Ortiz v. County Of Nassau

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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ALEXANDER ORTIZ,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

-against- 20-CV-3469 (OEM) (SIL)

COUNTY OF NASSAU, NASSAU COUNTY

POLICE DEPARTMENT, Detective Luis A. Salazar

(Sh. 908), in his official and individual capacity, under

Color of State Law, NASSAU COUNTY DISTRICT

ATTORNEY, Madeline Singas, ASSISTANT

DISTRICT ATTORNEY, Victoria Mauri and her

direct Jane Doe and John Doe supervisors, in their

official and individual capacities, under Color of State

Law, NASSAU COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF

SOCIAL SERVICES, and its John Doe and Jane Doe

Caseworkers, in their official and individual

capacities, and under Color of State Law, and

NASSAU UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, and

its John Doe and Jane Doe Doctor(s) and Sane

Nurse(s),

Defendants.

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ORELIA E. MERCHANT, United States District Judge:

On July 31, 2020, plaintiff Alexander Ortiz (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action asserting

federal and state law claims arising from his arrest and indictment for child sexual abuse.

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges false arrest and imprisonment, abuse of process, malicious

prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and violations of the Fourth

and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants County of Nassau

(“Nassau County”), Nassau County Police Department (“NCPD”), Luis Salazar (“Detective

Salazar”), Nassau County District Attorney Madeline Singas (“DA Singas”), Assistant District

Attorney Victoria Mauri (“ADA Mauri”), and Nassau County Department Of Social Services

(“DSS”), (collectively the “County Defendants”). See generally Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF 1.

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Plaintiff also brings claims for false imprisonment and “incorporates” each allegation set forth in

the Complaint for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments via Section 1983 against

defendant Nassau University Medical Center (“Defendant Medical Center”). Id. Plaintiff seeks

legal fees from all Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Id.

Before the Court are County Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, see Cnty. Defs.

Not. of Mot., ECF 67, and the Defendant Medical Center’s motion for summary judgment, see

Med. Ctr. Not. of Mot., ECF 74, on all claims. For the following reasons the County Defendants’

and Defendant Medical Center’s motions are GRANTED.

BACKGROUND1

Three minor children, B.A., O.A. and T.A., were adopted on or about January 21, 2014, in

the State of Arkansas and later brought to Hempstead, New York, by their adoptive mother,

Chriscelle A. Pl. Cnty. 56.1 ¶¶ 1-2.2 On or about January 22, 2018, B.A. ran away from home.

1 The facts set forth herein are drawn from County Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts Pursuant to Local Civil

Rule 56.1 (“Cnty. Defs. 56.1”), ECF 69; Declaration of Oscar Michelen in Support of County Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgement (“Michelen Decl.”), ECF 68, and exhibits attached thereto; Plaintiff’s Counter Statement to the

County’s Statement of Undisputed Facts Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1 (“Pl. Cnty. 56.1”); Declaration of Michael

J. Langer in Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition to County Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Langer Decl.”),

ECF 71-1, and the exhibits attached thereto; County Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiff’s Rule 56.1 Statement (“Cnty.

Defs. 56.1 Reply”), ECF 73; Medical Center’s Statement of Undisputed Facts (“Med. Ctr. 56.1”), ECF 74-1; Plaintiff’s

Counter Statement of Undisputed Facts to the Medical Center’s 56.1 (“Pl. Med. Ctr. 56.1”), ECF 76-4; Medical

Center’s Reply to Plaintiff’s 56.1 Statement (“Med. Ctr. Reply 56.1”), ECF 74-3; and various witness depositions

(“[Name] Dep.”). Citations to a party’s Rule 56.1 Statement incorporate by reference the documents cited therein.

Where facts stated in a party’s Rule 56.1 Statement are supported by testimonial or documentary evidence and denied

with only a conclusory statement by the other party, the Court finds such facts to be true. E.D.N.Y. Local Rule 56.1

(c)-(d).

2 Plaintiff responds this and other statements in the County Defendants’ 56.1 Statement stating that “Said evidence is

not admissible pursuant to FRCP 56(c), Local Rule 56.1(d) and Court Rule III(C)(5).” However, Plaintiff offers no

substantive basis for the objections. Because Plaintiff does not dispute the facts and because “Asserting an issue

without advancing an argument does not suffice to adequately raise” it, Cascianti v. Nesbitt, 392 F. App’x 887, 889

(2d Cir. 2010), the Court declines to deem any statements inadmissible based on Plaintiff’s conclusory and

unsubstantiated objections. See Chalfen v. E. Williston Union Free Sch. Dist., 2023 WL 2815719, at *3, n.1 (E.D.N.Y.

Feb. 27, 2023). The Court addresses infra Plaintiff’s arguments as to admissibility contained within its opposition

brief. Further, the Court does not consider arguments, legal conclusions, or unsubstantiated opinions contained in the

parties’ 56.1 statements. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Schneider, 95-CV-4083, 1999 WL 459813, at *1, n.3 (S.D.N.Y.)

(“Rule 56.1 statements are not argument. They should contain factual assertions with citation to the record. They

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Id. ¶ 3. When she later appeared at school, NCPD officers interviewed B.A. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. B.A.

reported to officers that Plaintiff, the boyfriend of Chriselle A.’s natural daughter, was sexually

abusing T.A., who was ten years old at the time. Id. ¶¶ 2-4. The three children and their adoptive

mother were brought in to the “Safe Center,” a private entity which operates a Child Advocacy

Center. Id. ¶¶ 5-7. Detective Salazar, an officer in the Special Victims Bureau within the NCPD,

was assigned to investigate the allegations against Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 9, 13. Detective Salazar

conducted forensic interviews of the three children, which were video and audio recorded. Id. ¶

14. Defendants have provided the Court with the video footage.3 See Ex. C, ECF 68-3.

During B.A.’s interview, who was then age 15, B.A. stated that T.A. told her and their

cousin that Plaintiff had attempted to rape her and to force her to perform oral sex on him. B.A.

stated that T.A. also said that Plaintiff had threatened to kill T.A. if she told anyone. B.A. stated

that she responded by telling T.A. not to tell anyone. B.A. said she decided not to tell her adoptive

mother because she previously accused B.A. of being a “pathological liar.” B.A. also reported that

her sister, O.A., told her that O.A. had seen T.A. and Plaintiff kissing on the lips.

During O.A.’s interview, who was then age 13, O.A. stated that she was not sexually

abused by Plaintiff, but that T.A. told her Plaintiff had sexually abused T.A. O.A. reported seeing

Plaintiff kissing T.A. on the lips.

should not contain conclusions.” (emphasis omitted)), aff’d, 56 F. App’x 27 (2d Cir. 2003); Williams v. City of New

York, 19-CV-3347 (LJL) (JLC) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2022).

3 The Court may rely upon video evidence to resolve questions of fact on a motion for summary judgment. Scott v.

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 379-80 (2007) (considering a motion for summary judgment, the court viewed the facts in the

light depicted by videotape); accord Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 215 n.6 (2d Cir. 2012) (affirming grant of

summary judgment based upon probable cause and qualified immunity relying in part on video evidence where

plaintiff did not dispute the accuracy of video).

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During T.A.’s interview, who was then age 10, T.A. reported that Plaintiff had sexually

abused her both orally and vaginally over the course of two years. T.A. estimated eleven separate

incidents of abuse had occurred and described several in detail.

After the interview, T.A. was taken to the Medical Center for forensic evaluation where

she was examined by Sexual Abuse Nurse Examiner Barbara Heffernan (“Heffernan”). Pl. Cnty.

56.1 ¶¶ 29-30. Heffernan’s report noted that during the exam T.A. was talkative, cooperative, id.

¶ 43, and “alert and oriented” across person, place, time, and situation, id. ¶ 40, and that T.A. told

Heffernan that Plaintiff put his penis in her mouth, vagina and “backside,” id. ¶ 44. Heffernan

then performed a physical exam on T.A. by observation and colposcope. Id. ¶ 45. Heffernan noted

a transection of the hymen and bruising around the anus. Id. ¶ 47. Heffernan testified before the

Grand Jury that her physical findings were consistent with T.A.’s recount of sexual abuse. Id. ¶

50.

Heffernan later testified in her deposition that her physical exam was consistent with T.A.’s

allegations but that, without DNA evidence, the findings were “inconclusive” as to actual sexual

abuse. Id. ¶¶ 48-49. She testified that there was nothing that called into question T.A.’s mental

competency and that she made her findings “in good faith and to the best of [her] ability.” Id. ¶¶

42, 52; see Heffernan Dep. at 117:5-19. Plaintiff disputes the accuracy of Heffernan’s findings

and asserts that there was no evidence of a hymen transection. Cnty. Defs. 56.1 Reply ¶ 105. The

County Defendants dispute this. Id. At the time, no doctor had reviewed the physical evidence.

Id. ¶ 106.

Heffernan is required to report suspected child abuse under New York State Law. Pl. Cnty.

56.1 ¶ 37. On January 22, 2018, Heffernan reported to Detective Salazar that T.A. showed signs

of sexual abuse. Id. ¶ 32.

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Detective Salazar determined that there was probable cause for the arrest; ADA Bresnahan

discussed with Detective Salazar what charges could be supported by the evidence. Id. ¶ 54. On

January 25, 2018, without first obtaining a warrant, Detective Salazar placed Plaintiff under arrest

for Course of Sexual Conduct Against a Child in the First Degree. Id. ¶ 53; Cnty. Defs. 56.1 Reply

¶ 102. The case was assigned to the ADA Mauri in the Special Victims Unit after Plaintiff’s arrest.

Pl. Cnty. 56.1 ¶ 55. ADA Bresnahan took over the case while ADA Mauri was on leave. Id. ¶ 58.

Bresnahan made the decision to prosecute Plaintiff based on the medical evidence Heffernan

provided – and without any other physical evidence. Cnty. Defs. 56.1 Reply ¶ 107. ADA

Bresnahan presented a video of T.A.’s testimony, Pl. Cnty. 56.1 ¶ 58, and Heffernan testified

before the Grand Jury, id. ¶ 50. ADA Bresnahan later testified that she “wouldn’t have put Nurse

Heffernan in the grand jury.” Cnty. Defs. 56.1 Reply ¶ 108; Bresnahan Dep. 76:13-15. The parties

dispute whether “best practices” required a doctor, not a nurse, to determine whether a hymen

transection occurred. Cnty. Defs. 56.1 Reply ¶¶ 109-10. On March 1, 2018, the Grand Jury

returned an indictment charging Plaintiff with Course of Sexual Conduct Against a Child in the

First Degree. Pl. Cnty. 56.1 ¶ 59.

In March 2019, as the District Attorney’s office prepared to bring the case to trial, the office

asked Dr. Jennifer Canter, a board-certified child abuse pediatrician, to review Heffernan’s

findings and to serve as a potential trial witness. Id. ¶¶ 61-62; Bresnahan Dep. at 64:12-22, 66:19-

20. Dr. Canter reviewed the medical records and colposcopic photos from Heffernan’s

examination and disagreed with Heffernan’s findings. Id. ¶ 61; Michelen Decl. Ex. K, ECF 68-

11. The parties dispute whether Dr. Canter determined there was no transection of the hymen. See

Cnty. Defs. 56.1 Reply ¶ 106.

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On April 2, 2019, ADA Mauri notified Plaintiff’s criminal defense attorney of Dr. Canter’s

disagreement, noting that Dr. Canter “did not believe there was a transection and c[ould] not

conclude whether what appeared to be bruising to the child’s anus was bruising or a vein.” Pl.

Cnty. 56.1 ¶ 63; Michelen Decl. Ex. K. The letter stated that the District Attorney’s office would

be “representing the case to the Grand Jury without presenting the medical records” and would

“not be using the injuries at trial.” Pl. Cnty. 56.1 ¶¶ 64-65; Michelen Decl. Ex. K.

In December 2018, Plaintiff’s attorney subpoenaed T.A.’s medical records, which were

delivered to the New York Supreme Court 10th Judicial District in December 2018 and reviewed

by Judge Robert A. McDonald’s law secretary. Pl. Cnty. 56.1 ¶ 66. Medical records from Stony

Brook Hospital, dated May 31, 2018, showed that T.A. was experiencing serious psychiatric issues

and maintained her accusations of sexual abuse by Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 67-68. T.A. had been admitted

to Stony Brook Hospital after an incident at school when she expressed suicidal ideation, reported

nightmares and flashbacks of sexual abuse, and fear that her abuser would hurt her again. Pl. Cnty.

56.1 ¶ 68; Michelen Decl. Ex. M, ECF 68-13. T.A.’s Stony Brook records were released to the

District Attorney’s office and Plaintiff’s attorney on May 10, 2019. Pl. Cnty. 56.1 ¶ 69; Michelen

Decl. Ex. N, ECF 68-14.

On June 26, 2019, ADAs Bresnahan and Mauri met with T.A. to ascertain whether she

could re-present testimony to a Grand Jury and testify at trial. Id. ¶ 70. At that time, T.A. was

living at a residential treatment facility for “young, emotionally traumatized disturbed children.”

Id.; Michelen Decl. Ex. N. ADAs Bresnahan and Mauri observed that T.A. was exhibiting

“delusional and incoherent behavior” and that she had an active history of “visual hallucinations.”

Pl. Cnty. 56.1 at ¶ 71; Michelen Decl. Ex. N; Mauri Dep. at 152:7-22.

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ADA Mauri determined that “it [was] not in the best interest of [T.A.] to have her testify

and that [the District Attorney’s] office c[ould] not go forward on this case.” Michelen Decl. Ex.

N; Pl. Cnty. 56.1 ¶ 72. Without T.A.’s testimony, “forensic or medical evidence,” or “admissions

by the Defendant,” ADAs Bresnahan and Mauri were left with B.A. and O.A., who had “their own

social and psychological considerations.” Therefore, ADAs Mauri and Bresnahan decided to drop

the case. Michelen Decl. Ex. N.; Pl. Cnty. 56.1 ¶¶ 73, 75. On July 31, 2019, they requested

approval from their office to seek dismissal of the case pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law 210.20

(1) (H), which authorizes the dismissal of an indictment due to the existence of a legal impediment.

Pl. Cnty. 56.1 ¶¶ 74, 76; see Michelen Decl. Ex. N.

On August 1, 2019, ADA Mauri moved to dismiss the indictment, stating that “It is clear

the child cannot testify at this time and we do not seek to further traumatize her.” Id. ¶¶ 77-78.

When asked by Judge McDonald whether the District Attorney’s office believed it could satisfy a

reasonable jury that Plaintiff was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, ADA Mauri explained that

they believed it would not be “appropriate” to have T.A. testify given the circumstances and that

the District Attorney’s office “wouldn’t be able to make out a case without her.” Id. ¶¶ 79-80.

The Court granted the motion to dismiss the indictment. Id. ¶ 84. The dismissal of the criminal

case is a termination “in favor of the accused” and, under New York Criminal Procedure Law §

160.60, the arrest and prosecution of Plaintiff was deemed a nullity and Plaintiff was restored to

the status occupied before the arrest and prosecution. Cnty. Defs. 56.1 ¶ 115.

Plaintiff was incarcerated in pre-trial detention for approximately one year. Id. ¶ 103. He

was released on bail in early 2019 before the indictment was dismissed. Id. Plaintiff was thereafter

detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement for several months. Id. ¶ 104. Plaintiff denied

all allegations of wrongdoing throughout the pendency of the criminal case. Id. ¶ 112. Warrants,

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subpoenas, DNA evidence, surveillance videos, and jail records obtained during the course of the

investigation produced zero evidence against Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 113.

Plaintiff filed this action on July 31, 2020, see Compl., and on July 12, 2023, this case was

reassigned to the undersigned. Following the close of discovery, the County Defendants and the

Medical Center moved for summary judgment.

LEGAL STANDARD

A movant is entitled to summary judgment only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a);

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate where “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “An issue of fact is

genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party.” Frost v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 980 F.3d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting SCR Joint Venture

L.P. v. Warshawsky, 559 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 2009)). “A fact is material if it might affect the

outcome of the suit under governing law.” Id.

The moving party bears the burden of showing that they are entitled to summary judgment.

See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). “The inferences to be drawn from

the underlying affidavits, exhibits, interrogatory answers, and depositions must be viewed in the

light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196,

202 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam),

and Ramseur v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 865 F.2d 460, 465 (2d Cir. 1989)). The court “is not to

weigh the evidence but is instead required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

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party opposing summary judgment, to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and to

eschew credibility assessments.” Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 122 (2d Cir.

2004). Therefore, “if ‘there is any evidence in the record from any source from which a reasonable

inference in the [nonmoving party’s] favor may be drawn, the moving party simply cannot obtain

a summary judgment.’” Binder & Binder PC v. Barnhart, 481 F.3d 141, 148 (2d Cir. 2007)

(quoting R.B. Ventures, Ltd. v. Shane, 112 F.3d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 1997)) (alteration in original).

If the moving party meets its burden of demonstrating the absence of a dispute over

material fact, then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to present “specific facts showing a

genuine issue for trial.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund v. Accra

Sheetmetal, LLC, 993 F. Supp. 2d 245, 248 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). The nonmoving party cannot rely

solely on “conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation” to defeat a motion for summary

judgment. Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 1998). If the evidence favoring the

nonmoving party is “merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative, summary judgment

may be granted.” Anderson 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

A. County Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

1. Liability Against the NCPD and DSS

The NCPD and DSS are not proper defendants. “It is well-established that under New

York law, departments that are merely administrative arms of a municipality do not have a legal

identity separate and apart from the municipality and therefore, cannot sue or be sued.’” Martinez

v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 999 F. Supp. 2d 424, 429 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Davis v. Lynbrook Police

Dep’t, 224 F. Supp. 2d 463, 477 (E.D.N.Y.2002)). Since the police department and DSS and are

merely administrative arms of Nassau County, the claims against them are dismissed. See, e.g.,

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Schweitzer v. Crofton, 935 F. Supp. 2d 527, 551 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (dismissing § 1983 claims

because DSS is not a suable entity); Davis, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 477 (same as to police department).

2. Absolute Immunity: DA Singas & ADA Mauri

The County Defendants argue that DA Singas and ADA Mauri are absolutely immune from

liability because each of their actions were in made their roles as prosecutors and advocates, not

as investigators. County Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment

(“Cnty. Defs. Mem.”), ECF 70, at 19-20. Prosecutors performing duties related to their

prosecutorial function are protected from liability under Section 1983 and state law by absolute

immunity. Shumeli v. City of New York, 424 F.3d 231, 237-38 (2d Cir. 2005); accord Buckley v.

Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 260 (1993). “[T]he prosecutor has absolute immunity for the initiation

and conduct of a prosecution ‘unless [he] proceeds in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Id.

(quoting Barr v. Abrams, 810 F.2d 358, 361 (2d Cir. 1987). In determining whether absolute

immunity applies, Courts must take a “functional approach,” examining “the nature of the function

performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.” Simon v. City of New York, 727 F.3d

167, 171 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 1934 (2014) (citations omitted).

Given the Court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims on the merits, infra, the Court need not

independently address Defendants’ absolute immunity arguments.

3. Federal and State False Arrest and Imprisonment Claims

The County Defendants contend that probable cause to arrest Plaintiff existed based only

on Detective Salazar’s forensic interviews of T.A. and her sisters, notwithstanding any medical

evidence. Cnty. Defs. Mem. at 4-5; Cnty. Defs. Reply at 1-4. Plaintiff responds that T.A.’s and

her sisters’ statements are hearsay and are therefore cannot be relied upon for the purposes of this

motion. Plaintiff’s Opposition to the County Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.

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Cnty. Opp.”), ECF 71, at 10. Plaintiff argues that the charges against him “required medical and

other evidence” to corroborate T.A.’s testimony. Id. at 10-11. Moreover, Plaintiff argues that the

evidence prosecutors did rely on was problematic. Plaintiff proffers expert witness testimony by

Dr. Ellen Treacy (“Dr. Treacy”) stating that the forensic interviews of the child witnesses were

“faulty” and that the County Defendants engaged in “confirmatory bias.” Id. at 12.

a. Applicable Law

Section 1983 provides liability against state and local actors for deprivation, under the color

of state law, “of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the constitution.” 42 U.S.C. §

1983. Federal false arrest claims derive from the Fourth Amendment right to be free from

unreasonable seizures – including the right to be free from arrest without probable cause. See

Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 151 (2d Cir. 2006).

The elements of a false arrest claim under the Fourth Amendment are “substantially the

same” as the elements for false arrest under New York law. Ashley v. City of New York, 992 F.3d

128, 136 (2d Cir. 2021). A plaintiff claiming false arrest or false imprisonment under New York

law must show that “(1) the defendant intended to confine [the plaintiff], (2) the plaintiff was

conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement and (4) the

confinement was not otherwise privileged.” Id.; accord Williams v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.

(Amtrak), 830 F. App’x 46, 47 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Wright v. Musanti, 887 F.3d 577, 587 (2d

Cir. 2018)).

“[P]robable cause is an absolute defense to a false arrest claim.” Jaegly, 439 F.3d at 152;

accord McCullough v. Graves, 24-CV-506, 2024 WL 4615821, at *2 (2d Cir. Oct. 30, 2024)

(“Because probable cause to arrest constitutes justification, there can be no claim for false arrest

where the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff.”). If, as is the case here, the

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arrest “is not made pursuant to a judicial warrant, the defendant . . . bears the burden of proving

probable cause as an affirmative defense.” Dickerson v. Napolitano, 604 F.3d 732, 751 (2d Cir.

2010). “The question of whether or not probable cause existed may be determinable as a matter

of law if there is no dispute as to the pertinent events and the knowledge of the officers.” Weyant

v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted); see also Jenkins v. City of N.Y., 478

F.3d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 2007) (“summary judgment dismissing a plaintiff’s false arrest claim is

appropriate if the undisputed facts indicate that the arresting officer’s probable cause determination

was objectively reasonable.”); Niles v. O’Donnell, 17-CV-1437 (LTS) (BCM), 2019 WL 1411068,

at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2019) (finding “no difficulty concluding” that defendants had probable

cause to arrest the plaintiff based on a potential victim’s statements and therefore dismissing false

arrest claim).

Probable cause exists when a law enforcement officer has “knowledge or reasonably

trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of

reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a

crime.” Hernandez v. United States, 939 F.3d 191, 199 (2d Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). “To

determine the existence of probable cause, a court considers the totality of the circumstances based

on a full sense of the evidence that led the officer to believe that there was probable cause to make

an arrest.” Guan v. City of New York, 37 F.4th 797, 804 (2d Cir. 2022) (citing Jenkins, 478 F.3d

at 90, and Stansbury v. Wertman, 721 F.3d 84, 93 (2d Cir. 2013)). “The court considers those facts

available to the officer at the time of the arrest and immediately before it.” Id. (citations omitted).

“Absent circumstances that raise doubts as to the victim’s veracity, a victim’s identification is

typically sufficient to provide probable cause.” Stansbury, 721 F.3d at 90 (citations omitted).

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b. Available Evidence: Witness Interviews

Plaintiff’s contention that video interviews of the child witnesses and the statements

contained therein are inadmissible hearsay is without merit. See Pl. Cnty. Opp. at 4, 10. The

videos and the statements contained therein are not hearsay because they not offered to prove that

Plaintiff committed the crimes he was accused of. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (defining hearsay as

a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, “offer[ed]

in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”). Rather, the statements are offered to show

the information available to the arresting officers when deciding to arrest Plaintiff. Thus, they are

offered to show the effect on the listener and are excepted from the rule against hearsay. See id.

advisory committee note; see also United States v. Dupree, 706 F.3d 131, 136 (2d Cir. 2013) (“a

statement offered to show its effect on the listener is not hearsay.”). “Such evidence is properly

before a fact finder charged with determining whether, in light of the then-available information,

a police officer had probable cause.” Tuccio v. Papstein, 307 F. App’x 545, 547 (2d Cir. 2009)

(citing Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir. 2002) (“When determining whether

probable cause exists courts must consider those facts available to the officer at the time of the

arrest and immediately before it.” (internal quotations omitted))); see also Golden v. City of New

York, 418 F. Supp. 2d 226, 233 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (witness statements leading to plaintiff’s arrest

are admissible where “offered to show the information [arresting officer] had when he arrested the

plaintiff” which “may also be viewed as showing [officer’s] state of mind at the time of the

arrest.”).

The information the County Defendants obtained is therefore properly before the Court

and will be considered for its effect on the probable cause determination.

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c. Probable Cause

At the heart of Plaintiff’s false arrest and imprisonment claim is the allegation that officers

lacked probable cause to arrest him. To the contrary, County Defendants argue that T.A.’s

statements, as corroborated by her sisters, created probable cause. Cnty Defs’ Mem. at 4. In

opposition, Plaintiff asserts that accusations of sexual assault must be corroborated with “medical

and other evidence,” “especially since [T.A.’s] assertions were drawn into question as a result of

her psychiatric delusions.” Pl. Cnty. Opp. at 11.

“‘[A]bsent circumstances that raise doubt as to the victim’s veracity,’ a victim’s report of

a crime is generally enough, by itself, to establish probable cause.” Koester v. Lanfranchi, 288 F.

App’x 764, 766 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Singer v. Fulton Cnty. Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir.

1995)); accord Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2000) (“police officers, when

making a probable cause determination, are entitled to rely on the victim’s allegations that a crime

has been committed.”). There is no genuine dispute that T.A. identified Plaintiff as having raped

her on multiple occasions. There is also no genuine dispute that T.A.’s sisters, O.A. and B.A.,

reported that T.A. had told them Plaintiff solicited oral sex from her, and that O.A. witnessed T.A.

and Plaintiff kissing. These statements are sufficient to justify Plaintiff’s arrest. See Stansbury,

721 F.3d at 90 (2d Cir. 2013).

Plaintiff claims that T.A. “suffer[ed] from severe mental health issues” and experienced

“psychiatric delusions,” which raise doubt as to the veracity of her accusations. Pl. Cnty. Opp. at

11. However, Defendants assert, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that Defendants were not in

possession of the T.A.’s medical records until May 2019 – well after Plaintiff’s arrest and

indictment. See Pl. Cnty. 56.1 at ¶ 69. Likewise, Plaintiff does not dispute that ADAs Bresnahan

and Mauri were not aware of T.A.’s psychiatric trauma until June 26, 2019. Id. ¶¶ 70-71; Michelen

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Decl. Ex. N at 4. Shortly thereafter, on August 1, 20219, the indictment against Plaintiff was

dismissed. Id. ¶ 77. Evidence of the child’s psychiatric issues, unavailable to the arresting officer

at the time of the challenged arrest is irrelevant to the determination of whether probable cause

existed. See, e.g., Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004) (“Whether probable cause exists

depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer

at the time of arrest.”); Dallas v. Goldberg, 143 F. Supp. 2d 312, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“evidence

discovered after the arrest is not admissible with respect to the question of whether there was

probable cause.”). Plaintiff has presented the Court with no other information about T.A. or her

accusations that was known to Defendants at the time of Plaintiff’s arrest that would raise any

doubt as to her reliability. Thus, Defendants had probable cause.

Plaintiff’s argument that for probable cause to exist in sexual abuse cases “medical and

other evidence” must corroborate a victim’s statements is lacking in legal support. See Pl. Cnty.

Opp. at 11. At common law, corroboration was not required in prosecutions for rape or other

sexual offense cases. 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 2061 (Chadbourne rev. 1978). Many states,

including New York, gradually required corroboration of a victim’s testimony. However, New

York and all other states abolished this requirement decades ago. See People v. Fuller, 50 N.Y.2d

628, 631 (1980) (“We hold that, in the absence of any statutory requirement for corroboration,

consonant with the reflection of social attitudes in prevailing legislative policy, the sworn

testimony of a child complainant under the age of 12 need not be corroborated in a prosecution for

her forcible rape.”). Plaintiff’s argument is rooted in an antiquated concept of the law.

Plaintiff argues that probable cause is questionable because, according to Plaintiff’s expert

witness Dr. Treacy, Defendants’ “entire interview process, techniques, and practice was faulty,

such that the County Defendants engaged in ‘confirmatory bias’ which would not have occurred

15

if correct techniques were employed.” Pl. Cnty. Opp. at 12. Dr. Treacy opines that Defendants’

investigation diverged from best practices in that the County Defendants failed to integrate

“alternative hypotheses or rival explanations” into the forensic interviews of T.A. and her sisters

which “caused a taint of the entire investigation.” Affidavit of Dr. Treacy (“Dr. Treacy Aff.”), Pl.

Cnty. Opp Ex. 4, ECF 71-4, at ¶ 4. This opinion does not change the Court’s analysis. It is well

established that failure to follow “best practices” does not vitiate the existence of probable cause.

Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 396 (2d Cir. 2006). “‘Although a better procedure may [be] for

the officers to investigate the plaintiff’s version of events more completely, the arresting officer

does not have to prove plaintiff’s version wrong before arresting him. Nor does it matter that an

investigation might have cast doubt upon the basis for the arrest.’” Id. (quoting Curley v. Village

of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 2001)). The function of the police is to apprehend a suspect,

“not to finally determine guilt through a weight of the evidence.” Id. (quoting Krause v. Bennett,

887 F.2d 362, 372 (2d Cir. 1989)). Accordingly, none of Dr. Treacy’s critiques rebut the

presumption that Plaintiff’s arrest was supported by probable cause.4 See Hayes v. City of New

York, 12-CV-4370 (LAK), 2014 WL 4626071, at *10-11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2014) (finding no

error in defendant’s probable cause finding where, despite purportedly inadequate investigation,

there was probable cause for the arrest); see also Gonzalez v. Hahl, 17-CV-373 (NAM) (ML),

2020 WL 1530741, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2020), aff’d, 850 F. App’x 127 (2d Cir. 2021);

McGrier v. City of New York, 16-CV-5667 (VEC), 2019 WL 1115053, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11,

2019), aff’d, 849 F. App’x 268 (2d Cir. 2021).

4 Moreover, “the existence of probable cause is a question of law that is not properly the subject of expert testimony.”

Rizzo v. Edison, Inc., 172 F. App’x 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2006). However, expert testimony regarding whether a defendant

deviated from best practices of police investigations, as Dr. Treacy offers here, may be admissible to assist the trier of

fact. Restivo v. Hessemann, 846 F.3d 547, 580 (2d Cir. 2017). In this regard, nothing in Dr. Treacy’s report raises

doubts as to its existence in this case.

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For these reasons, no reasonable juror could find that Plaintiff’s arrest lacked probable

cause. The County Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted as to Plaintiff’s federal

and state-law false arrest claims.

4. Federal and State Malicious Prosecution Claims

The County Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution must be

dismissed because Detective Salazar did not initiate the prosecution against Plaintiff, probable

cause did not dissipate before commencing the prosecution, and because there was no evidence of

malice. Cnty. Defs. Mem. at 7-9. Plaintiff responds that Detective Salazar was centrally involved

in initiating the prosecution and that the County Defendants’ attempt to gather evidence, while

failing to investigate T.A.’s psychiatric history, is evidence of malice. Pl. Cnty. Opp. at 15-18.

a. Applicable Law

To establish a claim for malicious prosecution under New York law, plaintiff must show

“(1) that the defendant initiated a prosecution against the plaintiff, (2) that the defendant lacked

probable cause to believe the proceeding could succeed, (3) that the defendant acted with malice,

and (4) that the prosecution was terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.” Rohman v. New York City

Transit Auth. (NYCTA), 215 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). As with false arrest,

claims for malicious prosecution under both New York Law and the Fourth Amendment are nearly

identical, except that plaintiff must show, in addition, “that there was [] a sufficient post-

arraignment liberty restraint to implicate the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights.” Id.

b. Application

The County Defendants concede that dismissal of the prosecution without a conviction

meets the fourth element: the prosecution was terminated in Plaintiff’s favor. County Defendants’

Reply (“Cnty. Defs. Reply.”), ECF 72, at 9 (citing Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 49 (2022)).

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Further, Plaintiff's detention was more than an adequate “deprivation of liberty . . . pursuant to

legal process” for Fourth Amendment purposes. Singer, 63 F.3d at 117 (citations omitted). The

remaining issues before the court are whether the County Defendants initiated a prosecution

against Plaintiff, whether probable cause existed to commence the prosecution, and whether the

decision to charge Plaintiff was motivated by malice.

As with a claim for false arrest, probable cause is a complete defense to a claim for

malicious prosecution. Manganiello v. City of New York, 612 F.3d 149, 161-62 (2d Cir. 2010).

However, “The probable cause standard in the malicious prosecution context is slightly higher

than the standard for false arrest cases.” Stansbury, 721 F.3d at 95. In this context, the

determination of probable cause means “probable cause to believe that [the prosecution] could

succeed.” Boyd v. City of New York, 336 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2003). That is, if the “facts and

circumstances . . . would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe the plaintiff guilty,” then

sufficient probable cause exists. Frost, 980 F.3d at 243. Whereas courts in the false arrest context

are limited to considering only the facts leading up to the arrest in determining whether probable

cause exists, Marcavage v. City of New York, 689 F.3d 98, 109 (2d Cir. 2012), in a malicious

prosecution action, “probable cause is measured as of the time the judicial proceeding is

commenced,” such as when plaintiff is arraigned, Mejia v. City of New York, 119 F. Supp. 2d 232,

254 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). The evidence supporting probable cause in a malicious prosecution case

must be admissible because a prosecution would not likely succeed based on inadmissible

evidence. See Walker v. Carrozzo, 664 F. Supp. 3d 490, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (“[I]n instances

where evidence ‘would clearly not be admissible,’ ‘there would be no probable cause to believe

that the prosecution could succeed.’” (quoting Boyd, 336 F.3d at 77)).

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“Where, as here, a grand jury indicted the plaintiff on the relevant criminal charge, New

York law creates a presumption of probable cause . . . .” Bermudez v. City of New York, 790 F.3d

368, 377 (2d Cir. 2015). In assessing the presumption of probable cause in “a malicious

prosecution claim under New York law, courts ‘may not weigh the evidence upon which the police

acted or which was before the Grand Jury after the indictment has issued.’” Debrosse v. City of

New York, 739 F. App’x 48, 50 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Colon v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 78,

83 (1983)). Instead, the presumption of probable cause “can only be overcome by evidence that

the indictment was the product of fraud, perjury, the suppression of evidence by the police, or other

police conduct undertaken in bad faith.” Bermudez, 790 F.3d at 377 (citations omitted). “[I]t is

the plaintiff who bears the burden of proof in rebutting the presumption of probable cause that

arises from the indictment.” Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63, 73 (2d Cir. 2003).

Plaintiff contends that the grand jury indictment was “manipulated” through the

presentation of “faulty” evidence, thus implying that the indictment was procured in bad faith. See

Pl. Cnty. Opp. at 3, 8. Plaintiff otherwise relies upon the arguments he raised in connection to

probable cause for Plaintiff’s arrest. Even accepting those arguments, they are insufficient to

defeat the presumption of probable cause for the purpose of his malicious prosecution claim. See

Soto v. City of New York, 132 F. Supp. 3d 424, 456 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing Ramashwar v. City of

New York, 231 F. App’x 26, 27 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Banno v. City of New York, 06-CV-2270

(RJS), 2015 WL 845709, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2015) (finding that plaintiff did not overcome

the presumption where he “merely assert[ed] that for the same reason[s] there [was] a question of

fact as to probable cause for the false arrest claim”).

Plaintiff has failed to adduce any evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude

that the indictment was procured through fraud, perjury, or other bad faith. Assuming for the sake

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of argument that Heffernan’s testimony and physical examination were found—approximately a

year later—to be incorrect is insufficient: simply raising doubts about probable cause is not

enough. See Ramashwar, 231 F. App’x at 27 (Plaintiff “raised some questions of fact” that

“merely tend[ed] to show the absence of probable cause.”). The same is true of Plaintiff’s

argument that the County Defendants relied on Heffernan’s report without immediately enlisting

a medical doctor to review it. See Pl. Cnty. Opp. at 6. Plaintiff cannot overcome the presumption

of probable cause by claiming the County Defendants failed to follow “best practices” or exhaust

every angle of the case. Id.; see, e.g., Dukes v. City of New York, 879 F. Supp. 335, 343 (S.D.N.Y.

1995) (finding that plaintiff could not overcome the presumption by “merely claim[ing] that [the

officer] failed to interview witnesses and to discover additional evidence”); Colon, 60 N.Y.2d at

83 (defendants’ “failure to pursue the investigation” and instead relying on circumstantial evidence

“is not the equivalent of fraud or the suppression of evidence.”).

Moreover, Plaintiff’s contention that ADA Mauri admitted Heffernan’s conclusions were

“incorrect” mischaracterizes the testimony. See Pl. Cnty. Opp. at 12. Rather, ADA Mauri testified

that Dr. Canter found “there was a difference of opinion from that of Barbara Heffernan.” Mauri

Dep. at 88:1-4. A difference of opinion between witnesses cannot overcome the presumption of

probable cause. Ramashwar v. Espinoza, 05-CV-2021 (AJP), 2006 WL 23481, at *8 (S.D.N.Y.

Jan. 5, 2006) (“Conflicting testimony between witnesses at the criminal trial is not enough to rebut

the presumption of probable cause.”); see also DiMascio v. City of Albany, 93-CV-0452 (TJM),

1999 WL 244648, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1999) (“A mere conflict between witness’ trial

testimony alone is insufficient to suggest fraud, perjury or the withholding of evidence.”).

Having failed to present more than “mere conjecture and surmise that his indictment was

procured as a result of conduct undertaken by the defendants in bad faith,” Savino, 331 F.3d at 72,

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Plaintiff has not shown the County Defendants lacked probable cause. Accordingly, the County

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment based on the existence of probable cause, and the

Court need not examine the other elements of Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claims.

Thus, Plaintiff’s federal and state-law malicious prosecution claims are dismissed.

5. Federal and State Abuse of Process Claims

The County Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims for abuse of process must be dismissed

because Plaintiff has not, and cannot, prove County Defendants acted with malice or with any

collateral objective. Cnty. Defs. Mem. at 6. Plaintiff responds by arguing that a “plethora of

evidence” shows “misconduct” by the County Defendants which “proves their intention was to

protect their employment, prevent personal liability, and deny Plaintiff his rights and entitlements”

by pursuing charges against him which were “faulty, infirm and based upon outrageous practices

and policies to harm the Plaintiff.” Pl. Cnty. Opp. at 13.

a. Applicable Law

“To prove abuse of process, plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) employ[ed] regularly

issued legal process to compel performance or forbearance of some act (2) with intent to do harm

without excuse of justification, and (3) in order to obtain a collateral objective that is outside the

legitimate ends of the process.” Hernandez v. United States, 939 F.3d 191, 204 (2d Cir. 2019)

(citations omitted). “The crux of a malicious abuse of process claim is the collateral objective

element.” Kraft v. City of New York, 696 F. Supp. 2d 403, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d, 441 F.

App’x 24 (2d Cir. 2011). To establish that element, a plaintiff must show that the defendant “aimed

to achieve a collateral purpose beyond or in addition to his criminal prosecution.” Savino, 331

F.3d at 77; accord Kanciper v. Lato, 989 F. Supp. 2d 216, 237 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). “A malicious

abuse of process claim thus requires an ulterior purpose such as the infliction of economic harm,

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extortion, blackmail, or retribution.” Hoyos v. City of New York, 999 F. Supp. 2d 375, 391

(E.D.N.Y. 2013). To survive a motion for summary judgment on this claim the Court must find,

viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, that the facts suggest the County

Defendants misused process for an improper purpose.

While the Second Circuit has not resolved whether “probable cause is a complete defense

to an abuse-of-process claim under New York law,” Mangino v. Inc. Vill. of Patchogue, 808 F.3d

951, 958-59 (2d Cir. 2015), the Circuit has acknowledged “confusion” regarding this issue and has

declined to resolve a split among the district courts. 5 Id. “Courts that have concluded that the

existence of probable cause is not necessarily a complete defense to an abuse-of-process claim

have required plaintiffs in such situations to ‘demonstrate the elements of abuse of process’

without ‘relying on any inference from a [purported] lack of probable cause.’” Carwell v. City of

New York, 21-CV-480 (VEC), 2023 WL 419182, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2023) (quoting Rao,

20187 WL 1582289, at *10).

b. Application

As an initial matter, the Second Circuit has recognized that an arrest is a clear employment

of the criminal process for the purposes of an abuse of process claim. See, e.g. Weiss v. Hunna,

312 F.2d 711, 716 (2d Cir. 1963); Cook v Sheldon, 41 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1994). So too is an

indictment. See Savino, 331 F.3d at 77.

5 Compare, e.g., Rao v. City of New York, 14-CV-7422 (RRM) (LB), 2018 WL 1582289, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. March

29, 2018) (finding probable cause is not an “absolute defense” to abuse of process, but “functions as a defense when

the only evidence of an improper purpose is the alleged lack of probable cause, and the court finds that there was, in

fact, probable cause.”); with Hurley v. Town of Southampton, 17-CV-5543 (JS) (AKT), 2018 WL 3941944, at *16

(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2018), report and recommendation adopted (Sept. 21, 2018) (“while the law is not entirely

settled on this point, the weight of authority holds that the presence of probable cause negates a claim for abuse of

criminal process.”); and with Hickey v. City of N.Y., 01-CV-6506 (GEL), 2004 WL 2724079, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.

29, 2004) (“the existence of probable cause offers a complete defense to [abuse of process].”), aff’d, 173 F. App’x

893 (2d Cir. 2006); and with Ying Li v. City of N.Y., 246 F. Supp. 3d 578, 618 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (“the Second Circuit

has long recognized that probable cause is not a complete defense to malicious abuse of process.”).

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Having determined that probable cause exists in this case, the next question before the

Court is whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to County Defendants’ alleged intent

to harm Plaintiff and a collateral objective. See Mangino v. Inc. Vill. of Patchogue, 814 F. Supp.

2d 242, 249 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“If plaintiff can demonstrate the elements of abuse of process –

including intent to harm and a collateral objective – without relying on an inference from a lack of

probable cause, then such a claim can survive even with probable cause.”).

Here, Plaintiff claims the County Defendants’ improper purpose was to avoid personal

liability and to fabricate a charge to save their own employment. Pl. Cnty. Opp. at 13-14. Plaintiff

contends that the County Defendants’ investigation of the charges against him was pursued “in a

desperate effort to obtain evidence [the County Defendants] never had,” which “proves their

collateral objective in seeking to harm the Plaintiff.” Id. at 14.

Courts have permitted abuse of process claims to go forward where the defendant allegedly

fabricated charges to shield themselves from liability or save one’s own employment. See, e.g.,

Crockett v. City of New York, 11-CV-4378 (PKC), 2015 WL 5719737, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29,

2015); Besedin v. Cnty. of Nassau, 18-CV-00819 (NRM) (ST), 2024 WL 4225956, at *16

(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2024); Hoyos, 999 F. Supp. 2d at 391. However, Plaintiff has provided no

evidence in support of these assertions. Plaintiff cites to numerous cases in which courts found

there was a genuine issue of material fact as to defendants’ collateral purpose. In those cases,

defendants’ misconduct before the employment of the criminal process provided circumstantial

evidence to support the asserted collateral purpose. For example, in Crockett, the court found there

was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the collateral purpose of concealing the

defendant-officers’ misconduct was to escape employment repercussions and to make it more

difficult for plaintiff to pursue legal action. Crockett, 2015 WL 5719737, at *11. In that case, it

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was undisputed that the defendant-officer shot plaintiff twice before taking him into custody. Id.

at *1-2. In Gabilly v. City of New York, there was a genuine issue of material fact of whether

defendants used excessive force when arresting plaintiff and whether they had probable cause to

accuse him of resisting arrest. Gabilly, 19-CV-11884 (RA), 2021 WL 3667981, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y.

Aug. 17, 2021). These circumstances in turn raised a question of fact regarding whether defendants

pursued charges against plaintiff for the collateral purpose of covering up the use of excessive

force. Id. The same circumstances occurred in Besedin: plaintiff’s abuse of process claims were

permitted to proceed where officers used excessive force to arrest plaintiff and probable cause was

genuinely disputed. Besedin, 2024 WL 4225956 at *15-16. Likewise, in Hernandez v. Wells,

plaintiff’s claim for abuse of process was allowed to proceed to a jury where defendant’s arrest of

plaintiff “may have violated [Bureau of Prisons] rules,” defendant was under a warning that

violation of such rules would result in his termination, and probable cause was not conclusively

established, because the combination of factors “g[ave] rise to a reasonable inference” that

defendant acted with a collateral purpose. Hernandez, 01-CV-4376 (MBM), 2003 WL 22771982,

at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2003).

Here, Plaintiff has provided no evidence that the County Defendants had a collateral

objective in effectuating his arrest and indictment or investigating the allegations against him. Nor

does anything in the record raise an inference that the County Defendants acted for any collateral

purpose. Plaintiff contends the County Defendants acted to “cover up their mistakes, protect their

jobs and avoid this lawsuit and avoid liability,” but does not explain what those mistakes are and

how such actions would put County Defendants’ jobs at risk or render them personally liable. Pl.

Cnty. Opp. at 16. Plaintiff’s claim that the County Defendants’ investigation “proves their

24

collateral objective” is merely conclusory. See id. at 14. None of the County Defendants’ actions

raise a reasonable inference they acted with a collateral purpose.

Accordingly, the County Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted as to

Plaintiff’s federal and state-law abuse of process claims.

6. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The County Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional

distress (“IIED”) must be dismissed because Plaintiff cannot show the County Defendants’

conduct was sufficiently “extreme and outrageous,” Cnty. Defs. Mem. at 23, and because public

policy bars such claims, id. at 24. Plaintiff responds that, based on the facts surrounding the

investigation and prosecution, “it is obvious that the conduct of the County Defendants was

intentional and designed to cause Plaintiff severe emotional distress.” Pl. Cnty. Opp. at 24.

“To prevail on a claim for IIED, a plaintiff must establish: (1) extreme and outrageous

conduct; (2) intent to cause, or reckless disregard of a substantial probability of causing, severe

emotional distress; (3) a causal connection between the conduct and the injury; and (4) severe

emotional distress.” Frederique v. Cnty. of Nassau, 168 F. Supp. 3d 455, 483 (E.D.N.Y. 2016)

(citing Stuto v. Fleishman, 164 F.3d 820, 827 (2d Cir.1999)).

Because this Court has found that the County Defendants’ conduct in the course of

Plaintiff’s arrest and prosecution was lawful, Plaintiff’s claim fails. The conduct complained of is

not extreme or outrageous as a matter of law. See Csoka v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 85 F. Supp. 2d 117,

123 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (“A lawful arrest cannot support a claim for intentional or negligent infliction

of emotional distress.”). Furthermore, “Pursuant to New York law, public policy bars claims for

intentional infliction of emotional distress against a governmental entity.” Frederique, 168 F.

Supp. 3d at 483-84.

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Plaintiff’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress are therefore dismissed

against the County Defendants.

7. Defamation

Plaintiff has brought two causes of action for defamation of character against the County

Defendants. Although the County Defendants seek dismissal on all claims, they make no

substantive argument as to Plaintiff’s defamation claims beyond including a header in their

memorandum of law. See Cnty. Defs. Mem. at 23. Nevertheless, courts may dismiss a claim as

time-barred sua sponte where, as here, it is clear the appliable statute of limitations has run. See,

e.g., Leonhard v. United States, 633 F.2d 599, 609 n.11 (2d Cir. 1980) (courts may dismiss on

statute of limitations grounds sua sponte); Baker v. Cuomo, 58 F.3d 814, 819 (2d Cir. 1995), cert

denied sub nom., Pataki v. Baker, 516 U.S. 980, vacated on other grounds, 85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir.

1996) (en banc) (“[Sua sponte dismissal] is . . . appropriate if it appears from the face of the

complaint that the action is barred, for example by expiration of the statute of limitations.”).

Under New York law, the statute of limitations for a defamation claim is one year. N.Y.

C.P.L.R. § 215(3). In determining when the statute of limitations begins to run on a defamation

claim, New York applies the single publication rule: the statute of limitation begins to accrue at

the time of the first publication. Van Buskirk v. The New York Times Co., 325 F.3d 87, 89 (2d Cir.

2003). Plaintiff filed this action on July 31, 2020. See Compl. Although the precise defamatory

action alleged is somewhat unclear, the fulcrum of Plaintiff’s claims stems from his arrest and

indictment. Plaintiff was arrested on January 25, 2018, and indicted on March 1, 2018. Thus, the

statute of limitations period on Plaintiff’s defamation claims ended on March 1, 2019.

Consequently, Plaintiff’s claim is untimely and is therefore dismissed.

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8. Monell Liability

Having dismissed Plaintiff’s underlying claims for constitutional violations, any claims

against the defendant Nassau County are also dismissed. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475

U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (“if [individual defendant] inflicted no constitutional injury on [plaintiff], it

is inconceivable that [the municipal defendant] could be liable”); Torraco v. Port Auth. of N.Y.

and N.J., 615, F.3d 129, 140 (2d Cir. 2010); Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 748-49 (2d Cir.

2004).

B. Medical Center’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiff brings three causes of action against Defendant Medical Center: false

imprisonment for violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and a claim

for legal fees under Section 1988. See Compl. ¶¶ 54, 179. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Medical

Center and its employees violated his constitutional rights by submitting false reports of child

sexual abuse, leading to Plaintiff’s arrest and indictment.6

The facts giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Medical Center are identical

to those against the County Defendants. Therefore, having found probable cause existed for

Plaintiff’s arrest and imprisonment, and that no underlying constitutional violation occurred,

Plaintiff’s various Section 1983 claims against Defendant Medical Center are dismissed. See

Section A.7 supra.7 Further, Plaintiff’s claims for attorney fees under Section 1988 fail, as this

6 Nassau County Medical Center is “part of the Nassau Health Care Corporation which is a public benefit Corporation

pursuant to the Laws for the State of New York.” Med. Ctr. Answer ¶ 14, ECF 13. A public benefit corporation is

not a municipal agency, but rather a “separate, suable entity.” Harris v. Viau, 17-CV-9746 (KMK), 2019 WL 133162,

at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2019). Therefore, the Medical Center and its employees are state actors for the purposes of

Section 1983. See Rookard v. Health and Hosps. Corp., 710 F.2d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1983); N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 1261

(16) (defining “state agency” to include any “public benefit corporation . . . of the state”).

7 Although Plaintiff names the Medical Center’s employees, “John Doe and Jane Doe Doctor(s) and Sane Nurse(s)”,

as individual defendants, he does not bring any claims against them. See generally, Compl.

27

section does not create a separate cause of action. Weiss v. Violet Realty, Inc., 150 F. App’x 119,

120 (2d Cir. 2005).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed, the County Defendants and Defendant Medical Center are grated

summary judgment, and the case is dismissed in its entirety.

SO ORDERED.

/s/

ORELIA E. MERCHANT

United States District Judge

February 24, 2025

Brooklyn, New York

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