Boltz v. PeaceHealth

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

EUGENE DIVISION

MICHELLE BOLTZ, Civ. No. 6:24-cv-00246-AA

Plaintiff, OPINION & ORDER

vs.

PEACEHEALTH,

Defendant.

_______________________________________

AIKEN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Michelle Boltz brings seven religious discrimination claims against

her former employer, Defendant PeaceHealth, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and under ORS 659A.030. See Compl., ECF No. 1.

Before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss six of Plaintiff’s Title VII and ORS

659A.030 religious discrimination claims. For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s

Partial Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 5, is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Title VII and ORS

659A.030 claims are DISMISSED. Plaintiff shall have thirty days to file an amended

complaint consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

In February 2020, the global COVID-19 pandemic hit Oregon and the United

States. In August 2021, the FDA approved the first COVID-19 vaccine. On August

5, 2021, the Oregon Health Authority (“OHA”) issued a rule requiring all Oregon

healthcare providers and staff to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 (the “OHA

Vaccine Mandate”) by September 30, 2021, subject to medical or religious exemption

as provided under existing federal law. Former OAR 333-019-1010 (Aug. 5, 2021).

“In the summer of 2021, Defendant [healthcare facility] announced its intent

to impose a COVID-19 vaccine mandate.” Compl. ¶ 10. At that time, Plaintiff was

employed by Defendant as a registered nurse. Id. ¶ 4. In August 2021, Plaintiff

applied for a religious exemption to the vaccine because, as a “devout Christian,” she

“believes that the use of any vaccination that was tested or manufactured using

aborted fetal cells is a direct violation of the sanctity of life and goes directly against

her biblical convictions and beliefs.” Id. ¶ 10. Defendant granted Plaintiff a religious

exemption to the vaccine mandate and placed her on unpaid administrative leave.

Id. Plaintiff remained on unpaid administrative leave for nearly two years until she

was terminated by PeaceHealth on July 28, 2023. Id. ¶ 14.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the

sufficiency of the claims. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). When

evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint’s allegations, a court must accept a plaintiff’s

allegations of fact as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 668 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012). But a

plaintiff’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). “[A]

plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation” of the action’s elements. Id.

at 555 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a pleading must allege “sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged. The plausibility standard . . . asks for more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff brings seven religious discrimination employment claims under Title

VII and ORS 659A.030: (1) failure to accommodate; (2) disparate impact; (3) disparate

treatment; (4) wrongful pay reduction; (5) retaliation; (6) “pattern or practice”

discrimination; and (7) hostile work environment. Compl. ¶¶ 19–26. “A claim for

religious discrimination under Title VII can be asserted under several different

theories, including disparate treatment and failure to accommodate.” Peterson v.

Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 2004).

Plaintiff’s state law claims under ORS 659A.030 are analyzed together with

her Title VII claims. Pullom v. U.S. Bakery, 477 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1100 (D. Or. 2007)

(“Because ORS 659A.030 is modeled after Title VII, plaintiff's state law

discrimination claim can be analyzed together with [their] federal discrimination

claim.” (citing Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1437 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993); Winnett

v. City of Portland, 118 Or. App. 437 (1993)).

I. The Claims

Plaintiff first alleges a failure-to-accommodate claim. “Plaintiff’s [religious]

exception [to the vaccine mandate] was granted, but instead of providing

accommodations to allow her to continue to work, Defendant placed her on indefinite

unpaid leave[.]” Compl. ¶ 10. Defendant “does not dispute that Plaintiff has

sufficiently alleged failure-to-accommodate claims, under state and federal law.” Def.

Mot. at 3.

Defendant moves to dismiss the other six claims because they “are either

insufficiently pleaded, implausible, or both.” Id. Defendant notes that the pleadings

“contain few, if any specific factual allegations[,]” and that the allegations are

“materially identical to allegations in other cases brought by Plaintiff’s counsel,

including allegations against different employers.” Def. Reply at 2, ECF No. 8.

A. Disparate Impact

Plaintiff alleges that “[PeaceHealth] wrongfully terminated the Plaintiff in

violation of [Title VII and state law] by identifying the claimant and other similarly

situated employees by their initial requests for religious accommodation and

terminating them[].” Compl. ¶ 24-1.

Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer “to discharge any individual . . .

because of such individual's . . . religion[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Title VII bars an “employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the

basis of . . . religion” unless the employer shows that “the challenged practice is job-

related . . . and consistent with business necessity.” Title VII 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

2(k)(1)(A)(i). A disparate impact claim challenges “employment practices that are

facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more

harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.”

Stout v. Potter, 276 F.3d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002). To plead a prima facie case of

disparate impact, a plaintiff must “(1) show a significant disparate impact on a

protected class or group; (2) identify the specific employment practices or selection

criteria at issue; and (3) show a causal relationship between the challenged practices

or criteria and the disparate impact.” Bolden-Hardge v. Office of the Cal. State

Controller, 63 F.4th 1215, 1227 (9th Cir. 2023).

To meet the first prong of a disparate impact claim based on religion, Plaintiff

must allege facts to show that the employment practice at issue disparately impacts

“all or substantially all” individuals of a specific faith or religious subgroup. See

Bolden-Hardge, 63 F.4th at 1127–28.

Plaintiff defines the group of allegedly disparately impacted individuals as ‘“all

or substantially all’ religious individuals opposed to taking the vaccine on religious

grounds[.]” Pl. Resp. at 5, ECF No. 7. Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails the first

element because Plaintiff “does not identify a legally cognizable disparate impact on

a protected class or group.” Def. Mot. at 6.

A group of individuals who hold any religious-based objection to the vaccine,

as Plaintiff alleges, is not a protected group under Title VII. Title VII protects

individuals of a specific faith or religious subgroup who hold a consistent and defining

set of beliefs at odds with an employment requirement. See, e.g., Bolden-Hardge, 63

F.4th at 1228 (Because the plaintiff “contends that her religious beliefs are ‘consistent

with [those] of other Jehovah's Witnesses,’ who also believe that their faith forbids

them from swearing primary allegiance to any human government[,] . . . we must

presume that the oath requirement will impact ‘all or substantially all’ Jehovah’s

Witnesses seeking government employment[.]”).

Courts have determined that religious individuals who share a specific belief—

held by some within and some outside of a specific faith or religious subgroup—do not

form a legally cognizable class protected by Title VII. Cox v. Nw. Reg’l Educ. Serv.

Dist., Case No. 3:22-cv-01073-HZ (Lead Case), 2024 WL 777598, at *13–14 (D. Or.

Feb. 23, 2024) (While “disparate impact claims can be made by specific religious faiths

or groups[,] . . . parties cannot establish a prima facie disparate impact claim by

defining the group as comprised of religious individuals holding a particular belief

they attribute to their religion even if other members of that individual's faith or

religious group believe otherwise.”) (citing Dunbar v. Walt Disney Co., No. CV 22-

1075-DMG (JCx), 2022 WL 18357775, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2022) (emphasis in

original) (collecting cases). “Courts generally treat disparate impact claims as those

affecting particular groups or faiths, including articulable sub-groups, but not all

those who share a single common belief.” Dunbar, 2022 WL 18357775, at *3.

Because Plaintiff’s allegedly impacted group is not a protected class or group

under Title VII, Plaintiff fails to state a disparate impact religious discrimination

claim under Title VII and state law.

B. Disparate Treatment

As in her disparate impact claim, Plaintiff alleges that she “and other similarly

situated employees” were “terminat[ed] after they invoked their rights under Title

VII and [state law].” Compl. ¶ 24-1.

A disparate treatment claim requires an allegation that defendant acted with

discriminatory intent. Lavelle-Hayden v. Legacy Health, No. 3:22-cv-01752-IM, 2024

WL 3822712, at *7 (D. Or. Aug. 14, 2024). The elements of a prima facie disparate

treatment claim are, “(1) [plaintiff] is a member of a protected class; (2) [plaintiff] was

qualified for [the] position; (3) [plaintiff] experienced an adverse employment action;

and (4) similarly situated individuals outside [plaintiff’s] protected class were treated

more favorably, or other circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action

give rise to an inference of discrimination.” Peterson, 358 F.3d at 603.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails the second and fourth elements of the

claim. Def. Mot. at 6. As to the second element, Plaintiff alleges that she has a

fourteen-year work history as a registered nurse under Defendant’s employ. Compl.

¶ 4. Defendant asserts that “Plaintiff’s ability to allege qualification for her job

depends on a successful failure-to-accommodate claim[.]” Def. Mot. at 6–7. The Court

concludes that Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts that, at the time she requested an

exemption, aside from her nonvaccinated status, she was otherwise qualified for her

job.

As to the fourth element, Defendant argues that Plaintiff “does not, and

cannot, identify similarly situated employees who received more favorable

treatment.” Def. Mot. at 7. Specifically, Defendant asserts that “Plaintiff does not

allege (nor could she) that PeaceHealth continued to employ any unvaccinated

individuals who did not have an approved religious or medical exception (much less

that it allowed them to work in person).” Def. Mot. at 7.

To succeed on the fourth element, Plaintiff must plausibly allege that at least

one similarly situated individual outside of Plaintiff’s protected class was treated

more favorably. “[I]ndividuals are similarly situated when they have similar jobs and

display similar conduct.” Vasquez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir.

2003); Weil v. Citizens Telecom Svcs. Co., LLC, 922 F.3d 993, 1004 (9th Cir. 2019)

(“[T]he plaintiff and the comparator employee must be similarly situated . . . in all

material respects.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Plaintiff does not succeed here. She fails to allege that any similarly situated

employee outside of her protected class was treated more favorably or allege other

facts that give rise to an inference of discrimination. That is, Plaintiff fails to allege

that any unvaccinated nurse who did not request a religious exemption was treated

more favorably. Small v. Oregon Health and Sci. Univ., No. 3:23-cv-01290-JR, 2024

WL 4137484, at *5 (D. Or. Aug. 5, 2024) (dismissing disparate treatment claim

because plaintiff failed to allege that any other similarly situated unvaccinated

employee was permitted to work onsite or elsewhere).

Because Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendant treated any similarly situated

(i.e., unvaccinated) nurse who did not request a religious exemption more favorably

or plead other facts that give rise to an inference of discrimination, Plaintiff fails to

state a disparate treatment claim under Title VII and state law.

C. Wrongful Pay Reduction

Plaintiff alleges that “[PeaceHealth] wrongfully reduced Plaintiff’s pay under

Title VII and ORS [659]A.030(1)(b) in a discriminatory manner on the basis of her

religion by placing her on unpaid administrative leave after she submitted a religious

exemption.” Compl. ¶ 24-2. Plaintiff asserts that what she calls a “wrongful

reduction in pay” claim. Pl. Resp. at 2.

Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer . . . “to discriminate against any

individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges [of]

employment, because of such individual's . . . religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s wrongful-pay-reduction claim fails because it

is “entirely derivative of the primary theory at issue” in Plaintiff’s failure to

accommodate claim. Def. Mot. at 8. Specifically, “whether unpaid leave was a

reasonable accommodation is already—and more appropriately—at issue with

respect to the failure-to-accommodate theory.” Id.

Wrongful pay reduction, like wrongful termination, is not a claim under Title

VII. It is an employment outcome, alleged to be “wrongful,” for which Plaintiff seeks

redress. To obtain relief under Title VII, Plaintiff must allege facts under a Title VII

theory of discrimination, such as failure-to-accommodate or disparate treatment.

Plaintiff cites Justice Marshall’s concurring opinion in Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v.

Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 74 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“A forced reduction in

compensation based on an employee's religious beliefs can be as much a violation of

Title VII as a refusal to hire or grant a promotion”). But, in Ansonia, the plaintiff

sought redress for an alleged wrongful pay reduction under a failure-to-accommodate

theory, not as an independent “wrongful pay reduction” claim. Id. at 60.

Thus, wrongful pay reduction is not itself a Title VII claim. It is an element of

a Title VII claim within a specific Title VII theory of discrimination. See Matthews v.

Legacy Health, No. 6:24-cv-00592-MC, 2024 WL 3970794, at *5 (D. Or. Aug. 26, 2024)

(dismissing wrongful pay reduction claim as “merely a duplicative restatement of

Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim”); Burton v. Legacy Health, No. 3:23-cv-

01528, 2024 WL 4186068, at *5, n.5 (D. Or. July 18, 2024) (dismissing wrongful pay

reduction claim because “[a]ny compensation-related claims . . . fall within the

purview of plaintiff’s failure to accommodate theory”). To the extent that Plaintiff

pleads “wrongful reduction in pay” as a stand-alone claim, it is dismissed.

D. Retaliation

Plaintiff asserts that PeaceHealth retaliated against her “by segregating and

terminating [Plaintiff]” because she “invoked Title VII's protections in [her] initial

request[] for religious exemption[.]” Compl. ¶ 24-3.

Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any

employee “because [that employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful

employment practice by [Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). “The elements of a prima

facie retaliation claim are, (1) the employee engaged in a protected activity; (2) [they]

suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal link between the

protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520

F.3d 1080, 1093–94 (9th Cir. 2008).

Plaintiff asserts that she engaged in protected activity (the first element) when

she applied for a religious exemption and that she suffered an adverse employment

action (the second element) when she was granted the exemption, placed on unpaid

leave, and terminated. Pl. Resp. at 7. Defendant argues that “requesting religious

accommodation, without more, is not protected activity.” Def. Mot. at 9.

The Court need not resolve this issue. Even assuming that Plaintiff meets the

first two elements, the claim fails on the third element, the causal link required to

show retaliatory motive.

As to causality, Plaintiff alleges that she and “other similarly situated

individuals who . . . request[ed] . . . religious exemptions [were] then terminat[ed] for

that invocation of their rights under Title VII and ORS 6[59].030.” Compl. ¶ 24-3.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege a causal link because

“PeaceHealth created an accommodation process before [Plaintiff] requested an

exception from PeaceHealth’s vaccination requirement.” Def. Mot. at 9.

“The causal link [supporting a retaliatory motive] may be inferred from

‘proximity in time between the protected action and the allegedly retaliatory

employment decision.’” Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d at 1234, 1244 (9th Cir. 2000)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Miller v. Fairchild Ind. Inc., 797

F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing cases in which the adverse action occurred after

the protected activity).

The Court takes judicial notice that the OHA Vaccine Mandate took effect on

August 5, 2021, and was in effect until it was repealed on June 30, 2023. Former

OAR 333-019-1010. “Courts may take judicial notice of . . . the ‘records and reports

of administrative bodies.’” United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2003)

(quoting Interstate Nat. Gas Co. v. S. Cal. Gas Co., 209 F.2d 380, 385 (9th Cir. 1953)).

Plaintiff alleges that, “[i]n the summer of 2021, Defendant announced its intent to

impose a COVID-19 vaccine mandate.” Compl. ¶ 10. “Plaintiff applied for a religious

exception to the vaccine mandate on or about August 24, 2021.” Id. Defendant

granted the requested “exception” and placed Plaintiff on “indefinite unpaid leave,

beginning on or about August 31, 2021.” Id. Plaintiff was terminated on July 28,

2023. Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiff also alleges that "other similarly situated individuals” who

requested a religious exemption were treated the same. Compl. ¶ 24-3. Plaintiff

asserts that “this sequence [of events] indicates a clear causal link” between the

protected activity (requesting exemption) and the adverse action (being placed on

unpaid leave resulting in termination). Pl. Resp. at 7.

The Court disagrees. The sequence of events does not support a causal link

because the exemption process that resulted in the alleged adverse employment

action (unpaid leave and termination) was in place before Plaintiff applied for an

exemption (the protected activity). Further, Defendant instituted that exemption

process to comply with the OHA Vaccine Mandate. The sequence of events and the

context does not support a retaliatory motive, and Plaintiff offers no other facts that

support a retaliatory motive. Gallagher v. Hawai’i Symphony Orchestra, No. 23-

00395 JMS-RT, 2024 WL 1331799, at *15–16 (D. Haw. Mar. 27, 2024) (rejecting

causation element of retaliation claim because “religion-neutral policy . . . had been

established before [plaintiff] made a religious accommodation claim”) (emphasis in

original) (collecting cases); see also Matthews, 2024 WL 3970794, at *4 (rejecting

causation element of retaliation claim on nearly identical facts, because plaintiff

“excluded from [complaint] any independent evidence of retaliation”).

Because Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support a causal connection

between the protected activity and the adverse action or other facts that support a

retaliatory motive, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim fails.

E. Pattern-or-Practice Discrimination

Plaintiff alleges that “[PeaceHealth] engaged in a companywide discriminatory

pattern or practice of wrongfully placing the claimant and other employees seeking

religious exemptions from the Covid-19 vaccine mandate on unpaid administrative

leave regardless of . . . [their] involvement with patient care and without . . .

reasonabl[e] accommodat[ion].” Comp. ¶ 24-5.

Title VII § 2000e-6(a) authorizes the Attorney General to bring civil suits in

“pattern or practice” matters, and § 2000e-6(c),(e) transfers enforcement powers to

the EEOC including “authority to investigate and act on a charge of a pattern or

practice of discrimination, whether filed by or on behalf of a person claiming to be

aggrieved or by a member of the Commission.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-6.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s pattern-or-practice claim “rel[ies] on the

EEOC’s enforcement powers[,]”and “is not “actionable in an action brought by a

private individual.” Def. Reply at 8.

Outside of a class action, only the government may pursue a pattern-or-

practice action. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360 (1977)

(“[T]he plaintiff in a pattern-or-practice action is the Government.”); see also Bacon

v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 370 F.3d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 2004) (“The Supreme Court

has never applied the Teamsters method of proof in a private, non-class suit charging

employment discrimination.”); Burton, 2024 WL 4186068, at *10 (“Courts have

interpreted this Title VII provision [vesting enforcement authority in the Attorney

General and the EEOC] to foreclose the use of the pattern-or-practice method of proof

by private plaintiffs.” (citing Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360)).

Because Title VII does not provide a private right of action for a pattern-or-

practice claim, Plaintiff, as a private individual, cannot bring a pattern-or-practice

claim against Defendant. The claim is dismissed.

F. Hostile Work Environment

Plaintiff alleges that “[PeaceHealth]’s staff and employees created a hostile

work environment for the claimant . . . by making threatening and hostile statements

which made the claimant feel intimidated, harassed, and humiliated on account of

her sincere religious beliefs in opposition to the Covid-19 vaccine.” Compl. ¶ 24-6.

Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any

individual with respect to . . . conditions, or privileges of employment[] because of

such individual’s . . . religion.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1). To establish a prima facie

hostile work environment case, an employee must plausibly allege that (1) they were

“subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a [religious] nature; (2) that the conduct

was unwelcome; and (3) that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter

the conditions of the plaintiff's employment and create an abusive work

environment.” Mills v. PeaceHealth, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1115 (D. Or. 2014) (brackets

in Mills) (quoting Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 642).

Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to allege a hostile work environment

claim because she makes only “vague and conclusory assertions[,]” “alleges nothing

about harassing comments or conduct by PeaceHealth employees or staff,” and

appears to “allege statements expressing hostility based on vaccination status, rather

than religious beliefs or practices.” Def. Mot. at 11–12.

The Court agrees. Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to state a hostile

work environment claim. She alleges that she was the subject of “threatening and

hostile statements,” Compl. ¶ 24-6, but she does not allege facts to show that those

statements were “of a religious nature” or that the statements were “sufficiently

severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the plaintiff's employment and create an

abusive work environment.” Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 642. Instead, Plaintiff’s allegations

suggest that the statements were aimed at her vaccination status, not her religious

status. Vaccination status is not a protected class under Title VII. To succeed in this

claim, Plaintiff must plausibly allege that hostile statements were directed at her

religious status. Plaintiff has not done so. See Brown v. NW Permanente, PC, No.

3:22-cv-986-SI, 2023 WL 6147178, at *6 (D. Or. Sept. 20, 2023) (“To remain

unvaccinated may be a secular choice, and unvaccinated status alone does not

establish any connotation of religious affiliation. Without some connection to their

religion, [p]laintiffs fail to allege that they faced verbal or physical conduct of a

religious nature.”)

For the reasons above, Plaintiff fails to state a hostile work environment claim

under Title VII and state law.

II. Leave to Amend

Generally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 “advises the court that leave

shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon,

Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). “This policy is to be applied with extreme liberality.” Id.

But “[d]ismissal without leave to amend is proper if it is clear . . . that the

complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. New York

State Common Ret. Fund, Inc., 339 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir.2003) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). “[A] proposed amendment is futile only if no set of facts

can be proved under the amendment to the pleadings that would constitute a valid

and sufficient claim or defense.” Sweaney v. Ada Cty., Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1393

(9th Cir. 1997) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). “Futility of amendment can,

by itself, justify the denial of a motion for leave to amend.” United States ex rel. Lee

v. SmithKline Beecham, Inc., 245 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001).

Plaintiff is granted leave to amend her disparate impact, disparate treatment,

retaliation, and hostile work environment claims. The remaining two claims are

dismissed with prejudice because amendment would be futile. Plaintiff’s “wrongful

pay reduction” claim is dismissed with prejudice because Title VII provides no such

claim. Plaintiff’s “pattern-or-practice” claim is dismissed with prejudice because Title

VII does not provide a private right of action for “pattern-or-practice” claims.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained, Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 5,

is GRANTED, and the Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend consistent with

this opinion. Plaintiff shall have thirty days from the date of this Order in which to

file an amended complaint.

It is so ORDERED.

DATED this _1_9_t_h_ day of February 2025.

/s/Ann Aiken

ANN AIKEN

United States District Judge