Marcus A. Minor, Jr. v. State of Indiana

FILED

Feb 25 2025, 9:00 am

CLERK

Indiana Supreme Court

Court of Appeals

and Tax Court

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana

Marcus A. Minor,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

February 25, 2025

Court of Appeals Case No.

24A-CR-895

Appeal from the

Marion Superior Court

The Honorable

James B. Osborn, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49D21-2102-MR-4074

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-895 | February 25, 2025 Page 1 of 21

Opinion by Senior Judge Crone

Judges Bailey and Brown concur.

Crone, Senior Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] Marcus A. Minor appeals from his convictions of murder and attempted

murder. He contends that two separate instances of ex parte communication,

one by the bailiff, and the other by the trial court, constitute reversible error.

He additionally challenges the court’s ruling excluding a portion of an expert

witness’ testimony under Evidence Rules 702 and 704. And he argues that all

of the errors, taken together, cumulatively establish reversible error. After

reviewing the record, we conclude that none of the errors, taken alone or

cumulatively, rise to the level of reversible error. Consequently, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Melissa Smith and her son Austin lived in a house known by many as a drug

house. Those who frequented the house referred to it as “Mama’s house.” Tr.

Vol. 3, p. 195. At some point, Minor, who was known as “Psycho,” and

Marcello Snell, who was known as “Cello,” took over Mama’s house and

began selling and manufacturing drugs there.

[3] On January 11, 2021, Austin invited Cassie Rugenstein over to the house to use

drugs he had stolen from Psycho. Nearly everyone in the house was high, but

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Cassie remembered seeing Psycho, who was in an aggressive mood, cooking

crack on the stovetop in a pan. Cassie left in the morning on January 12.

Austin had bruises and marks on him when Cassie returned later on that day.

Austin and Cassie used drugs she bought from Psycho via CashApp. When she

paid, she saw Psycho’s given name was Marcus Minor.

[4] Melissa’s daughter Amber McBride visited her mother once a week. On

January 12, she visited Melissa and brought her two-year-old daughter, G.H.

with her. Amber knew Minor as Psycho and would see him at Melissa’s house

whenever she visited. But Amber claimed she did not know him personally.

When Amber visited her mother, she would stay for a couple of hours.

[5] On that day, Amber noticed Minor was there. She took her daughter, who was

in a car seat, into Melissa’s bedroom and sat on the bed. Amber heard and saw

Melissa and Minor argue. Minor claimed that Melissa was stealing his drugs

and that if the drugs were not returned, “he was going to kill everybody.” Id. at

158. During that argument, Minor called someone, presumably Cello, to “have

everybody killed.” Id. at 160.

[6] Melissa and Minor continued to argue about whether she had stolen drugs from

him as she begged for him not to kill her. Amber joined the argument in

defense of her mother and to beg for her own life as well. Minor and Cello

were both armed and in Melissa’s bedroom. Amber saw Minor holding a gun

as he shot her mother. Amber saw Minor and Cello shoot at her. Melissa

suffered nine gunshot wounds, and Amber was shot eighteen times before she

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blacked out. At some point after Austin became involved in the mêlée, he

suffered nine gunshot wounds. Amber called 911 after the shooting stopped.

Amber survived her injuries, but Melissa and Austin died.

[7] Officers responded to Melissa’s house after hearing a report that a person was

shot. Once there, officers discovered Austin, Melissa, and Amber suffering

from gunshot wounds. Officers interviewed Amber the day after the shooting

and showed her a photo array. Amber selected Minor’s photograph from the

array. In an interview a few days later, Amber, who was more alert and awake,

again identified Minor as the person who shot her and her mother.

[8] Minor was charged with murdering Melissa and Austin and attempting to

murder Amber. As part of Minor’s defense, he called Dr. Kimberley McClure

as an expert in eyewitness identification. The State successfully challenged

Minor’s attempt to have McClure testify that Amber’s identification of him was

unreliable. The trial court concluded that McClure could “testify as to factors

that can cause unreliability, and that’s fine, but she can’t draw the ultimate

conclusion with regard to [Amber].” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 136-37.

[9] When Amber testified at trial, she acknowledged that she suffered from PTSD,

an intellectual learning disability, ADHD, depression, anxiety, and

schizoaffective disorder. When questioned about whether she had issues with

her memory, she responded, “Sometimes. Not all the time.” Tr. Vol. 3, p. 146.

She said, “Just like little stuff. I can’t really explain what stuff I would have

trouble with, but it—it’s not something that’s a big deal.” Id. Amber agreed

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that she remembered “big events in [her] life” and said she remembered people

“by face.” Id. Amber was fully cross-examined about aspects of her ability to

remember people and events.

[10] McClure testified that experts in her field look at estimator and system variables

to determine the reliability of eyewitness identification. Estimator variables are

things that are out of our control. Those are things that make a person’s

memory less reliable, such as observing something in low light, or seeing

something without wearing needed corrective eyewear. System variables are

things that can be controlled. And experts have devised strategies for

preserving an eyewitness’ identification in a reliable way. Those things include

strategies for who presents the photo array to the eyewitness and how to

interview the eyewitness.

[11] McClure reviewed Amber’s deposition, statements to law enforcement officers,

medical records, and 911 call. She testified that there were a number of

estimator variables in Amber’s identification, such as the violence of the event,

the presence of a weapon, the high stress, Amber’s intellectual developmental

delay, poor eyesight, and schizoaffective disorder. She also discussed how post-

event information, such as discussing the event with police officers, attorneys,

friends, family members, and reading social media, which are separate from the

experience, become embedded in the eyewitness’ recollection of the event. She

further explained that the “lack of unbiased lineup instructions” before Amber

identified Minor at the hospital was a system variable. Tr. Vol. 4, p. 147.

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[12] Minor’s counsel made an offer of proof outside the presence of the jury.

Counsel elicited McClure’s opinion “as to the probative nature or the reliability

of [Amber’s] identification[.]” Id. at 159. McClure opined, “I think there are

sufficient estimator and system variables that we know through the science and

anecdotal information that impact witnesses’ memory that this witness

statement is unreliable.” Id.

[13] The jury retired to the jury room for deliberations at the close of the evidence.

The bailiff retrieved the evidence to be sent back to the jury room. After the

bailiff placed the materials in the room, the jurors asked if they could have the

bodycam recording depicting what officers saw and heard upon arriving at

Melissa’s home after the shooting. The bailiff told the jurors, “No.” Id. at 223,

226. The bailiff did not tell the trial court about the jurors’ question.

[14] Around two hours into deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial court,

which read:

After about two hours of deliberation, we are at an almost perfect

split decision/standstill when it comes to our decision. Is there

procedural or experiencial [sic] advice to charge us with to try

and drive towards a consensus? The sheer lack of quality

information in this case has been the major issue.

Appellant’s App. Conf. Vol. III, p. 93. The court called Minor and counsel into

the court room, read the juror question, and agreed to instruct the jury to

continue deliberating.

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[15] Sometime later, the jury sent another question to the court stating and asking:

“We have reached a unanimous decision/verdict on two of the four counts, but

are still not unanimous in the other two. One is very much deadlocked. Would

you like for us to consider additional discussion?” Id. at 92. There is no

transcription showing that the trial court consulted with the parties before

responding, “Yes. Keep deliberating.” Id. And, consequently, there is no

record of Minor objecting to the court’s response.

[16] At the conclusion of deliberations, the jury found Minor guilty of Melissa’s

murder, Amber’s attempted murder, and not guilty of Austin’s murder.

[17] After the trial, the jurors informed the trial court that they had requested the

bodycam recording at the start of their deliberations, but the bailiff had told

them no. The court held a hearing on the matter. The bailiff testified about the

interaction. And the court summed up the interaction as the bailiff believing

that the jury wanted to watch the bodycam recording in the jury room, because

there was a television in the room, instead of in open court. The court agreed

that the bailiff should have had a juror write the request down on a piece of

paper to present to the court and the parties. And the court said, “[h]ad that

been done, we would have brought them into the courtroom, as I’ve done on

other cases numerous times, and replayed video for them to watch. But that

didn’t happen.” Tr. Vol. 4, p. 223. Minor’s counsel ultimately moved to

overturn the verdicts due to the interaction’s possible effect on the verdicts. The

court denied the motion and imposed an aggregate sentence of ninety-five years

executed.

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Discussion and Decision

I. Presence At All Crucial Stages of Criminal Proceedings

[18] Minor argues that his common law and constitutional rights to be present at all

stages of a criminal proceeding were violated on two separate occasions during

his trial; namely, once when the bailiff answered a jury question, and the

second when the trial court answered the jury’s second written question without

him being present.

A. Bailiff’s Interaction With the Jury

[19] Minor argues he is entitled to reversal of his convictions because of the bailiff’s

interaction with the jury when he was not present. For this part of his claim, he

acknowledges that he is not entitled to relief under Indiana Code section 34-36-

1-6 (1998) because there was no disagreement among the jurors about any part

of the testimony nor did they desire to be informed as to any point of law

arising in the case at that point. Minor’s claims here are based on common law

and state and federal constitutional protections.

1. Common Law

[20] In Bouye v. State, the Supreme Court noted that unlike the statutory protection,

“the common law protection applies whenever jurors request any type of

additional guidance from the court[.]” 699 N.E.2d 620, 628 (Ind. 1998).

“[T]he proper procedure is for the judge to notify the parties so they may be

present in court and informed of the court’s proposed response to the jury before

the judge ever communicates with the jury.” Id. “When this procedure is not

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followed, it is an ex parte communication and such communications between

the judge and the jury without informing the defendant are forbidden.” Id.

“However, although an ex parte communication creates a presumption of error,

such presumption is rebuttable and does not constitute per se grounds for

reversal.” Id. For example, “[w]hen the trial judge responds to the jury’s

request by denying it, any inference of prejudice is rebutted and any error is

deemed harmless.” Id.

[21] Indiana Code section 35-37-2-6(b) (1981) provides that after the jury retires to

the jury room for deliberation, they are placed under the charge of an officer, or

bailiff, who may not communicate with the jury except to ask if they have

agreed on a verdict, or when ordered to do so by the court. “When

communication between a bailiff and a jury occurs outside of the defendant’s

presence, there is a presumption of harm to the defendant that the State must

rebut to avoid reversal.” Driver v. State, 594 N.E.2d 488, 493 (Ind. Ct. App.

1992), trans. denied. “The State may, however, avoid reversal if we are satisfied

that no harm or prejudice resulted from the communication.” Id.

[22] “When the trial court has addressed the issue of improper communications, we

do not reweigh its determinations as to the credibility of the witnesses.” Sowers

v. State, 988 N.E.2d 360, 368 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Baxter v. State, 727

N.E.2d 429, 435 (Ind. 2000), reh’g denied)), reh’g granted on other grounds.

“Because this is a factual determination, it is subject to a clearly erroneous

standard of review.” Id.

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[23] In this case, as the bailiff was bringing the evidence in the jury room, the jurors

asked the bailiff “if they could have” the bodycam recording. Tr. Vol. 4, p. 225.

The bailiff responded, “no, you guys can’t.” Id. at 226. After the trial court

became aware of the situation, the parties were notified, and the court

established a record of what had transpired. At first, Minor’s counsel “wasn’t

worried . . . [and] didn’t think that it impacted the verdict.” Id. at 224. But

counsel ultimately moved to set aside the verdicts because: “We just can’t

know if this impacted the jury’s verdict.” Id. at 229.

[24] Minor relies heavily upon this Court’s decision in State v. Winters, 678 N.E.2d

405 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). However, this Court’s holding in Winters; namely

that the statutory protection is triggered any time the jury requests to rehear

testimony because that amounts to an inherent expression of disagreement or

confusion about the evidence, was disapproved of in the Supreme Court’s

decision in Bouye. 699 N.E.2d at 627-28. And Minor has explicitly stated that

he is not relying on the statute for relief.

[25] As for Minor’s common law claim, we have found no reversible error where the

“bailiff did not talk about the facts of the case, further instruct the jury, or

discuss substantive legal matters with the jury.” Farris v. State, 732 N.E.2d 230,

235 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Here, the bailiff should not have communicated with

the jury. However, the communication that occurred was a refusal of

information. And we have held that an inference of prejudice is rebutted by

evidence that the response to the request was a denial. See Bouye, 699 N.E.2d at

628. We acknowledge that the bailiff’s response by saying “no” will not always

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lead to a rebuttal of the inference of prejudice. In this case, based on the facts

and circumstances before us, the inference of prejudice is rebutted.

Consequently, we find that the error here does not require a reversal of Minor’s

convictions.

2. Constitutional Claims

[26] Minor claims violations of the Sixth Amendment of the federal constitution and

article 1, sections 12 and 13 of the Indiana constitution. He claims that the

bailiff’s ex parte communication with the jury deprived him of the right to be

present and heard at all critical stages of his trial.

[27] Our Supreme Court has concluded that for the purpose of the federal

constitutional analysis “the burden of establishing that there is a critical stage in

the first place falls on the defendant.” Hernandez v. State, 761 N.E.2d 845, 850

(Ind. 2002). The Supreme Court’s test for identifying a critical stage is

“‘whether the defendant is confronted with the intricacies of the law or the

advocacy of the public prosecutor or prosecuting authorities.’” Id. (quoting

Dullen v. State, 721 N.E.2d 241, 242 (Ind. 1999)).

[28] In addition to his argument under the Sixth Amendment, Minor contends that

under the Fourteenth Amendment: “A defendant’s presence ‘is a condition of

due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his

absence.’” Appellant’s Br. p. 22 (quoting U.S. v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526

(1985)). However, immediately prior to that quote, the United States Supreme

Court said, “a defendant has a due process right to be present at a proceeding

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‘whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the [fullness] of

his opportunity to defend against the charge.’” Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526

(quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934)).

[29] As for Indiana constitutional claims, the Supreme Court recognizes the

existence of “‘state constitutional protection for a defendant’s right to be present

when a jury makes a request for any additional guidance during deliberations.’”

Hernandez, 761 N.E.2d at 853 (quoting Stephenson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 463, 492

(Ind. 2001)). “A denial of the right to be present during all critical stages of the

proceedings, like the right to counsel at a critical stage, is a constitutional right

that is subject to a harmless error analysis.” Id.

[30] We conclude that Minor has not carried his burden of establishing that the

bailiff’s communication with the jury by replying “no” to a request for the

bodycam footage while she was placing evidence in the jury room before

deliberations had begun in earnest triggered a critical stage where he was

required to be present and heard. Minor argues that his “right to be present was

triggered when the jury requested an important piece of evidence—the bodycam

footage.” Appellant’s Br. p. 21. He contends that the footage was important

“because it brought into question the reliability of McBride’s identification of

[him] as the person who shot her and Melissa.” Id.

[31] The Supreme Court, however, has made clear that,

the danger of an ex parte communication is the extraneous

influence the judge may have over the jury by his

communications. When a judge refuses any communication, the

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danger of extraneous influence is eradicated. Therefore, contrary

to the defendant’s argument, the prohibition against ex parte

communications is not designed to give the defendant an

opportunity to provide the jury with more information that might

benefit his case, but rather it is designed to prevent the jury from

being improperly influenced by the judge.

Bouye, 699 N.E.2d at 628-29. Thus, to the extent Minor’s argument appears to

be that he was prejudiced or harmed by the missed opportunity to have the

bodycam footage played for the jury a second time, that argument misses the

mark according to Bouye. The injury prevented by the prohibition against ex

parte communications is improper influence by the judge or, as here, the bailiff.

And the court’s comments indicating that had it known of the request, the jury

would have seen the footage in open court, unfortunately, does nothing more

than undercut its own judgment in addition to being superfluous. We review

the impact of what happened, not what might have happened, had things gone

differently. We find no error that rises to the level of reversible error here under

the federal or Indiana constitutions.

B. Jury’s Second Note to the Trial Court

[32] Next, Minor contends that the court committed reversible error by engaging in

ex parte communications with the jury. The jurors sent two questions to the

court during deliberations. Minor’s argument rests with the circumstances

surrounding the second question.

[33] During deliberations, the jury informed and asked the trial court in a written

note: “We have reached a unanimous decision/verdict on two of the four

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counts, but are still not unanimous in the other two. One is very much

deadlocked. Would you like for us to consider additional discussion?”

Appellant’s App. Conf. Vol. III, p. 92. There is no transcription showing the

trial court consulted with the parties before responding, “Yes. Keep

deliberating.” Id. And there is no record of Minor objecting to the court’s

response.

[34] “When the jury directs a question to the trial court, the ‘better practice [is] for

the judge to [notify] the parties before sending his [or her] response to the

jury.’” Henri v. Curto, 908 N.E.2d 196, 200-01 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Rogers v. R.J.

Reynolds Tobacco Co., 745 N.E.2d 793, 796 (Ind. 2001)). “If this procedure is not

utilized, the resulting judge-to-jury ex parte communication creates a rebuttable

presumption of error, but is not per se grounds for reversal.” Henri, 908 N.E.2d

at 201. “‘In deciding whether the presumption of harm has been rebutted, we

evaluate the nature of the communication to the jury and the effect it might

have had upon a fair determination.’” Id. (quoting Smith v. Convenience Store

Distrib. Co., 583 N.E.2d 735, 738 (Ind. 1992)). “One significant factor in

determining the effect of an ex parte communication upon the jury’s decision-

making is whether or not the court’s response to the jury contained any new

information regarding the facts or law of the case.” Henri, 908 N.E.2d at 201.

[35] Here, the record shows that counsel received a text message from the court

reporter indicating that the deliberating jury had another question. Tr. Vol. 4,

p. 229 (“The second question that we got, I checked my text, was at 3 p.m.—or

that’s when the court reporter texted me to say there was a question. That

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question was that they were unanimous on two counts and not hanging but

couldn’t come to a decision on the other two counts.”). However, there is no

record that the judge brought Minor and counsel into the courtroom to discuss

the question and agree upon a response. And there is no record of an objection

to the response given because there is no transcript.

[36] Better practice would have been to call Minor and counsel into the courtroom

and establish a record of the second note from the jury and the discussions

involving any response. But, looking at what we do know, the court’s response

did not contain any new information regarding the facts or law of the case. As

such, we find that the presumption has been rebutted, and the error does not

rise to the level of reversal.

[37] We recognize that this is an area that the Supreme Court has become more

involved in by regulating trial courts’ involvement with juries. But if the

Supreme Court decides to overturn longstanding precedent, it is up to them to

do so. We see the parties’ concern. The bailiff should have had the jury submit

the request in writing to the court. And the court should have made a record of

the second note according to the guidelines set out in Bouye. But based on

precedent, we find no error here that rises to the level of reversal.

II. Exclusion of Expert’s Testimony

[38] Minor argues that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding Dr.

McClure’s testimony about the reliability of Amber’s testimony identifying

Minor as the person who shot her and murdered her mother. He contends

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McClure’s testimony was admissible: (1) under Evidence Rules 702 and 704

because the rules “allow expert testimony based on opinion or otherwise that

will help the jury determine a fact at issue[;]” and (2) “because it was [an]

opinion on a question of fact.” Appellant’s Br. pp. 23, 26.

[39] “The decision to admit or exclude evidence at trial is within the trial court’s

discretion, and we afford it great deference on appeal.” Gee v. State, 193 N.E.3d

1036, 1039 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). “We review the trial court’s decision

regarding the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion.” Id. “An

abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the

logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.” Id.

[40] The trial court excluded McClure’s proffered testimony that in her opinion “as

to the probative nature or the reliability of [Amber’s] identification[,] . . . [she

thought] there are sufficient estimator and system variables that we know

through the science and anecdotal information that impact witnesses’ memory

that this witness statement is unreliable.” Tr. Vol. 4, p. 159. The trial court

concluded that McClure could “testify as to factors that can cause unreliability,

and that’s fine, but she can’t draw the ultimate conclusion with regard to

[Amber].” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 136-37.

[41] Evidence Rule 702(a) provides that “[a] witness who is qualified as an expert by

knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of

an opinion or otherwise if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine

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a fact in issue.” As for opinions on ultimate issues, Evidence Rule 704(a)

provides that generally, “[t]estimony in the form of an opinion or inference

otherwise admissible is not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate

issue.” But Evidence Rule 704(b) provides the exception to the general rule,

that “[w]itnesses may not testify to opinions concerning intent, guilt, or

innocence in a criminal case; the truth or falsity of allegations; whether a

witness has testified truthfully; or legal conclusions.”

[42] Here, Minor’s counsel cross-examined Amber at great length about her memory

and her diagnoses. Minor’s counsel also impeached Amber’s testimony with

portions of her deposition testimony. The jury heard Amber’s 911 call in which

she stated she did not know who shot her. And they heard Amber’s comments

to responding officers as reflected in the bodycam footage. McClure testified

about the science of studying the reliability of eyewitness testimony. Her

testimony educated the jury about estimator and system variables which can

affect an eyewitness’ identification of a suspect. And the jury heard Amber’s

testimony on cross-examination that she had “Googled” the incident, had

discussed it with her friends and family members, and learned Minor’s given

name and saw his picture via various forms of media.

[43] But Minor argues that McClure should have been allowed to connect the dots

for the jury and offer her opinion that Amber’s identification was unreliable.

We cannot agree.

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[44] In Jimerson v. State, 56 N.E.3d 117 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied, a panel of

this Court examined cases which decided the propriety of the partial or

complete restriction of expert testimony. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 770 N.E.2d

763 (Ind. 2002) (complete exclusion of expert’s testimony about coercive police

interrogation and false or coerced confessions was reversible error; expert

testimony which would have violated Rule 704(b) could be excluded through

rulings on individualized objections); Shelby v. State, 986 N.E.2d 345 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2013) (limitations on expert’s testimony to generalized information about

police interrogation tactics not reversible error where jury could use expert’s

testimony to apply to particular facts and circumstances of case), trans. denied;

Callis v. State, 684 N.E.2d 233 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (expert testimony about

coercive police interrogation and false confessions in the particular case

excluded), trans. denied. The Jimerson court concluded that “an expert should

not be invited to cross the line at which the jury can proceed without further

aid.” 56 N.E.3d at 123. The Court held,

the jury had been given adequate information to apply its

common knowledge and experience. Where a jury is able to

apply concepts without further assistance, highlighting individual

exchanges or vouching for the truth or falsity of particular

evidence is invasive.

Id.

[45] Despite these holdings, Minor claims that “McClure’s opinion did not speak to

whether [Amber] testified truthfully. The opinion only went to whether

[Amber’s] identification is reliable which is a question of fact.” Appellant’s Br.

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p. 27. However, McClure’s opinion about the reliability of Amber’s

identification does invade the sole province of the jury to determine her

credibility. See, Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007) (“It is the fact-

finder’s role . . . to assess witness credibility . . . .”). In this case, Minor’s

defense strategy was to attack Amber’s credibility via challenges to her memory

and by evidence of the impact of certain factors—vision, educational

challenges, mental health, traumatic experience—on the reliability of her

identification. It was for the jury, not McClure, to determine whether the

estimator or system variables affected Amber’s unequivocal identification of a

person with whom she was familiar as the person who shot her and murdered

her mother. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in this way.

III. Cumulative Errors

[46] Minor argues that the cumulative effect of the alleged errors made throughout

his trial denied him of his due process right to a fair trial under the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and his right to complete justice

under article 1, section 12 of the Indiana constitution. His argument is based

on the Supreme Court’s holding “‘for the sake of argument, that under some

circumstances the cumulative effect of trial errors may warrant reversal even if

each might be deemed harmless in isolation,’ but not where it has been ‘clear in

light of the evidence of guilt that no prejudice resulted from any of the

erroneous rulings, individually, or cumulatively.’” Inman v. State, 4 N.E.3d

190, 203 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Hubbell v. State, 754 N.E.2d 884, 895 (Ind. 2001)).

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[47] Minor is “‘entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect trial.’” Id. (quoting Myers v. State,

887 N.E.2d 170, 175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. Although there were

imperfections in his trial—ex parte communications—those were isolated

incidents and the imperfections did not permeate the trial. As we discussed

above, while the record reflects that the Bouye procedure was not followed in

those two instances, following longstanding precedent, we concluded that

neither instance resulted in the jury receiving new information about the law or

the facts of the case without Minor being present, and thus no reversible error.

And the trial court did not err by excluding the portion of McClure’s testimony

which would have invaded the province of the jury by offering, in effect, an

opinion on Amber’s credibility. McClure’s testimony provided the jury with

the necessary tools with which to make its determination without McClure

deciding the matter for them.

[48] Consequently, we conclude that Minor’s trial, while not a perfect one, was a

fair trial. And the imperfections did not rise to the level of reversible error

based on precedent.

Conclusion

[49] In light of the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[50] Affirmed.

Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-895 | February 25, 2025 Page 20 of 21

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Talisha R. Griffin

Marion County Public Defender Agency

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Theodore E. Rokita

Attorney General of Indiana

Tyler G. Banks

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-895 | February 25, 2025 Page 21 of 21