Opinion

In Re: Hedron Holdings, LLC

Court
District Court, E.D. Louisiana
Filed
Feb 25, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.1%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

IN RE: HEDRON HOLDINGS, LLC, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION

NO. 22-205 c/w NO. 21-2295

SECTION “O”

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court in this limitation-of-liability action is the opposed motion1 of

Limitation Petitioners Hedron Holdings, LLC and Triton Diving Services, LLC, as

owners of the D/B EPIC HEDRON, to clarify and reconsider Judge Guidry’s order

and reasons2 granting the Personal Injury Claimants’3 opposed motion4 to bifurcate

issues of exoneration from and limitation of liability from issues of damages.5

First, Limitation Petitioners ask the Court to clarify one part of Judge Guidry’s

order and reasons on bifurcation.6 Their question: If the Court denies limitation, will

the Personal Injury Claimants’ damages claims be tried in this Court or in a state

court of the Personal Injury claimants’ choosing? The latter. In no uncertain terms,

the Personal Injury Claimants moved Judge Guidry to bifurcate proceedings such

that, if limitation is denied, “[a]ll remaining issues” as to the Personal Injury

Claimants would be “tried to a state court jury.”7 Judge Guidry granted the Personal

1 ECF No. 126.

2 ECF No. 110.

3 The “Personal Injury Claimants” are Evan Plybon, Michael Cooper, Mark Adkins, Sean

Varnado, Robert Quezada, Carlos Quezada, Andres Corona, Lamarr Lewis, Darren Walker, Stefan

Mueller, Nero Davis, Grant Luke, Peter Little, Ronnie Matherne, Bobby Nelton, and Jeremy McGuire.

4 ECF No. 53.

5 The underlying facts are recounted in Judge Guidry’s order and reasons granting Plaintiffs’

motion to bifurcate; the Court need not re-state them here. See ECF No. 110.

6 ECF No. 126-1 at 1–5.

7 ECF No. 53 at 1.

Injury Claimants’ motion in full.8 So Judge Guidry’s order and reasons necessarily

contemplates state-court trials on the Personal Injury Claimants’ damage claims if

limitation is denied—the precise relief the motion that he granted asked for.

To erase any doubt, three of the cases Judge Guidry cited in his analysis

confirm that he intended to allow the Personal Injury Claimants to seek damages in

state court if—and only if—limitation is denied.9 First, the quoted passage of

Pershing recognizes that a federal court sitting in admiralty “can make certain that”

claimants “are free to pursue the petitioner in any other forum having requisite

jurisdiction.” 279 F.2d at 552. Second, In re Jack’d Up Charters allowed a personal-

injury claimant to “return to the forum of his choice, if the Court denies limitation[.]”

681 F. Supp. 3d at 568. Finally, Ingram Barge allowed a personal-injury claimant “to

seek damages in state court only if limitation is denied.” 2022 WL 952257, at *4.

Because each of the cases on which Judge Guidry principally relied recognizes that a

personal-injury claimant is free to seek damages in state court if limitation is denied,

the Court considers it clear that Judge Guidry’s order and reasons allows the

Personal Injury Claimants to try their damages claims in state court if limitation is

denied. No more clarification is needed. So the Court denies the motion to clarify.

8 ECF No. 110.

9 See ECF No. 110 at 3 n.8 (quoting Pershing Auto Rentals, Inc. v. Gaffney, 279 F.2d 546 (5th

Cir. 1960); id. at n.9 (first citing In re Jack’d Up Charters LLC, 681 F. Supp. 3d 560 (E.D. La. 2023)

(Brown, C.J.); and then citing Ingram Barge Co. v. Caillou Island Towing Co., No. 21-CV-261, 2022

WL 952257 (E.D. La. Mar. 30, 2022) (Fallon, J.)).

Next, the Limitation Petitioners ask the Court to reconsider Judge Guidry’s

discretionary decision to bifurcate issues of exoneration from and limitation of

liability from issues of damages under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b).10

The Court evaluates the Limitation Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration

under Rule 54(b) because it asks the Court to reconsider an interlocutory decision.

See Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 336 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). Judge

Guidry’s order and reasons on bifurcation is interlocutory “because it did not end the

action[.]” McClendon v. United States, 892 F.3d 775, 781 (5th Cir. 2018). It

“adjudicate[d] fewer than all the claims [and] the rights and liabilities of fewer than

all the parties” to this multi-party limitation-of-liability case. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).

“Under Rule 54(b), the [Court] is free to reconsider and reverse” Judge Guidry’s

order and reasons on bifurcation “for any reason it deems sufficient, even in the

absence of new evidence or an intervening change in or clarification of the substantive

law.” Austin, 864 F.3d at 336 (quotation and citation omitted). Sections of this Court

have said that “the precise standard” governing Rule 54(b) motions to reconsider

interlocutory orders “is unclear.” Namer v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 314 F.R.D. 392, 393

(E.D. La. 2016) (Africk, J.); accord, e.g., Bernard v. Grefer, No. 14-CV-887, 2015 WL

3485761, at *5 (E.D. La. June 2, 2015) (Fallon, J.). What is clear, however, is that

Rule 54(b) reconsideration is “within the [Court’s] broad discretion.” Koeppel v.

Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 608 F. Supp. 3d 398, 402 (E.D. La. 2022) (Vance, J.).

10 ECF No. 126 at 7–20.

To be sure, Rule 54(b) reconsideration is “more flexible” and less exacting than

Rule 59(e) reconsideration. See Austin, 864 F.3d at 337. But the Court “look[s] to

similar considerations” under both Rule 54(b) and Rule 59(e). Koeppel, 608 F. Supp.

3d at 402 (quotation and citations omitted). For example, like a Rule 59(e) motion, a

Rule 54(b) motion “is ‘not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or

arguments that could have been offered or raised before the entry of [the order].’” Id.

(quoting Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 478–79 (5th Cir. 2004)).

Beyond Rule 54(b), the law-of-the-case doctrine informs motions for

reconsideration where, as here, “one judge has rendered an order or judgment and

the case is then transferred to another judge.” United States v. O’Keefe, 128 F.3d 885,

891 (5th Cir. 1997). That doctrine requires the Court to “show deference to decisions”

that Judge Guidry has “already made” in this case. Stoffels ex rel. SBC Tel.

Concession Plan v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 677 F.3d 720, 727 (5th Cir. 2012). Of course,

the doctrine does not “prevent” the Court “from reconsidering” Judge Guidry’s “prior

rulings.” Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, 614 F.3d 161, 171 (5th Cir. 2010). After all,

“when a successor judge replaces another judge, the successor judge has the same

discretion as the first judge to reconsider the first judge’s order.” Stoffels, 677 F.3d at

728 (quotation, citation, and alterations omitted). “In exercising that discretion,”

however, the Court “should[ ] . . . carefully and respectfully consider the conclusions

of [Judge Guidry] before deciding to overturn them.” Id. (citations omitted).

Here, the Limitation Petitioners have not carried their Rule 54(b) burden to

persuade the Court to exercise its “broad discretion,” Koeppel, 608 F. Supp. 3d at 402,

to reconsider Judge Guidry’s own considered, discretionary decision to bifurcate the

issues of exoneration from and limitation of liability from the issue of damages.

Rule 42(b) empowered Judge Guidry to “order a separate trial” of those issues

“[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize[.]” FED. R. CIV. P.

42(b). As “courts have repeatedly emphasized,” Judge Guidry’s decision to bifurcate

was “committed to [his] sound discretion[.]” Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,

791 F. Supp. 113, 114 (E.D. La. 1992) (Feldman, J.). Exercising that “sound

discretion,” id., Judge Guidry found bifurcation “appropriate . . . because bifurcation

will be more convenient, will prevent prejudice, and will expedite and economize

judicial resources.”11 He stood on firm footing in so finding. Sections of this Court

routinely bifurcate issues of exoneration from and limitation of liability from issues

of damages in limitation actions like this one.12 So do district courts in nearby

districts.13 After “reviewing the case law,” one such court observed that the apparent

11 ECF No. 110 at 3.

12 See, e.g., In re Jack’d Up Charters, 681 F. Supp. 3d at 567–68 (Brown, C.J.); Ingram Barge

Co., 2022 WL 952257, at *4 (Fallon, J.); Intracoastal Tug & Barge Co. v. Magnolia Fleet, LLC, No. 23-

CV-5859, 2024 WL 3639540, at *3–4 (E.D. La. Aug. 2, 2024) (Lemelle, J.); S. Oil of La., LLC v. All.

Offshore L.L.C., No. 21-CV-2337, No. 22-CV-127, 2023 WL 3119919, at *4 (E.D. La. Apr. 27, 2023)

(Currault, M.J.); In re Diamond B. Indus., LLC, No. 2022 WL 4608140, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 30, 2022)

(Vance, J.); Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. M/T AMERICAN LIBERTY, No. 19-CV-10525, 2020 WL

1889123, at *3–4 (E.D. La. Apr. 16, 2020) (Vance, J.); In re Suard Barge Servs., No. 96-CV-3185, 1997

WL 358128, at *2–3 (E.D. La. June 26, 1997) (Vance, J.); In re Complaint of Bergeron Marine Serv.,

Inc., No. 93-CV-1845, 1994 WL 236374, at *1–2 (E.D. La. May 24, 1994) (Schwartz, J.).

13 See, e.g., In re Aries Marine Corp., No. CV 24-96, 2024 WL 3181446, at *3 (M.D. La. June 26,

2024); In re Orion Marine Constr., Inc. v. All Potential Claimants, No. 2:21-CV-4, 2021 WL 2779115,

at *5 (S.D. Tex. July 2, 2021); In re Chester J. Marine, LLC, 2021 WL 2661949, at *8 (M.D. La. June

29, 2021); Odfjell Chem. Tankers AS v. Herrera, 471 F. Supp. 3d 790, 795–96 (S.D. Tex. 2020); In re

Double C. Marine LLC, No. 6:14-CV-02273, 2019 WL 1495754, at *3 (W.D. La. Apr. 3, 2019); In re

Miss. Limestone Corp., 2010 WL 4174631, at *3–4 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 7, 2010).

“preferred approach” of district courts in this Circuit “is to decide the limitation issues

and then allow claimants to return to state court if they so desire.” In re Athena

Constr., LLC, No. 06-CV-2004, 2007 WL 1668753, at *6 (W.D. La. June 6, 2007).

The Limitation Petitioners offer two principal counterarguments. Neither

persuades. First, the Limitation Petitioners contend that bifurcating the issues of

exoneration and limitation from the issue of damages clashes with their rights under

the Limitation of Liability Act.14 But it does no such thing. The Personal Injury

Claimants do not ask to proceed in state court before limitation is decided; nor do the

Personal Injury Claimants threaten the Court’s exclusive jurisdiction over limitation

issues. As other sections of this Court have repeatedly recognized, the Court can

properly protect the Limitation Petitioners’ rights under the Limitation of Liability

Act by trying limitation first and freeing the Personal Injury Claimants to seek

damages in state court only if limitation is denied. Accord, e.g., In re Jack’d Up

Charters, 681 F. Supp. 3d at 567; In re Diamond B. Indus., 2022 WL 4608140, at *3;

Ingram Barge, 2022 WL 952257, at *4; S. Oil of La., 2023 WL 3119919, at *4 n.21.

Second, the Limitation Petitioners ask for a re-do of the Rule 42(b) analysis

Judge Guidry has already done.15 The Court declines the invitation. The Rule 42(b)

arguments the Limitation Petitioners make in their reconsideration briefing are

substantially similar to the Rule 42(b) arguments they made in their brief in

opposition to the Personal Injury Claimants’ motion to bifurcate.16 Judge Guidry

14 See ECF No. 126-1 at 7–15.

15 Id. at 15–19.

16 See generally ECF No. 57.

considered and rejected those arguments in his “sound discretion.” Laitram Corp.,

791 F. Supp. at 114. This Rule 54(b) motion is “not the proper vehicle” for “rehashing”

those arguments. Koeppel, 608 F. Supp. 3d at 402 (quotation and citation omitted).

* * *

In sum, the Limitation Petitioners have not met their burden to persuade the

Court to exercise its “broad discretion,” Koeppel, 608 F. Supp. 3d at 402, under Rule

54(b) to hold that Judge Guidry abused his own “sound discretion,” Laitram Corp.,

791 F. Supp. at 114, in ordering bifurcation of the issues of exoneration from and

limitation of liability from the issue of damages. The Court therefore declines to

disturb Judge Guidry’s considered decision to adopt the “preferred approach” of this

Circuit’s district courts. In re Athena Constr., LLC, 2007 WL at *6.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Limitation Petitioners’ motion!’ for clarification

and reconsideration of Judge Guidry’s order and reasons granting the Personal Injury

Claimants’ motion to bifurcate is DENIED.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 25th day of February, 2025.

Sls Sh

BRANDON S. LONG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

17 ECF No. 126.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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