Opinion

White, Shalanda v. Federal Express Corp.

  • 2025 TN WC App. 8
Court
Tennessee Workers' Compensation Appeals Board
Filed
Mar 6, 2025
Status
Published
On the bench
Godkin, Weaver, Conner
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.3%

The opinion

FILED

Mar 06, 2025

03:00 PM(CT)

TENNESSEE

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

APPEALS BOARD

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Shalanda White ) Docket No. 2021-08-1065

)

v. ) State File No. 2571-2021

)

Federal Express Corp., et al. )

)

)

Appeal from the Court of Workers’ ) Heard January 21, 2025

Compensation Claims ) in Jackson, TN

Shaterra R. Marion, Judge )

Reversed and Remanded

In this compensation appeal, the employee argues the trial court erred in determining she

did not give sufficient notice of her alleged gradual injury. Prior to reporting a work-related

injury, the employee had suffered from pain in both knees for a period of time and had

received medical treatment on her own. After reporting to her physician that she had

suffered an increase in symptoms while at work, her physician referred her to a specialist.

After attending several appointments with a specialist and undergoing objective testing,

the specialist reviewed the results of the objective testing with the employee and

recommended surgery in both knees. The employee then gave written notice of her injury

to her manager. The employer initially denied the claim based on a lack of evidence of

medical causation. It later raised a notice defense, contending the employee knew or

should have known she had a work-related injury causing permanent physical impairment

more than fifteen days before she provided written notice. After a trial, the court found the

employee knew or should have known she had a work-related cumulative trauma injury

more than fifteen days prior to her written notice of injury and was therefore barred from

receiving compensation. The employee has appealed. Upon careful consideration of the

record and arguments of counsel, we reverse the trial court’s decision and remand the case.

Judge Meredith B. Weaver delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which Presiding

Judge Timothy W. Conner and Judge Pele I. Godkin joined.

Christopher L. Taylor, Memphis, Tennessee, for the employee-appellant, Shalanda White

Stephen P. Miller and Joseph B. Baker, Memphis, Tennessee, for the employer-appellee,

Federal Express Corp.

1

Factual and Procedural History

Shalanda White (“Employee”) began working part-time for Federal Express Corp.

(“Employer”) in December 2004 as a package handler. Eventually, she became a full-time

team leader on offload. Employee described her job duties in this position as follows: “I

was on a bed of rollers, pushing and pulling containers, 3,000 pounds plus, with one other

employee at that particular time. I was pushing freight uphill. . . . And I was on my knees

in the plane, maneuvering freight and loading up to 2,000 pounds.”

On October 20, 2020, Employee had a telehealth visit with her family physician,

Dr. Lyle G. Bohlman, with complaints of ankle pain and swelling and pain in her right

knee. Employee provided a history of a swollen knee “x 3 days” and “states [she] was

exercising when it started swelling and hurting.” Employee indicated she had “some ankle

pain and some [r]ight knee pain when [she] got off work [and] she had a swollen knee since

yesterday.” She denied having suffered any known injury, and Dr. Bohlman noted

Employee had “known [degenerative joint disease (“DJD”)] and considerable weight load

in the knee.” Dr. Bohlman diagnosed Employee with primary osteoarthritis of the right

knee, stating it was due to “probable overuse with knee DJD flare” and prescribed an anti-

inflammatory.

Employee returned to Dr. Bohlman on November 2, 2020, stating she still had “right

knee swelling with sharp pain located behind the right knee” and “now her left knee is

swollen.” She indicated her knee pain “has not improved much” but was better with rest,

ice, and elevation. Employee also stated the pain “reoccurred at work” and noted the pain

was now in both knees. Dr. Bohlman reiterated his diagnosis of osteoarthritis in the right

knee, prescribed a steroid, and referred Employee to an orthopedist. He did not assign

work restrictions at either appointment.

On November 9, 2020, Employee saw Physician’s Assistant Sarah Hill at

OrthoSouth. 1 At that time, Employee reported a long history of knee pain in the left knee

and pain in the right knee for “about a month.” She stated she had been “doing a lot of

walking and thinks that this probably flared it up.” Ms. Hill obtained X-rays of both knees,

which indicated “extensive medial and patellofemoral compartment arthritis with bone on

bone contact” in the left knee and “mild patellofemoral arthritis” in the right knee. Ms.

Hill diagnosed unilateral primary osteoarthritis in the left knee and joint effusion in the

right knee, stating, “We have gone over the natural history of arthritis of the knee and have

explained to them that this is not a systemic disease and is typically related to overuse and

just advanced age. . . .” Ms. Hill went on to state there “are many causes of effusion of the

knee. Some of the more common causes include osteoarthritis, bursitis, or infection.” She

noted that the history of the joint effusion depends on the underlying cause of fluid

1

In its compensation order, the trial court inadvertently stated it was Dr. Bohlman who “detailed

[Employee’s] cumulative issues” and “ordered x-rays” on November 9 rather than Ms. Hill at OrthoSouth.

2

accumulation, observing that for some, “effusions can be recurrent whereas for others an

effusion may occur once in response to an isolated trauma.” Ms. Hill discussed treatment

options, including medications, injections, physical therapy and, in the case of the left knee,

a possible total knee replacement. She also noted that “[f]or those with advanced arthritic

disease causing the effusion, surgery may be required to correct the problem.” Employee

elected to receive an injection in the left knee and aspiration of and an injection in the right

knee, and Ms. Hill released Employee with instructions to “rest” for a week and return if

there was no improvement in a few weeks.

On November 23, 2020, Employee returned to OrthoSouth with continued

complaints of knee pain and saw Dr. Timothy Krahn. Dr. Krahn agreed with Ms. Hill that

Employee suffered from primary osteoarthritis of the left knee, but, in the impression

portion of the medical note, he listed an “acute meniscal tear in the right knee” and stated,

“[t]he meniscus can become torn through sporting activities or can be associated with the

degenerative aging process.” Dr. Krahn provided numerous possible treatment options

including medications, injections, and a possible knee replacement for the left knee and

referred Employee for an MRI of the right knee to confirm the presence of a meniscal tear.

Employee opted for a series of injections in the left knee.

The right knee MRI took place on November 30, 2020. Employee attended a

telehealth visit with her primary care physician, Dr. Bohlman, on December 7, 2020, at

which she told him that she had an appointment at OrthoSouth to go over her MRI results

the following week and that the injections had provided minimal relief. Employee

indicated she “continue[d] to have swelling and pain with limited [range of motion] of the

knees and [an] inability to stand for hours at a time.” Dr. Bohlman diagnosed Employee

with primary osteoarthritis of both knees and wrote a work restriction of “limited ability to

stand for more than [two] hours the next [two] months.”

On December 14, 2020, Employee saw Ms. Hill to review her MRI results. Ms.

Hill advised the MRI did reveal a complex tear of the right medial meniscus. On December

18, 2020, four days later, Employee sent an email to her supervisor, Londell Owens,

stating:

This is an official notification of injury . . . Approximate date of injury is

11/02/2020. Injuries sustained are Left Knee “Bone on Bone” injury and

Right Knee “Torn Meniscus.” Injuries sustained by on the Job cumulative

Trauma and Repetitive Motion.

Employer initially denied the claim in February 2021 due to a “lack of medical

evidence to support a work [-] related injury.” The next month, Employee began treating

on her own with Dr. Rommel Childress, an orthopedic physician. Dr. Childress

recommended an arthroscopy of the right knee but was hesitant to perform a knee

replacement on the left knee due to Employee’s young age. Employee complained of

3

multiple falls and was using a cane for balance. Thereafter, Employee’s knee treatment

stagnated for a time as she recovered from a triple heart bypass, but Dr. Childress indicated

she still could not work due to her knees as of September 21, 2021.

Employee filed a petition for benefit determination on October 29, 2021. She

alleged a cumulative trauma injury due to repetitive motion with a date of injury of

November 2, 2020. On April 14, 2022, Dr. Childress wrote a letter to Employee’s attorney

in which he opined, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that Employee’s

occupational exposure is greater than fifty one percent (51%), the cause and

source of her progressive arthritis symptoms with her right and left knee,

which prevents her from work and functioning and which will more likely

than not, need surgical intervention in the future, if her medical condition

allows. 2

Employer sent Employee for a medical evaluation with Dr. Jeffrey Dlabach in May

2022. Dr. Dlabach opined Employee’s obesity was the primary cause of her osteoarthritis

and that her work activities did not contribute more than fifty percent to her bilateral knee

condition. The parties then proceeded to mediation, which was unsuccessful, and

Employer specifically raised insufficient notice as a defense on the dispute certification

notice issued in October 2022. The parties deposed Drs. Dlabach and Childress, and the

case was tried on July 16, 2024. 3 Employee testified on her own behalf, and Employer

presented testimony from David Kirby regarding Employee’s job duties as a team leader. 4

At trial, Employee testified that, on November 2, 2020, she was stepping off a piece

of equipment known as an outrigger when she began to feel heaviness and burning in her

knees. Employee explained,

2

This same correspondence referenced an “episode documented in November 2020, where [Employee] had

sudden severe pain in her right knee, which caused her to fall backwards, sustaining a mild concussion.”

There is no other evidence or testimony in the record indicating Employee suffered a fall or a concussion

on November 2, 2020, and Dr. Childress was not asked about this portion of the letter at the time of his

deposition. Furthermore, the court made no finding of fact regarding a fall or a concussion, and the

attorneys agreed at oral argument that the employee’s claim for benefits was based on an alleged gradual

injury, not any sudden, traumatic event. As such, we need not determine whether such an incident as

described in Dr. Childress’s November 2, 2020 correspondence occurred, whether it constituted an injury

by accident as defined by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(12) (2024), whether Employee

failed to give timely notice of it, or whether it was the primary cause of the need for medical treatment.

Simply put, that is not the incident on which Employee’s claim is based.

3

We forego a discussion of the expert medical proof in the case, as this appeal concerns only the asserted

notice defense.

4

We also forego a discussion of Mr. Kirby’s testimony, as it was relevant only to the issue of causation,

which we do not address in this opinion.

4

One of the heavy machineries has a bed, it’s called an outrigger. Nothing but

rollers. It’s there to assist with the containers transitioning from the loader

to the outrigger. They don’t always work. So . . . I was stepping off that,

which is about . . . 1 to 2 feet . . . stepping down. And when I got down in

the midst of my second step, my knees just – and I – caught myself. They

just . . . seemed really heavy, and were burning, and . . . I felt the heaviness.

And I took a couple of steps into . . . I felt the swelling and the burn, and I

just – I couldn’t move. So one of the employees helped me over to the people

mover. That’s the – the vehicle that the entire team rides on . . . .

She testified she told her supervisor, Mr. Owens, that her knees were swollen and burning

and that she needed to leave. According to her testimony, Mr. Owens told her she was not

authorized to leave and to finish the job. She admitted she did not tell Mr. Owens of any

specific incident at work at that time and did not suggest her knee condition was work-

related. Counsel for Employer elicited testimony from Employee during cross-

examination acknowledging that, although she testified in her deposition to experiencing

pain and swelling in her knees while at work on November 2, 2020, she did not describe

any specific moment when she noticed an increase in her pain on that date, such as when

she stepped off the outrigger.

Employee testified she completed her shift and then had a telehealth visit with Dr.

Bohlman that day. The report from that appointment does not reflect that she reported any

specific incident occurring at work that day. She testified he referred her to OrthoSouth,

and she continued to work for Employer during that time without any specific work

restrictions. In regard to reporting her potential workers’ compensation claim, the

following exchange occurred on cross-examination:

Q: When was the initial [notice to Mr. Owens]?

A: When I told him Dr. Bohlman took me off work and I said, Londell, I

need to file a workman’s [sic] comp claim. He said let’s wait and see

what the results are, the test results.

Q: So when was that?

A: That was in, I want to say late November, December. And when I got

the results back, that’s when I contacted him again [and asked], “did

you file the workman’s [sic] comp?” And he hadn’t, and that’s why

[the December 18 email] took place.

Neither counsel elicited testimony from Employee at trial as to when or why she came to

believe her bilateral knee condition was work-related or when she believed she had suffered

some degree of permanent physical impairment in her knees.

5

In a July 24, 2024 compensation order, the trial court determined Employee had

failed to provide sufficient notice of her injuries and had offered no reasonable excuse for

her delay pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-201(b). In particular, the

court determined that “on November 9, the doctor ordered x-rays and told [Employee] that

her symptoms were related to overuse and aging. Thus, as of November 9, [Employee]

knew or should have known that she suffered cumulative trauma to her knees due to

overuse at work.” As such, it denied Employee’s claim for medical and permanent

disability benefits. The court also determined that its ruling on Employer’s notice defense

pretermitted the issue of medical causation and chose not to make alternative findings to

address that issue. Employee has appealed.

Standard of Review

The standard we apply in reviewing the trial court’s decision presumes that the

court’s factual findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.

See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2024). When the trial judge has had the

opportunity to observe a witness’s demeanor and to hear in-court testimony, we give

considerable deference to factual findings made by the trial court. Madden v. Holland Grp.

of Tenn., Inc., 277 S.W.3d 896, 898 (Tenn. 2009). However, “[n]o similar deference need

be afforded the trial court’s findings based upon documentary evidence.” Goodman v.

Schwarz Paper Co., No. W2016-02594-SC-R3-WC, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 8, at *6 (Tenn.

Workers’ Comp. Panel Jan. 18, 2018). Moreover, the interpretation and application of

statutes and regulations are questions of law that are reviewed de novo with no presumption

of correctness afforded the trial court’s conclusions. See Mansell v. Bridgestone Firestone

N. Am. Tire, LLC, 417 S.W.3d 393, 399 (Tenn. 2013). We are also mindful of our

obligation to construe the workers’ compensation statutes “fairly, impartially, and in

accordance with basic principles of statutory construction” and in a way that does not favor

either the employee or the employer. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-116 (2024).

Analysis

The only issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in finding Employee failed

to give sufficient notice of her alleged work-related gradual injuries. Employee contends

her notice to Employer was timely, as she gave written notice four days after discussing

her MRI results with her provider and learning she had permanent injuries. For its part,

Employer contends she should have known she had a permanent, work-related condition

as early as November 2, when she suffered an increase in pain and swelling after stepping

off an outrigger at work, or by November 9, when she was told her condition was related

to “overuse” and that she might need a knee replacement in the future. Employer asserts

it did not receive notice of her alleged injuries until thirty-nine days later on December 18,

2020, when Employee sent her supervisor the email referenced above identifying

November 2, 2020 as the date of her alleged injury.

6

Notice Requirement

With respect to the provision of timely notice in gradual injury cases, Tennessee

Code Annotated section 50-6-201(b) provides:

In those cases where the injuries occur as a result of gradual or cumulative

trauma, then the injured employee or the injured employee’s representative

shall provide notice of the injury to the employer within fifteen (15) days

after the employee:

(1) Knows or reasonably should know that the employee has

suffered a work-related injury that has resulted in a permanent

physical impairment; or

(2) Is rendered unable to continue to perform the employee’s

normal work activities as a result of work-related injury and

the employee knows or should know that the injury was caused

by work-related activities.

(Emphasis added.) We previously analyzed this portion of the statute and the resulting

case law extensively in Ernstes v. Printpack, Inc., No. 2020-07-0617, 2023 TN Wrk.

Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 25 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. June 6, 2023) (“Ernstes II”),

aff’d Ernstes v. Printpack, Inc., No. W2023-00863-SC-R3-W3, 2024 Tenn. LEXIS 1

(Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Jan. 2, 2024). By way of background, the employee in

Ernstes filed a petition for benefit determination on November 17, 2020, seeking benefits

for permanent hearing loss due to noise exposure at her place of work after learning she

had a permanent hearing loss at a medical evaluation in 2019. Id. at *4-5. She had not

worked for the employer since 2016. Id. at *3. At trial, after confirming that she had

undergone hearing screenings at work and had been told she suffered hearing loss, Ms.

Ernstes acknowledged on cross-examination that, after undergoing hearing tests at work,

she believed “all the loud noises and everything” at work was likely the cause of her hearing

loss. Ernstes v. Printpak, Inc., No. 2020-07-0617, 2022 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS

44, at *12-13 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Dec. 15, 2022) (“Ernstes I”). The trial

court in Ernstes I determined Employee had provided timely notice of her condition,

reasoning that although the employee knew she had hearing loss, she did not know it was

related to work until a meeting with her attorney in 2020, thus suspending the notice

requirement. Id. On appeal, we reversed, concluding that the employee admitted knowing

her hearing loss was work-related in 2019 at the latest, and we remanded the case for the

trial court to determine whether the employee had offered a reasonable excuse for her delay

in giving notice. Id. at *14. On remand, the trial court determined that the employee had

no reasonable excuse for her delayed notice but that the employer had not shown any

prejudice caused by that delay and, consequently, awarded benefits. Ernstes II, at *6-7.

The employer appealed that order, and, after an exhaustive review of the history of the

7

notice requirement, we determined that, in cases where an employer alleges improper

notice, the employee bears the burden of establishing proper written notice, the employer’s

actual knowledge of the injury, or a reasonable excuse for the failure to provide proper

notice. The employer only has the burden of proving prejudice when it alleges a defect in

the written notice itself. Id. at *35-36. As such, we set out the following framework for

analyzing whether proper notice has been provided:

A. Did the employee provide timely written notice of the alleged work-

related injury?

B. If no timely written notice was provided, did the employer have

“actual knowledge” of the alleged work-related accident or injury?

C. If no timely written notice was provided and no actual knowledge has

been proven, did the employee show a “reasonable excuse” for the

failure to give proper notice to the employer In considering whether

the employee has shown by a preponderance of the evidence a

reasonable excuse, a court can consider, among other things: (1) the

employer’s actual knowledge of the employee’s injury, (2) lack of

prejudice to the employer by an excusal of the notice requirement, and

(3) the excuse or inability of the employee to timely notify the

employer. However, as previously stated by the Tennessee Supreme

Court, “[l]ack of prejudice alone would not be sufficient to excuse

notice.”

D. If the court determines that: (1) no timely written notice was provided;

(2) the employer did not have actual knowledge of the alleged

accident or injury; and (3) the employee did not prove a reasonable

excuse for the failure to give timely notice, the claim should be denied

and dismissed.

E. If written notice was provided, but the employer affirmatively asserts

there was a defect or inaccuracy in the notice, the burden of proof

shifts to the employer to prove actual prejudice it suffered as a result

of the defective or inaccurate notice and, if such prejudice is found,

the trial court can fashion a remedy, if appropriate, “only to the extent

of the prejudice.”

Ernstes II, at *34 (citations omitted).

The trial court in the present case, relying on this analytical framework, determined

Employee knew or reasonably should have known her knee injuries were work-related as

of November 9, and she provided no reasonable excuse for her failure to give written notice

until December 18, more than fifteen days later. We conclude, however, that there are key

factual differences in the present case that impact the analysis as discussed in Ernstes.

8

First, the employee in Ernstes admitted under oath that she believed her hearing loss

was work-related, at the latest, in 2019 but did not report a work-related injury until the

end of 2020. Ernstes I, at *12-13. In the instant case, Employee did not testify as to when

she first believed her bilateral knee conditions were work-related, and Employer offered

no other evidence as to when Employee believed her knee conditions were both work-

related and had caused permanent physical impairment. Second, the employee in Ernstes

had retired in 2016 but did not provide notice of her alleged work-related hearing loss until

late 2020. Id. at *3-4. In the present case, Employee continued working after feeling the

increase in pain in early November and was not assigned any work restrictions related to

her knees until December 7. 5 Third, causation was not disputed in Ernstes; the parties

agreed her hearing loss was primarily caused by noise exposure at work. Id. at *3, n.1. In

this case, the primary cause of Employee’s condition is and has been disputed since the

inception of the claim. Finally, the employee in Ernstes no longer worked for her employer

and was never restricted from working or deemed unable to perform her work activities as

a result of her hearing loss. Id. at *3. As such, subsection 201(b)(2) was not pertinent to

the analysis in Ernstes, and that case could only be analyzed pursuant to subsection

201(b)(1), which requires an employee to provide notice within fifteen days of when he or

she knows or reasonably should know of a work-related injury that has resulted in a

permanent impairment.

In the case at hand, on December 7, 2020, Employee was assigned work restrictions

due to her knee conditions that prevented her from working in her position as a team leader.

Thus, both subsections 201(b)(1) and (2) must be considered, and the employee need only

satisfy one or the other to establish proper notice. See Hicks v. Travelers Ins. Co., No.

W2003-00768-WCM-CV, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 324, at *5-7 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel

Apr. 7, 2004) (analyzing proper notice under both subsections and determining it was

properly given when the employee began having issues with numbness and tingling in his

hands in 1995 but did not know the condition was permanent and was not taken out of work

until 2001). Consequently, in notice cases where work restrictions have impacted an

employee’s ability to “perform the employee’s normal work activities,” a trial court must

consider: (1) at what point in time the employee knew or reasonably should have known

he or she suffered from a work-related condition causing permanent physical impairment;

or (2) at what point in time the employee was unable to engage in or was restricted from

normal work activities due to a work-related condition.

With respect to subsection 201(b)(1), the statute requires the trial court to determine

when Employee knew or reasonably should have known she had an injury resulting in a

5

At oral argument, the parties agreed that the record was unclear with respect to when Employee’s last day

worked was, but the earliest work restriction appearing in the record is in Dr. Bohlman’s December 7 office

note. There is no evidence in the record that Employee missed any work when Ms. Hill told her to “rest”

at her November 9, 2020 appointment at OrthoSouth. Furthermore, Dr. Dlabach’s evaluation states

Employee worked until December 7, and the first report of work injury says Employee’s last day was

December 15, 2020.

9

permanent physical impairment. Gradual injury cases almost always present close factual

questions regarding when the employee knew or reasonably should have known a gradually

occurring injury was work-related. Hill v. Whirlpool Corp., No. M2011-01291-WC-R3-

WC, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 306, at *11 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel May 12, 2012). The

trial court in the present case determined that Employee knew or reasonably should have

known she had work-related injuries to her knees on November 9, 2020, when she was

informed the likely cause of her bilateral knee condition was “overuse” and “aging.”

However, the medical note from that date does not reflect that either Employee or the

doctor attributed the “overuse” specifically to Employee’s work duties, as the trial court’s

order infers. Furthermore, Employee described her condition as a “flare up” at that

appointment and gave no indication that she believed the increase in her symptoms to have

caused permanent impairment. Thus, we conclude the evidence preponderates against the

court’s finding that Employee knew or should have known on November 9, 2020 that she

had a permanent physical impairment primarily caused by her employment.

Throughout November and early December 2020, Employee was consistently

diagnosed with osteoarthritis at her various follow-up appointments. It was not until

December 14, when she received her MRI results, that the existence of a meniscal tear in

the right knee was confirmed. The record indicates Employee had experienced pain in her

left knee for a long period of time, which had recently worsened, and she had only recently

begun to have pain in her right knee. We conclude that, under these circumstances, the

evidence preponderates against the trial court’s determination that Employee knew she had

a permanent work-related aggravation of her pre-existing condition in the left knee and a

permanent work-related injury in her right knee in November 2020. 6

Subsection 201(b)(2) provides a second avenue by which an employee can provide

timely notice in the context of a cumulative trauma injury. Specifically, that subsection

requires an injured worker to give notice when he or she knows or reasonably should know

that cumulative trauma condition was caused by work activities and when he or she is

rendered unable to perform normal work activities. The trial court’s order does not provide

6

As we noted above, the record is silent as to the precise date Employee first believed her injuries to be

work-related. The first indication from an expert that her knee conditions were primarily work-related is

Dr. Childress’s April 2022 letter, written well after Employee provided written notice of her claim and filed

a petition for benefit determination. Although a doctor’s diagnosis and/or opinion on causation is not

required to trigger an employee’s obligation to provide notice of a gradual injury, courts have regularly

considered it as a factor. See, e.g., Hill, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 306, at *9; Roberts v. Marco Printing Co., No.

M1998-00197-WC-R3-CV, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 673, at *9 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Dec. 20, 1999);

Pentecost v. Anchor Wire Corp., 695 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tenn. 1986). Furthermore, we do not intend to

suggest that an employee’s obligation to provide notice is automatically tolled until he or she receives

results of objective testing such as an MRI. Instead, a court should consider the totality of the circumstances

in determining when an employee knew or reasonably should have known he or she had suffered a gradual

work-related injury resulting in permanent physical impairment. In this case, however, we conclude the

totality of the evidence does not indicate Employee knew or should have known she had suffered a

permanent injury or permanent aggravation prior to the date she received her MRI results.

10

an analysis of when Employee was rendered unable to perform her normal work activities,

and it does not address how or whether any such inability impacted the date on which she

was required to provide notice. However, because we conclude her notice was timely under

subsection 50-6-201(b)(1), we need not address the second prong of section 50-6-201(b).

In short, we conclude that there is insufficient evidence in the record to establish

that Employee either knew or reasonably should have known she had a work-related injury

resulting in permanent impairment more than fifteen days prior to her December 18 written

notice of injury. The preponderance of the evidence supports Employee’s assertion that

she did not believe she had suffered any permanent injury until she reviewed the MRI

results on December 14. She provided written notice on December 18, which was within

fifteen days. Therefore, the evidence preponderates against the court’s determination that

Employee failed to give proper, timely notice of her alleged knee injuries.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order dismissing Employee’s

claim for insufficient notice. Because the trial court made no alternative findings with

respect to medical causation, we remand the case for the court to address all remaining

issues in light of the evidence presented at the compensation hearing. Costs on appeal are

taxed to Employer.

11

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Shalanda White ) Docket No. 2021-08-1065

)

v. ) State File No. 2571-2021

)

Federal Express Corp., et al. )

)

)

Appeal from the Court of Workers’ ) Heard January 21, 2025

Compensation Claims ) in Jackson, TN

Shaterra R. Marion, Judge )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Appeals Board’s decision in the referenced

case was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service on this the 6th day

of March, 2025.

Name Certified First Class Via Via Sent to:

Mail Mail Fax Email

Christopher L. Taylor X ctaylor@taylortoon.com

Stephen P. Miller X smiller@mckuhn.com

mdoherty@mckuhn.com

Shaterra R. Marion, Judge X Via Electronic Mail

Kenneth M. Switzer, Chief Judge X Via Electronic Mail

Penny Shrum, Clerk, Court of X penny.patterson-shrum@tn.gov

Workers’ Compensation Claims

Matthew Keene

Acting Clerk, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board

220 French Landing Dr., Ste. 1-B

Nashville, TN 37243

Telephone: 615-532-1564

Electronic Mail: WCAppeals.Clerk@tn.gov

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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