TRIEU v. SPOTTS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TUAN ANH TRIEU, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-CV-4876

:

LAUREN SPOTTS, :

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM

SÁNCHEZ, J. MARCH 5, 2025

Pro se Plaintiff Tuan Anh Trieu, an incarcerated individual at SCI Phoenix, asserts

constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after he was denied reenrollment in the

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections’ Sex Offender Program, a requirement for his parole.

Trieu was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Trieu’s initial Complaint was dismissed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) upon screening as it failed to state a claim. See Trieu

v. Spotts, No. 24-4876, 2024 WL 5188043, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2024). Trieu returned with

this Amended Complaint.1 The Court will dismiss Trieu’s Amended Complaint for the reasons

stated.

1 Trieu again used the form complaint available to unrepresented litigants to file his

claims and added typed pages and exhibits. (ECF No. 10.) Trieu also attached to his Complaint

grievance and other prison documents. (Id. at 21-71.) The Court considers the entire submission

as the Amended Complaint, and adopts the sequential pagination assigned by the CM/ECF

docketing system. Trieu subsequently filed a copy of his Amended Complaint but did not attach

any of the exhibits or extra typewritten pages to that filing. (See ECF No. 12.) Thus, the Court

will consider ECF No. 10 as the operative Amended Complaint. The Court will correct

punctuation, spelling, and capitalization errors when quoting from the Amended Complaint.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS2

In his initial Complaint, Trieu alleged violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights by

sole Defendant Dr. Lauren Spotts, a psychologist at SCI Phoenix who runs the prison’s Sex

Offender Program. (Compl. (ECF No. 2) at 4.) Trieu alleged that Spotts deprived him of his

liberty interest in parole eligibility by preventing him from participating in the Sex Offender

Program, a requirement before an inmate can meet with the parole board. (Id. at 3, 13.) Trieu

was originally enrolled in the program in March of 2024 but was then removed in June of 2024.

(Id. at 13, 28, 31, 43-44.) Trieu alleged that Spotts treated him unfairly, is a “racist” who harbors

“Asian hate,” and is an “evil doctor.” (Id. at 5, 12.) He further stated that Spotts wrote him up

for a “misconduct” in April of 2024 in order to have him removed from the program and have his

eligibility for parole “prolonged.” (Id. at 13.) For relief, Trieu requested that the Court help him

get “back to the parole board” so that he can be united with his family. (Id. at 5.)

In its December 20 Memorandum, the Court granted Trieu leave to proceed in forma

pauperis and construed the Complaint as asserting Fourteenth Amendment claims for due

process and equal protection. See Trieu, 2024 WL 5188043, at *3. The Court concluded that the

due process claims must be dismissed with prejudice because “Trieu has no constitutionally

protected interest in parole or any parole procedures, including being provided an interview with

the parole board.” Id. at *2 (citing cases). The Court also concluded that Trieu failed to state a

plausible equal protection claim because he merely asserted “in conclusory fashion that Spotts

treated him unfairly and is ‘racist’” but failed to “allege any facts that raise a plausible inference

that Spotts discriminated against him on the basis of his race.” Id. at *3. The Court advised

2 The factual allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Trieu’s Amended

Complaint. (ECF No. 10.) Where the Court quotes from the Amended Complaint, punctuation,

spelling, and capitalization errors will be cleaned up.

Trieu that he could amend his equal protection claim if he could allege facts to cure the defects

as to that claim. Id. Trieu returned with this Amended Complaint, which again names Dr. Spotts

only.

Trieu asserts nearly identical allegations in his Amended Complaint. He states that in

July 2022, Spotts invited him to participate SCI Phoenix’s Sex Offender Program. (Am. Compl.

at 40.) However, Trieu did not enroll in the program until March 2024 because Spotts allegedly

failed to complete Trieu’s paperwork. (Id. at 21-24, 40, 46.) For reasons that are not clear, Trieu

was removed from the program a few months later. (Id. at 46.)3 Trieu alleges that Spotts treated

him unfairly by causing parole board meetings to be “postponed and delayed” in February and

May of 2024. (Id. at 7, 40.) He further alleges that when he complained about Spotts, she

“punished” him “with two misconducts.” (Id. at 7.) Trieu states that Spotts has “Asian hate” and

is a “racist.” (Id. at 5, 40.) He avers that Spotts refused to translate all of the program

documents to Vietnamese and never called Trieu by his name but instead only waved one finger

at him. (Id. at 40.) Trieu again asserts in his Amended Complaint that he was deprived of his

“liberty interest in parole eligibility” by not being permitted to participate in the Sex Offender

Program. (Id. at 3.) For relief, Trieu again requests that the Court help him get “back to the

parole board” so that he can be united with his family. (Id. at 5.)

3 A grievance document attached as an exhibit to the Amended Complaint reveals that

“[o]n 6/18/24, the Sex Offender Treatment Team met with [Trieu] to discuss concerns about

[his] participating in the program” and “[t]he final decision of the treatment team was to remove

[him] from [his] treatment group due to violations of the terms and conditions of SOP group

programing.” (Am. Compl. at 46.) Trieu was allegedly placed on a waiting list to be invited to

rejoin the program at a later date. (Id.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

As Trieu is proceeding pro se, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) applies and requires the

Court to dismiss the Amended Complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether a complaint fails to

state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to

dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d

236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to determine whether the complaint contains

“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). At this early stage of the

litigation, the Court will accept the facts alleged in the pro se complaint as true, draw all

reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, and ask only whether the complaint contains facts

sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir.

2021), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d

Cir. 2024). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As Trieu is

proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185

(3d Cir. 2021).

III. DISCUSSION

Trieu again brings Fourteenth Amendment claims pursuant to § 1983, the vehicle by

which federal constitutional claims may be brought against state actors in federal court. “To

state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the

Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was

committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

The Court previously dismissed Trieu’s due process claim with prejudice. See Trieu, 2024 WL

5188043, at *2 (“Since Trieu has no constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole or any

parole procedures, including being provided an interview with the parole board, his claim for a

due process violation based on Defendant Spotts’s actions in allegedly preventing his completion

of the Sex Offender Program necessarily fails.” (citing cases)). Accordingly, to the extent that

Trieu attempts to reassert a due process claim in his Amended Complaint, the claim is also

dismissed with prejudice.

Trieu’s equal protection claim remains. As the Court explained in its December 20

Memorandum, “[t]he Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no

State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is

essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of

Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.

202, 216 (1982)). To establish an equal protection violation, a prisoner must allege “that he was

treated differently than other similarly situated inmates, and that this different treatment was the

result of intentional discrimination based on his membership in a protected class.” Mack v.

Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d

277, 294, 298 (3d Cir. 2015)). “Persons are ‘similarly situated’ for purposes of an equal

protection claim when ‘they are alike in all relevant aspects.’” Startzell v. City of Philadelphia,

533 F.3d 183, 203 (3d Cir. 2008) (emphasis omitted). A plaintiff claiming race-based

discrimination must prove defendants acted with racial bias. W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 503

(3d Cir. 1995) (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971); Pratt v. Thornburgh, 807

F.2d 355, 357 (3d Cir. 1986)).

In support of an equal protection claim, Trieu again alleges that Spotts harbors “Asian

hate” and is a “racist.” (Am. Compl. at 5, 40.) He also alleges that she treated him unfairly by

interfering with his parole board meetings, issuing him misconducts, refusing to translate

documents to Vietnamese, and using hand gestures to get his attention. Although these

allegations may raise a plausible inference that Trieu was treated unfairly, this is not enough to

state a plausible claim. Notably, Trieu has again failed to allege how Spotts treated him

differently than other similarly situated inmates who were not in a race-based protected class.

See Perano v. Twp. of Tilden, 423 F. App’x 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2011) (“At the motion to dismiss

stage, Perano must allege facts sufficient to make plausible the existence of such similarly

situated parties.”); Carson v. Mulvihill, 488 F. App’x 554, 563 (3d Cir. 2012) (rejecting equal

protection claim when inmate did “not allege facts showing that he was similarly situated to the

inmates” who received accommodations “or that there was no rational basis for his different

treatment”). Accordingly, Trieu failed to raise a plausible inference that Spotts discriminated

against him based on his race.4

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss Trieu’s Amended Complaint pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. As Trieu has already been given an

opportunity to cure the defects in his claims and has been unable to do so, the Court concludes

that further amendment would be futile. See Jones v. Unknown D.O.C. Bus Driver & Transp.

Crew, 944 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 2019) (amendment by pro se litigant would be futile when

4 To the extent Trieu alleges any claims based on the allegation that he was forced to

admit guilt to participate in the Sex Offender Program, the claim similarly lacks merit. See

Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 775, 781 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal of First Amendment

claim because “the prison may structure its treatment programs and pursue legitimate

penological objectives,” including conditioning parole for sex offenders on their admission of

guilt); Roman v. DiGuglielmo, 675 F.3d 204, 214 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Roman’s Fifth Amendment

claim fails because the consequence he faces—the repeat denial of parole for refusing to

participate in the sex offender rehabilitation program—does not rise to the level of compulsion

necessary to violate the Fifth Amendment.”).

litigant “already had two chances to tell his story”). Accordingly, Trieu’s Amended Complaint

will be dismissed with prejudice. An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Juan R. Sánchez

JUAN R. SÁNCHEZ, J.