El Bey v. Velocity Investments LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

TWILLIAMS EL BEY, et al., ) Case No. 1:24-cv-1990

)

Plaintiffs, ) Judge J. Philip Calabrese

)

v. ) Magistrate Judge

) Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong

VELOCITY INVESTMENTS LLC, )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, identifying himself variously as Tyrone Williams, “TWilliams El

Bey,” and “TMcClain El Bey,” filed a pro se complaint in this case against Velocity

Investments LLC, CKS Financial, Web Bank, and Prosper Market Place Inc. (ECF

No. 1.)

From Plaintiff’s pleading, the Court is able to determine that his action

pertains to a $22,257.08 default judgment entered against him in a State court case

that Velocity Investments brought for breach of a consumer loan agreement Plaintiff

entered into with Web Bank. (See ECF No. 1-7; Velocity Investments, LLC v. Tyrone

Williams, CV2989964 (Cuy. Cnty. Ct. Com. Pls. May 7, 2024 Judgment Entry).)

Plaintiff’s complaint, however, is otherwise virtually incomprehensible and fails to

set forth cogent factual allegations and legal claims against each Defendant. Instead,

his complaint consists of an amalgam of incomprehensible and nonsensical legal

assertions and claims apparently challenging the validity of the consumer loan

agreement at issue in the State case and the propriety of the State court’s judgment

against him. He employs various terms from the Uniform Commercial Code

throughout his pleading; refers to himself as an “Implied Surety,” “Private Secured

Party Investor,” and “[t]rue Holder in Due Course for any note/negotiable instrument

his autograph or signature is affixed to”; and states that he “claims his inalienable

rights to Equitable Subrogation.” (ECF No. 1, PageID #1, #2.) In addition, he states

that he is “not subject to statutory codes or color of law”; that “[a]n administrative

kangaroo/mock court does not have jurisdiction” over him; and that “[m]ultiple

financial institutions/DEFENDANTS supported by [a]n administrative

kangaroo/mock court and its agents have violated constitutional law, SEC rules, IRS

regulations and GAAP accounting rules.” (Id., PageID # 2.) His complaint does not

set forth cogent allegations supporting these naked assertions.

The relief Plaintiff seeks is also unclear. He seeks damages (“$1,516,000 per

commercial financial institution named in complaint totaling $7,580,000”), as well as

an “Emergency Motion to Stay an unlawful wage garnishment,” “an immediate halt

to all collection activity against [him],” and “[f]ull disclosure on all chattels gained

from the negotiations, sale, trade, and interest earned on the note/security Implied

Surety is the Signatory.” (Id., PageID #2–-3, PageID #13.)

Plaintiff did not pay the filing fee in the case. Instead, he filed an application

to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2.) The Court GRANTS that motion

although it does not appear that Plaintiff sincerely attempted to completely fill out

his form application. Plaintiff answered “0” or left a blank in response to virtually

every question on the form regarding his income and expenses (despite explicit

instructions on the form not to “leave any blanks”) and simply generally represents

that his housing expenses are covered by a church where he is a “minister/chief

pastor.” (ECF No. 2, ¶ 14, PageID #61.)

ANALYSIS

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed and held to less stringent

standards than pleadings drafted by lawyers, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365

(1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the lenient treatment

accorded pro se plaintiffs has limits, see e.g., Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416

(6th Cir. 1996). Pro se litigants must still meet basic pleading requirements, and

courts are not required to conjure allegations on their behalf or create claims for

them. See Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App'x 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2001).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a federal court must review all complaints

filed in forma pauperis and dismiss before service any such complaint that the court

determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief can be

granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470 (6th Cir. 2010). A complaint fails to state a

claim on which relief may be granted where it lacks “sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 470–71

(holding that the dismissal standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662

(2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), for motions to

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under

Section 1915(e)(2)(B)). A complaint is frivolous “where it lacks an arguable basis

either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The “term

‘frivolous,’ when applied to a complaint, embraces not only the inarguable legal

conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation.” Id.

Moreover, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and have a duty to

police the boundaries of their jurisdiction in every case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

A federal district court “may, at any time, sua sponte dismiss a complaint for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) where the allegations of a

complaint are totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of

merit, or no longer open to discussion.” Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir.

1999).

Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff's complaint warrants sua sponte

dismissal pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2)(B) and based on Apple, 183 F.3d at 479. The

statements and claims set forth in Plaintiff’s pleading are so incomprehensible,

unsubstantial, incoherent, and frivolous that they do not provide a basis to establish

that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction in the case over any plausible federal

claim, against any Defendant. See Lillard v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716,

726 (6th Cir. 1996) (a court is not required to accept summary allegations or

unwarranted legal conclusions in determining whether a complaint states a claim for

relief). To the extent Plaintiff’s pleading can be deciphered, it is “based on legal

theories that are indisputably meritless.” Abner v. SBC (Ameritech), 86 F. App'x 958,

958 (6th Cir. 2004) (“A complaint lacks an arguable or rational basis in law if it is

based on legal theories that are indisputably meritless.”) (citation omitted).

Further, whatever Plaintiff’s claims are, they arise form a State court

judgment where his complaint is best directed. The Court has no jurisdiction to

review the propriety of that judgment. And any claims he is asserting for which he

seeks damages or other relief contesting his obligations under the loan agreement are

barred by res judicata, which precludes “parties from contesting matters that they

have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate.” Montana v. U.S., 440 U.S. 147, 153-

54 (1979). Under Ohio law, the concept of res judicata not only precludes the re-

litigation of the same cause as between parties to an earlier action, its “collateral

estoppel” aspect precludes parties from re-litigating legal or factual issues in a second

lawsuit that were the general subject of the first action even though the second action

presents a different cause of action. Ohio ex rel. Boggs v. City of Cleveland, 655 F.3d

516, 519–20 (6th Cir. 2011); see also National Amusements, Inc. v. Springdale, 53

Ohio St. 3d 60, 62, 558 N.E.2d 1178 (1990) (an existing final judgment on the merits

is conclusive as to all claims which were or might have been litigated in the first

lawsuit).

Collateral estoppel applies where there is: (1) a prior final, valid decision on

the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same

parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or

could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the

transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. Ohio ex

rel. Boggs, 655 F.3d at 520.

These elements are present here. A State court entered a default judgment

against Plaintiff regarding his obligation to pay under a loan agreement. A default

judgment is a valid and final judgment on the merits for purposes of res judicata.

Forgues v. Select Portfolio Servicing, No. 1:15-CV-1670, 2015 WL 8272596, at *3 (N.D.

Ohio Dec. 8, 2015). The State litigation involved the same parties or their privies as

this action; both actions concern the same subject matter; and any objections or

defenses Plaintiff had regarding his obligation under the loan agreement could and

should have been raised in the State court proceeding. See Johnson's Island, Inc. v.

Board of Tp. Trs. of Danbury Tp., 69 Ohio St.2d 241, 245–46, 431 N.E.2d 672, 675,

(Ohio 1982) (a defendant who fails to raise a defense in the first action is barred from

raising it in a later action).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims warrant dismissal. See Evans v. Franklin Cnty.

Ct. of Com. Pls., Div. of Domestic Relations, 66 F. App'x 586, 588 (6th Cir. 2003)

(upholding dismissal of action directed to State court procedures and specific acts and

decisions of a duly constituted Ohio domestic relations court).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in

forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) and DISMISSES his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and the Court's authority established in Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477

(6th Cir. 1999). Further, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), the Court CERTIFIES

that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 22, 2025

J. Philip Calabrese

United States District Judge

Northern District of Ohio