Galarza v. Pimentel

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

)

CHRISTINA M. GALARZA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

Civil Action No. 23-12881-MJJ

v. )

)

KATRINA PIMENTEL, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

February 21, 2025

JOUN, D.J.

Plaintiff Christine Galarza, (“Ms. Galarza”) who is representing herself, brings this action

in which she asserts claims concerning pending and completed state court actions and efforts to

establish a business. In an Order dated April 4, 2024, the Court allowed Ms. Galarza’s Motion

for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis, found that Ms. Galarza’s Complaint failed to state a

claim upon which relief could be granted or was otherwise defective, and directed Ms. Galarza to

file an Amended Complaint if she wished to proceed with this action. [Doc. No. 4]

On May 8, 2024, Ms. Galarza filed an Amended Complaint, [Doc. No. 6], and, on July

19, 2024, she filed a Motion to Allow Second Amended Complaint with the proposed amended

pleading, [Doc. No. 7]. Having reviewed the Amended Complaint and the proposed Second

Amended Complaint, the Court finds that neither pleading sets forth a claim upon which relief

may be granted or provides this Court with a basis to exercise its jurisdiction. Accordingly, the

Court will DISMISS the Amended Complaint and DENY the Motion to Allow Second Amended

Complaint.

I. Review of the Complaint

A. Statute of Limitations

At the beginning of her Amended Complaint, Ms. Galarza maintains that a claim accrues

when “‘the last thing occurs that gives rise to the cause of action’; when all legal elements are

present to enable the claimant to make a claim; and when the facts and circumstances giving rise

to the cause of action is reasonably learned by the injured party.” [Doc. No. 6 at 2].1 Ms. Galarza

states that, because she “alleges the continuous violation of her right to equal protection of the

law and due process,” the lawsuit “is within the time frame required as ‘the last thing occurred’

[in] March 2024.” [Id.].

Here, Ms. Galarza interprets “cause of action” too broadly. See Alvarez v. City of

Worcester, 450 F. Supp. 3d 74, 79 (D. Mass. 2020) (cleaned up) (“A cause of action generally

accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis for his

claim.”). Specifically, Ms. Galarza treats her Amended Complaint as containing a single “cause

of action” for the violation of her rights to due process and equal protection, but the pleading

contains at least four separate causes of action. Her “Statement of Claim” is divided into four

distinct sections. [Doc. No. 6 at 2-4].2

Section One concerns events in December 2016, when Ms. Galarza’s daughter’s school

did not permit her to take action to protect her daughter, which caused physical injury. [Id. at 2].

Ms. Galarza does not identify any events occurring later than December 2016 that form the basis

1 Ms. Galarza does not identify the source of the quoted material.

2 Indeed, it appears that the four sections of the Amended Complaint are so unrelated to each other that

they should have been raised in separate lawsuits. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2) (providing that multiple

defendants may be joined in a single lawsuit if “(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly,

severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series

of transactions or occurrences; and “(B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in

the action.”).

of her claim. Thus, this cause of action accrued in December 2016. In its April 4, 2024 Order, the

Court stated that, under the three-year state statute of limitations applicable to claims under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”), any claims based on conduct that occurred more than three years prior

to the commencement of this action on November 27, 2023, would be time-barred. [Doc. No. 4

at 6-7]. Thus, Section One fails to state a viable claim because it is time-barred.

B. Younger Abstention

In Section Two of the Amended Complaint, Ms. Galarza claims that her rights to “equal

protection of the law and her right to due process continues to be violated, starting June 09,

2017.” [Doc. No. 6 at 2]. According to Ms. Galarza, on that day, the Massachusetts Probate

Court granted a motion recognizing defendant Wilfred C Driscoll as a “Special Representative”

of the estate of Ms. Galarza’s grandfather, but [t]o date the court has not heard the Plaintiff on

her request to be appointed Special Representative.” [Id. at 3]. Additionally, in Section Four of

the Amended Complaint, Ms. Galarza alleges violations of her rights to equal protection and due

process “continuously during the proceedings within the Southeast Housing Court and the

criminal Clerks Office.” [Id. at 4].

In its April 4, 2024 Order, the Court stated that it lacked jurisdiction to directly intervene

in pending state court actions. [Doc. No. 4 at 6-7]. The Court also stated that, under the doctrine

of Younger abstention, see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), it was required to abstain

from exercising is jurisdiction where the Court would “needlessly inject” itself in a pending state

proceeding implicating important state interests if the Court were to consider a claim. [Id.]; see

Coggeshall v. Massachusetts Bd. of Registration of Psychologists, 604 F.3d 658, 664 (1st Cir.

2010). For the same reasons, even if Ms. Galarza sufficiently alleges a violation of her right to

due process or equal protection vis-à-vis these state court proceedings, the pleading does not

provide the Court a basis to exercise jurisdiction over these claims.

C. Failure to Allege a Plausible Claim

In Section Three of the Amended Complaint, Ms. Galarza alleges that “she was deprived

of her right to equal protection of the law and due process while operating her small business by

city officials while acting in an authoritative role.” [Doc No. 6 at 3]. Ms. Galarza identifies the

alleged conduct of four of the defendants as “fil[ing] a police report under a false complaint,”

“utili[izing] . . . influence . . . to interfere with the police investigation” and “to deny the Plaintiff

the right to due process,” “intentionally provid[ing] false information to the licensing board,”

“us[ing] [the defendant’s] authority within the business licensure department . . . to obstruct the

Plaintiff in obtaining the newly required licensure to operate her business,” and “provid[ing]

false information to an investigating office.” [Id.]. Ms. Galazra also claims that two other

defendants violated her right to due process by “us[ing] their authority within the Criminal

Clerks Office” to “issu[e] a Summons for [Arraignment] after an NPC Finding and the altering

of documents within the case file.” [Id. at 4].

Even if the existence of previous or pending judicial actions does not bar the claims in

Section Three, they cannot go forward as pled because they do not provide enough factual

content to give the defendants notice of the claims against them, nor do they set forth a plausible

claim.

To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a complaint must comply with Rule

8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007), which requires that a complaint include a “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The “fundamental

purpose” of this pleading rule “is to protect a defendant’s inalienable right to know in advance

the nature of the cause of action being asserted against him.” Martinez v. Petrenko, 792 F.3d

173, 179 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Ruiz Rivera v. Pfizer Pharm., LLC, 521 F.3d 76, 84 (1st Cir.

2008)); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“short and plain” statement of the claim must

provide a defendant with “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it

rests” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). This means that a pleading needs to provide a

defendant “enough detail to provide a defendant with ‘fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests,’” Silverstrand Invs. v. AMAG Pharm., Inc., 707 F.3d 95, 101 (1st

Cir. 2013) (quoting Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011))

(alteration in original), or, in other words, the statement of the claim “must ‘at least set forth

minimal facts as to who did what to whom, when, where, and why,’” Calvi v. Knox County, 470

F.3d 422, 430 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Educadores Puertorriqueños en Acción v. Hernandez, 367

F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir. 2004)).

Allegations that consist merely of “labels and conclusions” are not credited. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555. Further, “some allegations, while not stating ultimate legal conclusions, are

nevertheless so threadbare or speculative that they fail to cross ‘the line between the conclusory

and the factual.’” Penalbert-Rosa v. Fortuno-Burset, 631 F.3d 592, 595 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 n.5). Instead, the complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true” to state a plausible claim for relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The plausibility standard is not as onerous as a

“‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are

‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and

plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Section Three does not meet the Rule 8(a)(2) pleading standard. Although Ms. Galarza

refers generally to certain events, her allegations are vague or largely conclusory. For example,

Ms. Galarza states that defendant Casey “is alleged to have filed a police report under a false

complaint,” in which Casey “[a]lleg[ed] the Plaintiff had threatened her.” [Doc. No. 6 at 3]. This

claim does not identify the approximate date of the false complaint or adequately specify the

threat Casey claims Ms. Galarza made. Similarly, Ms. Galarza alleges that “Cordeiro is alleged

to have intentionally provided false information to the licensing board,” which “obstructed the

Plaintiff from a[n] application process.” [Id.]. However, Ms. Galarza does not identify when this

alleged misconduct occurred, what false information Cordeiro provided to the licensing board,

and how the false information resulted in injury to her. The rest of the factual allegations in

Section Three are similarly insufficient.

D. Application for a Criminal Complaint

Within Section Four of the Amended Complaint, Ms. Galarza alleges that a state court

clerk violated her right to equal protection by “interfering with the Criminal Complaint

submission and filing process,” and that “the clerk’s office did not process the application.”

[Doc. No. 6 at 4]. As the Court pointed out in its April 4, 2024 Order, under federal law, “a

private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of

another,” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973); see also id. (“[A] citizen lacks

standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither

prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.”), even where state law “allows a private citizen to

file a criminal complaint alleging a violation of state law,” Harris v. Anderson, 672 Fed. App’x

148, 150 (3d Cir. 2017).

E. Judicial Immunity

In addition, to the extent that Ms. Galarza seeks damages against defendants who are

judges, such claims fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because judges are

absolutely immune “from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial

jurisdiction . . . even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly.” Pierson v.

Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967); see also Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991) (doctrine of

judicial immunity is only overcome where alleged misconduct was not taken in the judge’s

judicial capacity or where the was taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction); Zenon v.

Guzman, 924 F.3d 611 (1st Cir. 2019) (“[I]t is an axiom of black letter law that when a judge

carries out traditional adjudicatory functions, he or she has absolute immunity for those

actions”). Further, quasi-judicial immunity extends to court clerks for “acts that are

discretionary, taken at the direction of a judge, or taken according to court rules.” Hamilton v.

City of Hayti, 948 F.3d 921, 928 (8th Cir. 2020).3

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby orders:

1. The Amended Complaint, [Doc. No. 6], is DISMISSED.

2. The Motion to Allow Second Amended Complaint, [Doc. No. 7], is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Myong J. Joun

Myong J. Joun

United States District Judge

Dated: February 21, 2025

3 The Court notes that, in the Second Amended Complaint’s prayer for relief, Ms. Galarza seeks not only

damages, but she also asks the Court “to allow time needed for Congress to review the plea to override

the States Immunity.” [Doc. No. 6 at 4]. The Court cannot grant this form of relief.