Gyani v. Lululemon USA Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 24-cv-22651-BLOOM/Elfenbein

AMANDEEP GYANI, ABBY UTAL,

HECTOR ACOSTA, DEBORAH TOMAZ,

ROYA SAYIED, PAULA MARTINEZ, and

ALEXANDRIA REESE, individually and on

behalf of all other similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

LULULEMON ATHLETICA INC. &

LULULEMON USA INC.,

Defendants.

________________________________/

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant lululemon athletica inc., and lululemon

usa inc. (collectively “Lululemon” or “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss the First Amended

Complaint (“Motion”), ECF No. [29]. Plaintiffs Amandeep Gyani, Abby Utal, Hector Acosta,

Deborah Tomaz, Roya Sayied, Paula Martinez, and Alexandria Reese, individually and on behalf

of all others similarly situated (collectively “Plaintiffs”), filed a Response in Opposition,

(“Response”), ECF No. [46], to which Defendants filed a Reply, ECF No. [47]. The Court has

carefully reviewed the Motion, the record in this case, the applicable law, and is otherwise fully

advised. For the reasons discussed below, the Motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Lululemon is one of the world’s largest and most popular “athleisure” fashion brands. ECF

No. [20], at ¶ 2. In October 2020, Lululemon announced its “Be Planet” marketing campaign as

part of “the Company’s long-term strategy to become a more sustainable and equitable business,

minimize its environmental impact, and accelerate positive change both internally and externally.”

Id. at ¶ 5, 58 (emphasis omitted). The Be Planet campaign included the following commitments

by Lululemon:

• 100% of the Company’s products will include sustainable materials and end-of-use

solutions by 2030;

• Ensure at least 75% of its products contain sustainable materials by 2025;

• Offer guests new options to extend the life of its products by providing resell,

repair, and/or recycle options by 2025;

• Source 100% renewable electricity to power the Company’s operations by 2021

and reduce carbon emissions across its global supply chain by 60% per unit of value

added, meeting its Science-based Targets by 2030; and

• Reduce its freshwater use intensity by 50% to manufacture its products and reduce

single-use plastic packaging by 50% by 2025.

Id. at ¶ 5, 58.

As part of its Be Planet campaign, Plaintiffs allege that Lululemon made a number of direct

environmental claims about the company’s products and actions that are false, deceptive, and/or

misleading. Id. at ¶ 75. For example, in its 2020 Impact Summary, Lululemon states, “[o]ur lives

are one with the health of the planet. Our products and actions avoid environmental harm and

contribute to restoring a healthy planet.” Id. at ¶ 76. Further, on its website, Lululemon states,

“[b]y adopting and evolving practices and mindful solutions, we enhance the products we offer

and contribute to restoring the environment.” Id. at ¶ 77 (emphasis omitted); see also id. at ¶ 78-

79. Lululemon pursued its extensive Be Planet marketing campaign through express and implied

statements and images on its website, throughout its hundreds of retail stores, and elsewhere. Id.

at ¶ 7.

Plaintiffs further allege that Lululemon makes false, deceptive, and misleading

representations that overemphasize the significance of certain environmental initiatives that

provide only minor improvements or benefits relative to the company’s overall climate and

environmental footprint. Id. at ¶ 86. For example, on its website, Lululemon introduces its

purported “2030 science-based climate targets,” which include “achieving 60% absolute reduction

of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in all owned and operated facilities (Scope 1 and 2)” and

“60% intensity reduction of GHG emissions across [Lululemon’s] global supply chain.” Id. at ¶

97; see also id. at ¶ 98-101.

Plaintiffs also allege that Lululemon’s marketing campaign makes deceptive and

misleading claims about the company’s vision, goals, and commitments. Id. at ¶ 107. On its

website, Lululemon states, “[w]e’re committed to making products that are better in every way-

for . . . the planet.” Id. at ¶ 109 (emphasis omitted). Plaintiffs assert that Lululemon is responsible

for significant GHG gas emissions, landfill waste, and release of microplastics into the

environment. Id. at ¶ 10. Critically, Lululemon’s GHG emissions have more than doubled since

the start of the Be Planet campaign in 2020, as confirmed by Lululemon’s own reporting. Id. at ¶

11, 68, 84, 110. The detrimental impact of Lululemon’s products and actions on the environment

is made worse by the company’s use of air and marine freight to transport its products, despite the

fact that air freight generates significantly more greenhouse gas emissions than marine shipping.

Id. at ¶ 70. Further, Lululemon’s products most heavily rely on polyester and nylon – materials

that are products from fossil fuels. Id. at ¶ 84, 111. Lululemon’s supply chain operations also used

more than 29 billion liters of freshwater in 2022. Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Lululemon is not

even on track to meet its own targets. Id. at ¶ 105.

Plaintiffs claim they were exposed to the deceptive and misleading messages in

Lululemon’s marketing campaign and believed that Lululemon was an environmentally friendly

company with a minimal environmental footprint that sold sustainably produced products, and that

the company’s actions and products contribute to improving the environment and the restoration

of a healthy planet. Id. at ¶ 20-27. Plaintiffs relied on Lululemon’s deceptive and misleading

marketing messages in deciding to purchase its products. Id. Plaintiffs then purchased Lululemon’s

products in reliance on its deceptive and misleading marketing messages at various times at

Lululemon’s retail stores. Id.

Plaintiffs Amandeep Gyani, Abby Utal, Deborah Tomaz, Paula Martinez, Hector Acosta,

and Julez Blake (collectively “the Florida Plaintiffs”) made such purchases at Lululemon retail

stores, including Lululemon’s locations in Miami Beach, Boca Raton, Brickell, Aventura, and

West Palm Beach. Id. at ¶ 20-25. Alexandria Reese (“New York Plaintiff”) made such purchases

at Lululemon retail stores, including Lululemon’s location in Hoboken, New Jersey. Id. at ¶ 26.

Plaintiff Roya Sayied (“California Plaintiff”) made such purchases at Lululemon retail stores,

including Lululemon’s locations in Santa Monica and San Francisco. Id. at ¶ 27.

The Amended Complaint asserts Five Counts: (1) Violation of the Florida Deceptive and

Unfair Trade Practices Act Under Florida Statutes § 501.201; (2) Violation of the New York

General Law § 349; (3) Violation of the California Legal Remedies Act Under the California Civil

Code § 1770; (4) Violation of the California Unfair Competition Law Under the California

Business and Professional Code § 17200; and (5) Unjust Enrichment. ECF No. [20]. Plaintiffs seek

money damages and injunctive relief, together with attorneys’ fees and costs, restitution, and

disgorgement.

In its Motion, Lululemon contends that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing, and the Court

lacks personal jurisdiction over the nonresident Plaintiffs’ state-law claims. ECF No. [29]; ECF

No. [47]. Moreover, Lululemon argues that Plaintiffs fail to state a plausible claim for relief. Id.

Plaintiffs respond that they suffered an injury in fact and have standing to bring their claims. ECF

No. [46]. Further, Plaintiffs assert that the Court can adjudicate the nonresident Plaintiffs’ claims.

Id.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To meet this “plausibility standard,” a plaintiff must plead

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged. Id. “A facially plausible claim must allege facts that are more than

merely possible. . . . But if allegations are indeed more conclusory than factual, then the court does

not have to assume their truth.” Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012)

(internal citations omitted). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. If the allegations satisfy the elements of the claims

asserted, a defendant’s motion to dismiss must be denied. See id. at 556.

Further, “[o]n a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, ‘[t]he moving party bears the burden to

show that the complaint should be dismissed.’” Sprint Sols., Inc. v. Fils-Amie, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1224,

1228 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (quoting Mendez–Arriola v. White Wilson Med. Ctr. PA, 2010 WL 3385356,

at *3 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2010)); see also Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1199 (11th

Cir. 2007) (“We are required to accept the facts as set forth in the plaintiff’s complaint as true, and

our consideration is limited to those facts contained in the pleadings and attached exhibits.”).

B. Standing

Under Article III of the United States Constitution, federal courts are limited to

adjudicating only “Cases and Controversies.” U.S. Const Art. III § 2; see Stalley ex rel. U.S. v.

Orlando Regional Healthcare Sys., Inc., 524 F.3d 1299, 1232 (11th Cir. 2008). For a case or

controversy to exist, the Plaintiff must have standing to bring the action. See I.L. v. Alabama, 739

F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Standing is one of the Article III case or controversy

requirements[.]”). “To have standing, the plaintiff[] must demonstrate injury in fact, causation, and

redressability. Failure to satisfy any of these three requirements is fatal” Id. (internal citations

omitted).

“The ‘foremost’ standing requirement is injury in fact.” Trichell v. Midland Credit Mgmt.,

Inc., 964 F.3d 990, 996 (11th Cir. 2020). “An injury in fact is ‘an invasion of a legally protected

interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or

hypothetical.”’ I.L., 739 F.3d at 1278; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).

“A ‘concrete’ injury must be ‘de facto’—that is, it must be ‘real, and not abstract.”’ Trichell, 964

F.3d at 996 (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 340 (2016)). However, an injury need

not yet have occurred to constitute an injury in fact. A harm yet to occur will still satisfy the case

and controversy requirement if is “sufficiently substantial and imminent.” DiPierro v. Fla. Health

Sciences Ctr., Inc., 2024 WL 3051320, at *5 (M.D. Fla. June 18, 2024). A harm is imminent if

there is “a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result” of the challenged conduct. Fla.

State Conf. of N.A.A.C.P. v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1161 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Babbitt v.

United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)).

C. Futility of Amendment

Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure directs that before trial, “[t]he court should

freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Leave to amend

should be “freely given” absent a showing of “futility of amendment.” Garfield v. NDC Health

Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1270 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).

When an amended complaint would still be “properly dismissed or be immediately subject to

summary judgment for the defendant,” a district court could determine that leave to amend the

complaint is futile. Rivas v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 777 F. App’x 958, 965 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting

Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standing

Lululemon contends that the Amended Complaint fails to plead an injury in fact to support

Plaintiffs’ claims for money damages or for injunctive relief. ECF No. [29] at 14, 28-29. Plaintiffs

respond that they suffered an economic injury because Lululemon’s misleading greenwashing

campaign caused Plaintiffs to pay a price premium for Lululemon’s products. ECF No. [46] at 12-

14. Plaintiffs further assert that they sufficiently allege a threat of future harm because Plaintiffs

would like to purchase Lululemon’s products in the future. Id. at 24-25. Because “standing is not

dispensed in gross . . . plaintiffs must demonstrate standing for each claim that they press and for

each form of relief that they seek (for example, injunctive relief and damages).” TransUnion LLC

v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 431 (2021). Therefore, the Court addresses each point in turn.

i. Injury in Fact: Money Damages

“A person experiences an economic injury when, as a result of a deceptive act or an unfair

practice, he is deprived of the benefit of his bargain.” Debernardis v. IQ Formulations, LLC, 942

F.3d 1076, 1084 (11th Cir. 2019). Lululemon argues that Plaintiffs’ boilerplate allegations of

paying a price premium are insufficient to assert an economic injury, and Plaintiffs were required

to set forth facts that the products were worth less or defective. ECF No. [29] at 14. Plaintiffs

respond that they have established an economic injury by alleging that Lululemon’s misleading

greenwashing campaign caused them to pay a price premium for Lululemon’s products. ECF No.

[46] at 12; see ECF No. [20] at ¶¶ 139, 151, 165, 176, 184. For support, Plaintiffs cite a myriad of

cases where courts determined that a plaintiff had standing because it suffered an economic injury

by paying a price premium for a product that contained an allegedly deceptive label. See, e.g.,

Valiente v. Unilever United States, Inc., 2022 WL 18587887, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 8, 2022)

(“Plaintiff suffered an actual monetary injury by paying a price premium due to the Product’s

allegedly deceptive label.”); Piescik v. CVS Pharm., Inc., 576 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1130 (S.D. Fla.

2021) (“Payment of an allegedly unauthorized premium constitutes an economic injury.”).

However, as Lululemon highlights, mere allegations of having paid a price premium are

insufficient – a plaintiff must tie the value of the product to any purported misrepresentation. See

Valiente v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 2023 WL 3620538 (S.D. Fla. May 24, 2023). Two cases cited

to by Plaintiffs are instructive. In Unilever, the defendant sold an antiperspirant deodorant

containing a label that stated that the product contained natural oils. 2022 WL 18587887, at *1.

However, the predominant oil was a synthetic ingredient, and the complaint specifically alleged

that the value of the product purchased was materially less than what was represented. Id. The

court determined that the plaintiff alleged a sufficient injury in fact because she claimed to have

paid a price premium due to this allegedly deceptive label. Id. at *5. Similarly, in Piescik, the

plaintiff argued that he did not receive the benefit of the bargain because a hand sanitizer he

purchased would not have actually killed 99.99% of all germs, despite its claim to the contrary.

576 F. Supp. 3d at 1130. The court found that, for standing purposes, the plaintiff pled a concrete

economic injury. Id.

Here, in contrast, Plaintiffs allege that but for Lululemon’s deceptive acts, Plaintiffs “would

not have paid as much for such products and, thus, they did not receive the benefit of the bargain,

and they suffered out-of-pocket loss.” ECF No. [20] at ¶ 139; see also ECF No. [20] at ¶¶ 151,

165, 176, 184. This case is analogous to the circumstances in Valiente. There, the plaintiff

purchased honey-lemon cough drops, apparently attracted by the phrase “honey-lemon,” the

“pictures of these ingredients,” and the statement that the product “soothes sore throats.” 2023 WL

3620538, at *1. From those representations, the plaintiff believed that the cough drops contained

lemon ingredients and were capable of soothing bronchial passages. Id. The product’s front label,

however, disclosed that the active ingredient was “Menthol Cough Suppressant/Oral Anesthetic,”

and the ingredient list did not include lemon. Id. The court ultimately held that the plaintiff failed

to assert an economic injury because the plaintiff did not allege that the “honey-lemon cough drops

were defective, did not work as advertised, or otherwise were so flawed as to render them

worthless.” 2023 WL 3620538, at *5.

The same conclusion is warranted here. As in Valiente, Plaintiffs fail to allege that

Lululemon’s products were defective or worthless. Rather, similar to how the active ingredient

was disclosed on the defendant’s product in Valiente, the Amended Complaint alleges that

Lululemon’s products “are made with polyester and nylon, which are manufactured from fossil

fuels.” 2023 WL 3620538, at *1; ECF No. [20] at ¶ 66. Further, as Plaintiffs allege, Lululemon

consistently reported its GHG emissions, see ECF No. [20] at ¶¶ 64, 66, 68, and that many of its

manufacturers and suppliers are in countries with significant fossil fuel reliance, id. at ¶ 66. The

Amended Complaint fails to allege a factual connection between the value of Lululemon’s

products and Lululemon’s representations. See Valiente, 2023 WL 3620538, at * 5. The Amended

Complaint contains nothing more than a subjective belief that plaintiffs paid a price premium.

Further, the Amended Complaint does not allege that there was any deceptive act or unfair

practice regarding the products sold to Plaintiffs. Indeed, the “deception” Plaintiffs purportedly

relied on amounts to nothing more than goals and promises contained in a press release or on

Lululemon’s website. See, e.g., ECF No. [29] at ¶ 58 (“The Company’s Impact Agenda outlines

its multi-year strategies to address critical social and environmental issues with 12 goals to drive

progress. These include targeting areas . . . with specific commitments to . . . make 100% of its

products with sustainable materials and end-of-use solutions by 2030.” (emphasis omitted)); ECF

No. [29] at ¶ 97 (“On its website . . . Lululemon introduces its purported ‘2030 science-based

climate targets,’ which include ‘achieving: 60% absolute reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG)

emissions in all owned and operated facilities (Scope 1 and 2)’ and ‘60% intensity reduction of

GHG emissions across our global supply chain (Scope 3)[.]’” (emphasis omitted)); ECF No. [29]

at ¶ 98 (“Lululemon claims on its website that ‘[w]e are making progress on our climate goals

around carbon reduction.’”). Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to tie any aspect of Lululemon’s statements

to the purported price premium that Plaintiffs paid for Lululemon’s products. See Valiente, 2023

WL 3620538, at *5. These blanket assertions are insufficient to constitute an economic injury, and

therefore Plaintiffs lack Article III standing.

ii. Injury in Fact: Injunctive Relief

To have standing to bring suit for injunctive relief, a plaintiff must also show “a sufficient

likelihood that he will be affected by the allegedly unlawful conduct in the future.” Wooden v. Bd.

of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001). “Because injunctions

regulate future conduct, a party has standing to seek injunctive relief only if the party shows ‘a real

and immediate—as opposed to a merely conjectural or hypothetical—threat of future injury.’”

Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc., 733 F.3d 1323, 1329 (11th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original)

(quoting Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 2001)).

Lululemon contends that Plaintiffs lack standing for injunctive relief because they have not

alleged an imminent threat of being harmed again in a similar manner. ECF No. [29] at 28.

Plaintiffs respond that the Amended Complaint plausibly alleges future harm because it states that

they would like to purchase Lululemon’s products if they can rely on Lululemon to be truthful in

their marketing statements regarding the sustainability and environmental impact of Lululemon’s

products and actions. ECF No. [46] at 24; ECF No. [20] at ¶ 140.

Lululemon presents two cases for support. In Williams v. Reckitt Benckiser LLC, 65 F.4th

1243, 1254 (11th Cir. 2023), the complaint alleged only that the plaintiffs wanted to purchase the

defendants’ brain performance supplements but were unable to rely on defendants’ representations

regarding the effectiveness of their products in deciding whether to purchase the products in the

future. The court determined that such allegations were “plainly insufficient to establish a threat

of imminent or actual harm,” because “‘some day’ intentions – without any description of concrete

plans, or indeed even any specification on when the some day will be – do not support a finding

of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury that our cases require.” Id. at 1255 (emphasis in original)

(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992)).

The court in Piescik reached the same conclusion, finding that that the plaintiff could not

“possibly be harmed in the future since he is now acutely aware that Defendant’s hand sanitizer

kills only 99.99% of many common harmful germs and bacteria found on the hands, not 99.99%

of all germs in existence.” Piescik v. CVS Pharm., Inc., 576 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1131 (S.D. Fla.

2021); see also Valiente v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 2023 WL 3620538, at *6 (S.D. Fla. May

24, 2023) (finding that the plaintiff failed to plead standing for injunctive relief because his

“allegations make clear that he will not purchase more of the purportedly deceptive products so

long as the labelling does not meet his standards” (cleaned up)).

Plaintiff argues that those cases are easily distinguishable because the nature of the

misrepresentations and products in those cases made it implausible that the plaintiffs would

purchase the products in the future. ECF No. [46] at 25. Plaintiffs’ contention is misplaced, as the

analysis in Williams and Piescik focused on how the plaintiffs’ alleged only a potential interest in

purchasing the products again. See Williams, 65 F.4th at 1254-55; Piescik, 576 F. Supp. 3d at 1131.

Both cases contained allegations that the plaintiffs “would like” to purchase the defendants’

products “if” the defendant developed improved products. Williams, 65 F.4th at 1255; Piescik, 576

F. Supp. 3d at 1130. Therefore, any alleged harm was conjectural and hypothetical, not actual or

imminent, as required by Article III. Similarly, the Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs

“would like” to purchase Lululemon’s products, but “only if” they can rely on Lululemon “to be

truthful in their marketing statements regarding the sustainability and environmental impact of

Lululemon’s products and actions.” ECF No. [20] at ¶ 140. Plaintiffs fail to allege any threat of

imminent injury and therefore lack standing to pursue injunctive relief.

Because the Court has concluded that Plaintiffs do not adequately plead Article III

standing, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiffs’ claims. See Steel Co.

v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (“Without jurisdiction the court cannot

proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist,

the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”

(quoting Ex Parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868))). The Court therefore does

not reach the merits of the Motion.

B. Leave to Amend

“Because standing is jurisdictional, a dismissal for lack of standing has the same effect as

a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction[.]” Cone Corp. v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 921 F.2d

1190, 1203 n.42 (11th Cir. 1991). “A dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not a

judgment on the merits and is entered without prejudice.” Stalley ex rel. U.S. v. Orlando Reg’l

Healthcare Syst., Inc., 524 F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir. 2008).

Nevertheless, Plaintiffs seek leave to amend the Amended Complaint should Lululemon’s

Motion be granted. ECF No. [46] at 27. Leave to amend should be “freely given” absent a showing

of “futility of amendment.” Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1270 (11th Cir. 2006)

(citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). However, “our precedent is clear that a request

for leave to amend embedded in an opposition memorandum does not properly put the issue before

the district court.” Advance Tr. & Life Escrow Servs., LTA v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 93 F.4th

1315, 1337 (11th Cir. 2024); see Newton v. Duke Energy Fla., LLC, 895 F.3d 1270, 1277-78 (11th

Cir. 2018) (stating that a request for leave to amend is not properly raised if embedded in a

memorandum in opposition to a motion to dismiss and not made by motion). Because Plaintiffs’

request for leave to amend is embedded in their Response to the Motion, it is not procedurally

proper, and must therefore be denied. See Valiente v. Publix Super-Markets, Inc., 2023 WL

3620538, at *7 (S.D. Fla. May 24, 2023) (dismissing complaint for lack of standing without

prejudice, but without leave to amend, because the request was procedurally defective and lacking

in substantive support); Ramirez v. Kraft Heinz Foods Co., 684 F. Supp. 3d 1253, 1261 (S.D. Fla.

2023) (dismissing without leave to amend because the request was not procedurally proper).

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. Lululemon’s Motion, ECF No. [29] is GRANTED.

2. The Amended Complaint, ECF No. [20], is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

and without leave to amend.

3. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case. If Plaintiffs file a new Complaint,

they must do so by opening a new case.

4. To the extent not otherwise disposed of, any scheduled hearings are CANCELED, all

pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT, and all deadlines are TERMINATED.

Case No. 24-cv-22651-BLOOM/Elfenbein

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on February 18, 2025.

BETH BLOOM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ce: counsel of record

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