Tinoco v. City of Hidalgo

Case: 23-40543 Document: 55-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/28/2025

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

____________ FILED

February 28, 2025

No. 23-40543

Lyle W. Cayce

____________ Clerk

Rafael Tinoco,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

City of Hidalgo, Texas; Sergio Coronado, in his individual

and official capacity; Romeo Rodriguez, in his individual and official

capacity; Raul Cantu, in his individual capacity and official capacity;

Esteban Lozano, in his individual capacity and official capacity;

Guadalupe Amaya,

Defendants—Appellees.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 7:23-CV-136

______________________________

Before Higginbotham, Stewart, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Rafael Tinoco brought this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the

City of Hidalgo, its mayor, its police chief, and two officers of the Hidalgo

Police Department (collectively, the “City”). Tinoco alleges that the City

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*

This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

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violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by wrongfully

arresting him on charges of witness tampering and by interrogating him

afterward. Tinoco also brought state law claims for defamation and slander

against Guadalupe Amaya for providing the police with information that led

to his arrest. The district court dismissed each of Tinoco’s claims.

Thereafter, Tinoco appealed. Because we agree that Tinoco failed to state a

claim for a violation of his constitutional rights, we AFFIRM the district

court’s judgment.

I.

A. Factual Background

Rafael Tinoco was the principal of Hidalgo Early College High School,

which is located in Hidalgo, Texas.1 As principal, one of Tinoco’s

responsibilities was to investigate matters involving teachers, staff, and

students at the school. On February 28, 2023, the school’s soccer team

refused to play a game scheduled for that day to protest the school reassigning

Ezequiel Morales, the team’s prior coach. As a result of the protest, the team

held a locker room meeting where Monty Stumbaugh, Athletic Director of

Hidalgo Independent School District, is alleged to have used profanity, made

threats, and assaulted a student-athlete.

On March 1, 2023, Tinoco was informed about the locker room

altercation and began collecting statements from students on the soccer team

regarding the incident. As he was leaving the school that day,

Amaya—assistant coach for the school’s soccer team—called Tinoco to

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1

Because this appeal involves review of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b), the facts presented herein are as alleged by Tinoco. See Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (“To

survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”).

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discuss what he had observed during the altercation. Tinoco asked him to

produce a written statement.2 The next day, Amaya provided his written

statement to Tinoco. Tinoco then learned from one of the school’s resource

officers that a parent filed a complaint of assault against Stumbaugh with the

Hidalgo Police Department. Tinoco told that resource officer that he had

“collected statements concerning another matter and would share those

statements with [the police department] after he reviewed the statements.”3

The next day, Tinoco directed Amaya to come to his office, where he asked

Amaya if he saw Stumbaugh grab or touch any of the students in the locker

room, to which Amaya responded, “no.” Tinoco then directed Amaya to

produce a second written statement that included this information, which

Amaya submitted to Tinoco the next day.

On March 22, 2023, police officers Raul Cantu and Esteban Lozano

came to the school and requested to meet with Tinoco. The officers asked

Tinoco to stop by the police station and provide a statement on an ongoing

investigation. Tinoco went to the station that day, but the officers were

unavailable when he arrived. The receptionist told Tinoco that the officers

would call him later so he left the police station.

Over the next few days, Tinoco alleges that he had two “bizarre and

puzzling” encounters with school staff members. First, Morales visited

Tinoco in his office and asked Tinoco to accompany him back to his

classroom. Morales made sure that both of their phones were left in Tinoco’s

office. Once they were inside Morales’s classroom, Morales began “talking

through his teeth,” writing on several pieces of paper, showing them to

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2

Due to Amaya’s limited English, Tinoco told Amaya that the statement could be

written in Spanish.

3

Tinoco does not clarify what he meant by “another matter” in this section of his

amended complaint.

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Tinoco, and then putting them in his pocket. Morales used this method to

communicate statements to the effect of “it’s going down,” “they are

looking out for themselves,” “they are not going to help you,” “you are on

your own,” “just tell them who told you to do it and they will leave you

alone,” and “tell them the order came from upstairs.” Tinoco then left

Morales’s classroom, stating that he did not know what Morales was talking

about.

During the second encounter, another staff member, Nancy Cavazos,

stopped by Tinoco’s office and made similar statements to those that

Morales had made. Eventually, Cavazos told Tinoco that “there is a coach

that said you told him to change his story,” and that “when they ask you just

tell them, who told you to do that.” Tinoco responded by telling Cavazos that

he did not ask anyone to change their story.

Later that afternoon, Tinoco was notified by security that members of

the media wanted to enter campus. Tinoco alleges that the media was tipped

off that he was going to be arrested in order to pressure, intimidate, and

humiliate him. An hour after the media arrived, Officers Cantu and Lozano

came to the school and stated that they had a warrant for Tinoco’s arrest for

tampering with a witness. When Tinoco asked to view the warrant, the

officers stated that they did not need to show it to him. Tinoco later learned

that the warrant included a probable cause affidavit recounting a police

interrogation of Amaya, in which he alleged that Tinoco told him that “he

needed to change his statement by adding that Coach Esteban Alegria was

present in the locker room at the time of the incident involving the assault of

a student,” but that Amaya refused to do so because that would be a lie.

After his arrest, Tinoco was taken to the police station and

interrogated as to whether he pressured Amaya to change his testimony about

the locker room altercation, which Tinoco denied. For some portion of the

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interview, the camera on the ceiling was covered. Officer Lozano, however,

video-recorded the interrogation with his cell phone.4 Despite Tinoco’s

arrest and subsequent interrogation, his criminal charges were ultimately

dismissed after a grand jury issued a “No Bill.”

B. Procedural History

On April 20, 2023, Tinoco brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against the City. Tinoco also brought state law claims for slander and

defamation against Amaya. The City moved to dismiss Tinoco’s claims and

then filed an answer. Tinoco subsequently filed an amended complaint, and

the City moved to dismiss his claims in the amended complaint as well.

Tinoco filed an opposition to the City’s motion to dismiss, briefly requesting

in the alternative that he be permitted to amend his complaint for a second

time if the district court found his amended complaint insufficient.

The district court dismissed all of Tinoco’s claims, reasoning that

Tinoco failed to state a plausible claim for relief because: (1) the arrest

warrant was supported by probable cause, (2) even if the officers violated

Tinoco’s rights, his claims against them are barred by qualified immunity,

(3) the court did not need to assess whether Tinoco established municipal

liability against the City of Hidalgo and its officials because Tinoco failed to

plead a constitutional violation, and (4) it would be inappropriate to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Tinoco’s state law claims against Amaya with

all of Tinoco’s federal claims dismissed. In doing so, the district court

declined to address Tinoco’s perfunctory request to amend his complaint for

the second time. Tinoco timely appealed.

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4

Tinoco alleges that other arrestees or witnesses have had similar recording

procedures employed during their interrogations with the Hidalgo Police Department.

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II.

On appeal, Tinoco raises four arguments. First, he argues that the

district court erred in dismissing his § 1983 claims against Officer Lozano and

Officer Cantu. Second, he argues that the district court erred in dismissing

his § 1983 claims against the City of Hidalgo, Mayor Coronado, and Chief

Rodriguez. Third, he argues that the district court erred in dismissing his

state law claims against Amaya. And fourth, he argues that the district court

erred in rejecting his request to amend his amended complaint. We address

each of these arguments in turn.

We review “a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss de novo,

accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and viewing those facts in the light

most favorable to the plaintiffs.” Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir.

2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To survive a motion to dismiss,

a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. To state a facially plausible claim for relief under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the

alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state

law. See James v. Tex. Collin Cnty., 535 F.3d 365, 373 (5th Cir. 2008).

We review a district court’s decision to retain jurisdiction over state

law claims for abuse of discretion. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser

Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir. 1992). We also review a district court’s

denial of a motion to amend a complaint for abuse of discretion. See Marucci

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Sports, L.L.C. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir.

2014).

III.

A. Tinoco’s § 1983 Claims Against Officer Lozano and Officer Cantu

1. Fourth Amendment

Tinoco first argues that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment

rights because they lacked probable cause for his arrest. We disagree. As the

record reveals, Tinoco’s arrest was made pursuant to an arrest warrant

accompanied by a probable cause affidavit. That probable cause affidavit

stated the following:

Investigator Esteban Lozano obtained a video affidavit from

witness Guadalupe Amaya . . . in which he stated that on

Friday, March 3, 2023 at or about 7:45 a.m., he was at work

when Principal Rafael Tinoco sent him a phone text, asking

him to go to his office. When he met with Principal Rafael

Tinoco at his office, Principal Tinoco told him he needed to

change his statement by adding that Coach Esteban Alegria was

present in the locker room at the time of the incident involving

the assault of a student. Coach Amaya refused to change his

statement, and told Principal Tinoco he was not going to add

that Coach Alegria was in the locker room at the time of the

incident because it was a lie. Coach Amaya did not change the

statement he had already turned in.

....

Hidalgo Police Officers reviewed the preliminary report,

[s]upplemental report, statements and evidence and

determined that there was sufficient evidence to determine

Rafael Tinoco did commit the offense [of] Tampering with [a]

Witness.

Because Tinoco’s arrest was carried out pursuant to an arrest warrant that a

magistrate judge authorized, there was presumptively probable cause for his

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arrest, and the officers who relied on the warrant are shielded from liability

by the independent-intermediary doctrine. Terwilliger v. Reyna, 4 F.4th 270,

285 n.10 (5th Cir. 2021); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 346 n.9 (1986). To

attack that presumption and doctrine, Tinoco must plausibly allege (1) that

the warrant affidavit facially failed to establish probable cause, see Malley, 475

U.S. 335, or (2) that intentional or reckless false statements in the affidavit

resulted in the warrant lacking probable cause, see Franks v. Delaware, 438

U.S. 154 (1978).5 He has failed to do so.

As to Officer Cantu, Tinoco failed to allege facts suggesting that he

had anything to do with the preparation of the allegedly deficient or

untruthful warrant affidavit. The probable cause affidavit shows that Officer

Lozano was the sole affiant. Liability under Malley only attaches to the

“affiant and person who actually prepared, or was fully responsible for the

preparation of, the warrant application.” See Melton v. Phillips, 875 F.3d 256,

264 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Michalik v. Hermann, 422 F.3d 252, 261 (5th Cir.

2005)). Thus, Malley does not apply here.

Separately, Franks liability extends to those who deliberately or

recklessly provide false information for use in an affidavit. Melton, 875 F.3d

at 264. Because the pleadings indicate that the warrant affidavit is based

exclusively on information obtained by Officer Lozano, Officer Cantu cannot

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5

In evaluating the facial sufficiency of the warrant under Malley, the district court

flipped the order of analysis. It first held that the warrant facially established probable cause

and then held that even absent probable cause the independent-intermediary doctrine

shielded Officer Lozano from liability. Because Malley deficiencies “overcome” the

independent-intermediary doctrine, the district court should have first assessed whether

the doctrine was applicable. Only then should it have evaluated the sufficiency of the

warrant under Malley. See Mayfield v. Currie, 976 F.3d 482, 487 (5th Cir. 2020).

Nonetheless, because the district court came to the correct conclusion at both stages of the

analysis, its judgment must be affirmed.

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be liable under Franks either. Thus, the district court did not err in dismissing

Tinoco’s Fourth Amendment claims against Officer Cantu.

As to Officer Lozano, Tinoco fails to plausibly allege under Malley that

his arrest warrant application was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as

to render official belief in its existence unreasonable.” 475 U.S. at 345. To

evaluate whether there was probable cause for an arrest, this court first looks

at the statute that the officers believed was violated. See Bailey v. Iles, 87 F.4th

275, 286 (5th Cir. 2023). Here, Tinoco was arrested for violating § 36.05 of

the Texas Penal Code, which provides:

(a) A person commits an offense if, with intent to influence the

witness, he offers, confers, or agrees to confer any benefit on a

witness or prospective witness in an official proceeding, or he

coerces a witness or a prospective witness in an official

proceeding:

(1) to testify falsely.

....

Tex. Penal Code § 36.05(a). Coercion is defined as “a threat, however

communicated”:

(A) to commit an offense;

(B) to inflict bodily injury in the future on the person

threatened or another;

(C) to accuse a person of any offense;

(D) to expose a person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule;

(E) to harm the credit or business repute of any person; or

(F) to take or withhold action as a public servant, or to cause a

public servant to take or withhold action.

Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(a)(9).6

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6

The Texas Penal Code does not explicitly define the term “coerces,” as used in

§ 36.05, but it does define the term “[c]oercion.” Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(a)(9). The

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Here, Tinoco fails to plead facts that show that the arrest warrant was

facially deficient. He argues that the affidavit does not show that he

“coerced” Amaya to “testify” at an “official proceeding.” While the

elements of a statute are relevant to a probable cause determination,

“[p]robable cause does not require the same type of specific evidence of each

element of the offense as would be needed to support a conviction.” Adams

v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972). An affidavit must merely present

relevant “facts and circumstances” so that a judge can independently

determine whether probable cause exists that a law was violated.” United

States v. Satterwhite, 980 F.2d 317, 321 (5th Cir. 1992).

The affidavit accompanying Tinoco’s arrest warrant contained

sufficient facts and circumstances to demonstrate probable cause. The

affidavit outlines Amaya’s police interrogation, where he stated that Tinoco

called Amaya into his office and told him that “he needed to change his

statement by adding that Coach Esteban Alegria was present in the locker

room at the time of the incident involving the assault of a student.” It depicts

Amaya’s belief that Tinoco wanted him to “lie” in his statement.

Additionally, the affidavit explains that the police officers did not rely solely

on Amaya’s interrogation statements to establish probable cause but that

they also reviewed other reports, statements, and evidence in the case before

determining that there was enough evidence that Tinoco plausibly violated

§ 36.05(a). This is sufficient under our precedent. See Kaley v. U.S., 571 U.S.

320, 338 (2014) (“Probable cause, we have often told litigants, is not a high

bar.”).

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definition of “coercion” is applicable here because Texas Penal Code § 1.07(b) states that

“[t]he definition of a term in this code applies to each grammatical variation of the term.”

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The affidavit contains facts from which it was at least probable that

Tinoco violated § 36.05(a). 7 Given the facts outlined in the affidavit, it is not

“conclusory” or “bare bones.” Satterwhite, 980 F.2d at 321 (noting that

“‘[b]are bones’ affidavits contain wholly conclusory statements, which lack

the facts and circumstances from which a magistrate can independently

determine probable cause”). Because the affidavit was not “so lacking in

indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence

unreasonable,” Tinoco has failed to state a Fourth Amendment violation

under Malley, 475 U.S. at 345.

Similarly, Tinoco fails to plausibly allege under Franks that intentional

or reckless false statements in the affidavit resulted in his arrest warrant

lacking probable cause. See 438 U.S. 154. Tinoco does not identify “material

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7

To be sure, the affidavit does not explain precisely how Tinoco “coerced”

Amaya. It also does not delineate whether the “official proceeding” was some part of the

school’s internal investigation or the police department’s criminal investigation into the

assault, or both. Counsel for the City argues that the plausibility of coercion is evident from

the inherent power imbalance between Tinoco, a school principal, and Amaya, a

subordinate staff member. Because this imbalance is discernible from the face the warrant

affidavit, that argument has some force. It is not unreasonable to suspect that when a

superior calls a subordinate into their office and instructs them to do something, that

instruction carries with it an implicit threat of disciplinary action. Moreover, when the

superior is a public servant, as is the case here, that implicit threat of discipline can

constitute a threat to “take or withhold action as a public servant.” See Tex. Penal

Code § 1.07(a)(9)(F); In re J.L. O., No. 03-01-00632-CV, 2002 WL 1804951, at *4 (Tex.

App. Aug. 8, 2002) (unpublished) (“[T]eachers, school employees, police officers, [and]

firefighters are defined by the penal code as public servants.”). And in some circumstances,

being disciplined by an employer can “expose a person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule.”

Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(a)(9)(F). But this court need not resolve whether any specific

theory of coercion could convict Tinoco. Nor does this court need to decide precisely which

events in this case fit within the Texas Penal Code’s broad definition of an “official

proceeding.” See Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(a)(33) (defining an official proceeding as

“any type of administrative, executive, legislative, or judicial proceeding that may be

conducted before a public servant”). It is sufficient, for present purposes, that the warrant

affidavit provides sufficient indicia of probable cause that Tinoco committed an offense.

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misstatements or material omissions” in the warrant affidavit. Terwilliger, 4

F.4th at 281. Instead, he mischaracterizes the affidavit. He contends that “it

clearly states that Coach Amaya witnessed an assault and that Tinoco wanted

him to include another coach who was present when the assault took place.”

In reality, however, the affidavit explains that Amaya testified during his

interrogation that those events occurred. In other words, Tinoco obfuscates

the distinction between what the affidavit directly says occurred and what the

affidavit says Amaya told the officers occurred.

In attempting to establish a material omission, Tinoco argues that the

officers should not have relied on Amaya’s interrogation testimony. That is

because, in Tinoco’s view, that testimony contradicted the written

statements that Amaya submitted to Tinoco following the locker room

meeting incident. As a result of those contradictions, Tinoco speculates that

Amaya must have given false information to the police or that Officer Lozano

must have fabricated probable cause. But Amaya’s written statements do not

refute the notion that Tinoco coerced Amaya to change his testimony—the

core of Tinoco’s witness tampering charge. Thus, there is no material

contradiction between Amaya’s written statements and his interrogation

testimony. Even if such a contradiction exists, Tinoco fails to allege that the

officers ever received or viewed Amaya’s written statements prior to his

arrest.

Tinoco also argues that the dates on the affidavit do not add up

because they suggest that Tinoco committed the offense of witness

tampering on February 28, 2023, but that Tinoco did not contact Amaya to

change his statement about the locker room incident until March 3, 2023. But

those alleged inaccuracies do not categorically preclude an affidavit from

meeting the standard of probable cause. See Kaley, 571 U.S. at 338. Because

Tinoco fails to allege material misstatements or material omissions that

resulted in a warrant being issued without probable cause, the district court

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did not err in dismissing his claims under Franks. See Terwilliger, 4 F.4th at

281.

At the core of Tinoco’s claims under Malley and Franks is his belief

that Amaya lied during his interrogation and that the evidence shows that

Tinoco was truly innocent. But it is not enough for Tinoco to argue that he

was innocent of the crime that he was arrested for because “innocent

behavior frequently will provide the basis for a showing of probable cause.”

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983). 8 Tinoco’s argument that there

was insufficient evidence to establish each element of § 36.05(a) is similarly

unpersuasive because, in assessing probable cause, it is not this court’s task

to determine whether a defendant could be convicted under the statute.

Brumfield v. Jones, 849 F.2d 152, 155 (5th Cir. 1988) (acknowledging that

“the standards for a determination of probable cause and for a criminal

conviction markedly differ”). For these reasons, we hold that the district

court did not err in ruling that Tinoco failed to state a claim under § 1983

against Officers Cantu and Lozano.

2. Fourteenth Amendment

On appeal, Tinoco argues that the district court erred in dismissing

his § 1983 claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. In support, he argues

that the district court erred by assuming that his Fourteenth Amendment

claim stems from his arrest. He contends that it instead stems from Officer

Lozano’s conduct in filming the interrogation on a cell phone camera and in

not allowing Tinoco to view his arrest warrant prior to his arrest. Again, we

disagree.

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8

In Gates, “seemingly innocent activity became suspicious in the light of the initial

tip.” 462 U.S. at 243 n.13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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In the first count of Tinoco’s amended complaint he argued that his

arrest violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights. As the district court

acknowledged, however, an action brought under the Fourteenth

Amendment “is inappropriate where a more specific constitutional provision

provides the rights at issue.” Arnold v. Williams, 979 F.3d 262, 270 (5th Cir.

2020) (citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994)). And a claim for

false arrest is rooted not in the Fourteenth Amendment, but rather in the

Fourth Amendment’s right to be free from unreasonable seizures. See Nieves

v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 414 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“The

common law tort of false arrest translates more or less into a Fourth

Amendment claim.”). Thus, Tinoco should have brought this claim under

the Fourth Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment.

Even if Tinoco’s Fourteenth Amendment claim were not about his

arrest, it would still fail. Tinoco argues, without citing a single case, that the

officers’ refusal to show him his arrest warrant and their decision to record

his interrogation on a cell phone camera were violations of his constitutional

right to procedural due process. But Tinoco neglected to allege facts

sufficient to establish a due process violation under the Fourteenth

Amendment. “The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects

persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who would

seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish that one of these

interests is at stake.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005).

Procedural due process claims are subject to a two-step inquiry. “The first

question asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has

been interfered with by the State; the second examines whether the

procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally

sufficient.” Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392, 399 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Liberty interests come from two potential sources:

(1) “the Constitution itself, by reason of guarantees implicit in the word

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‘liberty’”; or (2) “an expectation or interest created by state laws or

policies.” Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221.

Tinoco’s amended complaint does not allege that a property or liberty

interest is at stake in this case. Only on appeal does he perfunctorily assert,

without legal analysis or support, that his “liberty” interests were infringed

because he did not get to see his warrant before he was arrested and because

his interrogation was recorded on a cell phone camera. But Tinoco provides

no legal authority that supports that he had a liberty interest in viewing his

warrant before his arrest. To the contrary, the Texas Code of Criminal

Procedure states that an officer “need not have the warrant in his possession

at the time of the arrest.”9 Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 15.26.

Similarly, Tinoco provides no authority that supports that he had a

liberty interest in having his interrogation recorded with a specific type of

camera. Instead, he argues—again, without support—that “a video

recording taken on a personal [cell phone] is not dependable and susceptible

to being deleted or altered by the owner of the [cell phone].” Even assuming

arguendo that is correct, Tinoco has failed to establish an interest created by

the Constitution, a state law, or a state policy. Thus, he failed to demonstrate

a legally cognizable liberty interest and or state a plausible claim for relief

under the Fourteenth Amendment.

3. Qualified Immunity

Even if Tinoco plausibly stated a claim for relief under the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments, qualified immunity nevertheless bars his claims.

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9

To be sure, the Code also states that “upon request[, the officer] shall show the

warrant to the defendant as soon as possible.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 15.26.

Tinoco, however, does not allege that the officers prevented him from seeing his arrest

warrant for an unnecessarily prolonged period of time. Instead, he merely argues—without

support—that he was entitled to see his arrest warrant prior to his arrest.

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Tinoco bears the burden of showing that qualified immunity is inappropriate.

Terwilliger, 4 F.4th at 280. To discharge this burden, he must successfully

allege that (1) an officer violated his federal right; and (2) the right was

“clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation. See Cole v. Carson,

935 F.3d 444, 451 (5th Cir. 2019). As discussed above, Tinoco failed to allege

a violation of his Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Tinoco summarily alleges that his “constitutional rights” are clearly

established. But that allegation is far too broad and generalized, as we must

determine “whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly

established.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011).

“[G]eneralizations and abstract propositions are not capable of clearly

establishing the law.” Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 372 (5th Cir. 2011).

Thus, we must evaluate the specific conduct that Tinoco alleges.

On his Fourth Amendment claim, Tinoco alleges that he was arrested

based on a warrant affidavit that improperly relied on the testimony of

Amaya. But he cites no cases—much less a controlling case or robust

consensus of persuasive cases as our case law requires—showing that it is

clearly established that an officer cannot rely on the testimony of a victim and

direct witness to a crime to establish probable cause for an arrest. See Morgan,

659 F.3d at 372. Tinoco therefore does not show that a reasonable officer

would understand the officers’ conduct in this case to be a violation of a

federal right. See Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., 245 F.3d 447, 457 (5th Cir. 2001).

Because Tinoco did not meet his burden to show a clearly established right,

the officers are entitled to qualified immunity on his Fourth Amendment

claim. See Cole, 935 F.3d at 451.

On his Fourteenth Amendment claim, Tinoco again argues that his

due process liberty interests were violated because (1) he was not permitted

to see his arrest warrant prior to arrest, and (2) his post-arrest interrogation

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was recorded on a cell phone camera. And once again, he failed to cite a single

case showing that he had a clearly established right to inspect his arrest

warrant before his arrest or to have his post-arrest interrogation video

recorded in a specific way. Because Tinoco has failed to show that these

rights exist, he cannot show that they were clearly established. See Fisher v.

Moore, 73 F.4th 367, 375 (5th Cir. 2023) (“[A] right never established cannot

be one clearly established.”). Because Tinoco did not meet his burden to

demonstrate a clearly established right, the officers are entitled to qualified

immunity from his Fourteenth Amendment claims. See id.

For these reasons, we hold that Tinoco has failed to state a plausible

§ 1983 claim under either the Fourth Amendment or the Fourteenth

Amendment. And even if he could, qualified immunity would defeat his

claims in this case. See Cole, 935 F.3d at 451.

B. Tinoco’s § 1983 Claims Against the City of Hidalgo, Mayor Coronado,

and Chief Rodriguez

Tinoco further argues that the district court erred in dismissing his

§ 1983 claims against the City of Hidalgo, Mayor Coronado, and Chief

Rodriguez. Again, we are unpersuaded. Tinoco does not allege facts that

suggest that either Mayor Coronado or Chief Rodriguez was personally

involved in his arrest and interrogation. He therefore fails to state a claim

against them in their individual capacities. See Burge v. Par. of St. Tammany,

187 F.3d 452, 476–77 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[I]ndividual-capacity suits seek to

impose personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes

under color of state law.”). Further, a claim against a municipal official in his

official capacity is tantamount to a suit against the municipality. See Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978). Thus,

the district court did not err in dismissing Tinoco’s claims against Mayor

Coronado and Chief Rodriguez in their official capacities as “redundant” to

his claim against the City of Hidalgo. Sanders–Burns v. City of Plano, 594 F.3d

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366, 373 (2010) (noting that a plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against a governmental

entity “render[ed] any official capacity claim against [an employee of that

entity] redundant”); Guillot ex rel. T.A.G. v. Russell, 59 F.4th 743, 751 (5th

Cir. 2023) (“A claim against government officials in their official capacity is

a de facto suit against the local government entity of which the officials act as

agents.”).

Turning to Tinoco’s claims against the City of Hidalgo, he argues that

it should be held liable for the constitutional violations that he alleges

occurred in this case. But his argument fails to plead facts that would satisfy

the elements of Monell. This court demands “a high standard of proof before

imposing Monell liability on a municipality.” Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d

791, 796 (5th Cir. 1998). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must

plausibly allege “(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policy maker

can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a

constitutional violation whose ‘moving force’ is that policy (or custom).” See

Newbury v. City of Windcrest, 991 F.3d 672, 680 (5th Cir. 2021) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). For the purposes of § 1983, an official

policy is a

policy statement, ordinance, regulation or decision that is

officially adopted and promulgated by the municipality’s

lawmaking officers or by an official to whom the lawmakers

have delegated policy-making authority. Alternatively, official

policy is a persistent, widespread practice of city officials or

employees, which, although not authorized by officially

adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled

as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal

policy.

Sanders-Burns, 594 F.3d at 381 (cleaned up) (citing Brown v. Bryan Cnty., 219

F.3d 450, 457 (5th Cir. 2000)).

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An unconstitutional policy renders a municipality liable under § 1983,

and a facially innocuous policy can also support liability if it was promulgated

with deliberate indifference to the “known or obvious consequences” that

constitutional violations would result. Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d

567, 579 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v.

Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997)). Section 1983 liability can arise for a failure

to train police officers when “the failure to train amounts to deliberate

indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into

contact.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). In failure to train

cases, the plaintiff can prove the existence of a municipal custom or policy of

deliberate indifference to individuals’ rights in two ways:

First, he can show that a municipality deliberately or

consciously chose not to train its officers despite being on

notice that its current training regimen had failed to prevent

tortious conduct by its officers. See Bryan County, 520 U.S. at

405. Second, under the “single incident exception” a single

violation of federal rights may be sufficient to prove deliberate

indifference. Id. at 409. The single incident exception requires

proof of the possibility of recurring situations that present an

obvious potential for violation of constitutional rights and the

need for additional or different police training. See id. We have

consistently rejected application of the single incident

exception and have noted that “proof of a single violent

incident ordinarily is insufficient to hold a municipality liable

for inadequate training.” Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791,

798 (5th Cir. 1998); see also, Rodriguez v. Avita, 871 F.2d 552,

554–55 (5th Cir. 1989).

Gabriel v. City of Plano, 202 F.3d 741, 745 (5th Cir. 2000).

Whatever method a plaintiff uses to establish an official policy, “there

must be a direct causal link between the municipal policy and the

constitutional deprivation” such that the policy is the “moving force”

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behind the violation. Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 580. Plaintiffs must meet a “high

threshold of proof” in establishing this causal link, and in establishing

“deliberate indifference,” to prevent municipal liability from “collaps[ing]

into respondeat superior liability.” See id. (quoting Snyder, 142 F.3d at 796);

Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 410 (“To prevent municipal liability for a hiring

decision from collapsing into respondeat superior liability, a court must

carefully test the link between the policymaker’s inadequate decision and the

particular injury alleged.”).

As discussed above, Tinoco failed to plead a violation of his

constitutional rights. That error alone is fatal to his Monell claim as this court

has emphasized “time and again that ‘[w]ithout an underlying constitutional

violation, an essential element of municipal liability is missing.’” Doe ex rel.

Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys, 675 F.3d 849, 866–67 (5th Cir.

2012) (citing Becerra v. Asher, 105 F.3d 1042, 1048 (5th Cir. 1997)).

Tinoco also fails to plead an official policy or custom. He argues that

Officer Lozano has a persistent practice of violating citizens’ constitutional

rights, which includes: (1) arresting people without probable cause, (2) failing

to give Miranda rights before an arrest, (3) continuing to interview people

after they requested to have an attorney present, and (4) covering up cameras

in interrogation rooms and recording interrogations on personal cell

phones.10 Even assuming that these allegations are true, they do not form an

official policy. Tinoco’s attempt to cobble together a policy from a handful of

discrete, unrelated, actions taken by a single officer finds no basis in this

circuit’s jurisprudence. See Sanders-Burns, 594 F.3d at 381.

_____________________

10

Tinoco argues that both Officer Lozano and Officer Cantu recorded

interrogations this way.

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Tinoco also fails to demonstrate that the nebulous policy he alleges

was the moving force for the specific constitutional violations that he

purportedly endured. None of Tinoco’s allegations regarding Officer

Lozano’s prior instances of unconstitutional conduct are connected to his

alleged Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations in this case. Thus,

even if Officer Lozano’s prior acts could somehow generate a municipal

policy, there would be no “direct causal link between the municipal policy

and the constitutional deprivation” such that the policy was the “moving

force” behind the violation. See Piotrowski, 237 F.3d 567, 580. This failure

similarly dooms Tinoco’s claims for municipal liability based on hiring,

training, or supervision. Even if the City was inadequate in hiring, training,

or supervising its officers—which Tinoco has not demonstrated—Tinoco

fails to meet the “high threshold of proof” needed to show a “link between

the policymaker’s inadequate decision and the particular injury alleged.”

Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 410.

Tinoco’s § 1983 claims for municipal liability essentially “collaps[e]

into [claims for] respondeat superior liability” for Officer Lozano’s actions. Id.

While a handful of distinct prior alleged constitutional violations may

indicate an unfortunate trend for a single officer, it fails to meet the “high

standard of proof” required in this circuit to establish municipal liability. See

Snyder, 142 F.3d at 796. Thus, we hold that the district court did not err in

dismissing Tinoco’s claims against the City of Hidalgo, Mayor Coronado,

and Chief Rodriguez. See id.

C. Tinoco’s State Law Claims Against Amaya

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Tinoco’s

state law claims against Amaya. “A district court’s decision whether to

exercise [supplemental] jurisdiction after dismissing every claim over which

it had original jurisdiction is purely discretionary.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF

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Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367). To that end, the

general rule in this circuit is to dismiss state law claims if the federal law

claims to which they are pendent are dismissed. See Wong v. Stripling, 881

F.2d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.

715, 726 (1966)). In this case, Tinoco argues that the district court erred in

dismissing his state law claims against Amaya because Amaya did not file a

motion to dismiss and because the City did not request that the district court

dismiss Tinoco’s claims against Amaya. We reject this argument.

It is immaterial that defendants did not ask the district court to dismiss

Tinoco’s claims against Amaya. Once the district court determined that each

of Tinoco’s federal claims had failed, deciding whether to retain

supplemental jurisdiction over Tinoco’s state law claims against Amaya was

purely discretionary. See Carlsbad Tech., 556 U.S. at 639. The district court

correctly determined that there was no compelling reason to retain

jurisdiction over Tinoco’s state law defamation and slander claims because it

found that those claims do not overlap with Tinoco’s federal claims. For this

reason, we hold that, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining

to exercise § 1367 supplemental jurisdiction over Tinoco’s state law claims

after it dismissed his federal law claims. See Wong, 881 F.2d at 204.

D. Tinoco’s Request for Leave to Amend His Previously Amended

Complaint

Finally, Tinoco argues that the district court erred in rejecting his

request to amend his complaint for a second time. His argument is meritless.

Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires a trial court to

grant leave to amend freely, and the language of this rule evinces a bias in

favor of granting leave to amend.” Jones v. Robinson Prop. Grp., LP, 427 F.3d

987, 994 (5th Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

However, Tinoco never filed a motion for leave to file a second amended

complaint. Instead, Tinoco’s request to file a second amended complaint was

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a single boilerplate paragraph at the end of his response to the City’s motion

to dismiss stating that “if the [c]ourt finds Tinoco’s First Amended

Complaint does not set forth sufficient facts to state a claim for relief that is

plausible on its face, Tinoco requests an opportunity to demonstrate to this

[c]ourt that there are sufficient facts in this case to support his claims.”

But we have held that such a bare statement is insufficient to

constitute a request for leave to amend under Rule 15(a). See Goldstein v. MCI

WorldCom, 340 F.3d 238, 254–55 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that the district

court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiffs’ leave to amend where

they “tacked on a general curative amendment request to the end of their

response in opposition to the defendants’ motion to dismiss” which stated

that, “[s]hould this [c]ourt find that the Complaint is insufficient in any

way . . . plaintiffs respectfully request leave to amend”); U.S. ex rel. Willard

v. Humana Health Plan of Tex. Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 387 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[A]

bare request in an opposition to a motion to dismiss—without any indication

of the particular grounds on which the amendment is sought—does not

constitute a motion within the contemplation of Rule 15(a).” (cleaned up)).

Thus, Tinoco’s terse paragraph is insufficient to constitute a request for

leave to amend under Rule 15(a). We therefore hold that the district court did

not err in implicitly rejecting Tinoco’s perfunctory request to amend his

complaint for a second time. See Goldstein, 340 F.3d at 254–55.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s

judgment.

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