The opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
JEAN HAGEL and BRIAN HAGEL,
individually and as husband and wife, No. 86865-9-I
Respondents, DIVISION ONE
v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
DUKE N. BUI and CASSIDY T. BUI,
individually and as husband and wife;
and QUANG BUI, in his separate
capacity, and the marital community
comprised of QUANG BUI and
TRINITY BUI, husband and wife,
Appellants.
BIRK, J. — In this appeal, the Buis challenge the trial court’s order
interpreting the parties’ shared use agreement and granting injunctive relief
restricting use of the parties’ shared dock. We conclude certain of the trial court’s
findings of fact were not supported by substantial evidence and certain conclusions
of law were not justified, and because of this, the trial court abused its discretion
by granting an injunction beyond the scope of proven breaching conduct. We
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the superior court with instructions to
enter a revised final order as delineated herein.
I
Respondents Jean and Brian Hagel and appellants Duke and Cassidy Bui
own neighboring waterfront homes on American Lake in Lakewood, Washington.
No. 86865-9-I/2
The Hagels purchased their property in 2001 and have resided on it since 2003.
The Buis purchased their property in 2012. The properties share a dock that
straddles the property line, the access, use, and maintenance of which is governed
by a 2002 easement and maintenance agreement (Agreement). The Agreement,
which runs with the land, was originally signed in 2002 between the Hagels and
Kevin and Mary Byrne, then owners of the Bui property.
The Hagels and the Buis shared use of the dock without issue until 2020.
In July 2021, the Hagels filed a complaint against the Buis seeking, among other
relief, injunctive relief and enforcement of the Agreement. They alleged the Buis
had violated the Agreement by leaving floating devices in front of the Hagels’ “side”
of the dock, adding a dock extension without the Hagels’ consent, “claiming the
entire dock for themselves,” placing furniture on the dock, and leaving their
personal property on the shared dock. The Hagels also alleged numerous
instances of conflict, both verbal and physical, between their adult son and the
Buis and their guests. Before trial, the court denied the Buis’ motion for summary
judgment, CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and motion in limine to exclude extrinsic
evidence testimony.
At trial, the Hagels argued the Buis held frequent parties, occasionally
launched illegal fireworks from on or near the dock, blocked or impeded access to
the dock with outdoor furniture and personal property, moored numerous “boats”
and floating devices to the dock, and harassed the Hagels and their adult son.
This behavior, the Hagels alleged, had led them to discontinue use of the dock
during the pendency of the lawsuit. As a remedy, the Hagels sought an injunction
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limiting use of the dock consistent with the Agreement and declaratory relief
defining the scope of the Agreement.
At the bench trial, the Hagels called Kevin Byrne to testify about the “intent”
behind the Agreement. Byrne was the prior owner of both the Hagels’ and Buis’
properties, the developer of the housing tract, and one of the original signatories
to the Agreement. The court also heard testimony from Brian and Jean Hagel,
neighbor Mary Hudson, and Duke Bui. The Buis intended to call other witnesses
“to rebut credibility and to rebut the customary and normal use of the dock, which
is at issue.” But the court excluded all 11 of these witnesses, neighbors with similar
docks and witnesses to the Hagels’ past dock use, as being cumulative or
unhelpful. Despite Byrne’s testimony that all the docks on American Lake
constructed at the same time had the same shared dock agreements, the court
reasoned that “[w]hat the neighbors do . . . is [not] terribly relevant.” And the court
said the Hagels’ past dock use was not relevant because “[the Hagels] hadn’t read
[the Agreement]” until litigation began.
The court ruled in favor of the Hagels, granting an injunction and entering
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Buis appeal.
II
The Buis claim their CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss should have been
granted by the trial court due to the Agreement’s indemnity and hold harmless
provision. We disagree.
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A trial court’s ruling on a CR 12(b)(6) motion is reviewed de novo.
FutureSelect Portfolio Mgmt., Inc. v. Tremont Grp. Holdings, Inc., 180 Wn.2d 954,
962, 331 P.3d 29 (2014).
Under the Agreement’s indemnity and hold harmless provision, the parties
agreed to hold each other harmless from claims “arising in any manner from the
existence or use of this easement or the dock.” The Buis brought a CR 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, arguing that the Agreement barred the Hagels from bringing any
claims against the Buis related to the dock. However, courts do not generally
interpret hold harmless provisions to bar claims brought by parties to the
agreement seeking its enforcement. City of Tacoma v. City of Bonney Lake, 173
Wn.2d 584, 593, 269 P.3d 1017 (2012). Otherwise it “would produce the absurd
result of precluding a party to a contract from disputing its obligations under that
contract.” Id. Interpretations that give effect to all provisions in a contract are
favored over those that render some meaningless or ineffective. Pelly v.
Panasyuk, 2 Wn. App. 2d 848, 865, 413 P.3d 619 (2018).
Under the Buis’ interpretation, the parties’ obligations under the Agreement
would be entirely unenforceable in court. Such a result would be absurd. The
Hagels’ claims are properly understood as arising from the Agreement, which we
presume the parties intended to make enforceable. Because the Hagels’ claims
seek enforcement of the parties’ obligations under the Agreement, the trial court
properly denied the Buis’ CR 12(b)(6) motion.
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III
The Buis appeal the trial court’s order denying them summary judgment.
They assert that the dispositive issue in the case was entirely one of law, contract
interpretation, and that no material facts were in dispute between the parties.
However, there were material facts in dispute, such as whether the Buis ever
blocked the Hagels’ access to the dock. When an order denying summary
judgment is based on a dispute of material facts, “it ‘will not be reviewed when
raised after a trial on the merits.’ ” 224 Westlake, LLC v. Engstrom Props., LLC,
169 Wn. App. 700, 715, 281 P.3d 693 (2012) (quoting Johnson v. Rothstein, 52
Wn. App. 303, 306, 759 P.2d 471 (1988)). As the case proceeded to trial, we
decline to review the denial of summary judgment.
IV
The Buis contend that the trial court erred by improperly using extrinsic
“intent” evidence to add to or modify the terms in the Agreement. And if the trial
court properly admitted extrinsic evidence bearing on the “intent” behind the
Agreement, the Buis assert that the trial court erred by disallowing their extrinsic
evidence witnesses. We agree.
The rules of contract interpretation apply to the interpretation of an
easement. Pelly, 2 Wn. App. 2d at 864 (citing Hollis v. Garwall, Inc., 137 Wn.2d
683, 695-96, 974 P.2d 836 (1999)). Washington courts follow the objective
manifestation theory of contracts. Id. at 865. “ ‘Under this approach, we attempt
to determine the parties’ intent by focusing on the objective manifestations of the
agreement, rather than on the unexpressed subjective intent of the parties.’ ” Id.
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(quoting Hearst Commc’ns, Inc. v. Seattle Times Co., 154 Wn.2d 493, 503, 115
P.3d 262 (2005)). Courts impute ordinary and reasonable meanings to the words
in a contract, unless the agreement clearly demonstrates a contrary intent. Id. The
interpretation of an easement is a mixed question of law and fact. Hurlbut v.
Crines, 14 Wn. App. 2d 660, 667, 473 P.3d 263 (2020). “ ‘If the plain language is
unambiguous, extrinsic evidence will not be considered.’ ” Id. (quoting Sunnyside
Valley Irr. Dist. v. Dickie, 149 Wn.2d 873, 880, 73 P.3d 369 (2003)). “When there
is specific, unambiguous language creating an easement, that language may be
determinative of the permitted uses and, thus, the parties’ intent as to its scope.”
Wilson & Son Ranch, LLC v. Hintz, 162 Wn. App. 297, 306, 253 P.3d 470 (2011).
The three provisions in the Agreement the court sought to clarify through its
order were
1. Hagel and Byrne grant to each other, and to their
respective successors and assigns, an easement for ingress and
egress to the dock to be constructed. . . .
....
4. No more than one boat shall be moored on each side
of the dock.
5. Each party shall use the dock in a reasonably prudent
manner consistent with its purposes as a shared recreational
amenity to each of the Properties and to prevent harm or
unreasonable disturbance to the parties, their guests, and invitees,
and to other property owners within the plat of Eagle Point at
American Lake. Each party shall take reasonable steps to assure
that the conduct of his or her guests and invitees is consistent with
this paragraph.
(Emphasis added.) Over the Buis’ objections, the trial court admitted Byrne’s
testimony as extrinsic evidence bearing on these terms.
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Byrne gave testimony purporting to define the parameters of these written
provisions of the Agreement. He stated the dock’s use was meant to be limited to
getting to and from the moored boats. Asked whether it was the intention of the
parties to “hang out on the dock without utilizing the boats,” he replied, “No.
Because it wasn’t a party center. It was an access to get to a boat.” The intent of
the agreement was to limit each party to their respective “side” of the dock, that is
the side that lines up with the respective properties. His “vision” for what would
qualify as a “boat” was if it floats “[i]t’s a boat.” Personal property was not meant
to be left on the dock. The dock was not meant to be used for parties, swimming,
or setting off fireworks. He summed up his restrictive understanding of the
Agreement:
I guess you can draw up an agreement from a positive standpoint or
an initial negative standpoint. This was an agreement that outlined
what could be used. It did not then list the hundreds of other things
that [maybe] it couldn’t be used for. So it outlined the use, and the
use was for one boat moored on each side of the dock.
Drawing in part on Byrne’s testimony, the trial court entered its final order deeming
the Agreement to impose on the parties and all future owners rules that (1) the
parties were limited to attaching to the dock one boat “broadly” defined “to include
any craft that . . . floats” including “floating lilly pads or mats,” (2) each party’s
moorage was restricted to the side of the dock lining up with its property, (3) no
property could be left on the dock “except for the purpose of ingress and egress
onto and off of” the parties’ boats, (4) fireworks were prohibited, (5) the dock may
be used for swimming, (6) each party may have up to seven persons each at a
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time on the dock at any one time, and (7) the parties’ use of the dock shall be
“respectful to the other parties who are using the dock.”
None of the restrictions or definitions described in Byrne’s testimony or the
trial court’s final order were written into the Agreement anywhere. The Agreement
grants an easement across the land in front of the dock for the explicit use of
“ingress and egress.” The original contracting parties could have written in similar
restrictions related to the use of the dock, but instead opted for language allowing
mooring of one “boat” on each side of the dock, without restrictive definitional
language, “reasonably prudent” use “consistent with its purpose as a shared
recreational amenity,” and prohibiting “unreasonable disturbance.” These words
are plain, unambiguous, and subject to ordinary and reasonable meanings, not the
unexpressed subjective intent of Byrne.
Citing Berg v. Hudesman, 115 Wn.2d 657, 667, 801 P.2d 222 (1990), the
Hagels defend the trial court’s reliance on Byrne’s testimony as a proper
application of the “context rule.” The context rule recognizes “that intent of the
contracting parties cannot be interpreted without examining the context
surrounding an instrument’s execution.” Hearst, 154 Wn.2d at 502 (citing Berg,
115 Wn.2d at 667). However, the Hagels’ reliance on Berg is misplaced, as
“surrounding circumstances and other extrinsic evidence are to be used ‘to
determine the meaning of specific words and terms used’ and not to ‘show an
intention independent of the instrument or to ‘vary, contradict or modify the written
word.’ ” Hearst, 154 Wn.2d at 503 (quoting Garwall, 137 Wn.2d at 695-96). “We
do not interpret what was intended to be written but what was written.” Id. at 504.
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Byrne’s testimony improperly contradicted, modified, and added to the
written word. By the Hagels’ own admission, Byrne’s interpretation of the
Agreement even contradicted their use of the dock. Notably, proper extrinsic
evidence would have included “the subsequent acts and conduct of the parties”
and “the reasonableness of respective interpretations urged by the parties.”
Hearst, 154 Wn.2d at 502. This included the parties’ actual use of the dock over
their many years of uneventful shared use—not to justify arbitrary, unagreed
rules—but to explain in these parties’ circumstances the meaning of the agreed
requirements of prudent use, shared recreation, and unreasonable disturbance.
The trial court severely limited that evidence in a manner benefiting the Hagels by
discounting the importance of the parties’ actual usage, which the Buis maintained
contradicted the Hagels’ claims about the Agreement, and by accepting at face
value the Hagels’ claim that they had not read the Agreement while ignoring that
they had signed it. The trial court erred when it relied on Byrne’s testimony to add
restrictions to the Agreement on which the parties never agreed.
V
The Buis challenge 24 of 47 findings of fact as being unsupported by
substantial evidence, and 17 of 24 conclusions of law as being unsupported by the
findings of fact. We concur with many, but not all, of the Buis’ challenges.1
We review findings of fact for substantial evidence, “defined as a quantum
of evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person the premise is true.”
1 We note that many of the findings of fact restate assertions of the parties
and witness testimony. We focus our analysis on those findings of fact that, in
reliance on the evidence presented, determined the legally significant facts.
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Sunnyside, 149 Wn.2d at 879. Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Id. at
880. “ ‘Where the findings are supported by substantial evidence, the question is
whether they support the conclusions of law.’ ” Hurlbut, 14 Wn. App. 2d at 667
(quoting Nejin v. City of Seattle, 40 Wn. App. 414, 418-19, 698 P.2d 615 (1985)).
The trial court erred when it entered findings of fact and conclusions of law
regarding the ownership of two extensions added to the original dock. The trial
court entered an order assigning ownership of certain extensions and determining
the application of the Agreement to the extensions. But both parties agreed that
these issues were not pleaded or put at issue. The Buis told the trial court that
had the issue been pleaded, they would have put on different evidence. Despite
that, the trial court stated that the “un-refuted evidence . . . not even somewhat
challenged” supported its finding of dock extension ownership. The reason the
evidence was not challenged is that the Hagels had not provided the Buis notice
before trial that the issue of ownership would be tried. CR 15(b) provides a
mechanism for litigating issues at trial not pleaded previously. Mukilteo Ret. Apts.,
LLC. v. Mukilteo Invs., LP, 176 Wn. App. 244, 255-56, 310 P.3d 814 (2013). Issues
not raised in the pleadings may be tried by the express or implied consent of the
parties. Id. at 256; CR 15(b). The issue of dock extension ownership was not
raised in the pleadings, was not the subject of a CR 15(b) amendment, and was
not tried with consent. We therefore vacate the trial court’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law on the issue of dock ownership, specifically findings of fact 18,
21-25, 33, 43-47 and conclusions of law 52 and 64-68.2
2 We note that finding of fact 43 is listed as a second “42.”
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The Buis challenge several findings of fact and related conclusions of law
to the extent the trial court found intent in the Agreement to limit use of the dock in
specific ways. Testimony cannot “ ‘vary, contradict or modify the written word.’ ”
Hearst, 154 Wn.2d at 503 (quoting Garwal, 137 Wn. 2d at 695-96). Because
Byrne’s testimony was used improperly to modify the written word, it follows that
the trial court’s findings of facts and conclusions of law adopting new restrictions
on the use of the dock to which the parties never agreed were unsupported by
substantial evidence. These restrictions include limiting the parties’ dock use to
specific “sides” of the dock (finding of fact 35, conclusion of law 58), broadly
defining the term “boat” under the agreement (finding of fact 36, conclusion of law
59), prohibiting personal property on the dock (findings of fact 38-39, conclusion
of law 61), and limiting the number of occupants on the dock at any time (finding
of fact 42, conclusion of law 63). We vacate findings of fact 35-36, 38, 39, and 42,
and we reverse conclusions of law 57-59, 61, and 63. As described below, the
trial court’s remaining findings of fact and conclusions of law are supported by
substantial evidence or are otherwise unchallenged by the Buis.
VI
The Buis appeal the scope of the trial court’s injunction, which imposed
significant restrictions on the parties’ use of the dock. We agree that the scope of
the injunction was too broad and enjoined conduct not comprehended by the
Agreement and without relieving a proven breach by the Buis.
We review decisions to grant injunctions, and their terms, for abuse of
discretion. Snyder v. Haynes, 152 Wn. App. 774, 780-81, 217 P.3d 787 (2009). A
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trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or
based on untenable grounds or reasons. Id. at 781. “Trial courts have broad
discretionary power to fashion injunctive relief to fit the particular circumstances of
the case before it.” Id. “Injunctions must be tailored to remedy the specific harms
shown rather than to enjoin all possible breaches.” Kitsap County v. Kev, Inc., 106
Wn.2d 135, 143, 720 P.2d 818 (1986). Injunctions can be appropriate to enjoin
“incidents” of “rare” conduct by parties to an easement agreement. See Snyder,
152 Wn. App. at 781 (unauthorized use of easement road was “rare” but the trial
court’s determination to enjoin conduct was affirmed).
The Agreement requires the parties’ use of the dock to be “reasonably
prudent” in a “manner consistent with its purposes as a shared recreational
amenity.” And the parties agreed to “prevent harm or unreasonable disturbance
to the parties.” Any injunction must be tailored to remedy specific conduct
breaching these provisions. Based on the findings of fact supported by substantial
evidence and those conclusions of law that follow, the Hagels established at trial
that the Buis breached the Agreement in four ways. First, the Buis launched
fireworks from the dock and the easement in a manner the trial court found based
on admissible evidence was inconsistent with sharing the dock as a recreational
amenity. Second, the Buis left a floating “lily pad” in the water that blocked the
Hagels’ son from navigating to the Hagels’ usual mooring, thus actually interfering
with the Hagels’ use of the dock. Third, an invitee of the Buis once dangled from
the Hagels’ boat lift, which Duke Bui conceded was not prudent use. Fourth, during
one of the Buis’ parties, the Hagels had to “walk over some of [the Buis’] guests”
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to get to their boat, another actual interference of the Hagels’ use of the dock.
These breaches were properly subject to being enjoined, but the trial court abused
its discretion by granting injunctive relief going beyond them. We remand with
instructions to the trial court to enter a revised final order confining relief to
enjoining the parties and their invitees from (1) launching fireworks from the dock
or easement area in such manner as to prevent others from using the dock, (2)
attaching devices to the dock unreasonably blocking navigation to and from usual
moorings, (3) clinging to or from any boat lifts, and (4) crowding the dock in a
manner that unreasonably restricts the other party’s use of the dock. The trial
court’s final order and injunctive relief is otherwise reversed.3
VII
The Buis raise three other issues on appeal: they argue the trial court erred
in denying their motion in limine to exclude issues they allege were not previously
pleaded, they claim the trial court failed to fulfill its obligation to balance the equities
before granting injunctive relief, and they request attorney fees.
We review rulings in limine for abuse of discretion. Singh v. Zurich Am. Ins.
Co., 5 Wn. App. 2d 739, 753-54, 428 P.3d 1237 (2018). The Hagels sought relief
in the form of a court order interpreting and enforcing the Agreement. The scope
3 We also specifically reverse the trial court’s final order to the extent it
provided “the Plaintiffs and Defendants may agree, in writing, to modify the terms
of this final order at any time.” The parties are not free to modify at will a final
injunction entered by the court. They are free to modify their Agreement. If they
do so, and if appropriate in the future, either party may seek relief from the
judgment pursuant to CR 60, in particular CR 60(b)(6), but the parties may not
obtain new relief without initiating an action proving entitlement to relief under the
rules of civil procedure.
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of relief requested in the Hagels initial complaint was for an order and injunction
“preventing the [Buis] and their guests from violating the [Agreement].” The court
did not abuse its discretion in allowing the Hagels to raise requests for relief that
were within the scope of relief requested in their complaint.
In considering whether to grant an injunction, trial courts may “consider and
weigh equitable factors, such as the relative hardship likely to result to the
defendant if an injunction is granted and to the plaintiff if it is denied.” Garwall, 137
Wn.2d at 699. However, balancing of the equities is “reserved for the innocent
defendant who proceeds without knowledge or warning that his activity encroaches
upon another’s property rights.” Id. at 699-700. Here, as in Garwall, the Buis
continued with their use of the dock even after the Hagels had objected to it.
Injunctive relief as narrowed above was appropriate.
The Buis claim attorney fees on their CR 12(b)(6) and summary judgment
issues on appeal. As the Buis did not prevail on either issue, their request for
attorney fees is denied.
We affirm in part, vacate specified findings, reverse in part, and remand with
instructions to revise the final order as stated herein. Attorney fees are denied.
The parties shall bear their own costs.
WE CONCUR:
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