The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TERRELL TAYLOR, )
)
Civil Action No. 2:24-cv-00146-KT
Plaintiff, )
)
District Judge Cathy Bissoon
v. )
)
Magistrate Judge Kezia O. L. Taylor
JOSHUA PIPIK, et al., )
)
)
Defendants. ECF No. 26
)
) ECF No. 30
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that Defendants Pipik’s, Marcelle-Rudolph’s, and Contis’
Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 26, be granted in part and denied in part. The Motion should be
granted as to Plaintiff’s Due Process claim against Defendant Pipik, and this claim should be
dismissed, with prejudice. It is further recommended that the Motion be denied in all other respects
without prejudice to later renewal if and as appropriate.
It is respectfully recommended that Defendant Finerty’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 30,
be granted in part and denied in part. The Motion should be granted as to Plaintiff’s Due Process
claim and this claim should be dismissed, with prejudice. It is further recommended that
Defendant Finerty’s Motion be denied in all other respects without prejudice to later renewal if
and as appropriate.
It is further recommended that the Court stay and administratively close this case until
Plaintiff’s pending criminal proceedings have concluded, at which time Plaintiff may file a Motion
to re-open this case.
II. REPORT
A. Procedural History
Plaintiff Terrell Taylor (“Plaintiff”) initiated the instant lawsuit on February 2, 2024, with
the filing of a Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff’s Motion was granted
and his Complaint was docketed on February 6, 2024. ECF Nos. 4, 5. Plaintiff filed an Amended
Complaint on March 7, 2024, which is the operative pleading here. ECF No. 11. As Defendants,
Plaintiff has named several employees of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole
(“PBPP”) – Pipik, Marcelle-Rudolph, and Contis (“Parole Defendants”), and Finerty, a police
officer of the McKees Rocks Police Department.
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff brings claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution related his November 10, 2022 arrest and
subsequent incarceration in Allegheny County Jail. ECF No. 11, generally. Defendants filed
timely Motions to Dismiss, ECF Nos. 26, 30, and Plaintiff filed his responses thereto.1 ECF Nos.
39, 41. On July 23, 2024, Defendant Finerty submitted his reply. ECF No. 42. Defendants’
Motions to Dismiss are now ripe for review.
B. Factual Allegations
On November 10, 2022, in the presence of Defendant Finerty, Plaintiff’s home was
searched by several parole agents, including Parole Defendant Pipik, after Defendant Finerty gave
1 On June 4, 2024, Parole Defendants Pipik and Marcelle-Rudolph filed their Motion to Dismiss
at ECF No. 26 and Parole Defendant Contis filed her Motion to Dismiss at ECF No. 28. Having
reviewed these Motions, along with the supporting Briefs, the Court could not discern any
differences between the two filings and reached out to counsel for Parole Defendants regarding
the apparent duplicate submissions. Counsel advised that because not all Parole Defendants were
linked to the original filing, the Motion was refiled to reflect that it is filed on behalf of all Parole
Defendants. To avoid confusion, this Report and Recommendation will refer to ECF No. 26 as
Parole Defendants’ 12(b)(6) Motion.
an “anonymous tip” relating to Plaintiff’s involvement in criminal activity. ECF No. 11 at 6.
While the search did not result in any contraband being found in Plaintiff’s residene, Plaintiff was
nevertheless taken to McKees Rocks Police Department where he was questioned by Defendant
Finerty and advised that he was being charged with a crime and arrested. Id. Defendant Finerty
transported Plaintiff to the Allegheny County Jail, where Plaintiff remained until December 18,
2023. Id. Plaintiff asserts that he was detained by PBPP for a probation violation and because he
was not actually charged with a crime, the detention was due to a technical violation, which
Plaintiff denies he committed. Id.
On December 8, 2022, Plaintiff participated in a Gagnon I hearing before a Hearing
Examiner, during which Parole Defendant Pipik testified that Plaintiff was being detained as part
of a criminal investigation and that criminal charges would be forthcoming. Id. The Hearing
Examiner recommended for Plaintiff to be released to a work-release program and that his Gagnon
II be scheduled “immediately.” Id. Plaintiff asserts that he did not receive the Gagnon II hearing,
nor was he provided with written notice of the technical violations for which he was being
detained. Id.
Plaintiff brings a Fourth Amendment claim against Defendant Finerty and Parole
Defendant Pipik for “unlawful arrest and seizure.” Id. at 7. Plaintiff brings a Fourteenth
Amendment claim against Parole Defendants Pipik, Marcelle-Rudolph, and Contis for failing to
schedule his Gagnon II hearing. Id. As relief, Plaintiff seeks actual and punitive damages.
C. Legal Standard
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal
sufficiency of the complaint. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in
the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See U.S. Express Lines
Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the
allegations in the complaint must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). The “court[] generally consider[s]
only the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record,
and documents that form the basis of a claim” when considering a motion to dismiss. Lum v. Bank
of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 222 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114
F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir.1997)).
D. Discussion
1. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim
Plaintiff’s due process claim against Parole Defendants is premised on his representation
that Plaintiff was not afforded a Gagnon II hearing after his November 10, 2022 arrest. ECF No.
11 at 7. However, a review of Plaintiff’s criminal docket, No. CP-02-CR-0013237-2016, reveals
that Plaintiff’s Gagnon II hearing was held on March 16, 2023.2 Indeed, “it is well-established
that a court need not accept as true allegations contained in a complaint that are contradicted by
matters of which the court may take judicial notice.” Mollett v. Leith, No. 09-cv-1192, 2011 WL
5407359, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2011) (internal citations omitted). Since the Gagnon II hearing
took place, Plaintiff’s due process claim fails as a matter of law. As such, it is respectfully
2 Courts within the Third Circuit have held that a court may take judicial notice of court dockets
at the motion to dismiss stage. See In re Congoleum Corp., 426 F.3d 675, 679 n.2 (3d Cir. 2005)
(taking judicial notice of “state court proceedings insofar as they are relevant”); Mollett v. Leith,
2011 WL 5407359, at *2 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (“A court may also take judicial notice of the docket in
Plaintiff's underlying criminal trial.”) aff’d sub nom. Mollett v. Leicth, 511 Fed. App’x 172 (3d
Cir. 2013).
recommended that Plaintiff’s due process claim against Parole Defendants be dismissed, with
prejudice.
2. Heck v. Humphrey Bars Plaintiff’s Claims
All Defendants argue, inter alia, that Heck bars Plaintiff’s claims. See ECF Nos. 27, 31.
While their arguments are well-taken, they are premature.
In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court held that: “to recover
damages [or other relief] for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other
harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a §
1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus[.]”
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 (footnote and internal citation omitted). In other words, “a prisoner
cannot use § 1983 to obtain damages where success would necessarily imply the unlawfulness of
a (not previously invalidated) conviction or sentence.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81
(2005).
Here, criminal charges are currently pending against Plaintiff that relate to his November
10, 2022 encounter with Defendants. See USA v. Taylor, No. 23-cr-00277 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2025).
As such, it would be premature for the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim
against the Defendants because Plaintiff has not yet been convicted. Rather, in situations such as
the one presented here, both the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit allow for a district court to
stay a civil action until the related criminal case has ended.
In Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007), the United States Supreme Court provided:
If a plaintiff files a false-arrest claim before he has been convicted
(or files any other claim related to rulings that will likely be made in
a pending or anticipated criminal trial), it is within the power of the
district court, and in accord with common practice, to stay the civil
action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is
ended. See id., at 487–488, n. 8, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (noting that
“abstention may be an appropriate response to the parallel state-
court proceedings”); Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706,
730, 116 S.Ct. 1712, 135 L.Ed.2d 1 (1996). If the plaintiff is
ultimately convicted, and if the stayed civil suit would impugn that
conviction, Heck will require dismissal; otherwise, the civil action
will proceed, absent some other bar to suit. Edwards v. Balisok, 520
U.S. 641, 649, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997); Heck, 512
U.S., at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364.
Id. at 393 and 394.
The Third Circuit relied on this approach in McKinney v. Prosecutor Cnty. Prosecutor’s
Off., 612 F. App’x 62 (3d Cir. 2015), where the Court afforded the trial court latitude to stay the
case pending the outcome of Plaintiff’s related criminal proceedings. There, the Court explained:
The District Court dismissed McKinney’s malicious prosecution
claims under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129
L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), but McKinney’s criminal case was still pending
at the time. Heck does not apply to “an anticipated future
conviction.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393, 127 S.Ct. 1091,
166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007). The Supreme Court has noted that a proper
course of action in a situation like McKinney’s would be for the
District Court to stay the adjudication of the plaintiff’s claim until
the end of his criminal proceedings. See id. At that time, if the result
was a determination of guilt, the District Court would then dismiss
the claim under Heck. Id.
Id. at 65 and 66 (footnotes omitted).
More recently, District Judge Bissoon adopted Magistrate Judge Eddy’s recommendation
to stay a civil action where the asserted civil claims related to not-yet resolved criminal
proceedings. See Perrin v. Iuzzolino, CV 16-791, 2017 WL 487123 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2017),
report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Perrin v. Izzulino, CV 16-791, 2017 WL 478171
(W.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2017). In Perrin, the Court relied on Wallace and McKinney and provided that
“ . . . where the § 1983 plaintiff has yet to be convicted and his civil claims are closely related to
his criminal proceedings, the Court should stay the civil action.” Perrin, 2017 WL 487123, at *4.
The current posture of this civil action warrants the same outcome. As such, it is
respectfully recommended that the Court stay and administratively close this case until the
conclusion of Plaintiff’s criminal proceedings.
III. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff’s Due Process claim
be dismissed, with prejudice. It is further recommended that the Court stay and administratively
close this action until Plaintiff’s pending criminal proceedings have concluded. If, upon the
conclusion of Plaintiff’s criminal case, the charges against him are dismissed or there is a verdict
in his favor, Plaintiff may file a motion to re-open this case. If and when this occurs, Defendants
will be able to renew their Motions to Dismiss. In any event, it is recommended that the parties
file a status report with the Court within 30 days of the conclusion of the criminal prosecution
informing the Court of the outcome of the prosecution and how they intend to proceed.
In accordance with the Federal Magistrate Judge’s Act, 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B) and (C),
and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the
date of service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections thereto. Any party
opposing such objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to
respond thereto. Failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.
Dated: January 28, 2025.
_/s/ Kezia O. L. Taylor_______________
Kezia O. L. Taylor
United States Magistrate Judge
cc: TERRELL TAYLOR
140770
ALLEGHENY COUNTY JAIL
950 Second Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Counsel for Defendants
(Via CM/ECF electronic mail)