The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DEVON BATISTA, ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:23-CV-2028
Plaintiff )
) (MUNLEY, D.J.)
v. )
) (ARBUCKLE, M.J.)
JEREMY WILLIAMS, et al., )
Defendants )
)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff Devon Batista brings this civil rights action for injuries and
damages resulting from a state court criminal matter. In his Second Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff brings 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for violations of his First, Sixth,
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as state law claims for breach of
fiduciary duty, malpractice and breach of contract. (Doc. 24). Upon screening
review, the Court concludes Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, for the reasons explained in
this Report, we will recommend Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint be
DISMISSED.
II. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff lodged his Complaint on December 7, 2023. (Doc. 1). On December
18, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis and screened
Plaintiff’s Complaint, finding that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc.
7). Plaintiff was given leave to file an amended complaint and did so on March 20,
2024. (Doc. 18). On May 3, 2024, the Court screened Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint and found that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
(Doc. 20). After detailing the deficiencies of his First Amendment Complaint, the
Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend for a second time. Id.
On August 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint, the current
operative pleading, against the same Defendants named in the First Amended
Complaint. (Doc. 24). In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff names as
Defendants:
(1) Jeremy Williams (Plaintiff’s former defense attorney);
(2) Lewis Reagan (an Assistant District Attorney for York County);
(3) The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (“the Commonwealth”);
(4) York County; and
(5) Judge Kathleen Prendergast.
(Doc. 24, pp. 1-3).
Plaintiff alleges that on April 12, 2022, he had a pre-trial hearing where he
was “going to take a plea-deal.” (Doc. 24, p. 4). Plaintiff’s then defense counsel
Defendant Williams advised Plaintiff of a deal of three to six years with bootcamp,
“SDTP Program” and no time credits. Id. Plaintiff told Defendant Williams he would
only accept that deal if his time counted. Id. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Williams
informed him that “the Judge Defendant Kathleen Prendergast legally had to count
his time.” Id. Plaintiff then signed the agreement and was taken to the State
Correctional Institution at Camp Hill. Id.
On June 20, 2022, Plaintiff had a sentence modification hearing, however he
was not present for the hearing, either in person or via Zoom. (Doc. 24, p. 4). Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant Williams waived his right to be present without consulting
him, advising him of the hearing, and without Plaintiff’s consent. Id. Plaintiff alleges
that at this hearing Defendant Williams “failed to object to the courts that they lacked
authority jurisdiction to hold the modification hearing due to not timely filing a
motion to challenge [Plaintiff’s] sentence.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
Williams also “did not object to Defendant Lewis Reagan about the time credit
‘allowed by law’ as part of [Plaintiff’s] plea-agreement.” Id.
On September 16, 2022, a forfeiture hearing was held concerning Plaintiff’s
property in relation to two criminal cases against Plaintiff.1 (Doc. 24, p. 5). Plaintiff
alleges that in case “CR-1538-2021,” which was closed, the property included
“$891.00/iPhone 12 pro max,” and in case “CR-929-2021,” which was nolle
1 Comm. v. Batista, No. CP-67-CR-0001538-2021 (C.C.P. York Cnty.)
(available at
https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/Report/CpDocketSheet?docketNumber=CP-67-CR-
0001538-2021&dnh=11XKk2f%2FkjzsCIUELz454A%3D%3D (last accessed Oct.
3, 2024). The Court is unable to find a docket for the case with docket number CP-
67-CR-929-2021. (Doc. 24, p. 5).
prossed, the property included “$526.77/iPhone 12 pro max.” Id. Despite informing
Defendant Williams of his desire to be present for the hearing, Defendant Williams
did not ensure Plaintiff’s presence and again waived Plaintiff’s presence. Id. Plaintiff
had also informed Defendant Williams that any property recovered was to be
returned to Plaintiff’s “power of attorney,” his mother. Id. After the hearing,
Defendant Williams contacted Plaintiff’s mother, and advised her “for case CP-67-
CR-929-2021, he had retrieved the property to be returned to himself, again without
[Plaintiff’s] consent. Id.
Plaintiff has attempted numerous times to contact Defendant Williams
regarding “the above mentioned matters,” but has received no response. (Doc. 24, p.
5). Plaintiff alleges this has resulted in him “having to withdraw counsel to find new
counsel & or help,” and “having to pay him & paralegals for assistance.” Id.
On February 21, 2023, Plaintiff was appointed new defense counsel by the
state court “due to Defendant Williams negligence of non-responsive efforts.” (Doc.
24, p. 6).
On December 5, 2024, a Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) hearing was
held for Plaintiff, apparently relating to the “matters mentioned above.” (Doc. 24, p.
6). Plaintiff alleges that at the end of the hearing Judge Prendergast stated, “I find
your ex-counsel Mr. Williams more credible & you should be lucky with the plea
you received. If you appeal my decision & make me re-sentence you, you will not
get another plea deal, but I will list you for trial & you will be facing 30 years. Is
that understood?” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff brings seven legal claims:
(1) Eighth Amendment claim for cruel & unusual punishment
against all Defendants[;]
(2) Sixth Amendment claim for ineffective assistance of counsel
against Defendant Jeremy Williams[;]
(3) Fourteenth Amendment claim for violation of due
process/deprivation of property against Defendants:
Williams/Prendergast[;]
(4) First Amendment claim for future retaliation against Defendant
Prendergast[;]
(5) Breach of fiduciary duty[;]
(6) Malpractice claim[; and]
(7) Breach of contract[.]
(Doc. 24, pp. 7-8). Plaintiff alleges as injuries “emotional distress, mental suffering.”
(Doc. 24, p. 7).
As relief, Plaintiff requests:
(1) [T]he courts to order Defendants to return the aforementioned
property for CP-67-CR-929-2021/CP-67-CR-1538-2021
(money & phones);
(2) . . . money in the amount of $16,000, due to Defendant Williams
termination. Money that was paid to Mr. Williams from
Plaintiff[;]
(3) . . . money on behalf of paralegal fees & certified mail/the cost
of motions sent through mail & etc. In the amount of $500[;]
(4) . . . money for emotional distress, mental suffering as court
deems fit[;]
(5) . . . punitive damages against each & every Defendant, jointly,
individually & severally in the amount of $100,000[;]
(6) . . . actual damages against each & every Defendant, jointly,
individually & severally in the amount of $100,000[;]
(7) . . . direct damages against each & every Defendant, jointly,
individually & severally in the amount of $100,000[;]
(8) . . . general damages against each & every Defendant, jointly,
individually & severally in the amount of $100,000[;]
(9) . . . special damages against each & every Defendant, jointly,
individually & severally in the amount of $100,000[;]
(10) . . . treble damages against each & every Defendant, jointly,
individually & severally in the amount of $100,000[;]
(11) . . . extra damages against each & every Defendant, jointly,
individually & severally in the amount of $100,000[;]
(12) And any additional relief this Honorable Court deems just,
proper & equitable.
(Doc. 24, pp. 7, 9-10).
To his Second Amended Complaint Plaintiff attaches a transcript of the June
20, 2022 sentence modification hearing (Doc. 24-1, pp. 1-3); a document outlining
the estate administration of an individual not discussed in Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint (Doc. 24, p. 4); a completed and an uncompleted copy of
Plaintiff’s plea documentation (Doc. 24-2); two unreadable forms (Doc. 24-3); a
copy of Plaintiff’s DC16E Sentence Status Summary (Doc. 24-4); copies of three
letters, two addressed to Defendant Williams and one addressed to Gregory H. Gettle
(Doc. 24-5); a copy of a letter Plaintiff wrote to an unknown recipient (Doc. 24-6);
a copy of a letter from Defendant Williams to Plaintiff (Doc. 24-7); a copy of two
motions to set forfeiture hearing filed by the Commonwealth in the Court of
Common Pleas of York County (Doc. 24-8); and copies of certified mail receipts
(Doc. 24-9).
With this background in mind we will now turn to the legal standards we must
apply.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. STATUTORY SCREENING OBLIGATION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(E)
This Court has a statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of
complaints brought by a plaintiff who has requested leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and must dismiss a case sua sponte if: (i) the allegation of poverty is untrue,
(ii) the action is frivolous or malicious, (iii) the complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or (iv) the complaint seeks money damages from a
defendant who is immune from suit.2
When conducting this screening analysis, district courts apply the standard
governing motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
2 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Civil Procedure.3 At this early stage of the litigation, the district court must: “accept
the facts alleged in [a plaintiff’s] complaint as true,” “draw[ ] all reasonable
inferences in [their] favor,” and “ask only whether [that] complaint, liberally
construed, . . . contains facts sufficient to state a plausible . . . claim.”4 A court need
not “credit a complaint’s ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal conclusions,’”5 and does not need
to assume that a plaintiff can prove facts not alleged.6
Furthermore, a pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held
to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can only
be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his or her claim which would entitle him or
her to relief.7 To state a claim, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to raise a
3 See e.g., Endrikat v. Ransom, No. 1:21-CV-1684, 2022 WL 4111861, at *2
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2022) (“In dismissing claims under §§ 1915(e), 1915A, and
1997e, district courts apply the standard governing motions to dismiss filed pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
4 Shorter v. United States, 12 F. 4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Perez v.
Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 774, 782 (7th Cir. 2015)).
5 Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
6 Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
7 Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972).
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary
element[s].”8
In considering a motion to dismiss and in screening complaints under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court generally relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, and
matters of public record.9
B. FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 8: PLEADING REQUIREMENTS
While a pro se plaintiff is entitled to a liberal construction of their pleading,
they are not “excused from complying with the rules of procedural and substantive
law.”10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) commands “a pleading that states a
claim for relief must contain: . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(d)(1) further
requires “each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Under this rule,
a well-pleaded complaint must recite factual allegations which are sufficient to raise
the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth
in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action.
8 Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562 (2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
9 Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007).
10 Hayden v. Allegheny Health Network, No. 2:21-CV-525, 2022 WL 783430,
at *5 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2022); see McNeil v. U.S., 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1980).
In essence, Rule 8 requires a complaint “to give the defendant fair notice of
what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”11 The complaint should
allow a defendant to “meaningfully answer or plead to it . . . .”12 Dismissal under
Rule 8 is appropriate when a complaint leaves “the defendants having to guess what
of the many things discussed constituted [a cause of action];”13 or when the
complaint is so “rambling and unclear” as to defy response.14 Similarly, dismissal is
appropriate in “‘those cases in which the complaint is so confused, ambiguous,
vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.’”15
C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 CLAIMS FOR CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
i. In General
“Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the
color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”16 “It is well
settled that § 1983 does not confer any substantive rights, but merely ‘provides a
11 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47
(1957) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
12 Binsack v. Lackawanna Cnty. Prison, 438 F. App’x 158, 160 (3d Cir. 2011).
13 Id. at 160.
14 Tillio v. Spiess, 441 F. App’x 109 (3d Cir. 2011).
15 Id. at 110 (quoting Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995));
Tillio v. Northland Grp. Inc., 456 F. App’x 78, 79 (3d Cir. 2012).
16 Shuman v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing
Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 298 (3d Cir. 2000)).
method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’”17 To establish a claim
under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish two things: (1) a deprivation of a federally
protected right; and (2) that the deprivation was committed by a person or persons
acting under color of state law.18 Certain claims under § 1983 have their own unique
elements in addition to requiring a state actor acting under color of state law.
Further, if a civil rights complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a
claim, “a district court must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment
would be inequitable or futile.”19
ii. Individual and Official Capacity 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims
“Claims under Section 1983 can take two forms: an ‘individual capacity’
lawsuit, which are those brought against a government official to hold him or her
personally liable, and an ‘official capacity’ action, which seeks to hold the official’s
government entity liable for actions taken by the official.”20 Liability under § 1983
is personal in nature, therefore a plaintiff must allege facts that demonstrate “the
17 Williams v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm’n, 870 F.3d 294, 297 (3d
Cir. 2017) (quoting Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cnty., 757 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2014)).
18 Woloszyn v. Cnty. of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting
Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 689 (3d Cir. 1997)).
19 Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008); Lisowski
v. Walmart Stores, Inc., No. 21-2501, 2022 WL 2763698, at *4 n.4 (3d Cir. July 15,
2022).
20 Roberts v. Pennsylvania, No. 22-4829, 2023 WL 6278874, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 26, 2023) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985)).
defendants’ personal involvement in the alleged misconduct.”21 It is not enough to
state “a mere hypothesis that an individual defendant had personal knowledge
of or involvement in depriving the plaintiff of his rights.”22 Personal involvement
can include direct wrongful conduct by a defendant, allegations of personal
direction, or actual knowledge and acquiescence of the alleged violation of a federal
right.23 Additionally, “official-capacity suits generally represent only another way of
pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.”24
iii. Monell Claims Against a Government Agency
If a plaintiff wishes to recover under § 1983 from a municipality they must:
(1) identify a policy or custom that deprived [them] of a federally
protected right;
(2) demonstrate that the municipality, by its deliberate conduct, acted
as the “moving force” behind the alleged deprivation; and
(3) establish a direct causal link between the policy or custom and the
21 Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020); Murray v. Wetzel, No.
1:17-CV-1637, 2021 WL 5500511, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 2021) (“Personal
involvement can include direct wrongful conduct by a defendant, but it can also be
demonstrated through evidence of personal direction or actual knowledge and
acquiescence.” (internal quotations omitted)).
22 Gannaway v. PrimeCare Med., Inc., 150 F. Supp. 3d 511, 526 (E.D. Pa.
2015) (citing Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 133 (3d Cir. 1986), aff’d sub nom,
Gannaway v. PrimeCare Med., Inc., 652 F. App’x 91 (3d Cir. 2016)).
23 Murray, 2021 WL 5500511, at *5.
24 Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (quoting Graham, 473 at 165
(quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. Of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55
(1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
plaintiff’s injury.25
A municipality “can only be liable when the alleged constitutional transgression
implements or executes a policy, regulation or decision officially adopted by the
governing body or informally adopted by custom.”26 A policy “is a statement,
ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by a
government body’s officers.”27 A custom need not be formally adopted by the
municipality but may impose liability where “the relevant practice is so widespread
as to have the force of law.”28 A plaintiff is also able to bring a municipal liability
Monell claim “under certain circumstances” where constitutional violations result
from a municipality’s failure to train municipal employees.29 Further, “without an
underlying constitutional violation, there can be no Monell claim.”30
25 Blasi v. Borough of Pen Argyl, No. 14-1354, 2015 WL 4486717, at *5 (E.D.
Pa. July 23, 2015) (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520
U.S. 397, 404 (1997)).
26 Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Monell,
436 U.S. 658).
27 Id. (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690).
28 Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla., 520 U.S. at 404 (citing Monell,
436 U.S. at 690-91).
29 City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).
30 Knellinger v. York St. Prop. Dev., LP, 57 F. Supp. 3d 462, 471 (E.D. Pa.
2014) (citing Customers Bank v. Municipality of Norristown, 942 F.Supp.2d 534,
546 (E.D. Pa. 2013)).
D. STANDARD FOR DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE
The United States Supreme Court has observed that dismissal with prejudice
is a “harsh remedy.”31 “Dismissal of a count in a complaint with prejudice is
appropriate if amendment would be inequitable or futile.”32
IV. DISCUSSION
We now turn to our screening analysis of Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint. We will address Plaintiff’s various § 1983 claims by each Defendant
individually and then address his state claims.
A. DEFENDANT WILLIAMS
Plaintiff asserts § 1983 claims against Defendant Williams for violation of his
Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment, his Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, and his Fourteenth Amendment
rights to “due process/deprivation of property.” (Doc. 24, p. 7). Regarding defense
attorneys, the Third Circuit has stated that “it is well established that defense
attorneys, no matter whether they are privately retained, court-appointed, or
employed as public defenders, do not act under color of state law.”33 Therefore,
Plaintiff does not and cannot state any § 1983 claims against Defendant Williams.
31 New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 118 (2000).
32 Bankwell Bank v. Bray Entm’t, Inc., No. 20-49 (SRC), 2021 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11080, at *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 21, 2021).
33 Deangelo v. Brady, 185 F. App’x 173, 175 (3d Cir. 2006).
Accordingly, we will recommend Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Williams
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel, and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights be dismissed
with prejudice. Amendment would be futile because Defendant Williams does not
act under color of state law.
B. THE COMMONWEALTH
Plaintiff brings a § 1983 claim against the Commonwealth for the violation
of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. (Doc.
24, p. 7). The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State.34
By its terms, the Eleventh Amendment strictly limits the power of federal
courts to entertain cases brought by citizens against the state. “The Supreme Court
34 U.S. Const. amend. XI.
extended the Eleventh Amendment’s reach to suits by in-state plaintiffs, thus barring
all private suits against non-consenting States in federal courts.”35
The Eleventh Amendment “imposes a jurisdictional bar against individuals
bringing suit against a state or its agencies in federal court, or against a state official
in his or her official capacity.”36 “[U]nless Congress has ‘specifically abrogated’ the
states’ sovereign immunity or a state has unequivocally consented to suit in federal
court, we lack jurisdiction to grant relief in such cases.”37
Eleventh Amendment protection, however, is not absolute. There are three
primary exceptions: “(1) congressional abrogation, (2) waiver by the state, and (3)
suits against individual state officers for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief
to end an ongoing violation of federal law.”38
Here, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has not waived its Eleventh
Amendment immunity by consenting to suit in federal court.39 Nor has Congress
35 Lombardo v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 540 F.3d 190, 194 (3d
Cir. 2008).
36 Durham v. Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 227 (3d Cir. 2023) (emphasis added and
footnotes omitted).
37 Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.,
730 F.3d 291, 318 (3d Cir. 2013).
38 Pennsylvania Federation of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310
(3d Cir. 2002).
39 42 Pa. C.S. § 8521(b) (“Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be
construed to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts
guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States); 1
Pa. C.S. § 2310 (“the Commonwealth . . . shall continue to enjoy sovereign immunity
and remain immune from suit. . . .”); see also Slavish v. City of Wilkes-Barre, No.
abrogated States’ immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.40 The third exception is
obviously not relevant as Plaintiff is suing the Commonwealth itself. Accordingly,
the Eleventh Amendment confers immunity from this suit in federal court on the
Commonwealth.41 Therefore, we will recommend Plaintiff’s claim against the
Commonwealth pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 for the violation of his Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment be dismissed
without prejudice and without leave to amend.42 Amendment would be futile
because the Commonwealth is immune to this suit in federal court.
C. DEFENDANT REAGAN
Plaintiff does not indicate whether he brings his claims against Defendant
Reagan in his official or individual capacity. Given Plaintiff’s pro se status and our
requirement to liberally construe his pleadings, we will construe Plaintiff’s Second
3:17-CV-1468, 2018 WL 5289500 at *9-10 (M.D. Pa. June 14, 2018) (“Although
the Commonwealth has expressly waived its sovereign immunity from suit in state
court in nine specific areas, it has not waived its immunity from being sued in federal
court for any reason.”).
40 Phillips v. James, No. 13-1196, 2014 WL 1652914, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Apr.
23, 2014) (“Congress has not expressly abrogated Pennsylvania’s Eleventh
Amendment immunity from civil rights suits for damages . . . .”).
41 42 Pa. C.S. § 8521(b); Slavish, 2018 WL 5289500 at *9-10; Phillips v.
James, 2014 WL 1652914, at *8.
42 “Eleventh Amendment immunity is a ‘threshold, nonmerits issue’ that ‘does
not entail any assumption by the court of substantive law-declaring power,’
Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 433 (2007)
(internal quotation marks omitted), and a dismissal on that basis, like dismissals for
lack of jurisdiction, should normally be without prejudice.” Merritts v. Richards, 62
F.4th 764, 772 (3d Cir. 2023).
Amended Complaint as asserting his claims against Defendant Reagan in both
capacities. Against Defendant Reagan, Plaintiff brings an Eighth Amendment cruel
and unusual punishment claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 24, p. 7).
As to district attorneys, in Pennsylvania “county prosecutors can have a ‘dual
or hybrid status,’” and “may be State officials when they prosecute crimes or
otherwise carry out policies established by the State, but serve as local policy makers
when they manage or administer their own offices.”43 County prosecutors are
considered state officials when they prosecute crimes or carry out policies
established by the state and are thus considered state officials.44 Additionally,
“prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for their conduct in
‘initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case, insofar as that conduct is
intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’”45
Plaintiff’s factual allegations as to Defendant Reagan are exceedingly vague
and do not provide the Court with adequate information to determine whether
Defendant Reagan was a state or county official when allegedly violating Plaintiff’s
rights or whether he would be entitled to prosecutorial immunity. The statement of
facts section of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint mentions Defendant Reagan
43 Carter v. City of Phila., 181 F.3d 339, 352-53 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting
Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1499 (3d Cir. 1996)).
44 Carter v. City of Phila., 181 F.3d at 352.
45 Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 430 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
once. (Doc. 24, p. 4). Plaintiff alleges that at a June 20, 2022, modification of
sentence hearing, which he was not present at either in person or via Zoom,
“Defendant Williams did not object to Defendant Lewis Reagan about the time credit
‘allowed by law’ as part of [Plaintiff’s] plea-agreement.” Id. Plaintiff’s allegation
effectively reveals nothing about Defendant Reagan’s actions during this
modification of sentence hearing, other than that he apparently said something
regarding the time credit that Plaintiff, who was not present at the hearing, found
objectionable.
Additionally, Plaintiff attaches a copy of the state court transcript from the
June 20, 2022, sentence modification hearing to his Second Amended Complaint.
(Doc. 24-1). Review of that transcript reveals that Virginia A. Hobbs, Esq., was the
Assistant District Attorney representing the Commonwealth at the June 20, 2022,
sentence modification hearing. Id. That transcript makes no mention of Defendant
Reagan or indicate that he was present at the hearing. Id.
Again, to state a claim, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary
element[s].”46 As to his Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim
under § 1983 against Defendant Reagan, Plaintiff has failed to do so. Given that the
46 Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d at 234 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 562) (internal quotation marks omitted).
transcript of the hearing negates Plaintiff’s vague allegation about Defendant
Reagan’s actions at the sentence modification hearing, there are effectively no
allegations concerning Defendant Reagan in Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint would not allow Defendant
Reagan to make a meaningful response.47 Plaintiff therefore fails to state an Eighth
Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim against Defendant Reagan.
Accordingly, we will recommend Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Reagan
pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 for the violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment be dismissed with prejudice. Amendment
would be futile as Plaintiff has already had an opportunity to amend this claim
against Defendant Reagan and has failed to adequately do so despite explanation of
the deficiencies of his claim by the Court in our second Screening Order, giving us
no reason to believe an additional opportunity to amend would be profitable.
D. JUDGE PRENDERGAST
Plaintiff does not indicate whether he brings his claims against Judge
Prendergast in her official or individual capacity. Given Plaintiff’s pro se status and
our requirement to liberally construe his pleadings, we will construe Plaintiff’s
Second Amended Complaint as asserting his claims against Judge Prendergast in
both capacities. Against Judge Prendergast Plaintiff brings an Eighth Amendment
47 Binsack, 438 F. App’x at 160.
cruel and unusual punishment claim, a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim,
and a “First Amendment claim for future retaliation” pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
(Doc. 24, p. 7).
i. Official Capacity Claims
“Pursuant to Pennsylvania law, Pennsylvania state courts and their judges are
part of the Commonwealth government.”48 This means that Judge Prendergast is a
state official, and a lawsuit “against state officials in their official capacity [] should
be treated as [a] suit[] against the State.”49 As discussed above in Section IV(B), the
Eleventh Amendment confers immunity from this suit in federal court on the
Commonwealth. Therefore, we will recommend Plaintiff’s claims against Judge
Prendergast in her official capacity pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of
his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment,
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, and First Amendment rights be
dismissed without prejudice and without leave to amend.50 Amendment would be
futile as the Commonwealth is immune from this suit in federal court.
48 Devenshire, 2016 WL 4032881, at *2 (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. 102
(2013)).
49 Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25.
50 See supra, note 43. Further, Plaintiff’s claim against Judge Prendergast in
her official capacity pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of his Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment is duplicative of the
Eighth Amendment claim Plaintiff states against the Commonwealth, a named
Defendant in this case.
ii. Individual Capacity Claims
“Judicial officers are immune from damage suits arising out of their official
duties.”51 “[J]udicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate
assessment of damages.”52 “Judicial immunity may be overcome only when: (i) the
challenged actions were not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity; or (ii) the
challenged actions, though judicial in nature, were taken in the complete absence of
all jurisdiction.”53 “An act is taken in a judge’s judicial capacity if it is a function
normally performed by a judge.”54 “Moreover, “[g]enerally . . . where a court has
some subject matter jurisdiction, there is sufficient jurisdiction for immunity
purposes.”55
“Further, [a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he
took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.”56 Nor is
judicial immunity “forfeited even if a judge committed grave procedural errors,
51 Bender-Mathis v. City of Erie, No. 1:23-CV-208, 2024 WL 3744153, at *3
(W.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2024) (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978)).
52 Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511, 526 (1985)).
53 Bender-Mathis, 2024 WL 3744153, at *3 (quoting Mireles, 503 U.S. at 11-
12) (internal quotation marks omitted).
54 Davis, 2024 WL 4026728, at *3 (quoting Gallas v. Supreme Ct. of Pa., 211
F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
55 Lombardo v. Evans, No. 24-CV-1999, 2024 WL 3927233, at *5 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 22, 2024) (quoting Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 443-44 (3d Cir.
2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56 Talker v. Monmouth Cnty., NJ, No. 3:12-CV-02019, 2012 WL 2951857, at
*4 (D.N.J. July 17, 2012) (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57.
conducted a proceeding in an informal and ex parte manner, or performed an action
that was unfair or controversial,”57 or “even if the actions are alleged to be legally
incorrect, in bad faith, malicious, or corrupt, or are taken as a result of a conspiracy
with others.”58
In this case, the only actions Plaintiff alleges Judge Prendergast took occurred
while she was presiding over Plaintiff’s PCRA hearing. Plaintiff alleges at the end
of that hearing Judge Prendergast said, “‘I find your ex-counsel Mr. Williams more
credible & you should be lucky with the plea you received.’ ‘If you appeal my
decision & make me re-sentence you, you will not get another plea deal, but I will
list you for trial & you will be facing 30 years. Is that understood?’” (Doc. 24, p. 6).
Plaintiff’s allegations focus solely on Judge Prendergast’s rulings and conduct in
Plaintiff’s criminal case proceeding before her. Judge Prendergast plainly had
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s criminal case, and Plaintiff does not allege that she did
not.59 Even to the extent Judge Prendergast’s ruling and admonishment of Plaintiff
of the potential consequences of appealing that ruling were done in bad faith or
maliciously, she is still entitled to judicial immunity.60 Plaintiff’s allegations are
based on acts Judge Prendergast “took in [her] judicial capacity while presiding over
57 Bender-Mathis, 2024 WL 3744153, at *3 (quoting Gallas, 211 F.3d at 769)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
58 Lombardo, 2024 WL 3927233, at *5 (internal citations omitted).
59 See 42 Pa. C.S. § 931(a).
60 Lombardo, 2024 WL 3927233, at *5
a matter over which [she] had jurisdiction” and so she is entitled to judicial
immunity.61 Accordingly, we will recommend Plaintiff’s claims against Judge
Prendergast in her individual capacity pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation
of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment,
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, and First Amendment rights be
dismissed with prejudice. Amendment would be futile because Judge Prendergast is
entitled to judicial immunity for the acts Plaintiff complains of.
E. YORK COUNTY
Plaintiff brings a § 1983 claim against York County for the violation of his
Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. (Doc. 24, p.
7). As explained above in the legal standards section, a municipality “can only be
liable when the alleged constitutional transgression implements or executes a policy,
regulation or decision officially adopted by the governing body or informally
adopted by custom.”62 Plaintiff has not alleged that the deprivation of his Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment was the result of the
implementation or execution of a policy or custom, or provided facts that would
support a Monell claim. In fact, York County is not mentioned in the statement of
facts section of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint. In our Order screening
61 Id.
62 Beck, 89 F.3d at 971 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. 658).
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, we explained to Plaintiff that he had not
pleaded sufficient allegations to state a Monell claim against York County. (Doc. 20,
pp. 14-15).63 Despite this, Plaintiff pleads no allegations about York County in his
Second Amended Complaint. Moreover, “without an underlying constitutional
violation, there can be no Monell claim.”64 In this case, Plaintiff has failed to state a
claim for an underlying constitutional violation for a Monell claim to be predicated
on. Accordingly, we will recommend Plaintiff’s claim against York County pursuant
to 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 for the violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment be dismissed with prejudice. Amendment would be
futile as Plaintiff has already had an opportunity to amend this claim against York
County and ignored the Court’s findings and explanations of the deficiencies of his
claim in our second Screening Order, giving us no reason to believe an additional
opportunity to amend would be profitable.
63 In Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint he mentioned York County once in
the statement of facts where he concluded that York County violated his due process
rights and right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment because it ‘allowed’
the hearing where Defendant Williams improperly waived Plaintiff’s right to be
present, and because it took away his time credited towards his sentence. (Doc. 18,
¶ 21). No such allegations appear in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint.
64 Knellinger v. York St. Prop. Dev., LP, 57 F. Supp. 3d 462, 471 (E.D. Pa.
2014) (citing Customers Bank v. Municipality of Norristown, 942 F.Supp.2d 534,
546 (E.D. Pa. 2013)).
F. STATE CLAIMS
Plaintiff also brings state law claims for (1) breach of fiduciary duty; (2)
malpractice; and (3) breach of contract. (Doc. 24, p. 8). Plaintiff does not specify
which Defendants he brings these claims against. However, the Court need not
hypothesize as we will be recommending dismissal of all of Plaintiff’s federal
claims. When a district court dismisses all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction, the Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any
remaining state law claims.65 Whether the Court will exercise supplemental
jurisdiction is within its discretion.66 That decision should be based on “the values
of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.”67 Here, given the early
stage of this proceeding, there is no affirmative justification for retaining jurisdiction
over Plaintiff’s state tort claims. Therefore, we will recommend that, in the absence
of any plausible federal claim, the Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s state law claims, and Plaintiff’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty,
malpractice, and breach of contract be dismissed without prejudice and without leave
to amend.
[The next page contains the Recommendation]
65 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
66 Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 650 (3d Cir. 2009).
67 Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988).
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that:
(1) Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Williams pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for the violation of his Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel, Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights
be DISMISSED with prejudice.
(2) Plaintiff’s claim against the Commonwealth pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for the violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be from cruel
and unusual punishment be DISMISSED without prejudice and without
leave to amend.
(3) Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Reagan pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for the violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be from cruel
and unusual punishment be DISMISSED with prejudice.
(4) Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Prendergast in her individual
capacity pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of his First
Amendment rights, Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights be
DISMISSED with prejudice.
(5) Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Prendergast in her official capacity
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of his First Amendment
rights, Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights be
DISMISSED without prejudice and without leave to amend.
(6) Plaintiff’s claim against York County pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
the violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be from cruel and
unusual punishment be DISMISSED with prejudice.
(7) Plaintiff’s state law claims for breach of fiduciary duty, malpractice,
and breach of contract be DISMISSED without prejudice to him
bringing those claims in state court.
(8) The Clerk of Court be directed to CLOSE this case.
Date: February 3, 2025 BY THE COURT
s/William I. Arbuckle
William I. Arbuckle
U.S. Magistrate Judge
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DEVON BATISTA, ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:23-CV-2028
Plaintiff )
) (MUNLEY, D.J.)
v. )
) (ARBUCKLE, M.J.)
JEREMY WILLIAMS, et al., )
Defendants )
)
NOTICE OF LOCAL RULE 72.3
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that any party may obtain a review of the
Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings,
recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28
U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a
prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being
served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and
serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall
specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations
or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The
briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall
make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may
accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations
made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new
hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may
consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her
own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive
further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate
judge with instructions.
Date: February 3, 2025 BY THE COURT
s/William I. Arbuckle
William I. Arbuckle
U.S. Magistrate Judge