The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1195-22
C.E. and B.E., Individually and
on behalf of, K.E.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
AS REDACTED
ELIZABETH PUBLIC SCHOOL
March 4, 2025
DISTRICT and HAROLD E.
KENNEDY, JR. in his Official APPELLATE DIVISION
Capacity as School Business
Administrator/Board Secretary of
Elizabeth Public School District,
Defendants-Respondents.
___________________________
Argued November 13, 2024 – Decided March 4, 2025
Before Judges Gooden Brown, Smith and Vanek.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Union County, Docket No. L-2231-15.
Jamie Epstein argued the cause for appellants (Cohn
Lifland Pearlman Herrmann & Knopf, LLP, and Jamie
Epstein, attorneys; Walter M. Luers and Jamie
Epstein, on the briefs).
Christina M. DiPalo argued the cause for respondents
(La Corte, Bundy, Varady & Kinsella, attorneys;
Robert F. Varady, of counsel and on the brief;
Christina M. DiPalo, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SMITH, J.A.D.
Plaintiffs C.E. and B.E., parents of minor K.E., appeal from three trial
court orders: an August 29, 2022 order granting post-judgment interest on
attorney's fees awarded pursuant to the Open Public Records Act (OPRA) 1; a
November 10, 2022 order denying plaintiffs' order to show cause and request
for sanctions; and a December 16, 2022 order quashing the deposition of
defendant Harold E. Kennedy, Jr. and issuing a warrant of satisfaction of a
monetary judgment. For the reasons which follow, we affirm in part, reverse
in part, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
We recount the salient facts from our opinion in C.E. v. Elizabeth Public
School District (C.E. I), 472 N.J. Super. 253 (App. Div. 2022). 2
This litigation began in April 2015 when
plaintiffs filed a complaint and order to show cause to
enforce their OPRA request, seeking the following
information:
1. From [January 1, 2013] to present, all
settlements entered into by the [school
1
N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13.
2
See also C.E. & B.[E.] v. Elizabeth Pub. Sch. Dist. (C.E. II), No. A-3016-20
(App. Div. July 18, 2023).
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b]oard in [the New Jersey Office of
Administrative Law (OAL)] EDS
docketed cases.
2. Any final decisions incorporating or
pertaining to item #1.
3. [May 1, 2014], any purchase orders,
vouchers, bills, invoices and canceled
checks for payment(s) made for legal
services rendered to the [b]oard in regards
to [an] . . . OPRA [r]equest of [May 17,
2014,] and the subsequent civil action
....
4. Any [b]oard [r]esolution(s) which
refer[(s)] to item[] #1.
....
On December 18, 2015, the trial judge entered
an order requiring defendants produce: "(1) all
settlement agreements entered into by the [b]oard in
. . . OAL EDS docketed cases from January 1, 2013 to
April 2, 2015; and (2) any final decisions
incorporating or pertaining to those settlement
agreements." He ordered defendants to redact the
names and addresses of parents in the relevant records,
and dismissed, with prejudice, plaintiffs' request for
unredacted invoices and vouchers. The judge found
plaintiffs were entitled to attorney's fees as a partially
prevailing party for services rendered after August 7,
2015, and permitted defendants to file opposition to
the fee request. He denied, without prejudice,
defendants' request for a special service charge and
stayed the order pending defendants' appeal.
Defendants appealed and we subsequently
dismissed it in March 2016. [L.R. v. Camden City
Public School District (L.R. I), 452 N.J. Super. 56
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(App. Div. 2017)] was decided in October 2017 and in
April 2018, the Supreme Court granted certification,
which further stayed this case. In July 2019, an
evenly divided Supreme Court decided L.R. v.
Camden City Public School District (L.R. II), 238 N.J.
547 (2019) and remanded the matter to the trial court.
This case was consolidated with others and
heard in the Camden Vicinage action, along with the
L.R. II remand. In December 2019, the Camden
Vicinage judge granted plaintiffs' request to sever this
matter and return it to the Union Vicinage because
plaintiffs were not asserting common law claims and
only pursuing their OPRA claim. After a round of
motion practice, the trial judge concluded additional
hearings were necessary to determine the special
service charge, attorney's fees, and other remaining
issues.
....
A final hearing was held on August 28, 2020, to
address plaintiffs' attorney's fee request. After
analyzing the RPC 1.5 factors, the judge granted
plaintiffs $78,646 in attorney's fees. He entered an
order the same day denying defendants' OPRA service
charge and ordering defendants to provide plaintiffs
with "copies of all decisions with settlements, with
non-exempt portions redacted, entered into by the
[b]oard in the [OAL] EDS cases dated between
[January 1, 2013 and April 2, 2015.]" The judge
stayed the order on September 25, 2020, pending this
appeal.
[C.E. I, 472 N.J. Super. at 258-61 (alterations in
original) (footnotes omitted).]
We affirmed the trial court's August 28, 2020 order of judgment on May
18, 2022. Id. at 262-68.
A-1195-22
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After the parties disagreed on the process for satisfying the attorney's fee
award, plaintiffs sought a judgment for the award in the Civil Judgment and
Order Docket,3 which the Superior Court Clerk's Office entered on July 20,
2022. On August 29, 2022, the trial court ordered defendants to submit a
certification detailing the extent of their compliance with the August 28, 2020
order, and it also ordered plaintiffs to submit a proposed order for post -
judgment interest running from July 20, 2022 to August 29, 2022. In its
accompanying statement of reasons, the trial court found that "[p]laintiff [wa]s
only entitled to an award of post-judgment interest from the date of judgment
docketing, July 20, 2022" to the date of the order.
3
We explained the purpose of filing a judgment in the Civil Judgment and
Order Docket in Brescher v. Gern, Dunetz, Davison & Weinstein, P.C:
The Clerk of the Superior Court is required by statute,
N.J.S.A. 2A:16-11, to maintain a book known as "a
civil judgment and order docket" which constitutes the
record of the judgments in civil cases and provides the
basis for establishment of judgment liens . . . The
docketing of a judgment for lien purposes is
effectuated when a notation is made in the civil docket
kept by the Clerk of the Superior Court in Trenton.
Once the judgment is "docketed" by the Clerk, it
serves as constructive notice to subsequent purchasers,
encumbrancers, and others that the judgment
constitutes a lien on the title of affected property.
[245 N.J. Super. 365, 371 (App. Div. 1991).]
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On September 6, 2022, defendants produced twenty-four of the thirty-
three requested records, claiming that the nine records not produced were
unaccounted for. On September 13, defendants paid $78,984.80 to plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs filed an order to show cause seeking compliance with the August 28,
2020 order and again requested sanctions, which the trial court denied on
November 10, 2022.
Next, plaintiffs noticed co-defendant Harold E. Kennedy, Jr. for
deposition and moved to hold defendants in contempt of court pursuant to Rule
1:10-3 for failing to produce the nine remaining records. Defendants opposed
and cross-moved for a protective order quashing Kennedy's deposition and for
a warrant of satisfaction for the payment of the August 28, 2020 judgment. On
December 16, 2022, the trial court granted defendants' cross-motion, finding
defendants demonstrated "the requisite diligent efforts to comply . . . ." The
trial court also issued a protective order barring Kennedy's deposition and
entering a warrant of satisfaction pursuant to Rule 4:48-2.
Plaintiffs appeal, arguing that the trial court erred when it: set July 20,
2022 as the post-judgment interest accrual date rather than August 28, 2020;
granted defendants a warrant of satisfaction; denied plaintiffs' discovery
requests related to the nine missing records; barred the deposition of Kennedy;
A-1195-22
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declined to issue civil penalties against defendants; and precluded plaintiffs'
claims for additional attorney's fees.
II.
A trial court's order regarding attorney's fees is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Noren v. Heartland Payment Sys., Inc., 448 N.J. Super. 486, 497
(App. Div. 2017). This is because a "trial court [is] in the best position to
weigh the equities and arguments of the parties . . . ." Packard-Bamberger &
Co. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427, 447 (2001). We reverse only if the award is
"made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established
policies, or rested on an impermissible basis." Flagg v. Essex Cnty.
Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002).
When the question on appeal concerns an award of post-judgment
interest, our review necessarily involves a mixed question of law and fact.
This is because it is well established that "a judgment creditor is entitled to
post-judgment interest at the rate specified in [Rule] 4:42-11(a) absent an
extraordinary and equitable reason." Marko v. Zurich N. Am. Ins. Co., 386
N.J. Super. 527, 532 (App. Div. 2006). "[T]he grant of post-judgment interest
is ordinarily not an equitable matter within the court's discretion but is . . . a
matter of long-standing practice," which has been codified by Rule 4:42-11(a).
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Bd. of Educ. of Newark v. Levitt, 197 N.J. Super. 239, 244-45 (App. Div.
1984) (citations omitted).
When issues on appeal present mixed questions of law and fact, we defer
to the supported factual findings of the trial court, but we review de novo the
trial court's application of legal rules to the factual findings. State v. Pierre,
223 N.J. 560, 576 (2015). We review a trial court's interpretation of OPRA,
court rules, and our case law de novo. See Am. Civ. Liberties Union of N.J. v.
Cnty. Prosecutors Ass'n of N.J., 257 N.J. 87, 101 (2024) ("We review de novo
a court's interpretation of OPRA, which constitutes a legal determination.");
In re A.D., 259 N.J. 337, 351 (2024) ("We . . . review de novo a trial court's
interpretation of a court rule, 'applying "ordinary principles of statutory
construction" to interpret' the rule."); 388 Route 22 Readington Realty
Holdings, LLC v. Twp. of Readington, 221 N.J. 318, 338 (2015) ("In
construing the meaning of a statute, an ordinance, or our case law, our review
is de novo."). "Findings of fact, however, are reviewed deferentially."
O'Boyle v. Borough of Longport, 426 N.J. Super. 1, 8 (App. Div. 2012) (citing
Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).
III.
Plaintiffs argue that the August 29, 2022 trial court order establishing
July 20, 2022 as the date when their attorney's fee award began to accrue post-
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judgment interest was error. Plaintiffs contend that Rule 4:42-11(a) entitles
them to post-judgment interest starting on August 28, 2020, the date when the
trial court initially issued the order of judgment awarding attorney's fees. This
argument presents mixed questions of law and fact. Pierre, 223 N.J. at 576.
We consider the relevant law.
Rule 4:42-11(a) provides for the accrual of post-judgment interest. The
rule states that "judgments, awards and orders for the payment of money, taxed
costs and attorney's fees shall bear simple interest . . . ." R. 4:42-11(a).
In Marko v. Zurich North American Insurance Co.,4 we reviewed our
jurisprudence concerning post-judgment interest awards. We stated:
As a matter of historical practice, post-judgment
interest is routinely awarded. See, e.g., Erie Railway
Co. v. Ackerson, 33 N.J.L. 33, 36 (Sup. Ct. 1868);
Simon v. N.J. Asphalt & Paving Co., 123 N.J.L. 232,
234 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Cohrs v. Igoe Bros., Inc., 66 N.J.
Super. 526, 528 (Law Div. 1961), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 71 N.J. Super. 435 (App. Div. 1962).
[Marko, 386 N.J. Super. at 530.]
We noted, however, that "in the case of private litigants, the grant of
post-judgment interest is ordinarily not an equitable matter within the court's
discretion but is, as a matter of longstanding practice, routinely allowed." Id.
at 531 (emphasis omitted) (citing Levitt, 197 N.J. Super. at 244-45).
4
386 N.J. Super. at 530-32.
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We then examined two cases in which Justice (then Judge) Long
considered the modification of post-judgment interest awards. In one instance
Judge Long considered whether to deviate from the interest rate established by
court rule. In the second instance, Judge Long considered whether equitable
considerations warranted an award of post-judgment interest at all. We stated:
In R. Jennings M[anufacturing] v. Northern Electric
[Supply Co., Inc.], 286 N.J. Super. 413, 418 (App.
Div. 1995), it was held in a contract action that the
seller was entitled to post-judgment interest at an
interest rate higher than that provided by R[ule] 4:42-
11 only if the trial judge finds "particular equitable
reasons for doing so." By way of dicta, the opinion
stated:
Our case law distinguishes between pre-
judgment interest as a discretionary
allowance, and post-judgment interest to
which a litigant is entitled as of right.
[Id. at 416.]
In Lehmann v. O'Brien, 240 N.J. Super. 242 (App.
Div. 1989), the New Jersey Property-Liability
Insurance Guaranty Association assumed the
contractual obligations of an insolvent insurer to pay
claims up to a maximum statutory liability. We held
that the Association was responsible for post-
judgment interest, including the interest which
accrued after the judgment but before the date of the
Association's assumption of the obligation. We
upheld the trial judge's determination that "no
equitable or exceptional reason" barred the payment of
post-judgment interest. We set forth the following
standard:
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Under the rules of court, the usual practice
is to allow post-judgment interest
"[e]xcept as otherwise ordered by the
court or provided by law . . . [.]" R. 4:42-
11(a). Thus, unless there is a legal
impediment to the payment of such
interest, its grant or denial is discretionary
with the trial judge.
[Id. at 249.]
[Marko, 386 N.J. Super. at 531-32.]
Marko neatly summarized how we analyze post-judgment interest issues
by stating, "[b]oth the court rule and our case law clearly indicate that a
judgment creditor is entitled to post-judgment interest at the rate specified in
R[ule] 4:42-11(a) absent an extraordinary and equitable reason." Id. at 532.
We have also applied equitable considerations to determine the start date
of post-judgment interest. In Baker v. National State Bank, we held that
"[a]lthough [Rule 4:42-11(a)] indicates that interest normally shall run from
the date of judgment, it also provides a trial court with the discretion to vary
the award, in the interests of equity." 353 N.J. Super. 145, 173 (App. Div.
2002) (citing Interchange State Bank v. Rinaldi, 303 N.J. Super. 239, 264
(App. Div. 1997)). We then concluded that the Baker trial court "did not abuse
its discretion in ordering interest to accrue from the date of the jury verdict"
rather than the order of judgment, in part because of a consent order that
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"made the compensatory damages verdict enforceable and apparently awarded
interest from the date of the verdict . . . ." Id. at 174.
We turn to the trial court's analysis here. Citing Baker and Rule 4:101-
2,5 the court determined that "[p]laintiff is only entitled to an award of post -
judgment interest from the date of judgment docketing . . . to the present." In
other words, the trial court determined post-judgment interest began accruing
on the date the Superior Court's Clerk Office entered judgment for attorney's
fees in the Civil Judgment and Order Docket.
The record shows the parties do not dispute that post-judgment interest
should be awarded. The question is how much. Assuming the interest rate is
fixed for purposes of this analysis, the question is decided by the start date for
post-judgment accrual.
The comments to Rule 4:42-11(a) state that "[p]ost-judgment interest
runs when the judgment is entered, not when all appeals have been disposed
of." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 1.2.2. on R. 4:42-
11(a) (emphasis added) (citing Baker, 353 N.J. Super. at 173-74). While
neither the rule, its comments, nor our case law clarify when a "judgment is
entered" for purpose of Rule 4:42-11(a), Rule 4:47 and its comments are
5
Rules 4:101-1 to -5 relate to the entry of judgments on the Civil Judgment
and Order Docket.
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instructive. Rule 4:47 states that "[t]he notation of a judgment in the Civil
Docket constitutes the entry of the judgment, and the judgment shall not take
effect before such entry unless the court in the judgment shall . . . direct that it
take effect from the time it is signed . . . ." (Emphasis added). The rule's
comments also state that "[i]t is . . . entry on the Civil Docket which triggers
the time for appeal." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 3 on
R. 4:47 (citing Pogostin v. Leighton, 216 N.J. Super. 363, 370 (App. Div.
1987)).
We conclude post-judgment interest presumptively accrues on the date
when the order of judgment is entered pursuant to Rule 4:47, subject to
modification by the trial court in the interests of equity. See Baker, 353 N.J.
Super. at 174. We turn to the matter at hand.
The presumptive start date for the accrual of post-judgment interest was
August 28, 2020—the day when the Law Division entered its order of
judgment awarding attorney's fees. The trial court did not support its
modification of the start date to July 20, 2022 with proper findings. See R.
1:7-4. Indeed, the record shows plaintiffs promptly sought payment of the
attorney's fees after we issued our opinion in C.E. I. Once the parties' efforts
to negotiate payment foundered, plaintiffs timely sought a judgment in the
Civil Judgment and Order Docket. Our careful review of the record reveals
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both the absence of trial court findings to support a modified accrual date, and
a dearth of any factual predicate proffered by defendants which would warrant
such a modification. It follows that the court's order of August 29, 2022
modifying the start date was error, and we reverse it.
We remand to the trial court to enter an order applying post-judgment
interest from August 28, 2020 to August 29, 2022 on the attorney's fees
judgment award of $78,646.
IV.
[At the court's direction, the published version of
this opinion omits Part IV, which discussed
plaintiffs' challenge to the trial court's orders of
November 10, 2022 denying plaintiffs' order to
show cause and request for sanctions and
December 16, 2022 order quashing discovery and
issuing a warrant of satisfaction of a monetary
judgment.]
Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is
a true copy of the original on file in
my office.
Clerk of the Appellate Division
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