BROWN v. LYNCH

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

COLUMBUS DIVISION

JESSE LEE BROWN, :

:

Plaintiff, :

v. : Case No. 4:24-cv-158-TES-AGH

:

Sheriff HANK LYNCH, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

________________________________ :

RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiff Jesse Lee Brown, a prisoner incarcerated at the Muscogee County Jail

in Columbus, Georgia, filed a pro se Complaint seeking relief pursuant

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff also seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis

(ECF No. 2). As discussed below, however, Plaintiff has three strikes under the

Prison Litigation Reform Act, so he should not be permitted to proceed in forma

pauperis. In addition, Plaintiff failed to completely disclose his litigation history

despite the Court’s clear instructions to do so. It is therefore RECOMMENDED that

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis be DENIED and that this

action be DISMISSED without prejudice.

DISCUSSION

I. Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

Federal law bars a prisoner from bringing a civil action in federal court in

forma pauperis

if [he] has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained

in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United

States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious,

or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the

prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). This is known as the “three strikes provision.” Under § 1915(g),

a prisoner incurs a “strike” any time he has a federal lawsuit or appeal dismissed on

the grounds that it is (1) frivolous, (2) malicious, or (3) fails to state a claim. See

Medberry v. Butler, 185 F.3d 1189, 1192 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Daker v. Comm’r,

Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 820 F.3d 1278, 1283-84 (11th Cir. 2016) (confirming that “these

three grounds are the only grounds that can render a dismissal a strike”). Once a

prisoner incurs three strikes, his ability to proceed in forma pauperis in federal court

is greatly limited—leave to proceed in forma pauperis may not be granted unless the

prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. Medberry, 185 F.3d at

1192.

A review of court records on the Federal Judiciary’s Public Access to Court

Electronic Records (“PACER”) database reveals that Plaintiff filed multiple federal

lawsuits and that at least three of his complaints or appeals have been dismissed as

frivolous, or malicious, or for failure to state a claim. See, e.g., Order Dismissing

Compl., Brown v. Abbot, ECF No. 22 in Case No. 4:03-cv-00108-BAE (S.D. Ga. June

1, 2004) (dismissing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)); Order Dismissing Compl.,

Brown v. McLane, ECF No. 4 in Case No. 7:03-cv-00101-HL-RLH (M.D. Ga. Jan. 13,

2004) (dismissing as frivolous); Order on Mot. Recons., Brown v. Nix, ECF No. 12 in

Case No. 7:03-cv-00098-HL-RLH (M.D. Ga. Jan. 6, 2004) (dismissing as frivolous and

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)); Order Dismissing Compl., Brown v. Nance, ECF No.

6 in Case No. 4:01-cv-00127-HL (M.D. Ga. Oct. 19, 2001) (adopting recommendation

to dismiss for failure to state claim); see also Order Dismissing Compl., Brown v.

Ezell, ECF No. 6 in Case No. 4:06-cv-00121-CDL (M.D. Ga. Oct. 23, 2006) (adopting

recommendation to dismiss pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) after identifying at least

four cases determined to be “legally frivolous”). Plaintiff is accordingly barred from

prosecuting this action in forma pauperis unless he is in imminent danger of serious

physical injury. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

To qualify for this exception, a prisoner must allege specific facts that describe

an “ongoing serious physical injury,” or “a pattern of misconduct evidencing the

likelihood of imminent serious physical injury.” Sutton v. Dist. Att’y’s Off., 334 F.

App’x 278, 279 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Complaints of

past injuries are not sufficient. See Medberry, 185 F.3d at 1193. Vague and

unsupported claims of possible dangers likewise do not suffice. See White v. State of

Colo., 157 F.3d 1226, 1231 (10th Cir. 1998). The exception to § 1915(g) is to be applied

only in “genuine emergencies,” when (1) “time is pressing,” (2) the “threat or prison

condition is real and proximate,” and (3) the “potential consequence is ‘serious

physical injury.’” Lewis v. Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 531 (7th Cir. 2002).

Although Plaintiff’s Complaint is not a model of clarity, it appears he primarily

contends he has been falsely imprisoned. See, e.g., ECF No. 1 at 11 (seeking “damages

from all the Defendants for aiding in the false imprisonment”). Plaintiff alleges he

was illegally arrested without a warrant in Chattahoochee County, Georgia, on

February 2, 2020 and “denied due pr[oc]ess to face his accuser” and a first appearance

hearing. Id. at 5. Plaintiff was released on bond in 2021 “but never given a docket

call to return to court to face the charges.” Id. at 6. On June 13, 2024, Plaintiff was

arrested on new charges in Muscogee County, Georgia. Id. The Chattahoochee

County Sheriff’s Department placed a hold on Plaintiff based on the 2020 charges,

and Plaintiff is presently incarcerated in the Muscogee County Jail as a result of this

hold. Id.1 Plaintiff names as Defendants in this action Chattahoochee County Sheriff

Hank Lynch, former Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit Superior Court Judge Ben Land,

and attorney John Wilson, who appears to be Plaintiff’s current or former public

defender. Id. at 6.

Any allegations challenging the constitutionality of Plaintiff’s 2020 arrest and

detention wholly fail to suggest that Plaintiff is in imminent danger of suffering any

serious physical injury. Plaintiff, however, also mentions that he is currently facing

serious physical danger in the Muscogee County Jail due to the conditions of his

confinement there. Id. at 9. Plaintiff contends he suffers from “life threaten

illness[es],” which include “heart condition and diabete[s] and high blood and HIV.”

Id. Plaintiff states he is not being “properly t[]reated” for these conditions, and he

also suggests his current diet is not appropriate for his medical condition. Id.

While the failure to treat serious medical needs can place an inmate in

imminent danger of serious physical injury for purposes of § 1915(g), Plaintiff’s

allegations here are not sufficient to do so. First, Plaintiff’s allegations of imminent

danger are too conclusory to warrant application of the exception. Plaintiff provides

1 Plaintiff states he was indicted on those charges on September 27, 2021. ECF No. 1 at 10.

no specific facts about the symptoms he is experiencing. He also fails to explain what

treatment or dietary modifications he requires, whether and from whom he has

requested such treatment, and whether any treatment has been provided or expressly

denied. A “prisoner's factual allegations must be sufficiently specific for us to infer

that the prisoner has a serious disease and that prison officials have failed to treat

it,” otherwise the Court has “no basis for evaluating the imminence or dangerousness

of the threat the prisoner faces.” Mitchell v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 587 F.3d 415,

421 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Moreover, without requiring prisoners “to demonstrate the

actual existence of an imminent threat, otherwise disqualified filers could obtain IFP

status simply by adding general allegations of endangerment.” Id. Plaintiff’s vague

generalizations regarding his medical treatment are thus insufficient to establish

that he is entitled to the § 1915(g) exception. See id. (holding that prisoner’s

allegations that he required unspecified medical treatment for untreated hepatitis,

standing alone, were insufficient to establish imminent danger).

In addition, Plaintiff failed to allege a sufficient nexus between the claims he

seeks to litigate—those involving his state court criminal case and the resulting “false

imprisonment”—and his allegations of danger, which involve his treatment at the

jail. A number of courts require there to “be a nexus between the imminent danger a

three-strikes prisoner alleges to obtain IFP status and the legal claims asserted in

his complaint.” Pettus v. Morgenthau, 554 F.3d 293, 297 (2d Cir. 2009); see also

McFadden v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 270 F. Supp. 3d 82, 87–88 (D.D.C. 2017) (“Multiple

decisions from this district, however, as well as decisions in every circuit to have

resolved the issue, agree that § 1915(g) requires some nexus between the imminent

danger asserted by the prisoner and the cause of action the prisoner seeks to litigate

IFP.” (internal citations omitted)). The Eleventh Circuit has suggested it will follow

these courts. Daker v. Robinson, 802 F. App’x 513, 515 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Pettus

to support holding that claims that prison officials were harming plaintiff in prison

did not have sufficient nexus to claims that state court judges and clerks

“mishandled” plaintiff’s state cases). This nexus “requires that the prisoner’s

complaint seek to redress an imminent danger of serious physical injury and that this

danger must be fairly traceable to a violation of law alleged in the complaint.” Pettus,

554 F.3d at 297.

In this case, Plaintiff’s claims concerning the conditions of his confinement are

“too attenuated from the crux of the complaint—that state actors mishandled his

cases”—to warrant application of the § 1915(g) exception. Daker, 802 F. App’x at 515.

The disconnect between Plaintiff’s substantive claims and his claims of imminent

danger is underscored by the fact that Plaintiff does not request any injunctive relief

to remedy the conditions of his confinement or sue any Muscogee County Jail officials.

Indeed, it appears Plaintiff is pursuing these claims in a separate action filed in this

Court, Brown v. Mitchell, Case No. 4:24-cv-00144-CDL-AGH (M.D. Ga. Oct. 11, 2024).

His Complaint therefore does not “seek to redress an imminent danger of serious

physical injury.” Pettus, 554 F.3d at 297.

For these reasons, Plaintiff should not be permitted to proceed in forma

pauperis pursuant to § 1915(g), and his Complaint should be dismissed without

prejudice to his right to refile with pre-payment of the full $405 filing fee. See Dupree

v. Palmer, 284 F.3d 1234, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he proper procedure is for the

district court to dismiss the complaint without prejudice when it denies the prisoner

leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to the three strikes provision of §

1915(g).”).

II. Dismissal for Failure to Disclose Litigation History

Plaintiff’s Complaint should also be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(1) because he affirmatively misrepresented his litigation history to the

Court. Plaintiff drafted his Complaint on the Court’s standard § 1983 complaint form.

This form requires a pro se plaintiff to disclose his complete litigation history before

stating his claims. Relevant here, the form unambiguously states, “Other than an

appeal of your conviction or sentence, and other than any habeas action, have you

ever filed any lawsuit while incarcerated or detained?” ECF No. 1 at 2. In response

to this question, Plaintiff checked yes. The form then requires prisoners to provide

information about each lawsuit filed and notes, “IF YOU HAVE FILED MORE THAN

ONE LAWSUIT, LIST OTHER LAWSUITS ON A SEPARATE SHEET OF PAPER,

GIVING THE SAME INFORMATION FOR EACH.” Id. Plaintiff listed only one

lawsuit, which the Court presumes is Brown v. Mitchell, Case No. 4:24-cv-00144-

CDL-AGH (M.D. Ga. Oct. 11, 2024), given Plaintiff’s statement that the case is

currently pending before the undersigned. See id.2

2 In response to the question asking if he had ever “filed a lawsuit dealing with the same or similar

facts or issues that are involved in this action[,]” Plaintiff also disclosed one lawsuit filed against

Sheriff Lynch in this Court in 2021. ECF No. 1 at 2. The Court presumes this case is Brown v. Lynch,

Case No. 4:20-cv-00053-CDL-MSH (M.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 2020).

The standard form also states, “AS TO ANY LAWSUIT FILED IN ANY

FEDERAL COURT in which you were permitted to proceed in forma pauperis, was

any suit dismissed on the ground that it was frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a

claim?” ECF No. 1 at 3. In response to this question, Plaintiff again checked yes. Id.

The form then provides space for the prisoner to “state the name of the court and

docket number as to each case.” Id. In response, Plaintiff wrote, “Middle District”

and “Don’t recall #.” Id.

A search of the PACER database confirms that Plaintiff has filed more than

two dozen federal cases in the Georgia district courts.3 As noted above, at least four

of those cases were dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted; he has been identified as a “three-striker;” and he

3 Searches of the Georgia Department of Corrections online offender query system and the Muscogee

County Jail online jail roster shows that Plaintiff spells his first name “Jessie” and “Jesse,” and he

also has the unusual alias “Bones.” https://portal-gamuscogee.tylertech.cloud/app/JailSearch/#/search

(searched “Jessie Brown”) (last visited Jan. 14, 2025);

https://services.gdc.ga.gov/GDC/OffenderQuery/jsp/OffQry Redirector.jsp (searched “Brown, Jessie”)

(last visited Jan. 14, 2025). The Court has confirmed that Plaintiff filed approximately two dozen

cases by cross-referencing Plaintiff’s Georgia Department of Corrections identification number

(407093), two Georgia Department of Corrections case numbers assigned to Plaintiff (EF164171 and

EF477643), and Plaintiff’s Muscogee County Sheriff’s Office identification number (572810), with the

information available on PACER to ensure that Plaintiff filed each of the following cases in addition

to the cases already mentioned above: Brown v. Tompkins, 4:20-cv-00260-CDL-MSH (M.D. Ga. Oct.

22, 2020); Brown v. Thomas, Case No. 4:20-cv-00098-CDL-MSH (M.D. Ga. May 12, 2020); Brown v.

Blakely, Case No. 7:18-cv-64-HL-TQL (M.D. Ga. Apr. 20, 2018); Brown v. Owen, Case No. 7:14-cv-170-

HL-TQL (M.D. Ga. Oct. 24, 2014); Brown v. Owens, Case No. 1:14-cv-00177-JRH-BKE (S.D. Ga. Sept.

2, 2014); Brown v. Stracker, Case No. 4:12-cv-00260-CDL-MSH (M.D. Ga. Sept. 27, 2012); Brown v.

Ezell, Case No. 4:06-cv-121-CDL (M.D. Ga. Oct. 23, 2006); Brown v. Amideo, Case No. 7:03-cv-00091-

HL-RLH (M.D. Ga. Aug. 21, 2003); Brown v. Thomason, Case No. 4:03-cv-00052-BAE-GRS (S.D. Ga.

Mar. 19, 2003); Brown v. Fletcher, Case No. 5:02-cv-0007-CWH (M.D. Ga. Jan. 9, 2002); Brown v.

Wetherington, Case No. 5:01-cv-00517-DF (M.D. Ga. Dec. 24, 2001); Brown v. Allen, Case No. 6:99-cv-

00020-BAE (S.D. Ga. Jan. 13, 1999); Brown v. Allen, Case No. 6:98-cv-00083-WTM-JEG (S.D. Ga. June

3, 1998); Brown v. Lewis, Case No. 6:92-cv-000106-DHB (S.D. Ga. July 27, 1992); Brown v. Malmberg,

Case No. 6:92-cv-00028-WTM (S.D. Ga. Apr. 13, 1992); Brown v. Lewis, Case No. 6:91-cv-00073-DHB

(S.D. Ga. Oct. 16, 1991); Brown v. Foster, Case No. 6:90-cv-00126-DHB-JEG (S.D. Ga. Nov. 8, 1990);

Brown v. Durrence, Case No. 6:90-cv-00118-AAA-JEG (S.D. Ga. Oct. 29, 1990); Brown v. Byrd, Case

No. 6:90-cv-00095-AAA-JEG (S.D. Ga. Sept. 13, 1990).

has had cases dismissed pursuant to § 1915(g). Moreover, while Plaintiff disclosed

filing a minimal number of cases in the Middle District of Georgia, he did not

acknowledge filing any cases at all in the Northern or Southern Districts of Georgia,

despite having filed approximately a dozen cases in those jurisdictions.

A prisoner’s “failure to comply with court rules requiring disclosures about

[his] previous litigation” may constitute “an abuse of the judicial process warranting

dismissal” of the party’s pleading as frivolous or malicious under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(1). Sears v. Haas, 509 F. App'x 935, 936 (11th Cir. 2013); see also Redmon

v. Lake Cnty. Sheriff’s Office¸ 414 F. App’x 221, 225 (11th Cir. 2011).4 “Although pro

se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard, a plaintiff's pro se status does not

excuse mistakes regarding procedural rules.” Sears, 509 F. App’x at 936.

A prisoner’s failure to disclose his full litigation history, when requested to do

so, is not considered a minor omission. Such information is highly relevant where, as

here, a prisoner seeks to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee, as the court

has a duty to enforce the statutory three strikes bar, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). This

information is also necessary for the court to determine, prior to service, whether a

prisoner’s claims are related to (or should be considered in connection with) another

pending action and—more importantly—whether any claims or issues in the current

4 The cases cited herein refer to three different statutes: 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(i), and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) is the predecessor to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Like 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, both statutes contain a provision allowing the Court to

determine whether a complaint is subject to dismissal as being frivolous or malicious, although

dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is now mandatory if such a finding is made. See, e.g., Bilal

v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1348-49 (11th Cir. 2001). Though the Court is recommending dismissal based

on 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, cases referring to any of these statutes support dismissal of Plaintiff’s

Complaint.

complaint have already been decided. Williams v. Wiggins, No. 6:09-cv-943-Orl-

28DAB, 2010 WL 4983665, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 2010). Reliable disclosures are

thus essential for an efficient and effective screening of the large number of pro se

prisoner complaints received by this Court. And, as other courts within this Circuit

have reasoned, if pro se plaintiffs were not penalized for providing false or misleading

information in the complaint, “there would be little or no disincentive” for prisoners

to attempt to evade the requirement that such disclosures be made. Williams, 2010

WL 4983665 at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hood v. Tompkins,

197 F. App’x 818, 819 (11th Cir. 2006) (agreeing with district court’s conclusion that

allowing prisoner to “acknowledge what he should have disclosed earlier would serve

to overlook his abuse of the judicial process”).

Here, Plaintiff failed to disclose his complete litigation history on a complaint

form that unambiguously requires this disclosure. Plaintiff specifically identified

only two previous lawsuits he filed out of at least two dozen, and his responses suggest

he only filed cases in the Middle District of Georgia even though approximately half

of the cases he filed were filed outside of this district. The form warned Plaintiff that

“FAILURE TO DISCLOSE ALL PRIOR CIVIL CASES MAY RESULT IN THE

DISMISSAL OF THIS CASE. IF YOU ARE UNSURE OF ANY PRIOR CASES YOU

HAVE FILED, THAT FACT MUST BE DISCLOSED AS WELL,” ECF No. 1 at 2, and

any claim that Plaintiff simply forgot filing more than two dozen lawsuits lacks

credibility. Shelton v. Rohrs, 406 F. App'x 340, 340 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding that

prisoner “would have known that he filed multiple previous lawsuits” even though he

claimed he did not remember filing lawsuits and that his records were inaccessible).

It thus appears that Plaintiff intentionally omitted references to his past litigation

history in an effort to avoid the three-strikes bar. Plaintiff’s Complaint is accordingly

subject to sua sponte dismissal. See Kendrick v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t Corr., No. 21-12686,

2022 WL 2388425, at *3 (11th Cir. July 1, 2022) (per curiam) (“A plaintiff’s bad-faith

litigiousness or manipulative tactics, which include lying about one’s litigation

history, warrant dismissal under § 1915.”); Sears, 509 F. App'x at 936; Attwood v.

Singletary, 105 F.3d 610, 613 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that “[a] finding that the

plaintiff engaged in bad faith litigiousness or manipulative tactics warrants

dismissal” under § 1915(d)).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion to

proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is DENIED, and that this action be

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and/or §

1915A(b)(1).

OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written

objections to these recommendations with the Honorable Tilman E. Self, III, United

States District Judge, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a

copy of this Recommendation. Any objection is limited in length to TWENTY (20)

PAGES. See M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.4. The parties may seek an extension of time in which

to file written objections, provided a request for an extension is filed prior to the

deadline for filing written objections. Failure to object in accordance with the

provisions of § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district judge’s

order based on factual and legal conclusions to which no objection was timely made.

See 11th Cir. R. 3-1.

SO RECOMMENDED, this 3rd day of February, 2025.

s/ Amelia G. Helmick

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE