State of Tennessee v. Crystal Lee Martin

02/21/2025

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs February 4, 2025 at Jackson

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. CRYSTAL LEE MARTIN

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Sumner County

No. 83CC1-2019-CR-121 Dee David Gay, Judge

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No. M2024-00876-CCA-R3-CD

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The defendant, Crystal Lee Martin, appeals the order of the trial court revoking her

probation and ordering her to serve her original six-year sentence in confinement. Upon

our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm revocation

of the defendant’s probation but reverse the trial court’s imposition of the original sentence

and remand for the trial court to make findings concerning the consequence imposed for

the revocation in accordance with State v. Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d 751, 753 (Tenn. 2022).

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court is Affirmed

in Part, Reversed in Part, and Remanded

J. ROSS DYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JILL BARTEE AYERS and TOM

GREENHOLTZ, JJ., joined.

Crystal Lee Martin, Gallatin, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Caroline Weldon, Assistant Attorney

General; Ray Whitley, District Attorney General; and Eric Mauldin, Assistant District

Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Facts and Procedural History

On November 18, 2019, the defendant pled guilty to attempted aggravated child

neglect of a child under 18 years old and received a sentence of six years to be served on

community corrections after service of six months in confinement with the Tennessee

Department of Correction.1

On January 20, 2021, a revocation warrant was filed, alleging that the defendant

violated the terms of her community corrections sentence having been charged with

domestic assault, a violation of condition #1 which required the defendant to obey all laws

and ordinances. The defendant pled guilty to the violation and was resentenced to a partial

revocation, requiring that she serve 30 days in confinement with the remainder of her

original sentence suspended to probation.

On August 25, 2022, a second revocation warrant was filed, alleging the defendant

had tested positive for THC, in violation of condition #8 which required the defendant to

refrain from using intoxicants or controlled substances. Again, the defendant pled guilty

to the violation and was reinstated to probation by order of the trial court.

Lastly, on August 21, 2023, a third revocation warrant was filed alleging the

defendant had been charged with driving under the influence and violation of the implied

consent law.

At the May 17, 2024 revocation hearing, the State presented the testimony of a

minor witness, N.V.,2 who testified that on August 19, 2023, she arrived to work an evening

shift at Subway at approximately 5:00 p.m. After she arrived, the defendant left for a

“break” and stated that she would be back in one hour. At 7:45 p.m., when the defendant

had not returned, N.V. began calling and texting the defendant to inquire as to her

whereabouts. At approximately 8:02 p.m., N.V. saw the defendant drive back into the

parking lot and described the defendant as sitting “inside of her car just staring at [her].”

N.V. also stated that the defendant was stumbling as she walked into the store, slurring her

words, and falling onto the counter. N.V. also described the defendant’s eyes as “going to

the back of her head.” N.V. left the scene to go home but returned a few minutes later to

check on the defendant. Soon after she returned to the restaurant, N.V. noted that the police

had been called to the scene.

Officer Kalum Stanley, an officer with the Hendersonville Police Department,

testified that he was dispatched to the Subway restaurant to respond to a suspicious person

call. When he arrived at Subway, Officer Stanley was met by three individuals outside

who reported an intoxicated employee inside the restaurant. Upon encountering the

1

The defendant’s sentence also included special conditions requiring a mental health evaluation, a

drug and alcohol evaluation within 60 days of release from confinement, and parenting classes. The

defendant was also to not have contact with the minor.

2

It is the policy of this Court to refer to minors by their initials. For purposes of this opinion, the

witness will be referenced as N.V. unless otherwise noted.

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defendant inside the restaurant, Officer Stanley noted that the defendant lacked dexterity

in her fingertips and had slurred speech. Officer Stanley testified that the defendant

initially denied any consumption of alcohol, but later stated she had two margaritas, and

then again changed her response to one margarita and a taco. Officer Stanley requested

the defendant perform a field sobriety test, which she refused. There were no signs of

alcohol inside the Subway restaurant or inside the defendant’s vehicle. After the defendant

refused consent to a blood draw, the defendant was placed under arrest. Officer Stanley,

therefore, obtained a search warrant for a blood draw. During the draw, the defendant

stated, “of all the times I’ve driven drunk, this is the time that I’m caught.” Officer Stanley

testified that based on his three-and-a-half-years of experience with the police department

and his observations of the defendant, he believed she was “impaired under the influence

of alcohol.”

The blood samples taken from the defendant were analyzed for alcohol content by

Special Agent Kelly Hopkins, an expert in forensic chemistry with the Tennessee Bureau

of Investigation. Specifically, Special Agent Hopkins testified that the defendant’s blood

alcohol content was 0.212-gram percent.

Officer Joseph Pace, another officer with the Hendersonville Police Department,

responded to the scene as a backup unit to Officer Stanley. Officer Pace testified that he

visited several nearby restaurants in an attempt to ascertain where the defendant had been

earlier in the evening and to locate additional witnesses. After visiting several restaurants,

Officer Pace discovered the defendant had been seen at a nearby Mexican restaurant. The

defendant’s presence was confirmed by a waitress, and the defendant’s receipt had been

inadvertently left at the table where she had been served. The receipt showed the defendant

had ordered and paid for three drinks from the bar at approximately 8:07 p.m. The waitress

confirmed that the defendant imbibed two and a half of her drinks prior to leaving. Officer

Pace also testified that he attempted to locate surveillance video from Subway that night,

but the cameras were inoperable.

After hearing argument from counsel, the trial court found that, based upon the

testimony of N.V., Officers Stanley and Pace, and Special Agent Hopkins, the defendant

had driven under the influence and violated the terms of her probation. The trial court then

determined that the defendant’s sentence was to be revoked, and she was to spend the

remainder of her sentence in confinement. As the hearing concluded, the defendant began

to speak out in open court despite multiple warnings by the trial court to cease. The

defendant referred to the trial court as a “gangster Sumner County cartel.” The State

requested the defendant be found in contempt of court, and the trial court agreed.

Ultimately, the trial court sentenced the defendant to an additional 10 days to be served

consecutively to her original sentence.

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Analysis

On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by ordering her to serve

the remainder of her six-year sentence in confinement. Specially, the defendant contends

the trial judge abused its discretion in revoking her probation, there was insufficient

evidence that she violated the terms of her probation, certain evidence should have been

excluded, and she was provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Additionally, the

defendant argues that the violation warrant was facially invalid and that the time between

her arrest and her revocation hearing violated her constitutional rights. Lastly, the

defendant appeals the trial court’s decision to hold her in contempt of court. The State

argues the trial court acted within its discretion in finding the defendant violated her

probation and sentencing her to confinement as there was adequate evidence of the

defendant’s violation. Furthermore, the State asserts the defendant’s remaining issues on

appeal are waived or meritless. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

determining the defendant had violated the conditions of her probation. However, we find

the trial court did not sufficiently include findings of fact as to the defendant’s disposition

in accordance with State v. Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d 751, 753 (Tenn. 2022). All other issues

raised by the defendant are waived or without merit.

I. Trial Court’s Determination of Violation and Disposition

A trial court’s decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion

with a presumption of reasonableness “so long as the trial court places sufficient findings

and the reasons for its decisions as to the revocation and the consequence on the record.”

State v. Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d 751, 759 (Tenn. 2022). “A probation revocation proceeding

ultimately involves a two-step inquiry. A trial court, upon finding by a preponderance of

the evidence that a defendant violated the conditions of his or her probation, must

determine (1) whether to revoke probation, and (2) the appropriate consequence to impose

upon revocation.” Id. at 753.

a. Trial Court’s Finding of Violation

A trial court has statutory authority to revoke a suspended sentence upon finding

that the defendant violated the conditions of the sentence by a preponderance of the

evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-310, -311; see State v. Turner, No. M2012-02405-

CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 5436718, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 27, 2013). “The trial

judge has a duty at probation revocation hearings to adduce sufficient evidence to allow

him to make an intelligent decision.” State v. Leach, 914 S.W.2d 104, 106 (Tenn. Crim.

App. 1995) (citing State v. Mitchell, 810 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)). If a

violation is found by the trial court during the probationary period, the time within which

it must act is tolled and the court can order the defendant to serve the original sentence in

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full. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-310; see State v. Lewis, 917 S.W.2d 251, 256 (Tenn. Crim.

App. 1995).

To overturn the trial court’s revocation, the defendant must show the trial court

abused its discretion. See State v. Shaffer, 45 S.W.3d 553, 554-5 (Tenn. 2001). In

revocation cases, the trial court abuses its discretion when the record contains “no

substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trial court that a violation of the

conditions of probation has occurred.” Id. at 554 (citing State v. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d 79,

82 (Tenn. 1991)). “The evidence need only show the trial judge has exercised

conscientious judgment in making the decision rather than acting arbitrarily.” Stamps v.

State, 614 S.W.2d 71, 73 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980).

Here, the trial court’s determination that the defendant violated the conditions of her

probation was not an abuse of discretion. At the hearing, the trial court heard testimony

that the defendant was seen driving a vehicle to work, emerging from the vehicle

stumbling, and slurring her words. Officer Stanley testified that his experience and

observations of the defendant indicated to him that she was intoxicated. Lastly, the

toxicology report conducted by the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation showed the

defendant to have 0.212-gram percent ethanol in her blood. Upon review, the record

contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s decision. Therefore, in the first step

of its discretionary analysis, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

revoking the defendant’s probation.

b. Trial Court’s Determination to Sentence to Confinement

Having concluded that the trial court’s determination to revoke the defendant’s

probation was not an abuse of discretion, this Court must separately review the trial court’s

determination of the consequence imposed on the defendant. When a defendant’s

probation is revoked, the trial court has “discretionary authority to: ‘(1) order confinement;

(2) order execution of the sentence as originally entered; (3) return the defendant to

probation on appropriate modified conditions; or (4) extend the defendant’s probationary

period by up to two years.’” State v. Fleming, No. E2017-02352-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL

6787580, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 26, 2018) (quoting State v. Brawner, No. W2013-

01144-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 465743, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 4, 2014)) (citations

omitted).3 “The determination of the proper consequences of the probation violation

embodies a separate exercise of discretion.” Id. (citing State v. Reams, 265 S.W.3d 423,

430 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007)). While it is “not necessary for the trial court’s findings to

be particularly lengthy or detailed,” sufficient reasoning must exist to promote meaningful

3

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-308(c)(1) statutorily limits trial courts to a maximum of one year

extension of probation.

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appellate review. Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d at 759 (citing State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 705-

06 (Tenn. 2012)). The Tennessee Supreme Court also clarified this Court’s review on

appeal is the same standard of review applied in the context of sentencing decisions: “abuse

of discretion with a presumption of reasonableness so long as the trial court places

sufficient findings and the reasons for its decisions as to the revocation and the

consequence on the record.” Id. at 6.

Here, we conclude that the trial court failed to make the required findings of fact as

to its disposition of the revocation. While it is clear from the record that the defendant’s

current violation was her third revocation, the trial court did not place on the record

“sufficient findings and the reasons for its decisions” as to the consequence determination.

See Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d at 759. For example, the hearing transcript and subsequent order

did not identify any of the relevant factors identified by Dagnan or other panels of this

Court. See id. at 759 n.5; State v. Rand, 696 S.W.3d 98, 106 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2024).

Because “[s]imply recognizing that sufficient evidence existed to find that a violation

occurred does not satisfy” the trial court’s burden with respect to the consequence

determination, we are constrained to remand for the trial court to place on the record its

reasoning for the consequence imposed. See Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d at 758.

II. Validity of Probation Violation Warrant

The defendant also appeals the revocation of her probation on the grounds that the

warrant alleging her probation violation was invalid. However, the record does not reflect

the defendant ever filed a motion before the trial court to challenge the alleged invalid

warrant. The defendant failed to argue, and the trial court never considered, whether the

violation warrant was invalid. An issue raised for the first time on appeal is waived. State

v. Alvarado, 961 S.W.2d 136, 153 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). Here, the defendant raised

the issue of an invalid warrant for the first time on appeal, and therefore, we conclude the

defendant has waived this issue.

III. Denial of Speedy Trial

The defendant also argues her constitutional rights were violated because she was

denied a speedy trial. Again, however, the record does not reflect that the defendant raised

this issue before the trial court. Because this issue was raised for the first time on appeal,

it is deemed waived. See id.

IV. Application of Exclusionary Rule

The defendant alleges the trial court erred by failing to exclude evidence obtained

by law enforcement during and after her arrest. While the defendant’s trial counsel

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successfully argued for the exclusion of said evidence in the underlying DUI charge, the

same exclusionary rules do not apply to revocation proceedings because a probation

violation hearing is not part of the criminal prosecution process. State v. Hayes, 190

S.W.3d 665, 669 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92

S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972). “Revocation proceedings are informal, as evidenced

by relaxed rules regarding the admissibility of evidence, the absence of a jury, and a

preponderance of evidence burden of proof.” See id. at 669. Therefore, petitioners are not

entitled to receive the full range of due process rights. Id. However, Tennessee has

recognized that evidence obtained through police harassment or evidence obtained in a

particularly offensive manner may be excluded. Id. at 670. “Generally, harassment

requires more than mere evidence that the police knew the accused was on probation at the

time of the encounter.” Id.

Here, there was no evidence in the record that the police officers engaged in

harassment or pursued offensive techniques to acquire evidence of the defendant’s

violation. Therefore, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable, and this issue is without merit.

V. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The defendant alleges she was provided with ineffective assistance of counsel at the

revocation hearing. Specifically, the defendant asserts that counsel failed to ask follow-up

questions of the State’s witnesses and failed to introduce surveillance video from Subway

on the night of her arrest.

While the right to counsel is constitutionally guaranteed in criminal proceedings,

there is no guaranteed right to counsel at a revocation hearing. State v. Eldridge, No.

M2004-01080-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 359665, *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006) (citing

Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 798-90, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 1763, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973)).

“The effectiveness of counsel at a revocation hearing does not raise a constitutional issue

unless counsel’s performance was so defective that one of the defendant’s due process

rights was violated.” Id.

Here, the defendant has not presented proof regarding what additional questioning

of the witnesses would have revealed. Therefore, the defendant has failed to show how

counsel’s performance was deficient. Further, as to the supposed surveillance video

footage of Subway, Officer Pace testified that the surveillance cameras on the night of the

defendant’s arrest were inoperable. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.

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VI. Criminal Contempt Charge

The defendant argues the trial court erred when it convicted her of criminal

contempt. Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(a) allows a judge to summarily find

a defendant guilty of direct criminal contempt for willful misconduct committed in the

court’s presence. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 42(a). If a court finds a defendant to be in contempt,

the court shall enter an order on the record reciting the facts and signed by the judge. Id.

“A determination of contempt is within the sound discretion of the trial court, subject to

the provisions of the law.” In re Brown, 470 S.W.3d 433, 442 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015) (citing

Daniels v. Grimac, 342 S.W.3d 511, 517 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010)). Because a trial court’s

use of its contempt power is discretionary, appellate courts review a trial court’s contempt

order using the abuse of discretion standard. Id.

Here, at the end of the revocation hearing, the defendant began a course of disruptive

behavior drawing several warnings from the trial court. The defendant was repeatedly told

not to speak and was warned, “[y]ou’re very close to being in contempt of court. Now, all

I want you to do is not say anything else.” The defendant then continued to speak,

disrupting the trial court. Finally, the defendant called the trial court “nothing but a

gangster Sumner County cartel.” The trial court found the defendant to be in contempt and

ordered her to serve an additional ten days consecutively to her underlying sentence. On

June 4, 2024, the trial court issued a contempt order reciting the above facts, signed the

order, and entered the order into the record in compliance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal

Procedure 42(a).

We conclude the trial court’s order was done in compliance with the rule and can

find no abuse of discretion. This issue is without merit.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, we affirm the revocation of the

defendant’s probation but remand for the trial court to make findings concerning the

consequence imposed for the revocation. All other issues raised by the defendant are

without merit or waived.

S/ J. ROSS DYER _

J. ROSS DYER, JUDGE

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