ZOOK v. O'MALLEY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

COURTNEY ELIZABETH ZOOK, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 23-1990

)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, )

)

)

Defendant. )

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 20th day of February, 2025, upon consideration of the parties’

cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court, after reviewing the Commissioner of

Social Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits

under Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., and her claim for

supplemental security income benefits under Subchapter XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§

1381 et seq., finds that the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence

and, accordingly, affirms. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148,

1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v. Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d

114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)).

See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported by

substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed, as a federal court may

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neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because it would have decided the claim

differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).1

1 Plaintiff contends the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred by finding she did

not meet or equal Listing 12.06 and by crafting a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) that

did not fully incorporate the full limiting effects of her physical and mental impairments.

(Doc. No. 9). After careful review, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff and finds the ALJ’s

determinations are supported by substantial evidence.

The Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed to properly analyze

whether she met Listing 12.06 based on her impairment of obsessive compulsive disorder

(“OCD”). Plaintiff contends the ALJ’s analysis was based on cursory, selective, and

inaccurate references to the record. (Id. at 13-16). In support of this, Plaintiff points out

that the ALJ relied on evidence of Plaintiff’s social interaction during her time working,

which was before Plaintiff’s illness progressed, and evidence that she could dress and

groom herself, despite evidence in the record demonstrating the opposite. (Id. at 13-14).

Plaintiff also emphasizes that the ALJ did not address her homicidal ideations against her

ex-boyfriend, her need to turn off her video during tele-treatment, and her inability to attend

in-person appointments. (Id. at 14). Plaintiff posits that these errors led the ALJ to

improperly conclude that Plaintiff did not meet the criteria of Listing 12.06, including the

four areas of mental functioning: (1) understanding, remembering, or applying

information; (2) interacting with others; (3) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace;

and (4) adapting or managing oneself (collectively the “Paragraph B Criteria”). (Id. at

14-16).

The Court views this argument as essentially a request to re-weigh the evidence.

It is well-established that an ALJ “need not mention every piece of evidence within the

record.” Beety-Monticelli v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 343 Fed. Appx. 743, 747 (3d Cir. 2009)

(citation omitted). Moreover, the ALJ is allowed to consider “all of the evidence

presented including information about [Plaintiff’s] prior work record.” 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3). Here, the ALJ thoroughly considered the Paragraph B

Criteria and concluded Plaintiff had mild and moderate limitations in each criterion. (R.

21-22). Additionally, the ALJ considered evidence of Plaintiff’s social interaction while

working and heard Plaintiff’s testimony that she had some difficulty interacting with others

toward the end of her employment. (R. 21, 54-55). This was all taken into consideration

as evidenced by the limitation to occasional interaction with others in Plaintiff’s residual

functional capacity (“RFC”). Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004)

(holding that an ALJ’s decision must be “read as a whole”). The ALJ also considered

that Plaintiff repeatedly denied homicidal ideation and viewed treatment records showing

Plaintiff participated in tele-treatment and a remote intensive outpatient program. (R. 24-

27). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument on this point fails.

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The Court also rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ found the opinion of

Danielle Classen, LPC, Plaintiff’s treating provider, unpersuasive based on irrelevant

findings. (Doc. No. 9 at 13-16). Ms. Classen opined that Plaintiff had listing-level

limitations due to her OCD and anxiety. (Ex. 15F). The ALJ considered this opinion in

accordance with the relevant regulations and found it unpersuasive. (R. 27); 82 Fed. Reg.

at 5853; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b), (c); 416.920c(b), (c). Specifically, the ALJ

found this opinion to be inconsistent with other record evidence, including treatment

records, which showed generally unremarkable findings, and Plaintiff’s records from

intensive outpatient treatment, which showed a severe mental impairment but not marked

limitations. (R. 27). Moreover, the ALJ found this opinion unsupported by Ms.

Classen’s treatment records, which did document extremely impaired functional status but

also generally unremarkable findings. (R. 27 (citing Ex. 13F)). In sum, substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s analysis of Ms. Classen’s opinion.

Similarly, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred by finding the

state agency consultants’ opinions persuasive. These psychological consultants opined

that Plaintiff had only mild and moderate mental limitations. (Exs. 1A, 5A). Plaintiff

contends that the ALJ based his persuasive finding on factors that had nothing to do with

OCD, such as her clear speech and average intelligence. (Doc. No. 9 at 14). Further,

Plaintiff posits that these opinions are not very persuasive as these medical experts did not

have access to 700 pages of evidence, including the opinion of Ms. Classen, when

rendering their opinions. (Id. at 14-15). Plaintiff, though, overlooks that the ALJ was

not prohibited from finding these opinions persuasive simply because these opinions were

rendered before other evidence became available. See Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating “[t]he Social Security regulations impose no limit

on how much time may pass between a report and the ALJ's decision in reliance on

it.”). Here, the ALJ found these opinions persuasive, as they were supported by

consultative examination findings, which showed results within normal limits, and other

evidence within the record was consistent with these opinions, as it showed Plaintiff had

an anxious mood and affect, but otherwise showed generally normal findings. (R. 27-28).

The ALJ’s analysis considered many aspects of Plaintiff’s psychological health, including

her memory skills, cognitive function, insight, judgment, thought process, behavior, and

speech. (Id.). Further, the ALJ had access to and considered the 700 pages of evidence

that were produced after the psychological consultants rendered their opinions when

deciding and issuing his decision in this case. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument on this

point fails.

The Court also finds no merit in Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred in analyzing

the criteria of Listing 12.00G2 (the “Paragraph C Criteria”). The Paragraph C Criteria

are satisfied when the claimant’s disorder is “serious and persistent[;]” there is evidence of

“[m]edical treatment, mental health therapy, psychosocial support(s), or a highly structured

setting(s), to diminish the symptoms and signs of [the] mental disorder[;]” and there is

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“[m]arginal adjustment, that is, [the claimant] ha[s] minimal capacity to adapt to changes

in [his/her] environment or to demands that are not already part of [his/her] daily life.” 20

C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.06. Plaintiff argues she met these criteria as she

relies on ongoing mental health therapy, psychosocial supports, and a highly structured

setting to diminish the signs and symptoms of her mental disorders. (Doc. No. 9 at 16).

Moreover, Plaintiff contends, the medical records demonstrate that she has had marginal

adjustment. (Id. at 17). The Court disagrees.

The ALJ stated Plaintiff did not meet the Paragraph C Criteria because the record

did “not show evidence of treatment, supports, or a highly structured setting that is ongoing

and that diminishes the symptoms and signs of mental disorder and marginal adjustment[.]”

(R. 22 (emphasis in original)). Moreover, the Paragraph C Criteria require psychosocial

supports, “such as the help of family members who aid a claimant in his or her basic

functioning and daily activities, participation in programs that provide instruction in entry-

level work skills and daily living, the receipt of ‘comprehensive “24/7 wrap-around”

mental health services,’ residence in a hospital or institution that provides 24-hour care,

and receipt of ‘assistance from a crisis response team, social workers, or community mental

health workers’ who help the claimant with his or her physical needs.” Gibson v. Saul,

No. 20-145, 2021 WL 371577, at *5 (D. Conn. Feb. 3, 2021) (quoting 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404,

Subpt. P, App. 1, 12.00D.1.). “The regulations also recognize that a claimant can meet

[the Paragraph C Criteria] if he [or she] lives alone and does not receive psychosocial

supports but has instead ‘created a highly structured environment by eliminating all but

minimally necessary contact with the world outside [his or her] living space.’” Gibson,

2021 WL 371577, at *5. Here, the ALJ correctly recognized that Plaintiff did not meet

this standard. The ALJ explained in his decision that Plaintiff reported she was able to

live alone, could operate a motor vehicle, and is able to dress and groom herself, among

other activities. (R. 24). While Plaintiff may rely on ongoing mental health therapy and

require some help at home, there is no evidence in the record that she relies on ongoing

psychosocial supports or a highly structured setting such that she would meet the Paragraph

C Criteria. See Hirst v. Kijakazi, No. 20-1756, 2021 WL 5989111, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Dec.

17, 2021) (stating “a claimant who functions mostly independently, travels independently,

shops alone, goes online, manages money, and is observed to have goal-directed thoughts,

typically cannot meet this standard.) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the ALJ’s analysis

of the Paragraph C criteria is supported by substantial evidence.

Likewise, the Court finds no merit in Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred by

rejecting her self-described limitations. (Doc. No. 9 at 20-21). The Court notes that, as

a general matter, when an ALJ has articulated reasons supporting a credibility

determination, that determination is afforded significant deference. See Horodenski v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 215 Fed. Appx. 183, 188-89 (3d Cir. 2007); Reefer v. Barnhart, 326

F.3d 376, 380 (3d Cir. 2003). Here, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff’s statements concerning

the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were not entirely consistent

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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. No. 8) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. No. 11) is GRANTED.

s/Mark R. Hornak, J.

Chief United States District Judge

ecf: Counsel of record

with the record evidence. (R. 23). Plaintiff contends this analysis was merely

boilerplate, but Plaintiff overlooks that the ALJ went on to explain that the record showed

Plaintiff was capable of logical thought processes, was cooperative, of average intelligence,

and that her judgment was within normal limits. (R. 25-27). The ALJ did not ignore

Plaintiff’s complaints that she has days where she is in complete isolation, had to complete

all her treatment via video, and has been through two intensive outpatient treatment

programs. (R. 24-26). After analysis of the entire record, the ALJ concluded that

Plaintiff’s complaints were not fully supported. (R. 23). This analysis was logical and

is supported by substantial evidence.

Similarly, Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed to consider her off-task time due

to medical appointments and treatment is without merit. While Plaintiff asserts that her

treatment would require her to miss 8.3 days of work per-month, Plaintiff fails to show the

evidence to support this assertion as there is no indication in the record that each

appointment requires her to miss a full day of work. (Doc. No. 9 at 23-24).

Additionally, Plaintiff provides no evidence that such appointments could not be scheduled

outside of her prospective working hours. Accordingly, there is no indication that

Plaintiff would necessarily have to miss partial days of work in order to attend her

appointments. Simply, Plaintiff has not established that she would have the necessary

absences per month that would preclude her from engaging in work on a regular and

ongoing basis. See Stull v. Saul, No. 19-227-E, 2020 WL 5774895, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Pa.

Sept. 28, 2020). In sum, Plaintiff has failed to carry her burden on this point.

The ALJ’s findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence.

Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed.

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