Villavicencio v. City of Columbus

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

JOSE VILLAVICENCIO,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 2:25-cv-134

Judge Michael H. Watson

Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura

CITY OF COLUMBUS, et al.,

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Jose Villavicencio, an Ohio resident proceeding without the assistance of

counsel, has submitted a request to file a civil action in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1.) The Court

GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis. All judicial officers who render

services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

This matter is also before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF

No. 1-1) as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to identify cognizable claims and to recommend

dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having performed the initial screen, for the

reasons below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS this action under

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In

doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are

assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e) as part of the

statute:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—

* * *

(B) the action or appeal—

(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or]

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte

dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or

upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the basic

federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also Hill v.

Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule

8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual

demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,

727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, a pleading

that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”

is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). A complaint will not

“suffice if it tenders naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (cleaned up).

Instead, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (cleaned up). Facial

plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The

plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the

strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504

(citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 374 F. App’x 612,

614 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient

treatment, however, has limits; “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim

asserted.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v.

Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s claims arise from his dissatisfaction with proceedings initiated against him by

the City of Columbus in the Environmental Division of the Franklin County Municipal Court.

(Compl., ECF No. 1-1.) Although the Complaint caption names both the City of Columbus and

the Franklin County Environmental Court as Defendants, Plaintiff’s allegations refer to only a

singular “defendant,” and it is clear from context that references to the “defendant” are

references to the City. Plaintiff alleges that the City denied Plaintiff the usual procedure for

addressing violations of housing code at properties owned by LLCs Plaintiff controlled.

Specifically, the City hired inspectors who violated department procedures and repeatedly

changed the inspectors assigned to Plaintiff’s properties. Plaintiff also alleges that the City failed

to give proper notice of a court status conference, improperly requested Plaintiff’s properties be

put in receivership, and improperly requested that Plaintiff be disqualified from participating in

the court deliberation that resulted in the sale of the properties. (Compl. 3, ECF No. 1-1.)

The undersigned construes Plaintiff’s Complaint to advance claims under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for violating his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights. Plaintiff seeks

damages and injunctive relief.

Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed in its entirety. First, Plaintiff makes no

allegations against the Franklin County Environmental Court. Plaintiff has therefore failed to

provide the necessary “factual enhancement” to support any claim against the Environmental

Court. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Any such claim must therefore be dismissed.

As to the City of Columbus, “a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an

injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s

policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under

§ 1983.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Nichols v. Wayne Cty. Mich.,

822 F. App’x 445, 448 (6th Cir. 2020) (“To state a municipal-liability claim under § 1983, the

plaintiff must allege the deprivation (1) of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the

United States, (2) that was directly caused by a municipal policy or custom.”) (citing Hardrick v.

City of Detroit, 876 F.3d 238, 243 (6th Cir. 2017)). A plaintiff may prove an unconstitutional

“policy” or “custom” by demonstrating “(1) the existence of an illegal official policy or

legislative enactment; (2) that an official with final decision making authority ratified illegal

actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of

a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations.” Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d

462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir.

2005)).

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts on which the Court could rely to conclude that an

official policy or custom of the City of Columbus resulted in the violation of his constitutional

rights. To the contrary, Plaintiff alleges that the City did not, in his case, abide by its usual policy

of addressing violations of the housing code. (Compl. 3, ECF No. 1-1.) Consequently, Plaintiff’s

claims against the City of Columbus must also be dismissed.

III. DISPOSITION

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED.

It is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint under § 1915(e)(2) for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those

specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with

supporting authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations

to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a District Judge of this Court may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive

further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura

CHELSEY M. VASCURA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE