Taylor v. Illinois

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

RAPHAEL TAYLOR, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:22-CV-2837-MAB

)

ROGER SULLIVAN, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:

This matter is currently before the Court on the motion for summary judgment on

the issue of exhaustion filed by Defendant Roger Sullivan (Doc. 34). To date, Plaintiff

Raphael Taylor has not filed a response to the motion. Despite the lack of opposition from

Plaintiff, there are evident issues of fact that preclude the Court from awarding summary

judgment to Defendant, and Defendant’s motion is therefore denied.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Raphael Taylor, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections,

brought this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he sought protective

custody at Shawnee Correctional Center and “feared for his life[,] because inmates and

correctional officers were trying to force [him] to join a homosexual cult.” (Doc. 18; see

also Doc. 25). The pertinent factual allegations are that Plaintiff was housed at Shawnee

Correctional Center from April 14, 2022, through April 27, 2023 (Doc. 34-1). Plaintiff

alleges that on or around June 14, 2022, Plaintiff requested protective custody because

inmates and officers were actively trying to force him to join a homosexual cult (Doc. 18,

p. 5; see also Doc. 25, p. 3). In order to join the cult, Plaintiff would have to have sex with

a male officer or inmate or be photographed with an officer or inmate’s penis in his mouth

(Doc. 18, p. 7). According to Plaintiff, he spoke with Internal Affairs and was informed

that he was being placed in protective custody (Doc. 18, pp. 5–6). Plaintiff was kept on

protective custody status from June 14, 2022, through November 10, 2022 (Id.).

Once out of protective custody, Plaintiff alleges that on December 8, 2022,

Defendant Roger Sullivan, who is a correctional officer at Shawnee, another officer, and

an inmate went to his cell “like they were trying to scare me.” (Doc. 18, p. 7). But “after

Sullivan saw that I wasn’t afraid of them he closed [the] cell” and then began harassing

Plaintiff “everyday after” (Id.). For example, Defendant Sullivan entered his cell and

ripped up his clothes, broke his tablet, and stole some of his court documents (although

Plaintiff did not learn Sullivan was responsible until later) (Id. at pp. 7–8). On another

occasion, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sullivan purposely made him 30 minutes late

for a call pass to the law library (Id. at p. 8). And Plaintiff alleges that Sullivan and some

other officers took him to segregation in December 2022 under false pretenses in order to

cover up Sullivan’s actions and scare him into not “fil[ing] charges on . . . Sullivan” (Id.).

Following a threshold review of Plaintiff’s amended complaint pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915A, he was permitted to proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim for cruel

and unusual punishment against Defendant Sullivan for attempting to force Plaintiff to

engage in homosexual behavior, to pose for inappropriate photographs, and/or to join a

homosexual cult or religion (Doc. 25).

On March 18, 2024, Defendant Sullivan filed a motion for summary judgment on

the issue of exhaustion (Doc. 34). He acknowledges there are grievances that specifically

allege some type of wrongdoing on his part but argues they are insufficient to exhaust

Plaintiff’s claims against him for one reason or another (Doc. 34, p. 15).

Defendant Sullivan initially neglected to provide Plaintiff with the requisite Rule

56 Notice advising him of the consequences of failing to respond to the motions for

summary judgment and the necessity of supporting his response with affidavits or other

documentary evidence, but Defendant did so after prompting from the Court (Doc. 36;

see also Doc. 35). See Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 248 (7th Cir. 1996); Timms v. Frank, 953

F.2d 281, 285 (7th Cir. 1992); Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 102 (7th Cir. 1982). Shortly

thereafter, Plaintiff filed a motion indicating that he had yet to receive a copy of the Merit

Review Order (which had been entered in October 2023 (Doc. 25)) and questioning the

authority of the Illinois Attorney General's Office to represent Defendant Sullivan (Doc.

37). Plaintiff’s deadline to respond to Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the

issue of exhaustion was temporarily stayed and a hearing was set to sort through whether

Plaintiff had received any of the documents filed in the case since the Merit Review Order

was issued in October 2023 (Doc. 39). Following the hearing, the Clerk of Court mailed

Plaintiff a copy of the Merit Review Order, as well as Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment with all of the supporting exhibits and the Rule 56 Notice (Doc. 41).

Plaintiff’s deadline to respond to the motion for summary judgment was reset to

September 6, 2024 (Doc. 41). That deadline has come and gone, and Plaintiff has yet to

file a response or a motion seeking additional time to do so.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV.

P. 56(a). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court’s role is not to determine

the truth of the matter, and the court does not “weigh conflicting evidence, resolve

swearing contests, determine credibility, or ponder which party's version of the facts is

most likely to be true.” Stewart v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 14 F.4th 757, 760 (7th Cir.

2021). Instead, the court’s task is to view the record and draw all reasonable inferences in

the light most favorable to the non-moving party and decide if there is a genuine material

dispute of fact that requires a trial. Stewart, 14 F.4th at 760; Hansen v. Fincantieri Marine

Grp., LLC, 763 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 2014). Where, as here, “a nonmovant fails to respond

to a motion for summary judgment, the movant ‘still ha[s] to show that summary

judgment was proper given the undisputed facts,’ with those facts taken as usual in the

light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Robinson v. Waterman, 1 F.4th 480, 483 (7th Cir.

2021) (quoting Yancick v. Hanna Steel Corp., 653 F.3d 532, 543 (7th Cir. 2011)).

The Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that a prisoner may not bring a lawsuit

about prison conditions unless and until he has exhausted all available administrative

remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 903 (7th Cir. 2011).

Exhaustion is an affirmative defense, which the defendants bear the burden of proving.

Pavey, 663 F.3d at 903 (citations omitted). In order for a prisoner to properly exhaust his

or her administrative remedies, the prisoner must “file complaints and appeals in the

place, and at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286

F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006). Failure to

do so means failure to exhaust. Riccardo v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521, 524 (7th Cir. 2004).

As an inmate in the IDOC, Plaintiff was required to follow the three-step

grievance process outlined in the Illinois Administrative Code to exhaust his claims. 20

ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.800, et seq. (2017). Inmates first submit their grievance to their

counselor. Id. at § 504.810(a).1 After receiving the counselor’s response, they must submit

the grievance to the grievance officer, who tenders a recommendation to the warden, who

then provides the inmate with a written decision. Id. at § 504.830(e). Id. If the inmate is

unsatisfied with the warden’s decision, the inmate can appeal to the Administrative

Review Board (“ARB”) for a final determination by the Director of the IDOC. Id. at §

504.850(a), (d), (e).

An inmate may also request that a grievance be handled as an emergency by

submitting the grievance directly to the warden. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.840. If the

warden finds that an emergency exists, then the grievance will be handled on an

expedited basis. Id. On the other hand, if the warden determines that the grievance should

not be handled on an emergency basis, the inmate is notified and must resubmit the

grievance through the standard grievance process.” Id.

DISCUSSION

In this case, Plaintiff failure to respond to Defendants’ motions for summary

judgment is deemed an admission that Defendants’ version of the facts is true. SDIL-LR

1 There are exceptions to this rule, none of which apply here. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 504.810, 504.830 (2017).

56.1(g) (“All material facts set forth in a Statement of Material Facts . . . shall be deemed

admitted for purposes of summary judgment unless specifically disputed.”). The Court

thus credits Defendant’s uncontroverted facts so long as they are properly supported by

evidence in the record. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2); Keeton v. Morningstar, Inc., 667 F.3d 877,

884 (7th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Defendant’s facts are also supplemented by

additional facts the Court came across in its review of the evidence that were relevant to

the issue at hand.

The records demonstrate that Plaintiff was a prolific grievance writer (see Doc. 34-

2 through 34-11). According to Defendant, Plaintiff submitted approximately two dozen

grievances in 2022 and 2023 that are “tangentially” related to his claims in this case (Doc.

34, pp. 3–11). Of those grievances, Defendant claims there are four that specifically allege

some type of wrongdoing on his part but are insufficient to exhaust Plaintiff’s claims

against him for one reason or another (Doc. 34, p. 15). After reviewing the evidence,

however, the Court believes there is at least one additional grievance in which Plaintiff

complained about conduct that he now claims Defendant Sullivan was responsible for.

Each grievance will be discussed in turn below.

A. Emergency Grievance #2023-1-32, dated December 28, 2023

According to Defendant, this is the first grievance that specifically mentions him

(Doc. 34, pp. 9, 15; Doc. 34-2, pp. 61–63; Doc. 34-6, pp. 6–9). The evidence demonstrates,

and Defendant concedes, this grievance went through every step of the grievance process

before being denied on the merits by the ARB (see Doc. 34, p. 9; see also Doc. 34-6, pp. 6–

9). The Court thus finds this grievance was fully exhausted. Defendant argues that this

grievance is nevertheless insufficient to exhaust Plaintiff’s claim against him because it is

“irrelevant,” as “the issues considered in that grievance are not germane to the issues of

Plaintiff’s current suit” (Doc. 34, p. 15). The Court is not persuaded.

In this grievance, Plaintiff complained that Defendant Sullivan caused him to

miss thirty minutes of law library “in retaliation for a lawsuit that [he] filed against

I.D.O.C.” (Doc. 34-6, pp. 8–9). This same incident is one of the many ways Plaintiff alleged

in the complaint that Defendant harassed him (see Doc. 19, p. 8). Therefore, this grievance

specifically relates to one of the events underlying Plaintiff’s claim in this action.

B. Emergency Grievance #2023-1-31, dated December 30, 2022

This is the second grievance that specifically mentions Defendant Sullivan (Doc.

34, pp. 9–10, 15; see Doc. 34-2, pp. 31–34; Doc. 34-5, pp. 7–13). The evidence demonstrates,

and Defendant acknowledges, this grievance went through every step of the grievance

process before the ARB issued a decision on the merits (see Doc. 34, pp. 9–10; see also Doc.

34-5, pp. 7–13). The Court thus finds this grievance was fully exhausted. However,

Defendant once again argues that this grievance is irrelevant (Doc. 34, p. 15). And once

again, the Court is not persuaded.

In this grievance, Plaintiff complained about numerous things, including that an

officer went in his cell and broke his tablet, cut up his clothing, and took his court

documents (Doc. 34-5, pp. 12–13). He also complained that Defendant Sullivan and other

officers took him to segregation even though he did not violate any IDOC rules (Id.).

These are some of the very same ways that Plaintiff alleged in the complaint that

Defendant harassed him (see Doc. 19, pp. 7–8). This grievance covers some of the events

underlying Plaintiff’s claim in this action.

C. Emergency Grievance #2023-2-62, dated February 2, 2023

This is the third grievance that specifically mentions Defendant Sullivan (Doc. 34,

pp. 11, 15-16; see Doc. 34-2, pp. 43–44). In this grievance, Plaintiff alleged that he was

released from restrictive housing on February 2, 2023, and Defendant Sullivan tried to

put him in a cell with another inmate even though he told Sullivan that “it is in my file

that I can not [sic] have a cellmate” and that he was “suspost [sic] to be in protective

custody.” (Doc. 34-2, pp. 43, 44). Plaintiff said Sullivan “became hostile” with him and

eventually issued him an erroneous ticket for refusing housing (Id.).

The warden declined to process the grievance on an emergency basis (see Doc. 34-

2, pp. 43, 44). According to Defendant, ‘it does not appear” that Plaintiff re-submitted this

grievance “to a grievance counselor” through the regular grievance process, thus

implying the grievance is unexhausted (Doc. 34, pp. 11, 15 (citing Doc. 34-2, pp. 43–44)).

However, the grievance plainly shows that after the warden deemed the grievance to be

a non-emergency, the counselor responded to it (see Doc. 34-2, p. 43), which suggests

Plaintiff did in fact resubmit the grievance through the regular grievance process.

Additionally, the grievance officer’s report to the aforementioned emergency grievance

#2023-1-31 seems to indicate that it was also in response to six other grievances, including

#2023-2-62 (see Doc. 34-5, p. 10). Indeed, the grievance officer’s report addresses issues

that were not contained within emergency grievance #2023-1-31 but were part of the

other six grievances listed. The same goes for the ARB’s response to grievance #2023-1-

31 (see Doc. 34-5, p. 7). In particular, the ARB’s response addresses Plaintiff’s complaint

of “having a cellmate, wants PC,” (Doc. 34-5, p. 7), which is never mentioned in

emergency grievance #2023-1-31 but is one of the complaints in grievance #2023-2-62. For

these reasons, the Court believes an issue of fact exists to whether this grievance was fully

exhausted.

D. Emergency Grievance #2023-2-98, dated February 10, 2023

This is the fourth grievance that specifically mentions Defendant Sullivan (Doc.

34, pp. 10–11, 16; see Doc. 34-2, pp. 11–14; Doc. 34-5, pp. 3–6). In this grievance, Plaintiff

complains that he received a ticket in January 2023 and was given segregation and a

month of C-grade “to keep me on the C-grade unit with Sargent Sullivan who keep

making homosexual justs [sic] at me trying to for [sic] me to join a homosexual cult” (Doc.

34-5, p. 6). Plaintiff further alleged that “on February 3, 2023[,] Sargent Sullivan had

another c/o write me a ticket because I told him that I’m not suspost [sic] to have a cell

mate” (Id.).

The warden determined this grievance did not present and emergency, and

Plaintiff resubmitted it back through the normal grievance process (see Doc. 34-5, p. 5).

His counselor responded in late March 2023 and Plaintiff then sent the grievance on to

the grievance officer (see id.). Before he got a response, however, Plaintiff was transferred

out of Shawnee and sent to Lawrence on April 27, 2023 (Doc. 34-1, p. 1). The grievance

officer reviewed the grievance on June 30, 2023, approximately three months after

receiving it (Doc. 34-5, p. 4). The warden then denied and/or mooted the grievance on

July 12, 2023, because “issues regarding PREA allegations have been addressed and

individual is no longer at Shawnee CC” (Id.). Plaintiff appealed to the ARB, where his

appeal was received on August 17, 2023 (Id. at p. 3). The ARB returned the grievance

without further redress because it was untimely as it was received “30 days past date of

Chief Administrative Officer’s decision.” (Id.).

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s untimely appeal to the ARB means that this

grievance was not fully exhausted (Doc. 34, pp. 10–11, 16). Based on the record, however,

the Court finds that an issue of fact exists as to whether Plaintiff’s appeal was indeed

untimely. The record indicates that the grievance office at Plaintiff’s new facility

(Lawrence) received the decision from the warden at Shawnee on August 11, 2023, which

is exactly 30 days after the decision was issued and the deadline for Plaintiff to appeal to

the ARB (Doc. 34-5, p. 4). 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(a) (“The appeal must be received

by the Administrative Review Board within 30 days after the date of the [warden’s]

decision.”) This begs the question as to whether the warden’s decision was provided to

Plaintiff in time for him to place his appeal in the mail to the ARB and for the ARB to

receive it before the 30 day-deadline elapsed. As such, there is an issue of fact as to

whether Plaintiff’s appeal was properly denied as untimely by the ARB.

E. Other Grievances

The Court notes there is at least one other grievance mentioned by Defendant in

his brief that directly relates to Plaintiff’s allegations in this case: emergency grievance

#2022-12-189, dated December 20, 2022 (Doc. 34-2, pp. 53–56). In this grievance, Plaintiff

complained that an officer or inmate, whose identity he did not know, went into his cell

and broke his tablet (Doc. 34-2, pp. 53–56). Plaintiff later alleged in his complaint that it

was Defendant Sullivan. Plaintiff initially said in the grievance that his tablet was broken

“in retaliation for a lawsuit that [he] filed against IDOC, but he later said it was because

he did not “what [sic] to join there [sic] homosexual cult” (Id.).

Defendant seemed to think this grievance was unexhausted (see Doc. 34, p. 9

(“[T]he section for an individual to appeal to the ARB is left incomplete”)), however, the

Court, in its own review of the records, came across Plaintiff’s appeal to the ARB (see Doc.

34-6, pp. 2–5). The ARB denied the grievance on the merits (see id.), meaning it was fully

exhausted.

To the extent that Defendant did not consider whether this grievance was

sufficient to exhaust any aspect of Plaintiff’s claim because Defendant was not expressly

named in it, the Court notes there are situations in which the failure to name the target of

a grievance is excused, particularly when the inmate expressly indicates that they do not

know the who was responsible for the conduct at issue. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE §

504.810(c) (requiring grievance to include “the name of each person who is the subject of

or who is otherwise involved in the complaint” but explaining “[t]his provision does not

preclude an offender from filing a grievance when the names of individuals are not

known, but the offender must include as much descriptive information about the

individual as possible.”); Glick v. Walker, 385 F. App'x 579, 582 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining

that “the identification requirement in the first sentence [of the regulation] is softened by

the second sentence, which clarifies that prisoners need identify names only to the extent

practicable.”).

Based on the various factual issues identified in this Order, summary judgment

for Defendant is inappropriate and must be denied. Resolving these issues will require

an evidentiary hearing. See Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008). If Defendant

wants to continue to pursue the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative

remedies, he must request a Pavey hearing within 14 days of this Order. If no request is

made, the Court will enter a scheduling order for discovery on the merits of this case.

Alternatively, the parties may request that this case be referred for alternative dispute

resolution.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 5, 2025

s/ Mark A. Beatty

MARK A. BEATTY

United States Magistrate Judge