holding that the dismissal standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) for determining a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6
How later courts described this case
- holding that the dismissal standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) for determining a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
ANGELA NAILS, ) CASE NO. 1:24-cv-2135
)
Plaintiff, ) JUDGE CHARLES E. FLEMING
)
v. )
)
PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
COMPANY, ) ORDER
)
Defendant. )
)
I. INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff Angela Nails has filed a civil complaint in this matter against Progressive
Insurance Company (“Progressive”). (ECF No. 1). Her complaint does not set forth any specific
legal claims, nor does it provide a basis for the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. It generally
alleges that Plaintiff has had three auto accidents where Progressive is the liability insurer of the
other driver, Plaintiff has suffered damages from those accidents, and Progressive has paid no
damages to Plaintiff. (Id. at PageID #1–3).
With her complaint, Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2).
That motion is GRANTED. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s complaint is
DISMISSED.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND DISCUSSION
Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, so her complaint is subject to initial screening
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under that statute, federal district courts are expressly required
to screen all in forma pauperis complaints filed in federal court, and to dismiss before service any
such complaint that the court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the dismissal
standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007) for determining a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6) governs
dismissals for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)).
To survive a dismissal for failure to state a claim, a pro se complaint must set forth
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a plausible claim for relief on its face. Id. at
471. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678. Although the standard of review for pro se pleadings is liberal, the generous
construction afforded pro se plaintiffs has limits. Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir.
1996). Pro se plaintiffs must still meet basic pleading requirements, and courts are not required
to conjure allegations on their behalf or “guess at the nature” of their claims. Wells v. Brown, 891
F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).
Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B). Even if the Court liberally construed Plaintiff’s complaint as asserting a personal
injury claim for damages against Progressive as the alleged tortfeasors’ liability insurer, she has
failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In Ohio, “an injured person may sue a
tortfeasor’s liability insurer . . . only after obtaining judgment against the insured.” Clarke v. Geico
Ins., 1:21-cv-1283, 2021 WL 4148718 (N.D. Ohio Sep. 13, 2021) (quoting Chitlik v. Allstate Ins.,
34 Ohio App.2d 193, 193, 299 N.E.2d 295 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Ohio Rev. Code §§ 3929.05, 3929.06. Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege or
otherwise demonstrate that she has obtained a judgment against the drivers or alleged tortfeasors
to whom she alleges Progressive provides liability insurance. Thus, Plaintiff cannot maintain an
action against Progressive as the alleged tortfeasors’ insurer.
Notably, Plaintiff has filed two prior cases in this district against liability insurers that were
dismissed under § 1915(e)(2)(B) for the same reasons as here—failure to allege or demonstrate a
judgment against the alleged tortfeasors. See Nails v. Cent. Mut. Ins., No. 3:23-cv-488, 2023 WL
2956615, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 2023) (dismissing Plaintiff's prior pro se case against Central
Mutual Insurance); Nails v. Progressive Direct Ins., No.: 1: 21-cv-1764, 2021 WL 5800493, at *1
(N.D. Ohio Dec. 7, 2021) (dismissing Plaintiff's prior pro se case against Progressive). The Sixth
Circuit has authorized district courts to place prefiling restrictions on litigants who have a history
of repetitive or vexatious litigation. Feathers v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 141 F.3d 264, 269 (6" Cir.
1998). Plaintiff is therefore warned that prefiling restrictions may be imposed on her in the future
if she continues to file lawsuits in this district against liability insurers that fail on their face to state
a plausible claim.
I. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED,
and her complaint is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court further
CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be
taken in good faith.
IT ISSO ORDERED.
Date: March 4, 2025 “ads Hiaavg
CHARLES E.FLEMING
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE