Opinion

Simpson v. Cisneros

  • 129 F.4th 901
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Filed
Mar 4, 2025
Status
Published
Nature of suit
Prisoner w/ Counsel
Cited by
1 cases
Authority
More cited than 45.0%

“The Eighth Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment, protects prisoners from mistreatment and malfeasance.”

How later courts described this case

  • “The Eighth Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment, protects prisoners from mistreatment and malfeasance.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Case: 23-50678 Document: 56-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/04/2025

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

____________ FILED

March 4, 2025

No. 23-50678 Lyle W. Cayce

____________ Clerk

Amber Simpson; Britney Foster; Stephanie Olivarri,

Plaintiffs—Appellees,

versus

Joe Cisneros,

Defendant—Appellant.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 6:20-CV-716

______________________________

Before Higginbotham, Stewart, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.

Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge:

This appeal brings the question of whether the Eighth Amendment or

the Fourteenth Amendment protects inmates from abusive treatment.

I.

In August 2020, Amber Simpson, Britney Foster, and Stephani

Olivarri filed this suit alleging that a Texas Department of Criminal Justice

employee, Joe Cisneros, sexually abused and harassed them while they were

Case: 23-50678 Document: 56-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/04/2025

No. 23-50678

incarcerated at the Linda Woodsman State Jail in Gatesville, Texas. 1 After

their release, the Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the

Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 2 Soon thereafter, the case

was referred to Magistrate Judge Jeffrey C. Manske for the Western District

of Texas.

A.

While incarcerated, each Plaintiff was assigned to a plumbing work

crew under the supervision of Cisneros, a male jail guard. Reading testimony

in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the district court found that

Cisneros made numerous inappropriate, sexual comments to female

inmates. 3 Foster testified that Cisneros grabbed and moved his genitalia

around near her face—while their knees were touching—and his pants were

still on. 4 Simpson testified that Cisneros would continually isolate himself

with only female inmates. When inmates would crawl out of the pipe chases,

Cisneros would not move and would leave his genitalia at face-level, and

would make inappropriate sexual comments. In addition, Simpson testified

that Cisneros asked her on multiple occasions to perform sexual favors for

him.

_____________________

1

The Linda Woodsman State Jail is a female-only correctional facility.

2

The Prison Litigation Reform Act, which affects currently incarcerated

individuals, does not control here. See generally, 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e).

3

See Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655-56 (2014). The district court concluded

that these allegations were not rebutted by counterevidence from Cisneros. Furthermore,

these statements included talking about his “sick dick[,]” flirting with inmates, and making

comments about “girl on girl” sex.

4

Foster also testified that he tried to grab her buttocks at a later date.

2

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No. 23-50678

Simpson also testified that Cisneros sexually assaulted her on two

occasions. One time, Cisneros reached into her shirt pocket to grab a

screwdriver and proceeded to grab her left breast, rub it, take the screwdriver,

and walk away. Another time, Cisneros stuck his hand into her pants

underneath her underwear and rubbed her genitals in front of another inmate,

stopping only when Simpson stepped as far forward as she could.

Olivarri testified that on one occasion she was assigned to fix a pipe

under Cisneros’ supervision. Cisneros was right behind her and—when she

turned to see him—Cisneros stuck his hand between her legs and started

rubbing her vaginal area. She testified that he pulled his hand out and away

only after she closed her legs.

B.

Cisneros moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Plaintiffs’

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims did not survive scrutiny. In his

motion, Cisneros argued that Plaintiffs failed to plead a Fourteenth

Amendment claim and that—even if they did—Fourteenth Amendment

protections did not extend to prisoners. Plaintiffs filed a timely response, and

Cisneros replied.

On September 1, 2023, the Magistrate Judge issued his report and

recommendation on the motion for summary judgment. 5 In the report, the

Magistrate Judge recommended that the district court grant summary

judgment for the Defendant on the Eighth Amendment claims and deny

summary judgment on the Fourteenth Amendment claims. The Magistrate

Judge examined the applicability of the Fourteenth and the Eighth

_____________________

5

This was done pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(C), FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b), and

Rules 1(f) and 4(b) of Appendix C of the Local Rules for the U.S. District Courts in the

Western District of Texas.

3

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No. 23-50678

Amendment—and found the Fourteenth to be a source of relief for the

Plaintiffs.

Cisneros filed an objection to the Magistrate’s report, arguing: (1) no

Fourteenth Amendment claim had been pleaded, (2) the Fourteenth

Amendment framework did not control in the case, and (3) the conclusions

from the substantive due process analysis were erroneous. The Plaintiffs, as

both the district court and Cisneros noted, did not object to the Magistrate

Judge’s report. The district court adopted the report in full and issued

judgment on September 19, 2023. Cisneros filed a notice of appeal three days

later. 6

II.

The denial of a motion for summary judgment based on qualified

immunity is an immediately reviewable collateral order. 7 Summary judgment

is appropriate when the evidence and the pleadings show “that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” 8 In reviewing an appeal from summary judgment, this

Court must “view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.” 9

_____________________

6

Specifically, Cisneros appeals the denial of his motion for summary judgment on

the Fourteenth Amendment violation.

7

See Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 346 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (citing Mitchell

v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985)).

8

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). Here, the nonmoving parties are the three Plaintiffs.

Because of the lack of video evidence in this case, the added heft of facts from this form of

evidence is unavailable to the plaintiffs. See Carnaby v. City of Houston, 636 F.3d 183, 187

(5th Cir. 2011).

9

Griggs v. Brewer, 841 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Deville v. Marcantel, 567

F.3d 156, 163-64 (5th Cir. 2009)).

4

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No. 23-50678

The Magistrate Judge recommended the grant of summary judgment

to the Defendant under the Eighth Amendment—but not under the

Fourteenth Amendment—with the assumed facts. A failed summary

judgment motion denying qualified immunity is appealable under the

collateral-order doctrine. 10

III.

We turn to whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due

process doctrine protects inmates. It does not.

Cisneros argues that the district court erred in determining that the

plaintiffs pled a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth

Amendment, as it is the Eighth Amendment—not the Fourteenth

Amendment—that protects incarcerated individuals. We construe the facts

in favor of the Plaintiffs and conclude that the Plaintiffs did assert a

Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim in their initial

complaint. 11

We now turn to whether the Plaintiffs—as inmates—could proceed

under the Fourteenth Amendment. 12 In general, the “substantive

component of the Due Process Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment

secures the right to be free of state-occasioned damage to a person’s bodily

_____________________

10

See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 772 (2014). This is “akin to a final

decision[,]” and a losing defendant “can bring an interlocutory appeal.” Roque v. Harvel,

993 F.3d 325, 331-32 (5th Cir. 2021).

11

In this interlocutory appeal, “we accept the plaintiffs’ version of the facts as

true.” Kinney, 367 F.3d at 348 (referencing Wagner v. Bay City, Tex., 227 F.3d 316, 320 (5th

Cir. 2000). The factual dispute here is whether the Plaintiffs raised a Fourteenth

Amendment claim in their initial complaint.

12

See Kinney, 367 F.3d at 348 (explaining that on an appeal from summary

judgment in this context, the legal significance of conduct is the focal point of review).

5

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No. 23-50678

integrity.” 13 But when a particular constitutional amendment “provides an

explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of

government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of

substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” 14

And, the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 (“PREA”) notes that sexual

assault in prison implicates the Eighth Amendment. 15

Here, “the Eighth Amendment, which is specifically concerned with

the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain in penal institutions, serves as

the primary source of substantive due process under the Fourteenth

Amendment.” 16 As the Eighth Amendment gives “an explicit textual source

of protection,” the Plaintiffs here have no claim under the Fourteenth

_____________________

13

Tyson v. Sabine, 42 F.4th 508, 517 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).

14

Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.

386, 395 (1989)). See also United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997) (“[I]f a

constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or

Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that

specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process.”).

15

See 34 U.S.C. § 30301(13). This PREA subsection quotes Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825 (1994), a Supreme Court case that ruled that deliberate indifference to the

substantial risk of sexual assault violates the Eighth Amendment. State and local prisoners

are protected by the Eighth Amendment as well. See also 34 U.S.C. § 30302(7) (listing one

of the purposes of PREA as protecting the Eighth Amendment rights of prisoners). PREA

establishes a “zero-tolerance standard” for rape in prison in the United States and applies

to all correctional facilities. 34 U.S.C. § 30301(1).

16

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986).

6

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No. 23-50678

Amendment. 17 The district court erred in applying a Fourteenth Amendment

framework. 18

IV.

The Eighth Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment, protects

prisoners from mistreatment and malfeasance. The district court in its

rulings held back final judgment against the Warden and the Assistant

Warden. 19 It is now in its hands to deal with what remains in this case. As the

Fourteenth Amendment claim is the only live issue on appeal here, we

REVERSE that ruling, GRANT summary judgment on the Fourteenth

Amendment, and REMAND the case for further proceedings.

_____________________

17

See Austin v. Johnson, 328 F.3d 204, 210 n.10 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that the

explicit textual source of protection controls over the more generalized notion). See also

Pinkston v. Kuiper, 67 F.4th 237, 241 (5th Cir. 2023) (reasoning that the Supreme Court

instructs application of the specific textual provision over the general “substantive-due-

process catchall”).

18

It is worth noting that the Plaintiffs in their initial complaint treated the Eighth

Amendment as controlling and changed tact only when the Magistrate Judge found

otherwise.

19

Prior to this appeal, the Warden and Assistant Warden of the jail were both

dismissed in a grant of a FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings by the

district court. On September 15, 2022, Judge Alan D. Albright adopted the Magistrate

Judge’s report and recommendation in full over the noted objections of Plaintiffs’ counsel.

Defense counsel for the Warden and the Assistant Warden moved for entry of final

judgment but Judge Albright denied their motion.

7

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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