Bruce v. City of Mansfield, Ohio

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

DOUGLAS BRUCE, ) Case No. 1:23-cv-00373

)

Plaintiff, ) Judge J. Philip Calabrese

)

v. )

)

CITY OF MANSFIELD, OHIO, )

)

Defendant. )

)

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Douglas Bruce owns a parcel of real estate in the City of Mansfield.

He alleges that Defendant, the City of Mansfield, tore down a multi-family home on

his property without notifying him of its code violations or of demolition. By doing

so, Plaintiff complains that Defendant deprived him of property without due process

in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Further, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant levied excessive fines for the demolition in violation of the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments. Defendant moved for summary judgment. For the reasons

that follow, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the Court construes the record

in Plaintiff’s favor as the non-moving party. The record establishes the following

facts.

Plaintiff Douglas Bruce resides in El Paso County, Colorado, and has used a

Colorado post office box to receive mail since August 1986. (ECF No. 20-2,

PageID #179.) In April 2013, Mr. Bruce purchased a parcel of real estate in the City

of Mansfield, Ohio for $10,000. (Id., PageID #181.) A multifamily home sat on the

property. (ECF No. 20-1, PageID #130.) Mr. Bruce never visited the property or

made improvements to it since he bought it as an investment. (ECF No. 20-2, PageID

#186.)

The City claims that it issued five notices to Mr. Bruce between January 24,

2014 and October 19, 2016 regarding several violations of the Mansfield City Codified

Ordinances, including junk accumulation, sidewalk violations, and failure to

maintain the lawn. (ECF No. 20-1, ¶¶ 3–7, PageID #121–22; ECF No. 23,

PageID #205–06.) Three of these notices were addressed to Mr. Bruce’s post office

box in Colorado (ECF No. 20-1, PageID #124–26), while the other two (relating to

maintaining the lawn and removal of accumulated junk) were addressed to

“TENANT” and were allegedly sent to the Mansfield property (id., PageID #127–28).

On April 28, 2017, the City allegedly sent a notice regarding a demolition

inspection of the property scheduled for May 16, 2017 and addressed to Mr. Bruce at

his post office box in Colorado. (Id., PageID #129.) On June 15, 2017, the City

allegedly sent Mr. Bruce an order of demolition, which stated that the Mansfield

property was deemed to be unsafe and, therefore, declared a nuisance following an

inspection under Mansfield’s ordinances. (Id., PageID #130.) This notice advised

Mr. Bruce that he could appeal the order within 10 days, and the City allegedly sent

an appeal form the same day. (Id., PageID #130–31.) Two other notifications with

the same date and sent to the same addressee provided a waiver of demolition and

notice to remove personal property from the property before its demolition. (Id.,

PageID #132–34.) According to the affidavit of the City’s demolition coordinator,

these documents were sent by certified mail. (Id., ¶¶ 9 & 11, PageID #122.) The City

claims that the Richland County Land Reutilization Corporation, also known as the

County Land Bank, also sent the demolition notice and the notices that followed

through the U.S. Postal Service. (Id., ¶ 14, PageID #122.) A tracking receipt from

the U.S. Postal Service shows delivery on June 29, 2017. (Id., PageID #134.)

The City claims it posted the notice of demolition on the front door of the

property and published it in the local newspaper. (Id., ¶¶ 11 & 16, PageID #122–23.)

Further, the City claims that the County Land Bank performed a title search and

verified any liens on the property. (Id., ¶ 16, PageID #122–23.) On November 6,

2017, the City claims it sent Mr. Bruce a notice regarding the boarding up of his

property’s windows and doors. (Id., ¶ 17, PageID #123.)

It is undisputed that Mr. Bruce did not respond to any of these notices. In his

complaint, Mr. Bruce alleges that the City demolished the building on his property

“[w]ithout proper notice of any type or kind,” including notice of “any maintenance

issues or other possible bases for the demolition, and/or proper notice of the issuance

of fines or orders in connection with the same.” (ECF No. 1, ¶ 9, PageID # 2.) In

response to the City’s evidence on summary judgment, Plaintiff argues that, while

“[t]hese exhibits appear to be copies of letters maintained in Mansfield’s files, . . .

there is no evidence that these documents were actually sent to or received by

Mr. Bruce.” (ECF No. 23, PageID #206.) In this way, Plaintiff argues that he never

received actual notice or personal service of the City’s intention to demolish the

building on his property.

On October 2, 2018, the City passed an ordinance declaring the property

“insecure, unsafe, structurally defective and dangerous to life and other property by

reason of its hazardous and unsound condition, unsound and unsafe walls, floors,

foundation and ceilings, and by reason of want of repair, age and dilapidation.” (ECF

No. 20-1, PageID #141.) The City found the property “beyond repair” and a

“nuisance.” (Id.) On summary judgment, Plaintiff does not dispute the condition of

the property.

Between May 29, 2018 and September 6, 2019, the City claims it sent notices

to utility companies regarding demolition and verification of utility disconnections,

indicating that the Mansfield City Council had approved the demolition. (Id., ¶ 18,

PageID #123.) The County Land Bank prepared a demolition bid, which showed an

estimated abatement for the project of $76,000. (Id., ¶ 20, PageID #123.) In April

2016, the gas line to the property was abandoned. (Id.) In October 2019, surveyors

took photographs of the property to verify its condition. (Id., ¶ 21, PageID #123 &

#150–64.)

On January 22, 2020, the City started demolition and completed the project by

the end of the month. (Id., ¶ 22, PageID #123.) The City sent a bill to Mr. Bruce at

his Colorado post office box for $74,455 in demolition charges and administrative

costs. (Id., ¶ 23, PageID #123 & #165.) Mr. Bruce does not dispute receiving the bill

but did not pay it. (Id., ¶ 23, PageID #123.) The City claims that, other than a tax

lien in the amount of approximately $1,850, no other fines were assessed against the

property. (ECF No. 20, PageID #103.) The City transferred the property to the

County Lank Bank, which sold it at foreclosure due to the tax delinquency and the

cost of demolition. (ECF No. 20-1, ¶ 24, PageID #123; ECF No. 20, PageID #103.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On February 24, 2023, Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, bringing four

claims: (1) deprivation of property under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,

(2) violation of procedural due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,

(3) violation of substantive due process, and (4) violation of the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 16–48, PageID #4–8.) In his complaint,

Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment as well as actual, punitive, compensatory, and

special damages, along with attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id., ¶¶ 1–3, PageID #8–9.)

Defendant moved for summary judgment. (ECF No. 20.)

Notably, this is not the first time Mr. Bruce has brought such claims and made

similar arguments. He filed suit against other municipalities for the demolition of

property that he owned but never visited. See Bruce v. City of Maple Heights,

No. 1:23-cv-371, 2024 WL 2294779, at *1 (N.D. Ohio May 21, 2024); Bruce v. City of

Cincinnati, No. 1:23-cv-12, 2024 WL 37123, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 3, 2024); Bruce v.

City of Miamisburg, No. 3:21-cv-80, 2023 WL 184010, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 13, 2023),

aff’d, No. 23-3080, 2023 WL 6623194, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 11, 2023).

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). On a motion for summary judgment, the Court

must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

Kirilenko-Ison v. Board of Educ. of Danville Indep. Schs., 974 F.3d 652, 660 (6th Cir.

2020) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986)).

The moving party has the initial burden of establishing that there are no

genuine issues of material fact as to an essential element of the claim or defense at

issue. Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479–80 & n.12 (6th Cir. 1989);

Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 584 F. Supp. 2d 974, 988 (N.D. Ohio 2008). After

discovery, summary judgment is appropriate if the nonmoving party fails to establish

“an element essential to that party’s case and upon which that party will bear the

burden of proof at trial.” Tokmenko v. MetroHealth Sys., 488 F. Supp. 3d 571, 576

(N.D. Ohio 2020) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).

The Court’s function at this stage is not “to weigh the evidence and determine

the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for

trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). “The party seeking

summary judgment has the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its

motion” and identifying the portions of the record “which it believes demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Tokmenko, 488 F. Supp. 3d at 576 (citing

Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322). Then, the nonmoving party must “set forth specific

facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at

250). “When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent

must do more than show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586.

If a genuine dispute exists, meaning that “the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” summary judgment

is not appropriate. Tokmenko, 488 F. Supp 3d at 576 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at

250). However, if “the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative,”

summary judgment for the movant is proper. Id. The “mere existence of some factual

dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion

for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (quoting Anderson,

477 U.S. at 247–48). “Just as a plaintiff may not rely on conclusory allegations to

proceed past the pleading stage, so too a plaintiff may not rely on conclusory evidence

to proceed past the summary-judgment stage.” Viet v. Le, 951 F.3d 818, 823 (6th Cir.

2020) (cleaned up) (citations omitted). “Conclusory Statements unadorned with

supporting facts are insufficient to establish a factual dispute that will defeat

summary judgment.” Id. (quoting Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 560 (6th

Cir. 2009)).

To determine whether a genuine dispute about material facts exists, it is not

the Court’s duty to search the record; instead, the parties must bring those facts to

the Court’s attention. See Betkerur v. Aultman Hosp. Ass’n, 78 F.3d 1079, 1087 (6th

Cir. 1996). Ultimately, the Court must determine “whether the evidence presents a

sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided

that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251.

ANALYSIS

The parties sharply contest the evidentiary record on summary judgment and

whether Mr. Bruce received notice of the City’s declaration of his property as a

nuisance and its intent to demolish it. But the Court need not wade into these

matters because the resolution of Defendant’s motion for summary judgment turns

on one undisputed date: January 30, 2020—the date by which the City completed

demolition of the structure on Mr. Bruce’s property.

Defendant argues that the statute of limitations bars Plaintiff’s claims. (ECF

No. 20, PageID #104–06; ECF No. 24, PageID #234–41.) In response, Plaintiff

invokes the discovery rule, arguing that the statute of limitations has not run or, at

a minimum, a dispute of fact exists regarding when the statute of limitations began.

(ECF No. 23, PageID #209–12.)

Section 1983 itself does not provide a statute of limitations. In such

circumstances, federal courts borrow the applicable limitations period from the most

analogous one available under State law. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249–50

(1989). The City argues that Ohio’s two-year statute of limitations in Section 2305.10

governs (ECF No. 104), and Plaintiff does not argue for another period (ECF No. 23,

PageID #209). Therefore, the Court assumes that a two-year statute of limitations

governs Plaintiff’s claim.

When a cause of action under Section 1983 accrues presents “a question of

federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S.

384, 388 (2007). In Wallace, the Supreme Court recognized “the standard rule that

accrual occurs when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action . . . that

is, when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.” Id. (quoting Bay Area Laundry

& Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., Inc., 522 U.S. 192, 201

(1997)) (cleaned up). Without question, Plaintiff’s causes of action under Section 1983

accrued on January 30, 2020 when the City completed demolition of the structure on

his property. (ECF No. 20-1, ¶ 22, PageID #123.)

Instead of contesting the applicable limitations period, Plaintiff argues that

his claim is timely under the discovery rule. Under federal law, the discovery rule

tolls the statute of limitations until a plaintiff “knows or should have known certain

facts related to their injury.” Snyder-Hill v. Ohio State Univ., 48 F.4th 686, 698 (6th

Cir. 2022). The Supreme Court has determined that the limitations period starts to

run when the plaintiff has a “complete and present cause of action” such that he can

“file suit and obtain relief.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (citations omitted). The Sixth

Circuit employs a somewhat different formulation. See Dibrell v. City of Knoxville,

984 F.3d 1156, 1162 (6th Cir. 2021); see also Reguli v. Russ, 109 F.4th 874, 879 (6th

Cir. 2024) (per curiam). Under the law of this Circuit, the limitations period does not

begin to run until the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should discover the facts giving

rise to his claim. Reguli, 109 F.4th at 879.

“A plaintiff has reason to know of his injury when he should have discovered it

through the exercise of reasonable diligence.” Johnson v. Memphis Light Gas &

Water Div., 777 F.3d 838, 843 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Roberson v. Tennessee, 399

F.3d 792, 794 (6th Cir. 2005)). Specifically, “the clock starts on the ‘discovery of the

injury, not discovery of the other elements of a claim.’” Reguli, 109 F.4th at 883

(quoting Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000)).

Applying these rules here, the Court assesses when Plaintiff knew of or should

have known of his injury. Reguli, 109 F.4th at 879. Even if Plaintiff did not have

actual notice in June 2017 when the City sent notice to Mr. Bruce at his post office

box in Colorado, he should have discovered the facts giving rise to his claim more

than two years before he filed suit on February 24, 2023. It is undisputed that the

City completed demolition of the structure on his property by January 30, 2020. (ECF

No. 20-1, ¶ 22, PageID #123.)

In Plaintiff’s prior lawsuit against the City of Miamisburg, the Southern

District of Ohio granted summary judgment for the defendant. It held that Mr. Bruce

should have known of his property’s demolition within eight months. Miamisburg,

2023 WL 184010, at *4. The court reasoned that, “[f]or an individual with 46 years

of experience in property ownership and who currently owns 50 properties across the

country, it is not reasonable for Bruce to have gone at least eight months without

realizing two of his building [sic] were no longer in existence.” Id. Further, the court

recognized that Mr. Bruce had any number of means to learn of the demolition, from

asking someone “to drive by the property” to having an agent “simply visit the

properties, at which point they would have seen the Final Violation Notices posted

on the front doors.” Id.

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that a “reasonable property

owner—one who made any effort at all to stay apprised of his buildings’ condition . . .

and to ensure that they remained in compliance with the municipal code”—should

have known about the demolition of his properties eight months after they were

demolished. Miamisburg, 2023 WL 6623194, at *1. And this accrual date might be

generous. In Plaintiff’s lawsuit against Maple Heights, another judge in the Northern

District of Ohio reasoned that, because “[d]emolition of a house is open, noisy, and its

effects are plain for the eye to see,” Mr. Bruce was on notice of his claimed injury

“when the demolition occurred.” Maple Heights, 2024 WL 2294779, at *7; see also

Jacks v. City of Youngstown, 2021 WL 3288572, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 2, 2021)

(holding that the limitations period begins to run on the date of demolition). Such an

approach more closely tracks the approach the Supreme Court takes, running the

limitations period from the date an injury becomes complete such that a plaintiff can

file a lawsuit for his injury. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (citations omitted).

Assuming the more generous eight-month window from the Miamisburg case

applies, the accrual date for Plaintiff’s claims is September 30, 2020—meaning he

should have filed suit within two years of that date. Therefore, this suit, filed in

February 2023, comes too late.

Plaintiff fails to identify a specific date on which he claims he discovered his

injury. Yet he bears the burden to “set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine

issue for trial.” Tokmenko, 488 F. Supp. 3d at 576 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250).

Plaintiff claims that the dates on which he knew or reasonably should have known

about his alleged injury or that the City was the alleged cause of that injury are

“factual disputes.” (ECF No. 23, PageID #211.) But he fails to explain how his

lawsuit might be timely even accounting for eight months of tolling from the

completion of demolition—let alone without it. At best, he challenges the statute of

limitations with “[c]onclusory [s]tatements unadorned with supporting facts,” which

are “insufficient to establish a factual dispute that will defeat summary judgment.”

Viet, 951 F.3d at 823 (quoting Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 560 (6th Cir.

2009)). In short, Plaintiff fails to carry his burden to withstand a summary judgment.

Because Plaintiff’s filing of his complaint on February 24, 2023 came well after

the expiration of the limitations period, and because Plaintiff has not demonstrated

timeliness even with the benefit of tolling, the Court holds that all of Plaintiff’s claims

are time-barred. Based on this resolution, the Court need not reach the due-process

considerations under the Fourteenth Amendment or Plaintiff’s arguments under the

Fifth and Eighth Amendments. Therefore, the Court has no occasion to consider

application of other recent Sixth Circuit decisions here. See McIntosh v. City of

Madisonville, No. 24-5383, 2025 WL 2251719, at *2–5 (6th Cir. Jan. 21, 2025); First

Floor Living v. City of Cleveland, 83 F.4th 445 (6th Cir. 2023).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment. (ECF No. 20.)

SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 18, 2025

J Philip Calabrese

United States District Judge

Northern District of Ohio

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