listing requisites for issuance of a preliminary injunction
How later courts described this case
- listing requisites for issuance of a preliminary injunction
- holding that plaintiff, who alleged that prison officials repeatedly ignored her physician’s recommendations, stated sufficient facts to establish an Eighth Amendment violation
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Travis A. White, :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 508 M.D. 2023
: SUBMITTED: November 7, 2024
PA DOC, SCI Houtzdale Warden :
Scott Klinefelter, Medical Director, :
MAT Specialist, Dr. Naji, Dr. Bloom, :
and Dr. Knowles, :
Respondents :
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
SENIOR JUDGE LEADBETTER FILED: March 6, 2025
Petitioner Travis A. White, pro se, is an inmate at the State Correctional
Institution – Houtzdale (SCI-Houtzdale) who has filed a petition for review under
the Americans with Disabilities Act1 (ADA) and the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution2 by way of Section 1983 of the United
1
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
2
U.S. CONST. amends. VIII, XIV.
States Code, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.3 Petitioner seeks injunctive relief4 against
Respondent “PA DOC” (the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections) “so [the
Department] will give [him] [Medically Assisted Treatment (MAT) program]
medication that [his] body can tolerate”—specifically one not containing naltrexone,
such as Suboxone, Subutex, or methadone—for his opiate use disorder.5 Pet. for
Review, “P.F.R.” ¶ 20.
Now before us are the preliminary objections of Respondents
Department and personnel of SCI-Houtzdale, Warden Scott Klinefelter
(Superintendent Klinefelter6), and the person identified as “MAT Specialist”
(collectively, Department Respondents), and Dr. Naji, the Medical Director at SCI-
Houtzdale7 to the petition for review.
3
See Pet. for Review “P.F.R.” ¶ 2. Petitioner’s petition for review does not allege discrete
causes of action in separate counts, as required by Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1020(a),
Pa.R.Civ.P. 1020(a). However, Respondents have not preliminarily objected to any failure to
conform to rule of court.
4
Petitioner does not, per se, ask for a permanent injunction in his petition for review but
asserts that he seeks both a preliminary and permanent injunction elsewhere, see Petitioner’s
Response to Department Respondents’ Preliminary Objections ¶ 18. This issue is discussed
further, infra.
5
In addition to the medications requested by Petitioner, MAT includes administration of
medications containing naltrexone. See Rokita v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 273 A.3d 1260, 1263 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2022) (en banc) [petitioner seeking Vivitrol (naltrexone) through MAT program].
6
Department Respondents’ brief refers to Klinefelter as superintendent rather than warden.
7
The petition for review in this matter names “Medical Director” and Dr. Naji as Respondents.
Dr. Naji identifies himself as medical director for SCI-Houtzdale, as a contracted medical provider
for the Department employed by Wellpath, LLC, a private company. Dr. Naji’s Prelim. Objs. ¶
18.
(Footnote continued on next page…)
2
The facts alleged by Petitioner may be summarized as follows.8
Petitioner is an inmate at SCI-Houtzdale who wishes to be given MAT medications
for opiate use disorder, from which he suffers. P.F.R. ¶¶ 1-2, 7. Petitioner “run[s]
the risk of death due to cravings and tolerance being so low if relapse occurs”; his
addiction causes him depression; and he has attempted suicide. P.F.R. ¶ 3. The
opiate use disorder medications that have been offered to him—Vivitrol or Revia9—
contain naltrexone, which causes him “major depression” and suicidal thoughts.
In addition to the preliminary objections before us, the remaining captioned respondents were
dismissed on preliminary objections sustained for failure to properly serve the petition for review.
White v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 508 M.D. 2023, Order filed Aug. 14, 2024)
[dismissing Dr. Bloom and Joyce Knowles, CRNP (incorrectly identified in caption as Dr.
Knowles)].
8
We note that
[i]n ruling on preliminary objections, this Court accepts as true all
well-pled allegations of material fact, as well as all inferences
reasonably deducible from those facts. Key v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr.,
185 A.3d 421 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). However, this Court need not
accept unwarranted inferences, conclusions of law, argumentative
allegations, or expressions of opinion. Id. For preliminary
objections to be sustained, it must appear with certainty that the law
will permit no recovery. Id. Any doubt must be resolved in favor
of the non-moving party. Id.
Feliciano v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 250 A.3d 1269, 1274 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (en banc)
[quoting Dantzler v. Wetzel, 218 A.3d 519, 522 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019)].
9
In the course of his petition for review, Petitioner names several drugs used to treat opiate
use disorder. Petitioner avers that “many doctors will tell the Court that Suboxone, Subutex, and
methadone are the gold standard for treating opiate use disorder.” P.F.R. ¶ 20. The Court takes
judicial notice that Subutex and Suboxone are brand names for medications which each contain
buprenorphine hydrochloride and that Vivitrol and Revia, as Petitioner states, contain naltrexone.
See Drugs@FDA: FDA Approved Drugs,
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/daf/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 5, 2025).
3
P.F.R. ¶ 4. Petitioner was in a methadone10 maintenance program within 60 days
before entering prison and provided records indicating that to the Department; and
Petitioner avers that this record would be sufficient for other inmates to get Subutex
or Sublocade.11 P.F.R. ¶ 5. Petitioner suffers from several physical ailments which
the Department has not treated, and MAT would help the pain from those conditions.
P.F.R. ¶ 7. Petitioner denies that he currently uses drugs, but sometimes relapses
because of lack of treatment and uncontrollable urges to use opiates, which MAT
would treat. P.F.R. ¶ 16. Petitioner avers that the medical professionals at SCI-
Houtzdale, including the MAT Specialist, Dr. Naji, and the now-dismissed named
respondents “agree that [he] need[s] MAT” (in the form he is seeking), but that it
was denied due to Department policy or policies which allow others to use the
medications, but prevent him from using a MAT medication other than Vivitrol or
Revia for his opiate use disorder. P.F.R. ¶¶ 6, 19. Those policies, Petitioner avers,
do not permit the Department to give methadone to male inmates or the Subutex or
Sublocade because he “came before 2019.” P.F.R. ¶ 6.
Petitioner exhausted his administrative remedies and filed the instant
petition for review in our original jurisdiction. Department Respondents have filed
preliminary objections, as has Dr. Naji. Petitioner has filed responses thereto. The
preliminary objections are now ripe for disposition.
The Department Respondents raise two issues on preliminary
objections: (1) whether the Court has jurisdiction over Superintendent Klinefelter
10
Petitioner avers that the Department does not give methadone to male inmates. P.F.R. ¶ 5.
11
Sublocade is another treatment for opiate use disorder that contains buprenorphine. See
Drugs@FDA: FDA Approved Drugs, https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/daf/index.cfm
(last visited Mar. 5, 2025).
4
and the MAT Specialist as non-statewide actors; and (2) whether Petitioner has
failed to state a claim against Department Respondents for which relief can be
granted (demurrer). Dr. Naji raises three issues on preliminary objections: (1)
whether the Court has jurisdiction over Dr. Naji as a non-statewide officer; (2)
whether a mandamus action is improper to compel a discretionary act of a treating
medical provider; and (3) whether Petitioner has failed to state a claim for injunctive
relief under the ADA or the Eighth Amendment. Additionally, Dr. Naji incorporates
by reference the arguments raised by Department Respondents.
Jurisdiction over Superintendent Klinefelter, the MAT Specialist, and Dr. Naji
Department Respondents—on behalf of Superintendent Klinefelter and
the MAT Specialist—and Dr. Naji argue that this Court lacks jurisdiction over
claims against them because they are non-statewide actors.
This Court’s original jurisdiction extends to only a narrow class of
cases. Jones v. Peterman, 743 A.2d 537 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999). Section 761(a)(1) of
the Judicial Code provides that this Court shall have original jurisdiction in cases
asserted against “the Commonwealth government, including any officer thereof,
acting in his official capacity . . . .” 42 Pa.C.S. §761(a)(1). For purposes of
jurisdiction under 42 Pa.C.S. §761(a)(1), state employees are considered officers of
the Commonwealth only if they “perform state[]wide policymaking functions and .
. . are charged with the responsibility for independent initiation of administrative
policy regarding some sovereign function of state government.” Jones, 743 A.2d at
538 [quoting Mickens v. Jeffes, 453 A.2d 1092, 1093 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983)].
Nevertheless, Petitioner has pled a claim against the Department, which
is an agency of the Commonwealth government. This Court has “ancillary
jurisdiction over any claim or other matter which is related to a claim or other matter
5
otherwise within its exclusive original jurisdiction.” 42 Pa.C.S. §761(c). Because
this Court has original jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claim against the Department,
we also have jurisdiction over his related claims against Superintendent Klinefelter
and the MAT Specialist. See Ortiz v. Wetzel (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 615 M.D. 2018, filed
June 6, 2019), slip op. at 4.12 The same reasoning would apply with respect to Dr.
Naji. See Bullock v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 375 M.D. 2016, filed Sept.
28, 2017), slip op. at 9 (where inmate sought review of the actions of Department as
an agency, this Court had ancillary jurisdiction over related claims against a private
party).
Legal Sufficiency of Petitioner’s Request for Preliminary Injunction
We next consider Department Respondents’ and Dr. Naji’s demurrer
challenging the legal sufficiency of Petitioner’s petition for review. They assert that
the injunction will not restore the parties to their status quo as it existed before the
alleged wrongful conduct,13 because while Petitioner has been in custody since
before 2019, P.F.R. ¶ 5, he has not been on MAT during this time and did not first
inquire about MAT until June 2023, see P.F.R. Exhibits. Thus, they argue that
mandating the Department to provide the specific MAT medications Petitioner
requests would not restore the parties to the status quo ante, but instead would place
12
Section 414 of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures authorizes the citation of
unreported panel decisions issued after January 15, 2008, for their persuasive value, but not as
binding precedent. 210 Pa. Code §69.414.
13
A preliminary injunction should restore the status quo. Summit Towne Ctr., Inc. v. Shoe
Show of Rocky Mount, Inc., 828 A.2d 995, 1001 (Pa. 2003) (listing requisites for issuance of a
preliminary injunction). The status quo to be preserved is the “last actual, peaceable (and . . .
lawful) noncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.” Com. v. Coward, 414 A.2d
91, 99 (Pa. 1980) [quoting Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Israel, 52 A.2d 317, 321 (Pa. 1947)].
6
the parties in new positions relative to Petitioner’s medical care. They seek the
dismissal of the petition for review with prejudice.
While Petitioner asks only for a preliminary injunction by name in his
petition for review, it is clear that he is ultimately seeking permanent injunctive
relief:
20. I am asking this honorable [C]ourt to grant me my
preliminary injunction so the [Department] will give me a
MAT medication my body can tolerate . . . .
21. I believe that once my preliminary injunction is
granted[,] myself and the [Department] will not want to
prolong this case. I’d be willing to withdraw this once I
am receiving proper medical treatment for my opiate use
disorder.
P.F.R. ¶¶ 20-21 (emphasis supplied). Indeed, there would be no point in obtaining
a preliminary injunction if a permanent injunction were not sought as well—a
preliminary injunction maintains the status quo “until the merits of the controversy
can be fully heard and determined,” but it does not “decide the case as though on a
final hearing.” Weeks v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 255 A.3d 660, 666 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2021), aff'd, 302 A.3d 678 (Pa. 2023) [quoting Appeal of Little Britain Twp. from
Decision of Zoning Hearing Bd. of Little Britain Twp., Lancaster Cnty., Pa., 651
A.2d 606, 610-11 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994)]. Finally, “[t]he allegations of a pro se
[petitioner] are held to a less stringent standard than that applied to pleadings filed
by attorneys. If a fair reading of the [petition for review] shows that the [petitioner]
has pleaded facts that may entitle him to relief, the preliminary objections will be
overruled.” Danysh v. Dep’t of Corr., 845 A.2d 260, 262-63 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004).
A fair reading of the petition for review shows that Petitioner seeks permanent
7
injunctive relief.14 For these reasons, while we agree with Department Respondents
that Petitioner has failed to establish entitlement to a preliminary injunction,
dismissal of the petition for review would be inappropriate.
Legal Sufficiency of Petitioner’s ADA Claim
In addition to the fact that their remaining arguments in support of the
demurrer to the ADA claim, that there will be no immediate and irreparable harm to
Petitioner if a preliminary injunction is not granted and that he is unlikely to succeed
on the merits, relate only to a preliminary injunction, Department Respondents do
little to develop their arguments regarding his ADA claim. See Dep’t Resp’ts’ Br.
at 10-11. Department Respondents cite an unreported federal district court decision
denying a motion to dismiss a prisoner’s claim seeking methadone treatment under
the ADA15 and identify averments Petitioner has not made. However, Department
Respondents do not identify relevant legal standards and apply them to the facts
alleged (or failed to be alleged) by Petitioner. The argument portion of a brief must
be developed with pertinent discussion of the issues, including citations to relevant
authority. Rule 2119(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). When a party fails to satisfy this requirement, the
Court is neither obliged, nor even particularly equipped, to develop an argument for
them. Skytop Meadow Cmty. Ass’n, Inc. v. Paige, 177 A.3d 377, 385 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2017).
14
Assuming arguendo that we were to sustain the Department Respondents’ preliminary
objections on the basis of legal insufficiency, we would do so without prejudice. It would seem to
serve the interests of judicial economy to proceed with the understanding that the petition for
review, while unartfully pled, does not request a remedy without a point.
15
Strickland v. Delaware Cnty. (E.D. Pa., Civil Action No. 21-4141, filed Apr. 19, 2022).
8
With respect to the ADA claim, Dr. Naji argues that Petitioner is
unlikely to prevail on the merits because there is no individual liability under Title
II of the ADA. Title II of the ADA (relating to public services) provides, in relevant
part, that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability,
be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs,
or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
While the United States Supreme Court has not ruled on whether claims
may be made against private individuals under Title II of the ADA, the lower federal
courts have held that Title II does not provide for suits against state officials in their
individual capacity.16 See Garcia v. State Univ. of N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr., 280 F.3d
98, 107 (2d Cir. 2001); Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1005 n.8 (8th
Cir. 1999) (en banc); see also Scott v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr. (M.D. Pa., No. 3:24-CV-
00335, May 1, 2024) (noting that although the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit had not ruled on individual liability under Title II, nearly all of the
Third Circuit’s decisions regarding personal liability under the majority of the
ADA’s other titles point toward the absence of individual liability).
Following the prevailing rule, we conclude that there is no individual
liability under Title II of the ADA and that Petitioner cannot prevail on the merits of
his ADA claim as it regards Dr. Naji.17
16
Among the federal courts, only the holdings of the United States Supreme Court interpreting
federal statutes are binding on this Court. However, on-point decisions of the lower federal courts
may well have persuasive effect. Cole v. Pa. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 257 A.3d 805, 813 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2021).
17
Department Respondents have not raised this issue on behalf of Superintendent Klinefelter
and the MAT Specialist.
9
Legal Sufficiency of Petitioner’s Eighth Amendment Claim
Department Respondents and Dr. Naji also assert that Petitioner’s claim
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments is legally insufficient.18 Department
Respondents’ brief leaves something to be desired in its argument regarding the
demurrer to the Eighth Amendment claim. Department Respondents’ argument
consists of one brief paragraph stating that Petitioner has “failed to allege facts that
his rights are being violated under the [Eighth] and [Fourteenth] Amendments, thus
he has failed to establish that he is likely to prevail on the merits of these claims.”
Dep’t Resp’ts’ Br. at 11. Dr. Naji argues that Petitioner has failed to state a claim
for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need under the Eighth Amendment
that would warrant exercising injunctive relief.
To state a cause of action against a correctional health care provider
under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishments, a petitioner must prove “deliberate indifference to a serious medical
need.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). An inmate claiming deliberate
indifference must allege that: (1) the deprivation of medical care is objectively
sufficiently serious; and (2) subjectively, prison officials acted with a culpable state
of mind, being aware of, and disregarding, an excessive risk to the inmate’s health
18
We agree with Dr. Naji that Petitioner’s claim is properly considered as being under the
Eighth Amendment, rather than as a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment. If “a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional
protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more
generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Cnty.
of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998). To the extent the Fourteenth Amendment has
relevance to this action, it is for the incorporation of the Eighth Amendment as being applicable to
the states. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
10
and safety. Kretchmar v. Dep’t of Corr., 831 A.2d 793, 798-99 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2003) [citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 837 (1994)].
In Rokita v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 273 A.3d 1260
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2022) (en banc), another case brought under the ADA and the Eighth
Amendment by an inmate seeking to compel participation in MAT (specifically
seeking Vivitrol), we considered whether an inmate’s request for injunctive relief to
obtain MAT might survive preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer. We
denied the Department’s preliminary objections, concluding that the alleged
“blanket policy” prohibiting MAT to inmates in the situation of Rokita, i.e., those
whose release on parole was not imminent, in favor of group therapy alone met both
the objective and subjective requirements for a finding of deliberate indifference.
Id. at 1269-70. We reasoned as follows:
Because this decision was made pursuant to a policy
prohibiting MAT despite Rokita’s express request, the
Department certainly “knows of” Rokita’s condition and
his request for medical treatment, but the Department
“intentionally refuses to provide it,” which may constitute
“deliberate indifference” under our precedent. Tindell [v.
Dep’t of Corr.], 87 A.3d [1029,] 1040 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).
Moreover, the response to Rokita’s request does not
indicate that the Department afforded any individualized
consideration of Rokita’s circumstance to determine
whether a departure from its policy may be
warranted. See Pesce [v. Coppinger], 355 F. Supp. 3d
[35,] 47 [(D. Mass. 2018)] (noting in the context
of “deliberate indifference” analysis that defendants had
“stood by the policy without any indication that they
would consider Pesce’s particular medical history and
prescribed treatment in considering whether departure
from such policy might be warranted”).
11
Id. at 1269. In Pesce, heavily relied upon by us in Rokita, the federal district court
for Massachusetts granted preliminary injunctive relief where the plaintiff, a
prisoner, was already prescribed methadone. The district court found that the
correctional institution’s blanket policy prohibiting the use of methadone in the face
of medical advice and a prescription from the plaintiff’s physician “ignore[s]
treatment prescriptions given to [the plaintiff] by [his] doctors,” meeting the
subjective requirement of the deliberate indifference test. Pesce, 355 F. Supp. 3d at
48 [quoting Alexander v. Weiner, 841 F. Supp. 2d 486, 493 (D. Mass. 2012)
(holding that plaintiff, who alleged that prison officials repeatedly ignored her
physician’s recommendations, stated sufficient facts to establish an Eighth
Amendment violation)].
Petitioner has averred, and we must accept at this early stage of the
litigation, that prison medical staff “agree that [Petitioner] need[s] MAT,” P.F.R. ¶
19; that he suffers side effects from the MAT medications he has been offered,
including suicidal tendencies; and that there are policies at the Department that allow
certain inmates access to the MAT medications he seeks but not himself.19 For
purposes of preliminary objections, this suffices to meet both the objective and
subjective prongs of the deliberate indifference test under the Eighth Amendment.
Mandamus
Finally, Dr. Naji argues that mandamus is not available to compel a
discretionary act, such as the choice of appropriate medical treatment. This is clearly
correct, and to the extent the petition for review may be construed as a claim
sounding in mandamus, it would be dismissed. However, Petitioner does not state
19
Petitioner avers the Department does not give methadone to male inmates and does not give
Subutex or Sublocade to him because he “came before 2019.” P.F.R. ¶ 5.
12
that he is seeking mandamus relief—rather, he is seeking injunctive relief, which is
potentially available to him under either Section 1983 or Article II of the ADA,20 or
both.
Conclusion
Consistent with the foregoing, Department Respondents’ preliminary
objections are overruled, except to the extent he seeks preliminary injunctive relief,
and Dr. Naji’s preliminary objections are overruled, in part, and sustained, in part.
_____________________________________
BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
President Judge Emerita
20
Section 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under color of statute, . . . of any state . . .
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen . . . to the deprivation of rights . . . secured by the
Constitution and laws . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, a suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Title II of the ADA provides as follows:
“In any action against a [s]tate for a violation of the requirements of this chapter, remedies
(including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such a violation . . . .” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12202.
13
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Travis A. White, :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 508 M.D. 2023
:
PA DOC, SCI Houtzdale Warden :
Scott Klinefelter, Medical Director, :
MAT Specialist, Dr. Naji, Dr. Bloom, :
and Dr. Knowles, :
Respondents :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 6th day of March, 2025, it is ORDERED as follows:
The Preliminary Objections of Respondents Pennsylvania Department
of Corrections, Superintendent Scott Klinefelter, and the MAT Specialist
(collectively, Department Respondents) and Dr. Naji to the Petition for Review filed
by Petitioner Travis A. White in this matter are hereby OVERRULED, in part, and
SUSTAINED, in part, as follows:
1. Department Respondents’ preliminary objections are
OVERRULED in part and SUSTAINED in part. To the extent
Petitioner seeks a preliminary injunction, the objection is
SUSTAINED and such application is DENIED. The Department
Respondents’ preliminary objections are OVERRULED with
respect to the claim for a permanent injunction.
2. Dr. Naji’s preliminary objection to lack of jurisdiction is
OVERRULED;
3. Dr. Naji’s preliminary objection to mandamus being improper to
compel a discretionary act is OVERRULED; and
4. Dr. Naji’s preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer to the
Petition for Review with respect to any claim against him as an
individual under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
12101-12213, is SUSTAINED.
Department Respondents and Dr. Naji are directed to file an answer to the Petition
for Review within 30 days of this order.
_____________________________________
BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
President Judge Emerita
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Travis A. White, :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 508 M.D. 2023
: SUBMITTED: November 7, 2024
PA DOC, SCI Houtzdale Warden :
Scott Klinefelter, Medical Director, :
MAT Specialist, Dr. Naji, Dr. Bloom, :
and Dr. Knowles, :
Respondents :
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
DISSENTING OPINION BY
JUDGE DUMAS FILED: March 6, 2025
I respectfully dissent for two reasons. First, I would stay this matter
brought by Travis A. White (Petitioner) per the bankruptcy court’s most recent stay
order. Dr. Muhammad Naji’s employer, Wellpath LLC, filed for bankruptcy on
November 11, 2024, and Dr. Naji filed the initial stay order with this Court.
Suggestion of Bankruptcy & Notice of Automatic Stay (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 508 M.D.
2023, filed Nov. 19, 2024) (Initial Stay Order).
Subsequently, numerous federal courts construed the scope of the Initial
Stay Order differently,1 which prompted the bankruptcy court to issue a revised stay
1
Compare, e.g., Bowser v. Watson (E.D. Mich., No. 2:23-cv-10568, filed Nov. 20, 2024), 2024
WL 4989327; Lentz v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr. (E.D. Mich., No. 2:24-cv-10198, filed Nov. 22, 2024),
2024 WL 4874213, with, e.g., Jones v. Cnty. of Fresno (E.D. Cal., No. 1:23-cv-01636, filed Dec. 16,
2024), 2024 WL 5125809; McLemore v. Cnty. of Mahoning (N.D. Ohio, No. 4:23-cv-1144, filed
Dec. 30, 2024), 2024 WL 5247847; Henderson v. Correct Care Sols., Inc. (W.D. Pa., No. 2:23-cv-
1224, filed Dec. 10, 2024) (ECF No. 68); Talbert v. Biden (W.D. Pa., No. 1:23-cv-260, filed Nov.
22, 2024) (ECF No. 200); Major v. Halligan (W.D. Pa., No. 1:21-cv-60, filed Nov. 18, 2024) (ECF
order. Stipulated & Agreed Am. Order, In re: Wellpath Holdings, Inc. (S.D. Tx.
Bankr., No. 24-90533, filed Jan. 6, 2025) (Wellpath) (ECF No. 962). ECF No. 962
defines several capitalized terms, including “Lawsuits,” which the majority relied
on in its order discounting the Initial Stay Order. Id. at 1 nn. 2-3; Order, 1/3/25, ¶ 6.
Critically, in its most recent interim stay order, the bankruptcy court did
not use the defined, capitalized term “Lawsuits” in staying any “claims or causes of
action that have been or may be asserted against any . . . current or former employees
of the Debtor to the extent the Debtors are not named defendants in the underlying
lawsuit . . . .” ECF No. 962, ¶ 2. The bankruptcy court also stayed claims or causes
of action asserted against the Debtors’ current or former clients and customers,
including their current or former employees. Id. ¶¶ 3-4.2
No. 221); Hernandez-Santana v. Little (E.D. Pa., No. 24-6447, filed Dec. 30, 2024), 2024 WL
5250350.
2
ECF No. 962 follows:
2. Any claims or causes of action that have been or may be asserted against
any of the Professional Corporations[] or their current or former employees, or
current or former employees of the Debtor to the extent the Debtors are not named
defendants in the underlying lawsuit, are stayed pursuant to section 362, and to the
extent applicable section 105, of the Bankruptcy Code on an interim basis to and
including February 18, 2025, to provide the Debtors the opportunity, as requested
by the Statutory Unsecured Claimholders’ Committee (the “Committee”), to
confirm and substantiate the scope and extent of Debtors’ indemnification
obligations owed to these parties as well as any relevant insurance considerations.
3. Any claims or causes of action that have been or may be asserted against
any of the Debtors’ current clients or customers or their current or former
employees are stayed pursuant to section 362, and to the extent applicable section
105, of the Bankruptcy Code on an interim basis to and including February 18, 2025,
to provide Debtors, as requested by the Committee, the opportunity to confirm and
substantiate the scope and extent of Debtors’ indemnification obligations owed to
these parties.
4. Any claims or causes of action that have been or may be asserted against
any of the Debtors’ former clients or customers are stayed . . . pursuant to section
362, and to the extent applicable section 105, of the Bankruptcy Code on an interim
basis to and including February 18, 2025, solely to provide the Debtors the
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The reason for the across-the-board stay is simple: the debtors are self-
insured and finance the defense of lawsuits up to their insurance policies’ deductible
limits, at which point the insurers take over—to the extent such coverage was not
previously exhausted. Financing the defense of lawsuits will necessarily deplete
assets available to their creditors, notwithstanding the absence of any claim for
money damages. See, e.g., Debtors’ Omnibus Objs. to Mots. for Relief From
Automatic Stay ¶¶ 56, 60, Wellpath (ECF No. 827) (contending stay should continue
because the debtors are, inter alia, contractually obligated to (1) indemnify, defend,
and hold harmless Kentucky’s Department of Corrections and its employees
regarding Wellpath’s health care to inmates, and (2) finance the defense of
Wellpath’s employees up to its insurance deductible in Henderson, a Pennsylvania
federal case); ECF No. 913-1 (discussing the debtors’ insurance coverage).3
Second, with utmost respect, I disagree with the majority’s wholesale
recharacterization of Petitioner’s claim for a preliminary injunction as a claim for a
permanent injunction. I recognize that we must construe pro se pleadings liberally.
Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 766 (Pa. 2014) (per curiam).
opportunity, as requested by the Committee, to establish that indemnification
obligations exist such that allowing such claims or causes of action to go forward
would result in an administrative claim against the Debtors’ estate.
ECF No. 962 ¶¶ 2-4. On February 20, 2025, the court issued its final stay order, which continues
the stay pending final disposition of the bankruptcy or April 30, 2025. Order, 2/20/25, ¶¶ 2-3,
Wellpath (ECF No. 1480).
3
Accord, e.g., Debtors’ Omnibus Reply ¶¶ 13, 19, 39, Wellpath (ECF No. 897) (alleging that
because the debtors are self-insured, they finance the defense out of the bankruptcy estate; further,
the Pennsylvania federal Major suit “be stayed as to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
defendants” because “Wellpath has agreed to provide correctional health care services for the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania” and has indemnified the municipality and its employees “for
claims related to medical care”); Debtors’ Emergency Mot. for Entry of Interim & Final Orders to
Enforce the Automatic Stay ¶ 5, Wellpath (ECF No. 17) (arguing “courts routinely extend the
Automatic Stay to non-debtor third-party co-defendants under this test where, as here, continued
litigation would,” e.g., “divert management’s and in-house counsel’s attention and resources”).
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Nevertheless, it is also well settled that courts “cannot be expected to become a
litigant’s counsel or find more in a written pro se submission than is fairly conveyed
in the pleading.”4 Id. (emphasis added). Although Blakeney did not address
injunctive relief, this Court has held that the “trial court erred in converting the
hearing on the preliminary injunction to a final hearing on the merits of the
permanent injunction . . . .” Big Bass Lake Cmty. Ass’n v. Warren, 950 A.2d 1137,
1149 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008); Gun Owners of Am., Inc. v. City of Phila., 308 A.3d 401,
404 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024) (en banc).
In my view, those cases stand for the clear proposition that this Court
should not remodel Petitioner’s request for preliminary injunctive relief as a claim
for a permanent injunction. Compare Pet. for Rev. ¶¶ 20-21 (explicitly requesting
“my preliminary injunction”), and Pet’r’s Br. at 12, 14 (discussing the elements for a
“preliminary injunction” and concluding that “I’ve shown and proven enough to the
court to have my preliminary injunction granted”), with White v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr.
(Pa. Cmwlth., No. 508 M.D. 2023, filed March 6, 2025), slip op. at 7 (opining that
“it is clear that he is ultimately seeking permanent injunctive relief”) & Order
(overruling the preliminary objections “with respect to the claim for a permanent
injunction”). Therefore, I would sustain the preliminary objections and dismiss his
petition for review without prejudice to reraise a claim for a permanent injunction if
that reflects his intent. I respectfully dissent.
LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
4
In Blakeney, the trial court denied the defendant’s pro se motion for expert witness fees at
the penalty phase of his trial. Blakeney, 108 A.3d at 766. Following his direct appeal, the defendant
collaterally attacked his conviction by asserting that his appellate counsel was ineffective by not
challenging the denial of expert fees for the guilt phase of his trial. Very simply, the Court declined
to liberally construe the defendant’s penalty phase motion as a guilt phase motion. Id.
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