Colangelo v. Albert

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CAROL ANNE COLANGELO and : CIVIL ACTION

DONALD COLANGELO :

□□ NO. 25-41

SGT. JUSTIN ALBERT

CAROL ANNE COLANGELO and : CIVIL ACTION

DONALD COLANGELO ;

v. NO. 25-45

PA STATE POLICE AVONDALE

CAROL ANNE COLANGELO and : CIVIL ACTION

DONALD COLANGELO :

v. NO. 25-48

CPL. KATHERINE FRANCK

CAROL ANNE COLANGELO and : CIVIL ACTION

DONALD COLANGELO :

Y. NO. 25-50

TROOPER IAN HUTCHINSON

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

Before this Court are four Complaints filed in state Court by Plaintiffs Carol Anne

Colangelo (“Carol”) and her husband Donald Joseph Colangelo (“Donald”, and, with Carol,

“Plaintiffs”) against various police officers and the Pennsylvania State Police (collectively, or in

any grouping, “Defendants”). Defendants removed these actions to Federal Court, and

subsequently filed motions to dismiss. Because the Complaints are nearly identical and the bases

for dismissal are as well, this Court will address all four Complaints in one omnibus opinion,

Upon review of the pleadings, the Complaints each fail to state a claim for which relief can be

granted, each motion to dismiss is granted.

Il. = Factual Background!

The following facts are present in afl four of the above Complaints. Plaintiffs allege* that

they received mail from the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (“PennDOT”), noting

that its records reflected that their vehicles were no longer insured. Consequently, the letter

stated, those vehicle registrations were going to be cancelled. Plaintiffs allege this letter was

mistaken, as they had switched insurance carrier, and did not fail to maintain proper insurance.

Plaintiffs allege they sent PennDOT a ietter informing it of their new vehicle insurance.

Plaintiffs allege that on August 31, 2024, Janiyiah Hope Colangelo (“Janiyiah”),

Plaintiffs’ daughter, was stopped by the Corporal Katherine Franck of the Pennsylvania State

Police. Plaintiffs allege that this vehicle stop was based upon the canceled vehicle registration,

Plaintiffs concede that Janiyiah handed Cpl. Franck an expired insurance card, which would have

‘The factual allegations of this case are, at times, difficult to discern from the Complaint,

which does not generally conform with the pleading rules of either the Pennsylvania or Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. Although it is not this Court’s responsibility to sift through the filings

to form a coherent set of factual allegations, this Court has done so, given the pro se status of

Plaintiffs. This Court considers factual assertions made in the letters which were attached as

exhibits to the Complaints to be well-plead allegations of the Complaints.

For the benefit of the pro se Plaintiffs, this Court wishes to explain what the word

“allege” means when used while analyzing a motion to dismiss, “Allege” when given its legal

meaning, does not express any skepticism about the truth of the statement, as it often does in

casual conversation. All the word “allege” means here is that Plaintiffs have asserted something

as a fact in their Complaint. If a Complaint stated that the sky is blue, this Court would still say

that Plaintiffs “allege” that the sky is blue. “Allege” just means that someone has claimed

something is true, and passes no judgment on whether it is true or not.

corroborated the information Cpl. Franck obtained from running the vehicle’s licenses plates

(that the registration had expired due to expired insurance). Plaintiffs aliege that either Caro! or

Donald then spoke with Cpl. Franck by speakerphone and that Plaintiffs offered to send proof of

the active insurance card. Cpl, Franck allegedly suggested that Plaintiffs update the registration

online. Plaintiffs concede that they did not wish to do so because they believed the onus was on

the Commonwealth to update the registration. That vehicle stop resulted in a traffic citation,

attached by Plaintiffs to their Complaint, for “Operation Following Suspension of Registration”

to Jantyiah, with the notation “Provided Expired Insurance Card.”

After that interaction, Plaintiffs allege that cither Carol or Donald called the State Police

Internal Affairs and reached Set. Justin Albert. Plaintiffs allege that Sgt. Albert said there was

nothing he could do about the issue until after it went to court. Plaintiffs then summarily allege

harassment by letter from the Commonwealth, and that Cpl. Franck and Sgt. Albert “failed to

prevent the situation from continuing... .” On November 6, 2024, while awaiting a court date on

the aforementioned traffic citation, Janiyiah was again stopped, this time by Kennett ‘Township

Police Officer Ford (not a party to any of these cases), who upon receiving proof of the active

insurance policy, issued a warning which stated no further action was required of Janiyiah.

In only the Colangelo, et al. v. Hutchinson (2:25-cv-00050-GAW) Complaint, Plaintiffs

make separate allegations regarding a third traffic stop. In just the Hutchinson case, Plaintiffs

allege that on November 30, 2024, Trooper Jan Hutchinson stopped one of the family vehicles

while Donald was driving the vehicle and Carol was a passenger within it. The Hutchinson

Complaint alleges that Trooper Hutchinson said he was aware of the problems caused by

switching vehicle insurance but issued a traffic citation for driving on a suspended registration.

The Complaint alleges that Carol “felt very threaten” [sic] when Trooper Hutchinson ordered

Donald out of his car during the traffic stop. Carol also alleges that she thought Trooper

Hutchinson was “going to beat [Donald] up.” Carol alleges that when she stepped out of the

vehicle, Trooper Hutchinson ordered her to return to the vehicle.

WI. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits this Court to dismiss counts of a

complaint if they fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. “To survive a motion to

dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Zuber v. Boscov's, 871 F.3d 255, 258 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court must “construe the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint,

the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.

2009), But the Court cannot draw any unreasonable or unsupported inferences, See, e.g.: Curay-

Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, Delaware, Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 133 Gd Cir. 2006)

CFWle need not credit the non-movant's conclusions of law or unreasonable factual

inferences.”); Little v. Chambersburg Hosp., No. 1:11-CV-01804, 2012 WL 1048820, at *4

(M.D. Pa. Mar, 28, 2012) (“The deferential standard of review applicable to a motion to dismiss

does not go so far as to require this Court to accept unsupported inferences drawn by the

Plaintiff”).

A formulaic recitation of the elements of a claim will not suffice. Rather, a pleader is

required to “set forth sufficient information to outline the elements of his claim or to permit

inferences to be drawn that these elements exist.” Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir,

1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Conclusory statements and unfounded

speculation are insufficient to state a claim. Parker y. Pennstar Bank, NBT, 436 F. App'x 124,

127 (3d Cir. 2611). While this Court holds a pre se complaint to a less stringent standard, a case

must be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See, e.g.: Johnson

v. Hill, 910 F. Supp. 218, 221 (E.D, Pa. 1996) (dismissing pro se complaint despite deference).

IV. Analysis

a. § 1983 Claim in Colangelo, et al, vy. Hutchinson (No. 25-50)

This Court first begins with the $1983 claim in the Hutchinson case, which comes closest

to stating a claim upon which relief can be granted. Unlike each of the other cases (explained

infra), the Hutchinson Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs- not their daughter- were stopped by

Trooper Hutchinson.

As Trooper Hutchinson rightly points out, the Hutchinson Complaint does not actually

allege what substantive right Plaintiffs seek to vindicate under §1983. But, reading the

attachments to the Hufchinson Complaint generously, this Court assumes that Piaintiffs seek to

claim that Trooper Hutchinson committed a § 1983 violation of their 4% Amendment right to be

free of unreasonable search and seizure. This claim must be dismissed.

From the face of the Complaint, it is clear that PennDOT’s records reported to Officer

Hutchinson that Plaintiffs’ vehicles were no longer properly registered. Whether or not that

information was ultimately accurate or was inaccurate due to alleged recordkeeping failings at

PennDOT, that information still formed probable cause which justified the temporary seizure of

Plaintiffs and their vehicle by Trooper Hutchinson? United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d

392, 398 (3d Cir. 2006) (“fA]n officer need not be factually accurate in her belief that a traffic

law had been violated but, instead, need only produce facts establishing that she reasonably

3 It is far from clear that there was even a mistake by any officers here. The onus may well

be on Plaintiffs to take whatever steps are necessary to ensure their vehicles are properly

registered before taking them on the road, even if they are blameless for the cancellation of the

registration in the first instance. But because this Court is not Traffic Court, it need not resolve

that question to resolve these motions.

believed that a violation had taken place.”). “A reasonable mistake of fact does not violate the

Fourth Amendment.” /d (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). There are no facts in

the Complaint from which the Court can reasonably infer that the duration of the stop went

beyond what was necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Nor are Carol’s subjective fears

or Trooper Hutchinson’s allegedly loud commands enough to create a claim of misconduct in the

course of the traffic stop. Because there are no allegations which would form an unreasonable

search or seizure that would violate the 4" Amendment, Plaintiffs have not alleged a § 1983

claim upon which relief can be granted as to Trooper Hutchinson.

b. § 1983 Claim in Colangelo, et al. v. Sgt. Justin Albert (No. 25-41); Colangelo

et al. v. PA State Police Avondale (No. 25-45); Colangelo et al. v. Cpl.

Katherine Franck (No. 24-58),

The Complaints against Sgt. Albert, Cpl. Franck, and PA State Police Avondale each

assert a § 1983 claim against their defendants, which this Court again gieans is also likely rooted

in an argument that there was a seizure which violated the 4" Amendment, Unlike the

Hutchinson Complaint, these three Complaints make no reference to the third traffic stop where

Donald and Carol where in the vehicle. Rather, the only traffic stops alluded to in these

Complaints are the two aforementioned stops of Janiyiah, Carol and Donald’s daughter, who is

not a party to these claims. These claims are easily dismissed.

In the first instance, for the same reasons explained supra regarding Trooper

Hutchinson’s traffic stop, there are no facts in the Complaints which could lead this Court to find

the traffic stops in question were a violation of anyone's civil rights, But were there a colorable

civil rights claim which could find its basis in those stops, it could only conceivably belong to

Janiyiah, not Plaintiffs. The fact that Janiviah was stopped- not Plaintiffs- is fatal to the § 1983

claims in the case against Sgt. Albert, Cpl. Franck, and the PA State Police Avondale. As a

general rule, one cannot challenge the Constitutional validity of a stop of another. United States

v. Marrocco, 578 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir, 2009) (“Mr. Marrocco does not have standing to claim

that the officers impermissibly detained Mr. Fallon.’”)

c. The Remaining Claims in Ali Cases.

Because the Complaint fails to comport with the standards generally required under the

Pennsylvania or Federal Ruies of Civil Procedure, this Court expended great effort to identify the

remaining claims of the Complaints. Having construed the Complaints liberally, this Court has

identified at least five additional causes of action. Upon analysis of these claims, this Court

determines that the remaining counts of each Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted.

i. 18 ULS.C, §§ 241 and 242

Plaintiffs’ claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 fail because, as Defendants each point

out, there is no private cause of action available under these statutes. Carpenter v. Ashby, 351 F.

App’x 684, 688 Gd Cir. 2009) ([W]e agree with the District Court's dismissal of the 18 U.S.C. §

241 and § 242 claims. Neither statute creates a civil cause of action.”). Put more simply, these

statutes create criminal offenses which federal prosecutors can choose to pursue or not pursue in

criminal court. The statutes do not create a basis by which private citizens can sue each other or

the government. For that reason, these civil causes of action which Plaintiffs attempt to bring

under a criminal statute must be dismissed.

ii, 42 CFR 488.301 “Mental Anguish”

Plaintiffs purport to bring a claim for mental anguish pursuant to 42 CFR 488,30, That

citation leads to a definitional section of the Code of Federal Regulations. More specifically, it is

a series of definitions applicable to certain regulations regarding the Centers for Medicare &

Medicaid Services. These definitions are clearly irrelevant. Furthermore, they do not create any

cause of action, Any claim purportedly brought under this definitional section must be dismissed.

fii, 42 U.S.C. § 1986

In order to prevail on a claim under § 1986, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) the defendant

had actual knowledge of a § 1985 conspiracy, (2) the defendant had the power to prevent or aid

in preventing the commission of a § 1985 violation, (3) the defendant neglected or refused to

prevent a § 1985 conspiracy, and (4) a wrongful act was committed,” Clark vy. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d

1290, 1295 (3d Cir. 1994), In order to have a § 1985(3) violation’, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a

conspiracy; (2) motivated by a racial or class based discriminatory animus designed to deprive,

directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons to the equal protection of the laws; (3) an act

in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an injury to person or property or the deprivation of any

right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.” Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 685 Gd Cir.

1997).

There are no facts alleged in the Complaints which would permit this Court to infer, even

with additional pro se deference, that any of the Defendants have stated a claim for neglecting to

prevent a § 1985 conspiracy. Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts whatsoever related to racial or

class-based discriminatory animus. Further, there are no allegations of any conversations or

agreements or common purposes among alleged conspirators. And, as this Court explained

supra, there was no deprivation of rights associated with the three traffic stops referenced in the

Complaints, For that reason, the § 1986 claim must fail.

4 The other types of conspiracies prohibited by 42 U.S.C § 1985 (preventing an officer

from performing duties, obstructing justice, and intimidating a party, witness, or juror) are even

less applicable here.

iv. Breach of Fiduciary Duties

Plaintiffs allege that Set. Albert and Trooper Hutchinson breached a fiduciary duty in the

course of their official duties; fielding and responding to complaints for interna! affairs (for Sgt.

Albert), and conducting the third traffic stop (for Trooper Hutchinson). There are no facts in

either Complaint which could possibly lead to a finding that either officer owed a fiduciary duty

to Plaintiffs as individual citizens to perform his their responsibilities in a particular way. For

that reason, the claims are meritless. And even if there were some theorical merit to the claim,

Defendants enjoy sovereign immunity with respect to actions and inactions taken within the

scope of their duties. 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310. None of the enumerated exceptions apply, 42 Pa.C.S. §

8522(a), (b)(1)-(10). For this reason, too, this claim must be dismissed. Finally, even if this claim

were viable, because the federal claims (addressed supra) have each been dismissed, there would

no longer be a federal question justifying subject matter jurisdiction, and this Court would

decline to continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over it.

v. Miscellanea

Finaily, Plaintiffs bare list of causes of action includes things like “not listening to the

citizens [sic] right,” and “not obeying her oath of office.” There are no associated statutes or

causes of action cited. For the avoidance of doubt, this Court will directly state that these are not

recognized private causes of action under Pennsylvania or federal law and therefore any causes

of action purporting to be brought under these theories are dismissed.

d. Prejudice

This Court’s final determination is whether these cases should be dismissed with or

without prejudice. A complaint can be dismissed with prejudice when amendment would be

“futile.” Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 Gd Cir. 2002). Amendment is

futile where, even after amendment, the complaint would still fail to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 Gd Cir. 2000).

As this Court has held above, there are no private claims available under 18 U.S.C. §§

241 and 242 or 42 CFR 488.301. For that reason, all claims based on those are dismissed with

prejudice. Because Pennsylvania’s sovereign immunity applies, no amendment could save the

fiduciary duty claims against Sgt. Albert and Trooper Hutchinson, those claims are also

dismissed with prejudice. Because this Court has found that the traffic stops were lawful and

because there are no allegations whatsoever regarding discrimination based on membership in a

protected class, Plaintiffs’ § 1986 claims must be dismissed with prejudice, Plaintiffs’ § 1983

claims against Sgt. Albert, Cpl. Franck, and PA State Police Avondale must be dismissed with

prejudice because they themselves were not seized and the traffic stops and steps taken

afterward were clearly lawful.’ Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against Trooper Hutchinson is

dismissed with prejudice as to the lawfulness of the initial stop and the traffic citation received.

This Court, giving additional deference to pro se Plaintiffs, will dismiss the § 1983 count

without prejudice as to Trooper Hutchinson’s conduct during the course of the stop. An

appropriate order will be docketed separately.

Dated: March 5, 2025 BY THE COURT:

While this order does not bind Janiyiah as she is not presently before it, Plaintiffs are

advised that pro se representation only permits non-lawyers to represent themselves, and would

therefore prohibit Plaintiffs from pursuing a further action on behalf of Janiyiah. See generally:

https://perma.cc/96JT-8A8N (EDPA Pro Se Instructions); Yoder v. Dist, Att'y Montgomery Cnty.,

790 F. App'x 478, 481 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[A]n individual proceeding pro se may not represent

third parties in federal court... .”).

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