Opinion

LKRB INDUSTRIES, LLC v. xuzhouaiyaxundianzishangwuyouxiangongsi

Court: District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
Filed: Feb 18, 2025
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 34.0%

affirming the district court’s grant ofa preliminary injunction and concluding that loss of market share constitutes irreparable harm

How later courts described this case

affirming the district court’s grant ofa preliminary injunction and concluding that loss of market share constitutes irreparable harm
“District courts have the freedom to fashion preliminary equitable relief so long as they do so by ‘exercising their sound discretion.’” (internal citation omitted)
stating that courts should not “entirely ignore the fundamental nature of patent as property rights granting the owner the right to exclude”
“[T]o permit imitation of a patented invention which does not copy every literal detail would be to convert the protection of the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LKRB INDUSTRIES, LLC doing business as

HAPPY GRANDPA,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 2:24-cv-1601

v. Hon. William S. Stickman IV

xuzhouatyaxundianzishangwuyouxiangongsi,

et al,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILLIAM S. STICKMAN IV, United States District Judge

Plaintiff LKRB Industries, LLC (““LKRB”), d/b/a Happy Grandpa (“HGP”), asks the Court

to enter a preliminary injunction enjoining Defendants (identified in Schedule “A” of the

Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief (“complaint”) (ECF No. 3, pp. 23-24)) from

manufacturing, distributing, importing, offering for sale, and/or selling LKRB’s patented

encapsulated flexible light emitting diode light strips (‘LED light strips”) associated with United

States Patent Number 8,789,988 (‘“988 Patent”). (ECF No. 3, pp. 2, 21). At Count I, LKRB

asserts that Defendants directly and indirectly infringed, and continue to infringe, on at least

independent Claim 1 of the ‘988 Patent in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 271. Ud. at 18-19). At Count

II, LKRB asserts that Defendants violated the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), by making “false

and/or misleading descriptions of fact and/or false and/or misleading representations of fact about

the nature, characteristics, and/or qualities of Defendants’ Products.” (/d. at 19-20). For the

reasons explained below, the Court will grant the requested preliminary injunction with regard to

Defendant Nos. 9, 13, 25-27, 33, and 87. The Court will deny LKRB’s request for a preliminary

injunction with regard to Defendant Nos. 10, 15, 23, 31, 34, 36, 39, 41, 45, 49, 63, 70, 76, 77, 84,

88, and 92-94.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

LKRB is a limited liability company that is the sole authorized manufacturer and seller of

the product embodying the claims within the ‘988 Patent. (ECF No. 3, p. 2). The ‘988 Patent

entitled “Flexible LED light strip for a bicycle and method of making the same” was issued by the

United States Patent and Trademark Office on July 29, 2014. Ud. at 3). The ‘988 Patent was

originally issued to Dan Goldwater. (/d. at 3). Patrick Buckley (“Buckley”) obtained ownership

of the ‘988 Patent on behalf his business, LKRB, in 2021. (Ud. at 5). No license or other rights to

the ‘988 Patent have been granted to any Defendant. (/d.). LKRB currently sells and offers for

sale HGP’s LED light strips on Amazon.com (“Amazon”) and at www.HappyGrandpa.com. (/d.)

These LED light strips allegedly embody the innovative features set forth in the claims of the ‘988

Patent. (Ud). According to the complaint, “Defendants are individuals, partnerships,

unincorporated associations, and/or business entities of unknown makeup . . . [who] operate in

foreign jurisdictions and manufacture, distribute, import, offer for sale, and/or sell products,

including Defendants’ Products, from the same or similar sources in those foreign locations.” (d.

at 3).

Like LKRB, Defendants sell LED light strips. Defendants allegedly sell and offer for sale

infringing products through online marketplaces, including Amazon. (/d. at 6). LKRB alleges

that Defendants’ products are not only infringing, but likely to confuse consumers and erode

confidence in the LED light strip industry as a whole. (Ud. at 9). Moreover, LKRB alleges that

Defendants have-engaged in false marketing in violation of the Lanham Act, in part, regarding the

specifications and safety of Defendants’ products. (Ud. at 11-12).

On November 11, 2024, LKRB filed this lawsuit against Defendants for patent

infringement and false marketing. (ECF No. 3). In their complaint and ex parte motion, LKRB

requested (1) a temporary restraining order; (2) an order restraining Defendants’ assets; (3) an

order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue; and (4) expedited discovery.

(ECF Nos. 3, 4). On November 25, 2024, the Court held a motion hearing and granted LKRB an

ex parte temporary restraining order. (ECF Nos. 12, 13). In the complaint, LKRB also requested

entry of a preliminary injunction that would bar Defendants from selling the allegedly infringing

products during the pendency of this litigation. (ECF No. 3). The Court held hearings regarding

the preliminary injunction on December 23, 2024, and January 8, 10, and 17, 2025. (ECF Nos.

50, 98, 104, 138). During these hearings, it became apparent that the most contested issue at this

stage of the litigation is whether the allegedly infringing products include support tabs. (ECF No.

115, p. 17). LKRB asserts that the Defendants’ products include support tabs — meaning that their

products literally infringe on the ‘988 Patent. Most Defendants argue that the lack of support tabs

is the primary difference between their products and the ‘988 Patent. Support tabs are used during

the manufacturing of the patented LED light strips to connect and hold the strips together in a sheet

before they are separated into individual strips. Ud). The support tabs are not always visible to

the naked eye and sometimes must be viewed through a microscope. (d. at 26).

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Utility patents are issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 101, which provides that a patent may be

obtained for “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any

new and useful improvement thereof... .” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Patent Act enables federal courts

- to issue injunctive relief “to prevent the-violation-of any right secured by patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 283: □□□

For patent infringement claims, the Court must apply the preliminary injunction standards set forth

by the United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (“The [Federal Circuit] shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . of an appeal

from a final decision of a district court of the United States . . . in any civil action arising under . .

. any Act of Congress relating to patents.”’)

“The decision to grant or deny . . . injunctive relief is an act of equitable discretion by the

district court.” eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006); see also 35 U.S.C. §

283 (generally providing that courts “may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of

equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems

reasonable”). Injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Wind

Tower Trade Coalition v. United States, 741 F.3d 89, 95 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (internal citations

omitted). A party seeking a preliminary injunction must therefore demonstrate: (1) a reasonable

likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the prospect of irreparable harm in the absence of an

injunction; (3) that this harm would exceed harm to the opposing party; and (4) that the public

interest favors such relief. See, e.g., Sciele Pharma Inc. v. Lupin Ltd., 684 F.3d 1253, 1259 (Fed.

Cir. 2012). In determining whether to grant injunctive relief, no one factor, taken individually,

proves dispositive. See Hybritech v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Rather,

the Court “must weigh and measure each factor against the other factors and against the form and

magnitude of the relief requested.” Jd. at 1451. Nevertheless, the Court will not grant an injunction

unless the movant “establishes both of the first two factors, likelihood of success on the merits and

irreparable harm.” PHG Tech., LLC v. St. John Cos., Inc., 469 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2006)

(internal citations omitted).

reaching-its-decision on a -request-for-injunctive relief, a district-court sits as both the-----

trier of fact and the arbiter of legal disputes. A court must, therefore, make “findings of fact and

conclusions of law upon the granting or refusing of a preliminary injunction.” Bradley v.

Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1178 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(2)). At

the preliminary injunction stage, “procedures [] are less formal and evidence [] is less complete

than in a trial on the merits.” Kos Pharms., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 718 (3d Cir. 2004);

see also AT&T Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1427 (3d Cir. 1994)

(“[T]he grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is almost always based on an abbreviated set of

facts, requiring a delicate balancing [that] is the responsibility of the district judge.” (internal

citations omitted)). Accordingly, a court “may rely on affidavits and hearsay materials which

would not be admissible evidence.” Kos Pharms., 369 F.3d at 718 (quoting in parenthetical Levi

Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’l Trading, Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985 (11th Cir. 1995)). The weight given

to such materials will “vary greatly depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case.” Id.

at 719. A court is also tasked with assessing the credibility of witness testimony and may base the

decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction on credibility determinations. See, e.g., Hudson

Glob. Res. Holdings, Inc. v. Hill, 2007 WL 1545678, at *8 (W.D. Pa. May 25, 2007).

Against this backdrop, a district court maintains the sound discretion to grant or deny a

preliminary injunction. See Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2017)

(“District courts have the freedom to fashion preliminary equitable relief so long as they do so by

‘exercising their sound discretion.’” (internal citation omitted)). The primary purpose of

preliminary injunctive relief is “maintenance of the status quo until a decision on the merits of a

case is rendered.” Acierno v. New Castle Cnty., 40 F.3d 645, 647 (3d Cir. 1994). The “status quo”

refers to “the last, peaceable, noncontested status of the parties.” Kos Pharms., 369 F.3d at 708.

. ,

Tl. ANALYSIS

A. Count I: Patent Infringement

a. Reasonable Likelihood of Success on the Merits

To demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, LKRB must demonstrate that, in light

of the presumptions and burden that will be inherent at a trial on the merits, that (1) LKRB will

likely show that Defendants infringe on the patent and (2) LKRB’s infringement claim will likely

withstand Defendants’ challenges to the validity and enforceability of the patent. See Genentech,

Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1997). If Defendants raise a substantial

question concerning either infringement or validity, i.e., asserts an infringement or invalidity

defense that LKRB cannot prove lacks substantial merit, the Court will not grant a preliminary

injunction. See id. An infringement analysis requires two steps. First, the Court must determine

the claim at issue’s scope. See, e.g., Young Dental Mfg. Co. v. Q3 Special Prods., Inc., 112 F.3d

1137, 1141 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Second, the Court must compare the properly construed claim with

the accused device to determine whether all of the claim limitations are present either literally or

by a substantial equivalent. Jd. In light of the evidence submitted, the Court finds that LKRB has

demonstrated the likelihood of success on the merits of its infringement claim with respect to

Defendant Nos. 9, 13, 25-27, 33, and 87. LKRB has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success

on the merits with regard to Defendant Nos. 10, 15, 23, 31, 34, 36, 39, 41, 45, 49, 63, 70, 76, 77,

84, 88, and 92-94.

i. Claim Construction

“It is a bedrock principle of patent law that the claims of a patent define the invention to

.. -which-the patentee is entitled the right-to exclude.” Phillips v. AWA Corp.; 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 --

(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). “‘[T]here is no magic formula or

catechism for conducting claim construction.’ Instead, the court is free to attach the appropriate

weight to appropriate sources ‘in light of the statutes and policies that inform patent law.’”

SoftView LLC v. Apple Inc., 2013 WL 4758195, at *1 (D. Del. Sept. 4, 2013) (quoting Phillips,

415 F.3d at 1324) (alteration in original). When construing patent claims, the Court considers the

literal language of the claim, the patent specification, and the prosecution history. Markman v.

Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 977-80 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). Of these sources,

specification is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is

dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at

1315 (internal quotation marks omitted).

For utility patents, claim construction involves determining what the technical words in the

claim mean. “[T]he words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.

[Which is] the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in

question at the time of the invention, i.¢., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.”

Id. at 1312-13 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “[T]he ordinary meaning of a

claim term is its meaning to [an] ordinary artisan after reading the entire patent.” Jd. at 1321

(internal quotation marks omitted). “In some cases, the ordinary meaning of claim language as

understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges and claim

construction in such cases involves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning

of commonly understood words.” Jd. at 1314; see also See Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 1352

(Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the claims did “not require elaborate interpretation”).

Defendants are not disputing the meaning of any claim terms. Thus, no elaborate claim

-. construction is necessary, and the Court may rely on-the-plain language-in the patent specification—.--— —

as the meaning of the claim as outlined below. The Court accepts the language within the patent

specification as the meaning and scope of the ‘988 Patent. This construction is without prejudice

to any future motions on prosecution history, prior art, or any similar factors.

ii. Infringement

Since the Court has determined that claim construction is unnecessary in this case, the next

step is to compare the ‘988 Patent with the accused products to determine if infringement likely

occurred. Federal law prohibits one, without authority, from making, using, offering to sell, or

selling any patented invention within the United States or imported into the United States. 35

U.S.C. § 271(a). Utility patents may be infringed both literally and under the doctrine of

equivalents. A device infringes a utility patent “literally” if “every limitation recited in the claim

is found in the accused device.” Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 811 F.3d 1334,

1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

Under the doctrine of equivalents, “a product or process that does not literally infringe

upon the express terms of a patent claim may nonetheless be found to infringe if there are

‘equivalents’ between the elements of the accused product or process and the claimed elements of

the patented invention.” Warner—Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997)

(internal citations omitted). For doctrine of equivalents purposes, the accused and claimed

elements are equivalent if there are only “insubstantial differences” between them. /d. at 39. An

alternate formulation focuses on whether the “substitute element matches the function, way, and

result of the claimed element.” Jd. at 40; see also Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods.

Co., 339 U.S. 605, 612 (1950) (finding equivalents when the “changes which avoid literal

infringement are colorable only’). The doctrine recognizes that

..... [t]he language-in the patent-claims may not capture every nuance of the-invention □□□

or describe with complete precision the range of its novelty. If patents were always

interpreted by their literal terms, their value would be greatly diminished.

Unimportant and insubstantial substitutes for certain elements could defeat the

patent, and its value to inventors could be destroyed by simple acts of copying.

Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002); Graver Tank,

339 U.S. at 605 (“[T]o permit imitation of a patented invention which does not copy every literal

detail would be to convert the protection of the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing.”). The

determination of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is limited by two primary legal

doctrines, prosecution history estoppel and the “all elements” rule, the applications of which are

questions of law. Seachange Int'l, Inc. v. C-COR, Inc., 413 F.3d 1361, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

With respect to utility patents, prosecution history estoppel limits a patentee’s ability to

recover under the doctrine of equivalents but does not limit literal infringement. “The doctrine of

prosecution history estoppel bars a patentee from asserting as an equivalent subject matter

surrendered during prosecution of the patent application.” Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v. Arrow

Commce’n Lab’ys, Inc., 305 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted). The

doctrine is founded on the public notice function of patents. The Supreme Court has recognized

that “[t]here can be no denying that the doctrine of equivalents, when applied broadly, conflicts

with the definitional and public-notice functions of the statutory claiming requirement.” Warner—

Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29. Consequently, prosecution history estoppel limits the bounds of what

a patentee can claim as equivalent by “requir[ing] that the claims of a patent be interpreted in light

of the proceedings in the PTO during the application process.” Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 740.

Where subject matter is surrendered during prosecution, prosecution history estoppel prevents the

patentee from “recaptur[ing] in an infringement action the very subject matter surrendered as a

condition of receiving the patent.” Jd. at 734.

~The other limit on the doctrine of equivalents is the “all elements” rule. The all-elements

rule is that an accused device must contain every claimed element of the invention or the equivalent

of every claimed element. See Warner—Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29. No claimed element, or an

equivalent thereof, can be absent if the doctrine of equivalents is invoked. The “all elements” rule

attempts to balance the doctrine of equivalents with the basic patent law principle that claim

language defines the scope of an invention and every limitation is material.

Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to defining the scope of the

patented invention, and thus the doctrine of equivalents must be applied to individual elements of

the claim, not to the invention as a whole. It is important to ensure that the application of the

doctrine, even as to an individual element, is not allowed such broad play as to effectively eliminate

that element in its entirety. Warner—Jenkinson, 520 U:S. at 29. “Thus, as a practical matter, the

‘all elements’ rule informs a doctrine of equivalents analysis by requiring that equivalents be

assessed on a limitation-by-limitation basis, rather than from the perspective of the invention as a

whole, and that no limitation be read completely out of the claim.” Freedman Seating Co. v. Am.

Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

In certain instances, the “all elements” rule “forecloses resort to the doctrine of equivalents

because, on the facts or theories presented in a case, a limitation would be read completely out of

the claim-—i.e., the limitation would be effectively removed or ‘vitiated.’” DePuy Spine, Inc. v.

Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The “all elements” rule

generally is not met—and therefore a claim limitation can be said to be vitiated—if the theory or

evidence of equivalents is legally incapable of establishing that the differences between the

limitation in the claim and the accused device are insubstantial; i.e., “if the theory or evidence is

so legally insufficient as to warrant a holding of non-infringement as a matter of law.” Jd. (citing

--.Warner—Jenkinson;520 U.S. at 39 n. 8). “[C]ourts must consider the totality of the circumstances □□

of each case and determine whether the alleged equivalent can be fairly characterized as an

insubstantial change from the claimed subject matter without rendering the pertinent limitation

meaningless.” Freedman Seating, 520 F.3d at 1358.

LKRB generally argues that Defendants’ products are “(1) substantially identical to each

other and the same in all respects in their infringement of the Asserted Patent; and (2) substantially

identical to HGP LED strips such that consumers are likely to be confused.” (ECF No. 3, p. 8).

Specifically, LKRB alleges that Defendants infringed on independent Claim One of the “988

Patent. (/d. at 18). Claim One discloses:

An encapsulated flexible LED light strip comprising: a flexible Substrate having a

rectangular-shaped central portion and a plurality of Support tabs laterally

extending from elongate lateral sides of the central portion and spaced apart along

the elongate lateral sides of the central portion; an LED light circuit at the central

portion of the flexible Substrate and having at least three spaced-apart LED lights;

a Substantially Voidless flexible plastic housing encapsulating the LED light circuit

and the central portion of the flexible substrate; wherein the flexible plastic housing

has a length extending between opposed ends, a width extending between opposed

lateral sides, and a thickness extending between opposed front and rear sides;

wherein the encapsulated flexible LED light strip has a minimum flexibility of the

length such that when the length is shorter than 200 mm every 80 mm section of

the length can bend over an arc of 20 degrees and when the length is 200 mm or

longer every 150 mm section of the length can bend over an arc of 20 degrees;

wherein the length is in the range of 80 mm to 2.0 m: wherein the length to the

width has a ratio of at least 8:1; at least one flexible electrical cable extending from

the LED light circuit and through the flexible plastic housing; and wherein the

flexible plastic housing forms a contoured strain relief for at least one flexible

electrical cable.

(ECF No. 122-1, p. 26) (emphasis added). The most contested element of the claim is

whether the alleged infringing products include a plurality of support tabs.! Below is an image of

the subject of the ‘988 Patent - LKRB’s LED light strip:

! At this stage, the Court will only consider the arguments brought before the Court regarding

_.... infringement. .-For instance, if.a defendant argues that-its product is-not infringing because its .-—.~

product does not contain support tabs, the Court will analyze the support tab limitation of Claim

One. If neither LKRB nor a given defendant argues a limitation of Claim One, for instance length,

in relation to a certain product, the Court will not analyze that element under literal or doctrine of

equivalents infringement. At the preliminary injunction phase, LKRB has to prove a reasonable

ECF No. 3, p. 8). After reviewing LKRB’s claim limitations and the limitations of the allegedl

infringing products, the Court holds that LKRB demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits

on Count I of the complaint (infringement) with regard to Defendant Nos. 9, 13, 25-27, 33, and

87. The Court will grant requested preliminary injunction with regard to those Defendants. With

regards to Defendant Nos. 10, 15, 23, 31, 34, 36, 39, 41, 45, 49, 63, 70, 76, 77, 84, 88, and 92-94,

the Court holds that LKRB did not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits.

The Court will deny the requested injunction with regard to those Defendants.

a. Defendant No. 93

Defendant No. 93 sells the product pictured below:

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likelihood of success on the merits. In order to avoid converting preliminary injunction hearings

into full trials on the merits, the Court will view any limitations of Claim One that are not contested

as waived by the defendant solely for the purposes of determining whether the Court will grant

LKRB’s motion for a preliminary injunction.

(ECF No. 78, p. 8); (see also ECF No. 122-4, p. 72). Defendant No. 93 argues that LKRB failed

to prove literal or doctrine of equivalents infringement because its product “does not have support

pieces that extend laterally from the central part and are spaced apart along the long side edges of

the central part.” (/d. at 7).

LKRB has not produced any evidence showing that Defendant No. 93’s product had

support tabs. The Court cannot tell from the images provided whether the product was

manufactured using support tabs. (See ECF No. 116, pp. 39-40 (stating that support tabs often are

not visible with the naked eye and may only be visible with microscopic imaging)). The owner of

LKRB, Buckley, testified that he examined some of the accused products for support tabs. (/d.).

Buckley stated in relation to several Defendants, including Defendant No. 93, that he was unsure

whether he examined their specific product for support tabs. (/d.). Buckley further testified that

he analyzed “[m]aybe 20 or so” products but did not examine the product of every defendant in

this litigation for support tabs. (/d. at 28). The inclusion of support tabs is an element of Claim

One. ( ECF No. 122-1, p. 26). Since the Court cannot determine whether Defendant No. 93’s

product includes support tabs, the Court holds that Defendant No. 93’s product does not literally

infringe on the ‘988 Patent.

Further, under the all elements rule of the doctrine of equivalents, even if an allegedly

infringing product does not contain every claim element of the invention, it must contain the

equivalent of every claimed element. See Warner—Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29. For example,

assume that a utility patent for a chair requires that the chair have “three or more spaced legs” and

“each leg having one relatively flat end.” See COMPLEX LITIGATION COMMITTEE OF THE

-AMBRIGAN-COLLEGE-OF TRIAL -LAWYERS;-ANATOMY OF A PATENT GASE,-3.(2d ed.- 2012). □□ □

someone sells a chair with one or two legs but everything else is the same as claimed in the patent,

then there is no literal infringement because the claim requires “three or more spaced legs.” Jd.

However, if someone sells a chair with three spaced legs where two of the legs have relatively flat

ends and one has a rounded end, there is likely doctrine of equivalents infringement because there

is the equivalent of every claimed element.

Here, LKRB has not presented any evidence or argument that Defendant No. 93’s product

has the equivalent of support tabs. The Court acknowledges that the main role of support tabs is

to help with alignment during manufacturing. (ECF No. 115, p. 20). Support tabs do not appear

to serve a function to the eventual consumer. However, since each element contained in a patent

claim is material to defining the scope of the invention, the Court cannot read the limitation out of

the ‘988 Patent simply because the support tabs are not necessarily useful to a consumer. LKRB’s

conclusory and general statement that “Defendants’ Products infringed under the doctrine of

equivalents because Defendants’ Products performed substantially the same function in

substantially the same way to obtain the same result as one or more claims of the Asserted Patent,”

(ECF No. 3, p. 19), is both insufficient and misreads the law. The doctrine of equivalents is not

focused on whether the end product serves the same function in substantially the same way as the

patented invention. Instead, the inquiry is whether every element of each patented claim is present

either literally or with insubstantial differences. Since LKRB failed to produce evidence that the

allegedly infringing product contains support tabs or the equivalent thereof, the Court holds that

LKRB did not meet its burden to show a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits as to

Defendant No. 93.

b. Defendant No. 39

Defendant No. 39 sells the product pictured below:

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(ECF No. 78, p. 8); (see also ECF No. 122-4, p. 74). Defendant No. 39 argues that its product

does not infringe on the ‘988 Patent literally or under the doctrine of equivalents because its

product (1) “does not have support pieces that extend laterally from the central part and are spaced

apart along the long side edges of the central part, and (2) “does not have a flexible plastic shell.”

(Id. at 7).

LKRB has not presented evidence that Defendant No. 39’s product contains support tabs

or the equivalents of support tabs. (See ECF No. 116, p. 39-40 (stating that Buckley could not

remember the specific product of Defendant No. 39)). The Court cannot discern from the images

provided whether Defendant No. 39’s product features support tabs or the equivalents thereof.

Since LKRB has not presented evidence showing that Defendant No. 39 infringes on the *988

Patent either literally or under-the doctrine of equivalents, the Court holds-that LKRB has □□□□□ □□□ -

demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of an infringement action against

Defendant No. 39.

c. Defendant No. 34

Defendant No. 34 sells the below-depicted product:

(ECF No. 80, p. 4); (see also ECF No. 122-4, pp. 85, 98). Defendant No. 34 argues that its product

does not infringe on the ‘988 Patent because its product “do[es] not have such support pieces that

extend laterally from the central part and are spaced apart along the long side edges of the central

part.” Ud. at 5).

LKRB has not presented evidence that Defendant No. 34’s product contains support tabs

or the equivalents of support tabs. (See ECF No. 116, pp. 7, 39 (stating that Buckley does not

know whether any of the included Defendants’ products feature support tabs)). The Court cannot

discern from the images provided whether Defendant No. 34’s product features support tabs or the

equivalents thereof. Since LKRB has not presented evidence showing that Defendant No. 34

infringed on the ‘988 Patent, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalence, the Court holds

that LKRB has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of an

infringement action against Defendant No. 34.

. 23, 36, 41, 45, 49, 63, 76, 77, and 92

, 36, 41, 45, 49, 63, 76, 77, and 92 sell or offer to sell the following

Defendant No. 23 Bees et een? : Ea

Ree : : OR ea

Sisk ee : : ee

ERO St BS Co es

Se es : □□ eee

Re SEAR begets SAE

Pee gee Se ee oe cpr Guaeeel

Pere ee yg eg □□ aoe

geen oe Sie a a ee ai □□□ eR Ceo ee NS SEE ies

a ia Re een Ce ee

ee cree ee SP Bee ee SN

Baa rp a Ss Wee et BES See IS CES SUG?

Ce ee se

Bite Ba goes Seg nic STEN SE a aes □□

Bee ee, ee

ERED oe BES STE EES: AES TSS oe a

SESE age □ Se EES NINES

CES a eae Se ee eG ee) OE

efendant No. 41 Ee oo Pe ee

OC ee ae Sikes Ghee semen EG

Se ar ee ee a

St eee ge See ote Se OE Ga

SS Ges eee ee ee ee

EAS Bee ees fe ee ee

RE ee. SO a So

se cog SO ee eee

eS Se”

oa a 2 2m

Boke ogee ES Se GS Eg Pie (Ee SS

PES Mag a as pe lea ca AEP SSA ie ae REDS Ne ALye

PEE SESS BE A GIR EG Rae ree, eet se ne putin he Re oe

Defendant Nos. 45 and 76 SS se

: rg AS SR ES a ae EE Oi SP ay

gS □□□ a ae □□ cea epee aS CE

Se ee Gone

i a RS Serge aS

eT oto 2c emeemenie cosadbas ie iieneaiael

a ony. Tenet a aaereeee

beat ae ces ond ier eee a aaa cae

Bo Se is SAAR ee ee □□ ee oe □□ ge □□□ EE

CE es Sgr ER oe

sees Ue hu ee RP ee □□ SG ee ENS See

iGo ee Bee WO a es Sets eg ce SAE GS

Bea. OS ieee ee ee ee

Se □□□ TOU at SS a regs oro CS CHES

Bes Se ee SY

i Gi AC BABS se Reyes add NEU NSO oan ey

od eee een

pee PS a BES ES CREE

PG ee ee eee

SE re Se Sarg ge SR BAD ns So

BEB Td ore ET ee SE OR i EE se mee. aS ee ee

Se eee

Defendant Nos. 63 and 77 ee ee

eg Oe De ee oes Ee

be ee

eee

Sere aes Seer

Defendant No. 92 Sea Tee ees

ae ee ee ee

ee ee

(ECF No. 82-2, pp. 2-5); (see also ECF No. 122-4, pp. 23, 31, 35, 39, 52, 59-60, 71). Defendants

argue that their products do not infringe on the ‘988 Patent because their products do not have

support tabs as required by Claim One of the ‘988 Patent. (ECF No. 82, p. 7).

LKRB has not presented evidence that the included Defendants’ products contain support

tabs or the equivalents of support tabs. The Court cannot discern from the images provided

whether the included Defendants’ products feature support tabs or the equivalents thereof. Since

LKRB has not presented evidence showing that the included Defendants infringed on the ‘988

Patent either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, the Court holds that LKRB has not

demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of an infringement action against

Defendant Nos. 23, 36, 41, 45, 49, 63, 76, 77, and 92.

e. Defendant Nos. 70, 84, 88, and 94

Defendant Nos. 70, 84, 88, and 94 sell or offer to sell the product pictured below:

a Qe ee

oe a:

SNS hy ACES BE MRE om Be ss

foo Be

(ECF No. 105-3, p. 4); (see also ECF No. 122-4, pp. 67, 77-79, 97, 109 (depicting Defendant Nos.

88, 94, 70 and 84’s product respectively)). The listed Defendants contend that they do not infringe

on the ‘988 Patent because their product does not include “a plurality of support tabs laterally

extending from elongate lateral sides of the central portion and spaced apart along the elongate

lateral sides of the central portion” or a “flexible plastic housing encapsulating the LED light

circuit and the central portion of the flexible substrate” as detailed in Claim One of the 988 Patent.

(ECF No. 105, p. 4).

The Court cannot discern from the images provided whether Defendant Nos. 70, 84, 88,

and 94’s product features support tabs or the equivalents thereof. Since LKRB has not presented

- ~evidence showing that the listed Defendants’ product infringes on the ‘988 Patent, either-literally- □

or under the doctrine of equivalents, the Court holds that LKRB has not demonstrated a reasonable

likelihood of success on the merits of an infringement action against Defendant Nos. 70, 84, 88,

and 94.

f. Defendant No. 9

According to LKRB, Defendant No. 9 manufactures, sells, or offers to sell the product

depicted below:

ee See eee aa, rer car ere: ae a a

— po a oe UO ae

oo Ue ; a.

ES os reer me er ee AMEE Kany ee ae

fe : § ta ef reas □ 7S ze -

= a — oS i

a Be ee

on Po

linac: seers ee

re 2 ec ps scoereiceelae

□□ | □ aan ia ernie ra

(ECF No. 122-4, p. 16); (ECF No. 124-1, p. 1). The top image is a wider view of the product. The

lower image displays what LKRB argues is a support tab on the edge of Defendant No. 9’s product.

(ECF No. 144, p. 46). The red circles highlight the location of the alleged support tabs. □□□□

Defendant No. 9 argues that its product does not infringe on the ‘988 Patent because it lacks the

required support tabs. (ECF No. 126, p. 19). Further, at the preliminary injunction hearing,

Defendant No. 9 argued that it did not infringe on the ‘988 Patent because (1) the image at ECF

No. 124-1, p. 16 shows only one support tab (not a plurality of support tabs) and (2) the “stray

pieces of plastic” that appear at the edges of its product are not support tabs. (ECF No. 144, p. 51,

64). In response, Buckley testified that the support tabs “exist[] along the edge of the product at

repeated intervals.” (Ud. at 52).

The Court credits Buckley’s testimony and finds that the images above depict an example

of a support tab on Defendant No. 9’s product as required by the ‘988 Patent. The Court notes that

Defendant No. 9 produced a declaration whereby its director, Jinquan Xiao (“Xiao”), stated that

its product does not feature support tabs. (ECF No. 126-1, p. 2). Xiao did not appear during the

hearing held on January 17, 2025, to testify as to the contents of his declaration. Given that Xiao

was not subject to cross-examination regarding his statements, the Court gives the declaration the

weight it is due —fairly little. The Court holds that LKRB showed a reasonable likelihood of

success on the merits of a literal infringement action against Defendant No. 9.

g. Defendant No. 10

According to LKRB, Defendant No. 10 produces and sells the below-depicted product:

(ECF No. 122-4, p. 17). Defendant No. 10 has not submitted any written advocacy or briefing.

However, counsel for Defendant No. 10 appeared at the preliminary injunction hearing on

__ December 23, 2024, to oppose the preliminary injunction. (See ECF No, 66). During the hearing,

Defendant No. 10 did not present witnesses, but argued that its product is different from the ‘988

Patent because it (1) was a different length from the patented invention, (2) did not feature

contoured strain relief, and (3) did not have support tabs. (/d. at 21,25, 27). Following the hearing,

LKRB filed a supplemental brief addressing Defendant No. 10’s arguments. LKRB included the

following images which, according to LKRB, depict support tabs that have been trimmed off of

Defendant No..10’s product.

es ial sitll iis aie aes □ ie a a i i

oe ae i _ onl Lo □□□

oe oe

CE eee eee a □□ ee

i a aad

(ECF No. 74-1, p. 2). LKRB alleges that the red circles in the images above identify the remainder

of the support tabs. (/d.). The Court found Buckley to be a credible witness. It light of the

-evidence presented, the Court holds that-LKRB presented evidence that Defendant No. 10°s □□□

product included support tabs as required by Claim One of the *988 Patent.

Regarding the plastic housing which provides contoured strain relief, Defendant No. 10

argues that its product does not feature a strain relieving sleeve or housing. (/d. at 27). From the

image LKRB provided above, the Court cannot discern whether Defendant No. 10’s product

features a strain relief device of any kind. The image cuts off the edge of the product preventing

the Court from assessing whether this feature is present. Since the Court cannot determine whether

the product features a strain relief device, there is no literal infringement. Further, since the Court

cannot see the edge of Defendant No. 10’s product, the Court cannot determine whether there is

an equivalent feature. Thus, there is no doctrine of equivalents infringement. Since the Court

cannot determine whether Defendant No. 10’s product features strain relief or an equivalent

element, the Court does not reach the issue of whether Defendant No. 10’s product features support

tabs or can be cut to within the patented length. The Court holds that LKRB’s evidence is

insufficient to show a likelihood of success on the merits in relation to its infringement allegation

against Defendant No. 10.

h. Defendant No. 13

LKRB provided the following images of Defendant No. 13’s product:

(ECF No. 122-4, p. 104).

poo ee I ee PN

a Som 9.

meee ee re eS fo ee

ae Se

ee ee

a Se eee ee

eee dL Lm

ee oe ee 2

peo ee ee 7 Bitar eer ay aaa, □□ ner ee

(ECF No. 124-1, p. 2).

Defendant No. 13 argues that its product does not infringe on the ‘988 Patent because it

lacks the required support tabs. (ECF No. 129, p. 19). Further, at the preliminary injunction

hearing, Defendant No. 13 argued that it did not infringe on the ‘988 Patent because (1) the image

of the product above shows only one support tab (not a plurality of support tabs) and (2) the “stray

pieces of plastic” that appear at the edges of its product are not support tabs. (ECF No. 144, p. 51,

64). In response, Buckley testified that the support tabs “exist[] along the edge of the product at

repeated intervals.” (Ud. at 52).

The Court credits Buckley’s testimony and finds that the images above depict an example

of a support tab on Defendant No. 13’s product as required by the ‘988 Patent. The Court notes

that Defendant No. 13 produced a declaration whereby its director, Shiwei, stated that its product

does not feature support tabs. (ECF No. 129-1, p. 2). Shiwei did not appear during the hearing

held on January 17, 2025, to testify as to the contents of his declaration. Given that Shiwei was

not subject to cross-examination regarding his statements, the Court gives his declaration relatively

little weight. The Court holds that LKRB showed a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits

of a literal infringement action against Defendant No. 13.

i. Defendant Nos. 15, 27, and 87

According to LKRB, Defendant Nos. 15, 27, and 87 manufacture and sell the below-

Defendant No. 15

a a ces tao tapes wea □□□ Re perce omen pale ee a

ENS : esi 2 ORS sets meeps ais eR □□ eal oe Nein □□□ Be a

: is SSR SEDs See OC ORR a RE □□ eNO TS Pe eG ig Pa oe

ES Dee roe eye ee ee a ee oe

EO SS Reine ere ey Pe □□□ □ Se □□ aces A i MARS FS Re SRR ae ee

ee ee ne □□□ ed Does ie pe Oe □□ Si RS Base es Mamma oo Gea fe □□ eee ge

ie po

2. Ul es

oe □□ t—=*‘=WQ

oo ae

eo es

pcs ee OR ee

ec ae ee ee Drs SR SEE SEE

eae eS SENS DO Pe En CON □□□ CASON aa Ss

(ECF No. 122-4, p. 19).

Defendant No. 27

ee OM oe Gag Oo ee Se ae see ee Sk

RN Se SB ee TWOP ee See

eG Sieg OS GES ENE Bat aE he RE RES eo SS BES Ee

Bale IS Eg SE ss RS gece 270 AR SIN Oe RS cee LOR NE ISON □□□ Ge □ ERS VGN eienn Go Gee Saha |

ee EO ee PS Es

SSE ae oe is OS 2 NE ee REN a aN SGU NAR □□□ BAR □□□ ot ON SRNL BUR Sg oe ag lg aN OUR

UP SG arog te OL EUS SD Sl apse SN □□ □ EC ANS □□ Sa ce bs ue Ne pte Bs 8 BRB,

ee a Se IE ec ee Se SOLS Pe SO

a era or ahem □□□ oe SC SE se ne os Seema ee a Bo ee i □□□ hs

a eee EL ge oe ie

(ECF No. 122-4, p. 27).

SPA I Re REG eh So a eS ary » 7 <3

Se ee ca,

Se ee □□ oe a noe: al

Poors Se aie A EE ge ee On ed eee Pag if

ou eee AI Sige Fe A ERS ais ie a ai

ee ee a EB ae a id

BR aaa en

a ye ON ee ; oe

es UR Se SIs Rona ee □□□ eV ee en ao

SO OE □□ i ee ae

OK OR Un ey ets Oe PONE SERVE QRWN UIC OS SURRR ARTES 0 oo aa ae een ce oo

Oe Se ES Oa a sca □□ a EL, ee on. Dae

Se er oe 2 a I

□□□ W Se sor ec STUER PS RC Eg RNIN TANS oa RES GS eo ee er es Stee

rR ee ae Po

SR Re ce a eS ae

Ge More □□□ ee el es ee ee ee

Poe GS SN Pe □□ □

ee Baer Se ge eS Oe SS eae Sos Be ee ee

RN NE BES Sea SS Sond EASON HERS PLO □□ ee ee eee

a oo

CSN BOR SES BI Ey a Te ie Rs Ce Belo a OS □□ eae ee ee

ER OTE, et □□□ ARCESIN Saat GES ae See eS ON □□□ ce SEER Sg ge ls Sepa RS eee

ee Se RS a oe □□ EEN Ts oe PO Oy pie a See □□□

Re a Pe ee a Ge ERT ESE ca SEO eae oe ee

os ee Wee ee eo ee enna ee See

gs eg ON ee □□ ee ee ce □□ hee Fe NN ES oe a ee

is Az she □□□ 2S iE eG Se ae en na poe Geren oe

ey Be ee A emer nee So ae ee RR OS SH ee hae SO RECS ae ee □□

ee oh ee ee 2 Se eee

ene eee Renee een ee ke ee ee eer oe ee pe □□ □

ee se ee)

ee ee ee ee

BRR Se es Mpeg Oe eR ES OR Sa Ronee cates eR Ce eas St gee ee eo □

ee ean Se a eR SRS es ig Sow Sse ear □ ee ee

les, RECS ON Saipan ae

(ECF No. 124-1, p. 5). LKRB alleges that the red circles on the above images show where support

Defendant No. 87

□□ ee pee

Oe eC

eS oo So bee

□ ieee cco ceeteinenaeeneha

(ECF No. 122-4, p. 66).

wins □□□ eS See es a ae ee oe aes a ce a

Po : i ee eee

ee ee

ee. ee

Miao | US

Moeigece geo eee Fe a oe eo

os ee se

Me 2 ee I.

Pee a

Poo □□ ieee

Be Ne ee

ee ee

wi es Se

a eer

(ECF No. 124-1, p. 7). LKRB alleges that the red circles on the above images show where support

tabs were trimmed from the LED light strip.

Defendant Nos. 15, 27, and 87 argue that their products do not infringe on the ‘988 Patent

because they lack the required support tabs. (ECF No. 130, p. 19). Further, at the preliminary

injunction hearing, these Defendants argued that they did not infringe on the ‘988 Patent because

(1) the image of the products shows only one support tab (not a plurality of support tabs) and (2)

the “stray pieces of plastic” that appear at the edges of the products are not support tabs. (ECF

No. 144, p. 51, 64). In response, Buckley testified that the support tabs “exist[| along the edge of

the product at repeated intervals.” (/d. at 52).

The Court finds that LKRB did not produce any evidence that Defendant No. 15’s product

featured support tabs. The Court cannot discern from the images provided whether Defendant No.

15’s product feature support tabs or the equivalents thereof. Since LKRB has not presented

evidence showing that Defendant No. 15’s product infringes on the ‘988 Patent, either literally or

under the doctrine of equivalence, the Court holds that LKRB has not demonstrated a reasonable

likelihood of success on the merits of an infringement action against Defendant No. 15.

In relation to Defendant Nos. 27 and 87, the Court credits Buckley’s testimony and finds

that the images above depict an example of a support tab on Defendant Nos. 27 and 87’s products

as required by the ‘988 Patent. The Court notes that Defendant Nos. 27 and 87 produced a

declaration whereby their director, Jiamiao Chen (“Chen”), stated that their products do not feature

support tabs. (ECF No. 130-1, p. 2). Chen did not appear during the hearing held on January 17,

2025, to testify as to the contents of his declaration. Given that Chen was not subject to cross-

examination regarding his statements, the Court gives his declaration relatively little weight. The

Court holds that LKRB showed a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of a literal

infringement action against Defendant Nos. 27 and 87.

j. Defendant Nos. 25 and 26

According to LKRB, Defendant Nos. 25 and 26 manufacture and sell the below-depicted

products:

Defendant No. 25

(ECF-No, 122-4, p.25). ------ - +>

a EN ie ee eee ee CE RESP eer FENG EN creek □□

a ee Need

a ee

ee ee ee ee

o_o ee

en a ‘3 a +7 a

a a ee —— ao

rr ae ee ea

eo bad Tain: See

hee aoe as eee ae Loe a i Fake

a af .

Bigg ee ee ee ee ue Se

OO Bee eee ee

SE a RS □□ Ses ak og a oe eee ee ee

ee ee

SSE os AEs SEES OE eee ee ees □□ ere Se ence □□□

fe ee Oe: ee a □ ee

age ee Bene Roe ee Rc en a

ECF No. 124-1, p. 3). LKRB alleges that the red circles on the above images show where support

tabs were trimmed from the LED light strip.

Defendant No. 26

pe RS SCS eS po meen] H oe oe

Ge gg SR i ee ere ae ST

Ze ee i og 7 i ec le wy ri □ ay

Peer ae ee nt er

ood at. | ene oe

i a eer oe

(ECF No. 122-4, p. 26).

ae □ ; Pee a ae a urn Sanco Coa ON en □□

□ Fe NONE a Ce eR es ee □□

ae Oy a earn. STC am □□□ See gr eS SE SERRE I BEE SO ee i ra Arcee eNOS

ili: eee Sams gern a

Ee oe ee "ae tae Cape arty Veen ce a AO ate Soe ee a Ce □□

«= Re Feces

an ooo ee ee ce tees Co □□□

Ete. ET RM i SE EE Fe OE Ee OEE ce, CMs es geen vee RE Ree □□

ees es a5 ge ee ee ee ee □

ed i . ee eri

- Ba ee fe □□

po a nn

ee TM ae SS ee eee Be Go ee

Ns CL

PNY oe a

Bs Ee ee ee oo ee

(Id. at 4). LKRB alleges that the red circles on the above images show where support tabs were

trimmed from the LED light strip.

Defendant Nos. 25 and 26 argue that their products do not infringe on the ‘988 Patent

because they lack the required support tabs. (ECF No. 131, p. 19). Further, at the preliminary

injunction hearing, the listed Defendants argued that they did not infringe on the ‘988 Patent

because (1) the images of the products show only one support tab (not a plurality of support tabs)

and (2) the “stray pieces of plastic” that appear at the edges of the product are not support tabs.

(ECF No. 144, p. 51, 64). In response, Buckley testified that the support tabs “exist[] along the

edge of the product at repeated intervals.” (/d. at 52).

The Court credits Buckley’s testimony and finds that the images above depict an example

of a support tab on Defendant Nos. 25 and 26 as required by the ‘988 Patent. The Court holds that

LKRB showed a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of a literal infringement action

against Defendant Nos. 25 and 26.

k. Defendant Nos. 31 and 33

LKRB alleges that Defendant Nos. 31 and 33 offer to sell the following products:

Defendant No. 31

Tt’ « IN

ao.

(ECF No.-122-4, p.-73).-

Defendant No. 33

he Ee Be oie Re re

poe eee gees ee eee en

eS TRE Ve Ee ee ei a AS Us eg ea era

oe Pega oon Boca ane SiR enema oes □□□ Laiae minora ecie Rae age See pearae mene ses

(ECF No. 122-4, p. 28)

□□ ee gee os

Pn SS ee Pe ee □□ ee

eee ae eh ee rr ee ee ee

ee ee Pe Gr kent oS ee

ep Oe

Ree a ee □□ ee oe

(ECF No. 124-1, p. 6).

Defendant Nos. 31 and 33 argue that their products do not infringe on the “988 Patent

because they lack the required support tabs. (ECF No. 130, p. 19). Further, at the preliminary

injunction hearing, the listed Defendants argued that they did not infringe on the *988 Patent

because (1) the images of the products above show only one support tab (not a plurality of support

tabs) and (2) the “stray pieces of plastic” that appear at the edges of the products are not support

tabs. (ECF No. 144, p. 51, 64). In response, Buckley testified that the support tabs “exist[] alon

the edge of the product at repeated intervals.” (Ud. at 52).

The Court finds that LKRB did not produce any evidence that Defendant No. 31’s product

featured support tabs. The Court cannot discern from the images provided whether Defendant No.

31’s product featured support tabs or the equivalents thereof. Since LKRB has not presented

evidence showing that Defendant No. 31’s product infringes on the ‘988 Patent, either literally or

under the doctrine of equivalents, the Court holds that LKRB has not demonstrated a reasonable

likelihood of success on the merits of an infringement action against Defendant No. 31.

The Court credits Buckley’s testimony and finds that the images above depict an example

of a support tab on Defendant No. 33’s product as required by the ‘988 Patent. The Court holds

that LKRB showed a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of a literal infringement action

against Defendant No. 33.

iii. Validity of the Patent

Since the Court held that LKRB has shown a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits

by Defendant Nos. 9, 13, 25-27, 33, and 87, the Court must proceed to the next step of the analysis

analyzing the validity of the patent. Defendants contend that the patent is invalid for obviousness

under 35 U.S.C. § 103. (See ECF Nos. 83, 126, 129, 130, 131, 132). Issued patents are entitled

to a presumption of validity. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a). Thus, if Defendants raise a “substantial question”

that the patent is invalid, the Court may not grant LKRB a preliminary injunction. Amazon.com,

Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also Erico Int’l

Corp. v. Vutec Corp., 516 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating that “a showing ofa substantial

question of invalidity requires less proof than the clear and convincing standard to show actual

invalidity” imposed at trial).

35 U.S.C. § 103 states:

A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the

claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the

differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed

invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of

the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill-in the art-to which the. □□□□

claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in

which the invention was made.

35 U.S.C. § 103. Whether a patent is invalid as obvious “is a question of law, based on the

underlying factual findings.” K/S Himpp v. Hear-Wear Techs., LLC, 751 F.3d 1362, 1364 (Fed.

Cir. 2014). The obviousness determination is centered on four factual inquiries, known as the

Graham factors: “(1) the scope and content of prior art, (2) differences between claims and prior

art, (3) the level of ordinary skill in pertinent art, and (4) secondary considerations such as

commercial success and satisfaction of a long-felt need.” LKQ Corp. v. GM Glob. Tech.

Operations LLC, 102 F.4th 1280, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2024); see also KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,

550 U.S. 398, 399 (2007); Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). The

Federal Circuit has explained that:

Obviousness requires more than a mere showing that the prior art includes separate

references covering each separate limitation in a claim under examination. Rather,

obviousness requires the additional showing that a person of ordinary skill at the

time of the invention would have selected and combined those prior art elements in

the normal course of research and development to yield the claimed invention.

Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 655 F.3d 1352, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (internal citations

omitted). The obviousness analysis should not be conducted in a “narrow, rigid manner,” but

instead should focus on whether a claimed invention is merely “the result of ordinary innovation”

which is not entitled to patent protection. KSR Int’L, 550 U.S. at 427-28. The analysis is

“expansive and flexible” and “need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject

matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps

that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” Jd. at 415. The prior art references must

not be analyzed in isolation, but with consideration of their “interrelated teachings.” Jd. at 418.

A person of ordinary skill in the art is attributed with knowledge of relevant prior art.

Rothman v.-Target-Corp.,556 F.3d 1310, 1318 (Fed-Cir. 2009). As-the Supreme Court explained. □

in KSR Int'l Co., a patent claiming the “combination of elements of prior art” is likely invalid as

obvious if a person of ordinary skill in the art could “implement a predictable variation” of those

elements. KSR Int'l Co., 550 U.S. at 417. Such a combination is proved obvious if “there existed

at the time of invention a known problem for which there was an obvious solution encompassed

by the patent’s claims.” Id. at 419-20.

When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a

finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has

good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this

leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of

ordinary skill and common sense. In that instance the fact that a combination [is]

obvious to try might show that it was obvious under § 103.

Id. at 421.

Defendant Nos. 9, 13, 25-27, 33, and 87 argue that the following patents and patent

application publications constitute prior art to the ‘988 Patent: (1) U.S. Patent No. 7,140,751 (“Lin

I”), (2) Patent Application Publication No. 2003/0193802 (“Lin II”), and (3) Patent Application

Publication No. 2009/0154182 (“Veenstra’”). (ECF No. 126, pp. 5-12); (ECF No. 129, pp. 5-12);

(ECF No. 130, pp. 5-12); (ECF No. 131, pp. 5-12); (ECF No. 132, pp. 5-12). In view of the above-

mentioned prior arts, Defendant Nos. 9, 13, 25-27, 33, and 87 argue that Claim One of the “988

Patent is “very likely invalid as anticipated and/or being obvious over these prior arts.” (ECF No.

126, pp. 20-21); (ECF No. 129, pp. 20-21); (ECF No. 130, pp. 20-21); (ECF No. 131, pp. 20-21);

(ECF No. 132, pp. 20-21).

Even assuming that the ‘988 Patent is solely a combination of elements of prior art, the

Court holds that all listed Defendants did not raise a substantial question as to the validity of the

patent at this stage of the litigation. The listed Defendants did not define who “a person of ordinary

skill in the art” is under this analysis. Since the parties have not provided the Court with a workable

definition, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the Court to perform the proper analysis. The Court

cannot create this definition without guidance from either party. See e.g. Dey, L.P. v. Teva

Parenteral Medicines, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 651, 675 (N.D.W. Va. 2014) (stating that the parties

agreed that a person of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of the action “would have either an

advanced degree in pharmacy or a graduate degree in pharmaceutics, along with several years of

experience with pharmaceutical formulations”). Further, determining who is a person of ordinary

skill in the art is a factual question that the Court cannot decide with no evidentiary record. Given

that Defendants bear the burden of raising a substantial question as to the validity of the ‘988

Patent, their failure to provide the necessary definition results, at least at this stage of the litigation,

in the failure of their argument. Without a workable definition, the Court cannot assess the third

Graham factor — the level of ordinary skill in pertinent art.

Defendants also did not provide the Court with any evidence or argument as to the fourth

Graham factor — “secondary considerations such as commercial success and satisfaction of a long-

felt need.” In sum, because the Court does not have sufficient evidence to assess whether “a person

of ordinary skill at the time of the invention would have selected and combined those prior art

elements in the normal course of research and development to yield the claimed invention,”

Unigene Labs., 655 F.3d at 1360-61, the Court holds that Defendants did not raise a substantial

question regarding the validity of the patent.

b. Irreparable Harm

There is no presumption of irreparable harm upon a finding of patent infringement. Robert

Bosch LLC y. Pylon Mfr. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1148 (Fed. Cir. 2011). To meet the requirements

for irreparable harm, LKRB must establish (1) “that absent an injunction, it will suffer irreparable

harm” and (2) “that a sufficiently strong causal nexus relates the alleged harm to the alleged

... infringement.” Apple Inc.-v--Samsung-Electronics Co.,; 695 -F:3d-1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2012)

(“Apple IP’) (internal citations omitted). In doing so, it must also clearly show “a likelihood of

substantial and immediate irreparable injury.” Jd. For the casual nexus prong, the Court must

determine to “what extent the harm resulting from selling the accused product can be ascribed to

the infringement.” Apple II, 695 F.3d at 1375. “The causal nexus requirement ensures that an

injunction is only entered against a defendant on account of a harm resulting from the defendant’s

wrongful conduct, not some other reason.” Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 809 F.3d 633,

640 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (‘Apple IP’).

Buckley stated that LKRB has suffered, and, if Defendants are permitted to continue to sell

their infringing product, will suffer

(1) the loss of the exclusivity to which [LKRB] is entitled for the inventions claimed

in the [Utility] Patent, (2) the market share which [LKRB] may never be able to

recover, (3) the goodwill and reputation in the market for the inventions already

sold and still being sold without authorization, and (4) the diminished sales due to

Defendant[s]’s false marketing.

(ECF No. 5-1, p. 7); See, e.g., Reebok Int'l, Ltd. v. J. Baker, Inc., 32 F.3d 1552, 1557 (Fed. Cir.

1994) (recognizing that “future infringement... may have market effects never fully compensable

in money”). Buckley further asserted that “Defendants’ inclusion of the inventive features of the

[‘988] Patent is the predominant, if not exclusive, reason for the demand for Defendants’ Products

because those features are desired by the consuming public (and explicitly advertised by

Defendants).” (d.).

The Court credits Buckley’s statements and finds, at this stage of the litigation, that

Defendant Nos. 9, 13, 25-27, 33, and 87 actions of selling and offering to sell infringing products

is causing irreparable harm to LKRB’s market share, goodwill and reputation, pricing power, and

sales. See e.g, Medicine Shoppe Intern., Inc. v. S.B.S. Pill Dr., Inc., 336 F.3d 801, 805 (8th Cir.

(Loss--of intangible assets. such as-reputation and goodwill-can constitute irreparable □

injury.”); Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson—Merck Consumer Pharms. Co.,

290 F.3d 578, 595-96 (3d Cir. 2002) (affirming the district court’s grant ofa preliminary injunction

and concluding that loss of market share constitutes irreparable harm); Malibu Boats, LLC v.

Nautique Boat Co., 997 F. Supp. 2d 866, 885 (E.D. Tenn. 2014) (“Price erosion, loss of goodwill,

damage to goodwill, damage to reputation, and loss of business opportunities are all valid grounds

for finding irreparable harm.”); Robert Bosch, 659 F.3d at 1149 (stating that courts should not

“entirely ignore the fundamental nature of patent as property rights granting the owner the right to

exclude”). Buckley obtained the ownership interest of the ‘988 Patent on behalf of his business,

LKRB, in 2021. Since acquiring the ‘988 Patent, he “has been revitalizing Plaintiffs business by

pivoting from bike lights to the larger category of LED light strips by selling HGP LED Strips

(i.e., encapsulated flexible LED light strips which embody claims of the Asserted Patent) under

the brand name Happy Grandpa.” (ECF No. 3, p. 5). LKRB has invested significant time, capital

and other resources to promote and sell its patented product. Absent an injunction, Defendants can

continue to ride LKRB’s coattails while simultaneously undermining LKRB’s efforts at quality

control and product marketing.

If LKRB is unable to prevent infringers from selling its product, LKRB may never be able

to obtain any market share or fully appreciate the exclusivity that it is entitled to by virtue of the

‘988 Patent. Further, irreparable harm is likely to be present in situations involving direct

competitors where there is “loss in market share and access to potential customers resulting from

[the infringing party’s] introduction of infringing [products.]” Robert Bosch, 659 F.3d at 1151.

See also, e.g., TEK Global, S.R.L. y. Sealant Sys. Int’l, Inc., 920 F.3d 777, 793 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

(“Head-to-head competition and lost market share tend to evidence irreparable harm.”). From the

-.......evidence introduced, it appears-that LKRB and Defendant Nos. 9, 13, 25-27, 33,and 87-are direct. ---

competitors in the lighting industry. The continuing nature of such harm, especially when the

infringing acts may “significantly change the relevant market,” can make monetary damages

“difficult to quantify.” i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 862 (Fed. Cir. 2010);

Hybritech, 849 F.2d at 1457 (“If monetary relief were the sole relief afforded by the patent statute

then injunctions would be unnecessary and infringers could become compulsory licensees for as

long as the litigation lasts.” (internal citations omitted)). Finally, the Court acknowledges that a

monetary judgment may be difficult for LKRB to collect since Defendant Nos. 9, 13, 25-27, 33,

and 87 are foreign entities. The Court holds that LKRB sufficiently demonstrated that it will likely

suffer irreparable harm if a preliminary injunction is not issued against Defendant Nos. 9, 13, 25-

27, 33, and 87.

c. Harm to the Opposing Party

The third equitable factor “assesses the relative effect of granting or denying an injunction

on the parties.” i4i Ltd., 598 F.3d at 862. A court may consider several factors in its analysis,

including “the parties’ sizes, products, and revenue sources.” Jd. A court should not, however,

give much weight to the harmful effects an injunction would have on a party who based their

business on an infringing product. See Merial Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd., 681 F.3d 1283, 1306 (Fed. Cir.

2012) (“As we have noted, ‘[o]ne who elects to build a business on a product found to infringe

cannot be heard to complain if an injunction against continuing infringement destroys the business

so elected.’” (quoting Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc, 543 F.3d 683, 704 (Fed. Cir. 2008))).

The Court does not have significant record evidence detailing the parties’ relative sizes,

products, or revenue sources. On the one hand, LKRB has suffered irreparable harm to its business

due to Defendant Nos. 9, 13, 25-27, 33, and 87’s infringement. The harm will be ongoing absent

injunction: On the otherhand, Defendants -will undoubtedly suffer from a permanent injunction;--.---~-

losing sales and market share. But there is no evidence Defendants have expended significant

resources in developing, designing, making or advertising their products.

The harm to LKRB if Defendants are permitted to continue their allegedly infringing

actions outweighs the harm to Defendant Nos. 9, 13, 25-27, 33, and 87 that will be caused by the

preliminary injunction. As discussed above, if Defendants are permitted to continue selling

allegedly infringing products, LKRB will suffer further erosion of goodwill and reputation,

diminished sales, and loss of exclusivity, pricing power, and market share. Defendants, on the

other hand, will be called upon to do no more than refrain from infringing on LKRB’s patent — an

action they have no right to take and an alleged violation of United States patent law. This factor

weighs in favor of granting the preliminary injunction.

d. Public Interest

The final factor the Court must consider is whether granting the injunction would serve the

public interest. Roper Corp. v. Litton Systems, Inc., 757 F.2d 1266, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1985). There

is a well-established public interest in “enforcing patents that are likely valid and infringed.”

Abbott Labs. y. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 452 F.3d 1331, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also Apple Inc. v.

Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., 735 F.3d 1352, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (recognizing a public interest

in patent enforcement). “However, the public’s interest in enforcing patent rights must also be

weighed with other aspects of the public interest.” Jd. at 1372. The public also has an interest in

legitimate competition and product choice. See Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1362—

63 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

Patent law “must be interpreted in the light of the [C]onstitution and of its purpose declared

_... -by-the Supreme Court,-to reward individual and-not group-achievement.” Potts v. Coe, 140-F.2d --~

470, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1944). Patents exist “to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by

securing for limited time to authors and inventors the exclusive rights to their respective writings

and discoveries.” U.S. Consr., Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 8. “The public policy of promoting the progress

of the useful arts is achieved by granting a limited monopoly to an inventor who fully discloses

his invention to the public in a United States Patent,” Congoleum Industries, Inc. v. Armstrong

Cork Co., 366 F. Supp. 220, 227 (E.D. Pa. 1973), and “the economic philosophy behind the

Constitution[al provision] is the conviction (of our Founders) that encouragement of individual

effort by personal gain, . . . is the best way to advance the public welfare,” Mazer v. Stein, 347

U.S. 201, 219 (1954). “In order to effectuate that end, Congress granted valuable, enforceable

rights to. . . [inventors]... without burdensome requirements.” Washingtonian Publishing Co. v.

Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939). Among these rights is the right to sue for infringement.

In short, while the public does have an interest in open competition, there is a strong public

interest in enforcing patent rights. Patents would be of little value if Defendant Nos. 9, 13, 25-27,

33, and 87 could not be prevented from selling infringing products. To encourage innovation,

inventors must be permitted to protect their invention from copycat infringers. Thus, the public

interest weighs in favor of granting the preliminary injunction against Defendant Nos. 9, 13, 25-

27, 33, and 87.”

* The parties addressed the amount of assets frozen as a result of the Court’s TRO, raising concern

that the amount frozen was disproportionate to amounts earned by Defendants relating to their

sales of the allegedly infringing products. While the Court has the authority to restrain assets that

have a close nexus with its exercise of equitable powers, see Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A.

y. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999), it cannot do so solely for the purpose of

preserving assets upon which a plaintiff may execute in the future if it should prevail. Rather, the

close nexus has to be intertwined with the specific exercise of equitable jurisdiction undertaken

with respect to the claims at issue in the case. See id. The Court holds that the blanket asset freeze

currently in place goes further-than permitted and beyond the close nexus required. Therefore, the. □□□□□

Court holds that all funds allegedly arising from the sale of the allegedly infringing products shall

be frozen—but no more. The record strongly suggests that the amounts frozen significantly exceed

permissible amounts relating to the allegedly infringing products but are insufficient at this point

to allow the Court to state with reasonable precision the amounts that so relate. Accordingly, the

B. Count II: False Marketing .

At Count II of the complaint, LKRB alleges that Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)

(the Lanham Act) by marketing Defendants’ products through unfair, deceptive, and fraudulent

means through online marketplaces. (ECF No. 3, p. 20). Specifically, LKRB alleges that

Defendants “made, and continue to make, false and/or misleading descriptions of fact and/or false

and/or misleading representations of fact about the nature, characteristics, and/or qualities of

Defendants’ Products.” (/d.). LKRB alleges that Defendants’ actions harm LKRB by:

(1) depriving Plaintiff of its right to fairly compete for space within the various

Online Marketplaces’ search results and reducing the visibility of Plaintiff's LED

strips in the various Online Marketplaces;

(2) diluting and eroding the retail market price for [HGP] LED Strips;

(3) causing overall degradation of the value of goodwill associated with Plaintiff 's

[HGP] LED Strips and any LED strips embodying the claims of the Asserted Patent

generally; and

(4) increasing Plaintiffs overall cost to market its goods and educate consumers

about Plaintiff's [HGP] LED Strips.

(Id.). For the foregoing reasons, the Court holds that LKRB did not demonstrate a reasonable

likelihood of success on the merits of its false marketing claim. The Court will deny LKRB’s

request for a preliminary injunction in relation to Count II.

a. Reasonable Likelihood of Success on the Merits

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) provides that:

(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any

container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device,

- Court will order-the parties to meet-and confer to address whether they can.reach.a stipulated... □□

amount to be frozen. The frozen assets can be paid into either the local Court Registry or held in

Defendants’ counsels’ IOLTA accounts pending the conclusion of this litigation. To the extent

the parties are unable to reach a stipulation as to the amount to be frozen within fourteen days, the

Court will schedule an evidentiary hearing.

or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading

description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which—

(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the

affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to

the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial

activities by another person, or

(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,

characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's

goods, services, or commercial activities,

shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is

likely to be damaged by such act.

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). To establish a Lanham Act claim based on a false or misleading

representation of a product, a plaintiff must show:

(1) that the defendant has made false or misleading statements as to his own product

[or another’ s];

(2) that there is actual deception or at least a tendency to deceive a substantial

portion of the intended audience;

(3) that the deception is material in that it is likely to influence purchasing □

decisions;

(4) that the advertised goods traveled in interstate commerce; and

(5) that there is a likelihood of injury to the plaintiff in terms of declining sales, loss

of good will, etc.

Johnson & Johnson—Merck Consumer Pharmaceuticals Co. vy. Rhone—Poulenc Rorer

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 19 F.3d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue

Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914, 922-23 (3d Cir. 1990)).

LKRB alleges generally that Defendants engaged in false marketing by stating that

Defendants’. products. “have an. Ingress Protection rating, are suitable for ‘outdoor. use’ □□□□□□ □□□

‘waterproof,’ are of a certain length, have UL and FCC certifications, and/or have an LED count

per meter... .” (ECF No. 3, p. 11). LKRB alleges that “some or all [of these statements] are

probably false when customers receive Defendants’ Products.” (/d.). LKRB further alleges that

Defendants engaged in false marketing by (1) marketing LED light strips with safety issues

including products that melt or catch on fire; (2) using misleading images which, in part, depict

products that are not the products actually distributed to customers; (3) using false, artificial,

compensated, misleading, or manipulated product reviews on online marketplaces; and (4) using

false statements as to the origins of Defendants’ products. Ud. at 11-12).

LKRB presented its false marketing count Sal Tascoheetianlaend annonce □□

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through Amazon online marketplace reviews. For 22.08 Suche enmermoeenns ome

example, LKRB provided the product review depicted □□□ □□

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No. 68. The review states: “This strip can only be one Bae oe Be man

solid color at a time. I hate how the advertisement — «sensory moresntien

shows multiple colors on the strip at a time which a 8€=§=—s ea □□□

A3MY6PONO598NB (American Lamp Factory)

sometimes can be misleading. There 18 also no "This strip can only be one solid color at a time. | hate how the advertisement show

muitiple colors on the strip at a time which sometimes can be misleading. There is □

. . no protective rubber in front of the LEDs and they are exposed, Definitely not

protective rubber in front of the LEDs and they are waterproof

URL:

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exposed. Definitely not waterproof.” (ECF No. 122- Me eHRIRCIONL XOBINE □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□

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2, p. 146). 2024-14-13 48:20:46 PM GMT -07:00

LKRB cited the product review depicted to the right on in □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□

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Defendant No. 17’s online marketplace to prove that Defendant oe eee ee □□

No. 17 engaged in false marketing. That product review states: a gt □ □□

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listing (ECF No 122-4 61) 3 A24WTBFANSY6F7 (Ledagic US)

° ° P. , Product is totally different than what is displayed in product listing.

The Court acknowledges that the United States Court of znszr=swonsntonnsvi

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Appeals for the Third Circuit has recognized that “[a]ffidavits and OPK 1880-4 P GMT Fog

other hearsay materials are often received in preliminary injunction proceedings.” Kos Pharma,

369 F.3d at 718. The Court may exercise its discretion in “weighing all attendant factors, including

the need for expedition, to assess whether, and to what extent, affidavits or other hearsay materials

are appropriate given the character and objectives of the injunctive proceeding.” Jd. at 719

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Accordingly, at the preliminary injunction stage,

a court may rely on hearsay evidence that would not be admissible at trial.

Nevertheless, the Court holds that LKRB did not present evidence sufficient to prove a

reasonable likelihood of success on the merits relative to its false marketing claim. The reviews

presented at ECF No. 122-2 did not come in the form of a sworn affidavit, nor did customers testify

regarding their experience with LKRB or Defendants’ products. Instead, all of LKRB’s evidence

pertaining to false marketing stems from Amazon online marketplace reviews. It is unclear how

Amazon online marketplace reviews could be presented at trial in an admissible format. Further,

LKRB selected reviews that support its position — generally negative reviews — out of numerous

3 This analysis presents merely a sample of the reviews LKRB submitted for the Court’s

ysis p y P

consideration. According to LKRB, the exhibit located at ECF No. 122-2 shows “Screenshots of

Defendants’ products indicating false marketing.” (ECF No. 122, p. 1). These exhibits make up

the majority, if not all, of LKRB’s evidence against Defendants as it pertains to false marketing.

product reviews on each Defendants’ online marketplace (including positive reviews). While the

Court does not blame LKRB for presenting reviews that support its position, the Court does not

view cherry-picking negative reviews and presenting solely those reviews as a sufficient method

of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of a false marketing claim.

While the Court may consider hearsay in determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction,

in these specific circumstances, the Court holds that it would be improper to grant a preliminary

injunction based solely on hearsay evidence. Given the evidence presented, the Court holds that

LKRB did not meet its burden to show a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of its false

marketing claim. The Court will deny LKRB’s request for a preliminary injunction based on Count

II (false marketing) as to all Defendants that are the subject of this opinion.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, the Court will grant the requested preliminary injunction

as to Defendant Nos. 9, 13, 25-27, 33, and 87. The Court will deny the request for a preliminary

injunction as to Defendant Nos. 10, 15, 23, 31, 34, 36, 39, 41, 45, 49, 63, 70, 76, 77, 84, 88, and

92-94.

BY THE COURT:

DUA « Wet

WILLIAM S.STICKMANIV

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

2 livizezs

Dated

Schedule "A"

Defendants with Business Name, Seller ID (ASIN), and Seller Name

[9 | NINGBO GOLDY INTERNATIONAL TRADECO.LTD | A29DSJAUPIYACR [CZCAUTO

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