Valley v. Vandergriff

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

ROBERT VALLEY, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 4:24 CV 608 JMB

)

DAVID VANDERGRIFF and ANDREW )

BAILEY, )

)

Respondents. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Robert Valley’s petition for a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of

the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons

set forth below, the petition is DENIED. In addition, Petitioner’s Motion for Appointment of

Counsel (Doc. 8) is DENIED.

I. Procedural Background

Petitioner is held by the Missouri Department of Corrections pursuant to the judgment

and sentence of the Circuit Court of Iron County, Missouri. In 2016, a jury convicted him of

first-degree assault and armed criminal action and he was sentenced to life and 30 years’

imprisonment, respectively, to be served consecutively. (Doc. 12-12, p. 2). On February 13,

2018, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence (Doc. 12-5).

Following an evidentiary hearing (Doc. 12-8), Petitioner’s motion for postconviction relief

pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 29.15 was denied by the trial court (Doc. 12-9, p. 62-

69). On November 14, 2023, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of

postconviction relief (Doc. 12-12). Petitioner timely filed his § 2254 petition on April 29, 2024

(Doc. 1).1 He asserts seven grounds for relief related to evidentiary rulings and ineffective

assistance of counsel. Respondent filed a response in opposition (Doc. 12) to which Petitioner

has not replied, rendering this matter fully briefed.

Petitioner seeks relief from his current and future sentences. Therefore, pursuant to Rule

2(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 and 2255 Cases, the Missouri Attorney General,

Andrew Bailey, is hereby ADDED as a Respondent.

II. Factual Background

Petitioner does not challenge the factual findings of the state courts and they are

presumed to be correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

The evidence at trial revealed that Petitioner shot his wife in the back with a shotgun,

severely injuring her. He fled the scene and was apprehended the next day. At trial, he argued

that the shooting was accidental.

III. Legal Standards

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d), allows for habeas relief in Federal court only if the state court’s determination:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established law if “it

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases, or if it

confronts a set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme

Court] but reaches a different result.” Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). “The state

1 Pages 19 and 20 of the Petition, as paginated by Petitioner, are transposed (Doc. 1-1, pp. 6-7).

court need not cite or even be aware of the governing Supreme Court cases, ‘so long as neither

the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.’” Brown v. Luebbers,

371 F.3d 458, 461 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002)). “In the

‘contrary to’ analysis of the state court’s decision, [the federal court’s] focus is on the result and

any reasoning that the court may have given; the absence of reasoning is not a barrier to a denial

of relief.” Id.

A decision involves an “unreasonable application” of clearly established law if “the state

court applies [the Supreme Court’s] precedents to the facts in an objectively unreasonable

manner,” Brown, 544 U.S. at 141; Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000), or “if the state

court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new

context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new

context where it should apply.” Id. at 406. “Federal habeas relief is warranted only when the

refusal was ‘objectively unreasonable,’ not when it was merely erroneous or incorrect.” Carter

v. Kemna, 255 F.3d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 410–11).

When reviewing whether a state court decision involves an “unreasonable determination

of the facts,” state court findings of “basic, primary, or historical facts” are presumed correct

unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption with clear and convincing evidence. Collier v.

Norris, 485 F.3d 415, 423 (8th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Erroneous

findings of fact by the state courts do not ensure the grant of habeas relief. Rather, the

determination of these facts must be unreasonable in light of the evidence of record. Id.

To prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Petitioner must show that his

attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that he was

prejudiced thereby. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). With respect to the

first Strickland prong, there is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide

range of professionally reasonable assistance. Id. at 689. Thus, “counsel should be strongly

presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise

of reasonable professional judgment,” and the “burden to show that counsel’s performance was

deficient rests squarely on the defendant.” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 22–23 (2013) (quotation

marks and citation omitted). Courts “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct

falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must

overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be

considered sound trial strategy.’” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; see also Abernathy v. Hobbs, 748

F.3d 813, 816 (8th Cir. 2014) (reviewing court must refrain “from engaging in hindsight or

second-guessing of trial counsel’s strategic decisions.”) (citation omitted)).

To establish the “prejudice” prong, the movant must show “that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “Merely showing a conceivable effect is not

enough; a reasonable probability is one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”

Paulson v. Newton Corr. Facility, 773 F.3d 901, 904 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Although

Strickland requires a showing of both deficient performance and prejudice, a “finding that no

prejudice exists is sufficient to conclude that counsel was not constitutionally ineffective —

[courts] need not first make a determination regarding deficiency.” Holder v. United States, 721

F.3d 979, 987 (8th Cir. 2013).

“Taken together, AEDPA and Strickland establish a ‘doubly deferential standard’ of

review.” Williams v. Roper, 695 F.3d 825, 831 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Cullen v. Pinholster,

563 U.S. 170, 202 (2011)).

First, under Strickland, the state court must make a predictive judgment

about the effect of the alleged deficiencies of counsel on the outcome of the trial,

focusing on whether it is “reasonably likely” that the result would have been

different absent the errors. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. . . . To satisfy Strickland,

the likelihood of a different result must be “substantial, not just conceivable.” Id.

Under AEDPA, [federal courts] must then give substantial deference to the state

court’s predictive judgment. So long as the state court’s decision was not

“contrary to” clearly established law, the remaining question under the

“unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d) is whether the state court’s

determination under the Strickland standard is unreasonable, not merely whether

it is incorrect. [Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112, 101], 131 S. Ct. 770,

792, 785 (2011). This standard was meant to be difficult to meet, and “even a

strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was

unreasonable.” Id. at [102].

Williams, 695 F.3d at 831–32. “When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel’s

actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel

satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105. Furthermore, a state

court’s findings of fact made in the course of deciding a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel are presumed to be correct. Odem v. Hopkins, 382 F.3d 846, 849 (8th Cir. 2004).

IV. Discussion

Petitioner seeks appointment of counsel. Petitioner has neither a Constitutional nor

statutory right to appointment of counsel. McCall v. Benson, 114 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir. 1997).

Where an evidentiary hearing is not required, appointment of counsel is discretionary. See Rules

6(a) and 8(c), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States Courts. No evidentiary

hearing has been requested and such a hearing is not warranted in this case. See 28 U.S.C.

2254(e)(2). A court may nonetheless appoint counsel if “the interest of justice so require” in §

2254 proceedings. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A9(a)(2); Martin v. Fayram, 849 F.3d 691, 699 (8th Cir.

2017). In determining whether to appoint counsel, the Court “should first determine whether the

petitioner has presented a nonfrivolous claim and then should consider the legal complexity of

the case, the factual complexity of the case, and the petitioner’s ability to investigate and present

his claims, along with any other relevant factors.” Id. at 699 (quotation marks, editing marks,

and citation omitted); Hoggard v. Purkett, 29 F.3d 469, 471 (8th Cir. 1994).

Counsel will not be appointed in this case. The Grounds raised by Petitioner are neither

novel nor complex, Petitioner appears capable of reading and writing in English, and almost all

the claims raised were previously raised by Petitioner in the state court. As such, it is clear that

Petitioner understands the claims that he is raising, even though, as set forth below, he ultimately

fails to show that he is entitled to federal habeas relief.

Petitioner asserts two substantive Grounds for relief: (1) that the trial court erred in

allowing the testimony of Kathleen Coffman who stated that Petitioner heard voices telling him

to kill the victim; and, (2) that the trial court erred in excluding a letter from the victim to

Petitioner and phone calls they exchanged during his pretrial detention until the penalty phase.

Petitioner also asserts that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by: (3) failing

to call Robert Keith Valley (“RKV” -- Petitioner’s son) to attack victim’s credibility; (4) failing

to present evidence of Petitioner’s physical disability which would have supported his theory of

accident; (5) failing to present evidence at sentencing of Petitioner’s mental health challenges

which would have mitigated his culpability and resulted in a lower sentence; (6) calling witness

Vicki Wilson, who attacked his credibility, without Petitioner’s knowledge or consent; and, (7)

failing to seek recusal of the presiding Judge because of a conflict of interest.2

Petitioner raised his substantive grounds for relief (Grounds 1 and 2) on direct appeal

before the state courts. Respondent first argues that the claims are procedurally defaulted. State

prisoners seeking habeas relief in federal court are typically limited to raising grounds that have

been “fairly presented” in state court proceedings. Deck v. Jennings, 978 F.3d 578, 581 (8th Cir.

2 In the section on Ground 7, Petitioner again refers to the testimony of Ms. Wilson; however, he asserts a

different ineffectiveness claim related to the presiding Judge. He claims that the presiding Judge was the

attorney of record in a prior divorce proceeding for his former spouse.

2020). Grounds raised in federal court that have not been presented in state court and for which

there are no remaining state remedies are procedurally defaulted and should generally not be

considered further. Dansby v. Payne, 47 F.4th 647, 659 (8th Cir. 2022); Stephen v. Smith, 963

F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 2020). Procedural default also occurs when a state court’s decision on a

question of federal law “rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question

and adequate to support the judgment.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-730 (1991).

Such procedurally defaulted grounds may nonetheless be considered if a petitioner can

demonstrate “cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of

federal law” or a fundamental miscarriage of justice (i.e. actual innocence). Bousley v. United

States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Morgan v. Javois, 744 F.3d 535,

538-539 (8th Cir. 2013).

At trial, Petitioner testified that he did not tell Ms. Coffman that he was going to kill his

wife. Ms. Coffman was called as a witness to rebut this statement. Petitioner argued at trial that

the statements were too remote in time and are inadmissible. On direct appeal, however, he

argued that the statements were irrelevant. The Missouri Court of Appeals found that because

Petitioner changed his legal theory, his claim is waived. As to the letter/calls from the victim,

the Missouri Court of Appeals found that they were never presented as evidence and therefore

never formally excluded by the Court. As such, Petitioner did not properly preserve his claim

that they were improperly excluded during the liability phase. The Court went on to find that

Petitioner was not prejudice by the supposed exclusion because the jury recommended the

maximum penalty, which the trial court imposed, after hearing the evidence at the penalty stage.

Respondent merely states that there is an independent and adequate state law ground, i.e.,

waiver, that renders these claims procedurally defaulted. Respondent’s bare argument does not

address the contours of this type of procedural default. See White v. Bowersox, 206 F.3d 776,

780 (8th Cir. 2000) (“Procedural default of a claim under state law may constitute an

independent and adequate state ground, but only if the state procedural rule is firmly established,

regularly followed, and readily ascertainable). Respondent does not present any case authority

showing that the state’s procedural rule on waiver is firmly established, regularly followed, and

readily ascertainable. In any event, pursuant to well-established Missouri law, “[t]o properly

preserve a matter for appellate review, the objection at trial must be specific, and the point raised

on appeal must be based on the same theory as that presented at trial.” State v. Sykes, 480

S.W.3d 461 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (citing State v. Goins, 306 S.W.3d 639, 645-46 (Mo. Ct. App.

2010)); see also, State v. Johnson, 483 S.W.2d 65, 67-68 (Mo. 1972) (“The ground of objection

in this court is limited to that stated at the trial.”). “Missouri courts strictly apply these principles

based on the notion that trial judges should be given an opportunity to reconsider their prior

rulings against the backdrop of the evidence actually adduced and in light of the circumstances

that exist when the questioned evidence is actually proffered.” State v. Boydston, 198 S.W.3d

671, 674 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted). As such, Petitioner has

procedurally defaulted Grounds 1 and 2. Petitioner has not shown cause and prejudice that

would excuse this default.

Even if these Grounds were not procedurally defaulted, they would fail on the merits

because Petitioner has not established a violation of his constitutional rights. In order for

Petitioner to prevail on these due process claims, he must show that the admitted evidence (or

excluded evidence) resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial – that the admission was “so gross,

conspicuously prejudicial, or otherwise of such magnitude that it fatally infect[ed] the trial.”

McCafferty v. Leapley, 944 F.2d 445, 452 (8th Cir 1991). Petitioner must show that a specific

constitutional right was violated by the admission of the evidence or that the admission of the

same “rendered his entire trial fundamentally unfair.” Sittner v. Bowersox, 969 F.3d 846, 849-

850 (8th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Petitioner makes no such showing.

Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (Grounds 3-7) are equally

unavailing. As set forth above, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in the

following respects: (3) failing to call Robert Keith Valley (“RKV” -- Petitioner’s son) to attack

victim’s credibility; (4) failing to present evidence of Petitioner’s physical disability which

would have supported his theory of accident; (5) failing to present evidence at sentencing of

Petitioner’s mental health challenges which would have mitigated his culpability and resulted in

a lower sentence; (6) calling witness Vicki Wilson, who attacked his credibility, without

Petitioner’s knowledge or consent; and, (7) failing to seek a change of Judge due to a conflict of

interest. In addressing Grounds 3, 4, and 5, the state court of appeals thoroughly analyzed the

claims, correctly identified the governing Strickland standard, and found that Petitioner was not

prejudiced by counsel’s performance (Doc. 12-12). In particular, the state court found that

RKV’s testimony would not have supported a viable defense (in this case accident) and that

when testimony is offered to impeach another witness, prejudice can only be found when the

testimony would negate an element of the crime (Doc. 12-12, pp. 4-5). The state court went on

to find that Petitioner failed to present evidence that his physical disabilities played any role in

the shooting – namely there was no evidence that his physical disabilities that affected the left

side of his body played any role in the accidental discharge of the shotgun (Id. 8-9). As such,

there was again no prejudice. Finally, as to Petitioner’s mental health, the state court found that

Petitioner failed to present evidence supporting this claim and that it is based on mere

speculation and conjecture. Hence, the state court found that Petitioner could not show prejudice

or that counsel’s performance was deficient (Id. pp. 10-11).

Petitioner has not explained or discussed how the Missouri Court of Appeals either

unreasonably applied the law or unreasonably determined the facts in light of the evidence. As

such, Petitioner cannot satisfy the “doubly deferential” standard required to obtain habeas relief

on Grounds 3-5. To the contrary, the state courts correctly identified the controlling legal

standard for Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12,

22-23 (2013) (noting that the burden is on a petitioner to show that counsel’s performance was

deficient). And, after thoroughly reviewing the claims, the state courts found that Petitioner

failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel’s performance.

Even if Petitioner had argued that the state courts erred in their analysis of these Grounds,

Petitioner still must demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel’s representation. Fink v.

Lockhart, 823 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1987) (“The defendant has the burden of showing that he was

prejudiced.”). Petitioner only identifies his claims and offers no argument as to how he was

prejudiced by counsel’s decisions in calling witnesses or presenting his disabilities. Moreover,

in light of the evidence of guilt and the lack of evidence supporting his defense theory of

accident, counsel’s failure to call RKV, to present evidence of his physical disability, or to

present evidence of his mental health was not prejudicial for the reasons set forth by the state

courts.

Finally, Grounds 6 and 7, alleging that counsel was ineffective for calling witness Vicki

Wilson and failing to seek a change of Judge, are procedurally defaulted. Petitioner did not raise

these claims before the state courts through one complete round of review (Doc. 12-10, pp. 16,

20 (stating that Petitioner does not challenge the trial court’s denial of Ground 6 and 7)). Nor

has he demonstrated that “some objective external” factor prevented him from raising these

grounds and that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would

have been different. Marcyniuk v. Payne, 39 F.4th 988, 995 (8th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). As such, this Court finds that Grounds 6 and 7 are procedurally

defaulted and there is no showing of cause and prejudice to excuse the default.

* * * * *

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition of Robert Valley for a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel

(Doc. 8) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no certificate of appealability will be issued because

Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. See 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-338 (2003) (setting forth the

standard for issuing a certificate of appealability).

A separate Judgment will accompany this Memorandum and Order.

/s/ John M. Bodenhausen

JOHN M. BODENHAUSEN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Dated this 21st day of February, 2025.