s opinion unpersuasive because it was

“inconsistent with his clinical findings . . . and contradicted [another doctor’s] opinion.”

No. 6:21-cv-201-JRK, 2022 WL 3135019, at *5–6 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 5, 2022). The court

held that the ALJ’s findings were “too conclusory to allow for meaningful judicial review”

because it was “not immediately apparent from a review of the treatment records and

clinical findings . . . how they fail to support the opinions,” and there was no explanation

as to how the two medical opinions conflicted. Id. at *6. Similarly, in this case, the ALJ

did not explain which parts of the record conflicted with Ellis’ opinions, which of Plaintiff’s

reports of symptom improvement she relied upon, or how she compared those reports

with the many contained in the hundreds of pages of medical records in which Plaintiff

complained of his symptoms worsening or still being debilitating despite improvement.

See also Collins v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:23-cv-276-KCD, 2024 WL 1694704, at

*2–3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2024) (remanding for insufficient discussion of supportability

and consistency because, even though the ALJ “did discuss some of [the opining

nurse’s] records . . . he never tied his discussion of those records to the persuasiveness

of her opinions,” nor made it clear which records he relied on); Mena v. Kijakazi, No.

1:22-cv-24098 SCOLA/GOODMAN, 2023 WL 8851099, at *6–7 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 17,

2023) (report and recommendation) (the ALJ’s explanation that an opinion is

“persuasive, as it is generally consistent with the overall medical evidence of record”

failed “to satisfy her burden to evaluate the ‘supportability’ and ‘consistency’ of the

opinion,” so required remand); Brioso v. Kijakazi, No. 22-cv-21991-JEM/Becerra, 2023

WL 5595912, at *7–9 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 2023) (recommending reversal and remand

due to the ALJ’s failure to adequately explain how the record evidence cited impacted

the supportability or consistency of the opinion at issue); Vicente v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

No. 6:22-cv-01057-LHP, 2023 WL 2864407, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2023) (when a

doctor based her opinion of claimant’s intellectual disability on two IQ tests, other

medical reports, and clinical observations, the ALJ’s explanation that the opinion is “not

persuasive as the testing results were invalid as the claimant did not put forth her best

effort” did not sufficiently address supportability, did not address consistency at all, and

required remand).

The Report suggests the Court can look to the ALJ’s summaries of Ellis’ and

others’ treatment notes from other areas of the ALJ’s decision to discern which parts of

the record the ALJ found inconsistent with Ellis’ opinions. (DE 20 at 12–14) (discussing

how “[t]he ALJ cited to various psychiatric treatment notes throughout her evaluation”

and to “specific psychiatric notes from []Ellis’ sessions,” before concluding that the

“record evidence is sufficient to support the ALJ’s decision”). However, “it is not the role

of the Court to assume that the ALJ intended to cite this record as support for [her]

conclusion that the treating providers’ opinion is inconsistent with the record evidence.”

Perez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:20-cv-1470-LRH, 2022 WL 195431, at *6 (M.D. Fla.

Jan. 21, 2022) (internal citations omitted); see also Pierson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.

6:19-cv-01515-RBD-DCI, 2020 WL 1957597, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2020) (report and

recommendation) (“Even if the Court waded through the ALJ’s entire discussion of the

medical record in this case . . . and managed to identify those records that both fall within

the relevant time period and (in the [c]ourt’s opinion) appear inconsistent with [the

medical opinion], the ALJ never discussed any such records in relation to [that medical

opinion]. . . . Thus, the ALJ failed to build the requisite ‘accurate and logical bridge from

the evidence to [her] conclusion.’”) (fourth alteration in the original) (quoting Flentroy-

Tennant v. Astrue, No. 3:07-cv-101-J-TEM, 2008 WL 876961, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 27,

2008)).5

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. Judge Reid’s Report (DE 20) is REJECTED.

2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (DE 15) is GRANTED.

3. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (DE 18) is DENIED.

4. The decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and REMANDED for the

Commissioner to address the issues outlined above and take any other

5 Neither Defendant nor the Report analyzes any cases in which similar rulings by ALJ’s

were held to be sufficient explanations of supportability and consistency.

action deemed necessary.

5. The Clerk is directed to ENTER judgment for Plaintiff and against the

Commissioner and CLOSE this case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Miami, Florida, on this 5th of

March, 2025.

KATHLEEN M, WILLIAMS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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