Bell v. State of Illinios

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JAMES B. BELL )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. 24 C 7615

v. )

) Chief Judge Virginia M. Kendall

STATE OF ILLINOIS, HON. THEODORE )

JARZ, HON. ROGER RICKMON, JP )

MORGAN ACQUISITION CORP., )

COMMUNITY LOAN SERVICING, LLC f/k/a )

BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC, and )

LINEAR MORTGAGE, LLC )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendant, the State of Illinois, Defendant Honorable

Theordore Jarz, and Defendant Honorable Roger Rickmon’s (collectively, the “State Defendants”)

Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. 61). Plaintiff James B. Bell alleges a host of grievances, related to the

foreclosure of his residence that occurred nearly three years ago in the Circuit Court of Will

County, Illinois, in his 12-count Amended Complaint. (Dkt. 58). Bell’s Amended Complaint

alleges violations by State Defendants, as well as non-State Defendants JP Morgan Acquisition

Corporation, Community Loan Servicing Corporation (formerly known as Bayview Loan

Servicing, L.L.C.), and Linear Mortgage, L.L.C. The State Defendants move to dismiss the suit

based on the Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction and Eleventh Amendment sovereign

immunity. For the following reasons, the Court grants the State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

[61] Bell’s Amended Complaint with prejudice.

BACKGROUND

The following facts were taken from Bell’s Amended Complaint, (Dkt. 58), except where

noted. Bell brings these claims pursuant to Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, alleging that he

is being deprived of the equal protection of the law and deprived of property without due process.

Bell seeks to enjoin the State from enforcing a ruling made in the Circuit Court of Will County

(“the Underlying Action”). The Underlying Action was brought by JP Morgan and Community

Loan Servicing to foreclose on Bell’s University Park, Illinois home. (Dkt. 62 at 2). Initially,

summary judgment was entered in favor of the loan servicers, but this decision was reversed, in

part, by the Illinois Court of Appeals, which vacated the entry of summary judgment and remanded

the matter to the trial court to resolve issues of disputed fact. JP Morgan Mortg. Acquisition Corp.

v. Bell, 162 N.E. 3d 334, 336 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020).

Defendants Judges Jarz and Rickmon both presided over the Underlying Action at various

stages. (Dkt. 58 at 8). On July 12, 2022, Judge Jarz entered an order granting judgment in favor of

the plaintiffs and approving a foreclosure sale of the subject-property. (Dkt 62-1 at 1) (Exhibit A,

Judgment for Foreclosure and Sale). On September 5, 2023, Judge Rickmon entered an order

approving the report of the sale and distribution and confirming the sale and possession. (Dkt. 62-

2 at 1) (Exhibit B, Order Approving Report and Sale and Distribution). Thereafter, Defendant

Linear, which was given ownership over the property, attempted to oust its occupier. (Dkt. 21 at

3).

Bell filed his initial Complaint on August 22, 2024. (Dkt. 1). Bell alleged that the

September 2023 Will County Circuit Court Order was void because the state court lacked

jurisdiction. (Dkt. 58 at 24). Specifically, Bell argued that the September 2023 Order was entered

before there was jurisdiction to do so and that the loan services used fraudulent evidence to secure

the judgment in the underlying case. (Id. at 21, 35). As a result, Bell asked the Court to enjoin an

eviction proceeding stemming from that Order. (Id. at 9). The State Defendants as well as

Defendants Community Loan Servicing and Linear each moved to dismiss the initial Complaint.

(Dkt. 17; Dkt. 21). Before the Court made any rulings on these motions to dismiss Bell’s initial

Complaint, on November 24, 2024, Bell filed an Amended Complaint. (Dkt. 61).

In his Amended Complaint, Bell lays out nearly identical allegations as in his original

Complaint but adds a claim for civil conspiracy. Bell alleges that the State Defendants worked in

concert to commit conspiracy resulting in the allegedly void September 2023 foreclosure Order.

The State Defendants now, again, move to dismiss. (Id.)

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the Court's subject matter jurisdiction.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). When, as here, a defendant makes a facial challenge to the sufficiency of

the allegations regarding subject matter jurisdiction, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual

allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Center for

Dermatology & Skin Cancer, Ltd. v. Burwell, 770 F.3d 586, 588 (7th Cir. 2014). However, “a

plaintiff faced with a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss bears the burden of establishing that the

jurisdictional requirements have been met.” Burwell, 770 F.3d at 588–89.

DISCUSSION

The State Defendants argue that Bell’s Complaint must be dismissed for two main reasons:

that (i) the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine because

Bell’s claims all arise from, and are targeted at, a state court judgment; and (ii) the Eleventh

Amendment immunizes the State Defendants from Bell’s lawsuit. (Dkt. 61 at 3). As explained

further below, Bell’s claims must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under Rooker–Feldman.

The Court therefore need not address the State Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment arguments.

“The Rooker–Feldman doctrine prevents lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction

over cases brought by state-court losers challenging state-court judgments rendered before the

district court proceedings commenced.” Mains v. Citibank, N.A., 852 F.3d 669, 675 (7th Cir.

2017); see also Brown v. Bowman, 668 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 2012). “Claims that directly seek

to set aside a state-court judgment are de facto appeals that trigger the doctrine” but “even federal

claims that were not raised in state court, or that do not on their face require review of a state

court’s decision, may be subject to Rooker–Feldman if those claims are closely enough related to

a state-court judgment.” Mains, 852 F.3d at 675; see also Jakupovic v. Curran, 850 F.3d 898, 902

(7th Cir. 2017). As such, the question is “whether the federal plaintiff is alleging that his injury

was caused by the state-court judgment,” because “if the claim alleges an injury independent of

the state-court judgment that the state court failed to remedy, Rooker–Feldman does not apply.”

Mains, 852 F.3d at 675. The rationale behind the Rooker–Feldman doctrine is that “no matter how

erroneous or unconstitutional the state court judgment may be, only the Supreme Court of the

United States has jurisdiction to review it.” Brown, 668 F.3d at 442 (citation omitted). A state court

litigant seeking review of a state court judgment, therefore, “must follow the appellate process

through the state court system and then directly to the United States Supreme Court.” Kelley v.

Med–1 Solutions, LLC, 548 F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 2008).

The Rooker–Feldman doctrine prevents the Court from exercising jurisdiction over Bell’s

claims. Mains, 852 F.3d at 765. Liberally construing Bell’s Amended Complaint, Bell seeks

judicial review over the state court’s order regarding ownership of the property and the

mortgagee’s rights to foreclose and take possession of the property. (See Dkt. 58); (Dkt. 62-2 at

1). Regardless of the merits of Bell’s claims of fraud or violation of his due process rights in the

foreclosure proceedings, the specific injunctive relief he seeks (i.e., to halt the state court

foreclosure) would necessarily require the Court to set aside that judgment, which is something

the Court cannot do under Rooker–Feldman. See generally Taylor v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 374

F.3d 529, 532 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Claims that directly seek to set aside a state court judgment are de

facto appeals and are barred without additional inquiry.”); see also Banister v. S. Holland Police

Dep't, No. 16 C 10445, 2017 WL 2813660, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 29, 2017) (noting that “Rooker–

Feldman has been frequently applied to claims stemming from a state's foreclosure judgment”).

When a Plaintiff seeks to challenge the order of a state court, even if he alleges that the

state court did not have jurisdiction over him, he must do so in state court. See e.g. Abrahamson

v. Illinois Dept. of Financial and Professional Regulation, 594 Fed. Appx. 307, 311 (7th Cir. 2014)

(Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s complaint that his medical license was

denied by the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation (“IDFPR”) under

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because plaintiff sought the very relief that the state court denied.)

In Abrahamson, two state courts affirmed the denial of plaintiff’s medical license by the IDFPR.

Therefore, Plaintiff was seeking the very relief that was denied in the state court which would have

required a federal court to vacate the state court’s judgment—precisely what Rooker–Feldman

prevents. See id. at 311 (“Illinois state courts were competent to determine their own jurisdictional

boundaries, so there is no need for the federal courts to intervene. If a state court had violated

constitutional jurisdictional limits, [plaintiff] could have brought that up with the Supreme Court

after exhausting his state court remedies.”).

Here, like in Abrahamson, enjoining enforcement of the September 2024 Order, pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, would require the Court to effectively vacate the state court’s judgment. Id.

at 311. As in Abrahamson, the Rooker–Feldman doctrine deprives the Court of the jurisdictional

hook required to hear the merits of the case.

This is true even for Bells’ fraud claims. (Dkt. 58 at 35). The Seventh Circuit has rejected

a fraud exception to Rooker–Feldman. Specifically, in the context of a foreclosure action in which

a plaintiff argued that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine did not apply to fraud on the court or fraud

during litigation, the Seventh Circuit stated that “[t]he Rooker–Feldman doctrine is concerned not

with why a state court's judgment might be mistaken (fraud is one such reason; there are many

others) but with which federal court is authorized to intervene.” Iqbal v. Patel, 780 F.3d 728, 729

(7th Cir. 2015) (emphasis in original); Gilbank v. Wood Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 111 F.4th 754,

781 (7th Cir. 2024) (“Rooker–Feldman applies even where the federal plaintiff alleges that the

state courts that injured her were corrupt.”). Accordingly, there is no fraud exception to Rooker–

Feldman.

Because all of Bell’s claims relate to the state foreclosure order Bell alleges is void,

Rooker–Feldman deprives the Court of jurisdiction to rule on any of his claims. Brown v. Bowman,

668 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Rooker–Feldman will act as a jurisdictional bar if those claims

are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a state court judgment.”) (citations omitted). Counts I–IV and

VIII–IX concern Bell’s due process rights in Illinois courts, (Dkt. 58 at 3–28, 45 –54); Counts V–

VII deal with the merits Bell’s claims in state court, (Id. at 29 –45); Count X concerns civil

conspiracy. (Id. at 54). The Court may not address these claims because they are all dependent on

the state court ruling. Swartz v. Heartland Equine Rescue, 940 F.3d 387, 390 (7th Cir. 2019) (“[t]he

Rooker–Feldman bar is jurisdictional; violations of it cannot be waived and thus preclude a court

from considering the merits of the claim.”).

With respect to Bell’s claims against the non-State Defendants, Bell’s Amended Complaint

is also dismissed with prejudice. Like Bell’s claims against the State Defendants, Bell brings no

claims against non-State Defendants, which are not “inextricably intertwined” with the state court

judgment. (See generally Dkt. 58); Bowman, 668 F.3d at 442. Rather, Bell seeks to relitigate

matters, which have been decided in state court. (Dkt 58). As with the State Defendants, because

Bell’s alleged injuries are associated with the state court judgment, the Court lacks subject matter

Jurisdiction to hear Bell’s claims. Holt v. Lake Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 408 F.3d 335, 336 (7th Cir.

2005) (determining that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because “absent the state

court’s judgment,” the plaintiff would have no injury, which required redress.). Accordingly,

Bell’s claims against both State and non-State Defendants are dismissed with prejudice.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [61] is granted with

prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

HY OO

Ay ‘ts JJ iG A Of

APYAA L MAT AE,

a M. Kehdall

gd States District Judge

Date: February 27, 2025